Relativity and relativism: historical and systematic considerations

Abstract

A brief overview of the emergence of the relativistic challenge to the so-called “exact” natural sciences, such as mathematics and physics, is followed by an analysis of the crisis that Husserl experienced in questioning rationalism. Against the background of a systematic distinction between modal laws and type laws, the pervasive influence of modern nominalism is identified as the root cause of the problems of relativism as it opened the way to the so-called Copernican turn in epistemology. The crucial and constant conditions required in every assertion of relativity are highlighted, particularly with regard to the foundational role of logical discernment in   respect of language use and the impossibility of affirming change and relativity outside or independent of a context of constancy, taking into account the philosophical implications of Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity. Against this background, the “(onto-)logic of relativism” is assessed and a brief characterisation is given of the fact that modern humanism has merely reified humanity’s accountable freedom to give shape to underlying (ontic)
principles in various (historically changing) circumstances.