Clausewitz, Mao Zedong en die Anglo-Boereoorlog

Abstract

In the military historiography (as opposed to the social historiography) of the Anglo-Boer War, there is an abundance of reconstructions o f what exactly happened, more or less along the lines of Ranke's ideal. However, there is a paucity of theoretical and analytical studies. In this paper, a theoretical model is constructed on the basis of the military thoughts of the Prussian theoretician Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote extensively about the nature of war as such, and the Chinese leader Mao Zedong, whose writings are essential for the understanding of guerrilla warfare. Clausewitz's thoughts are traced regarding the political nature of war, the correlation between the totality of war and the totality of the war aim, and his embryonic ideas on guerrilla war. Mao's ideas are also analyzed regarding the political nature of war, but are developed especially in the light of his writings about the three stages of guerrilla war, the need for liberated base areas, the fact that gucnillas need to disperse their forces as widely as possible (the relationship between force and space),and the indispensable role of the local population (the "fish in the water" theory). Presently the Anglo-Boer War is measured against this model. The conclusions are that the British and Boer war aims both developed to such a radical extent that only a total victory or defeat was possible, and that essentially this is the explanation for the total character the war developed during its second phase. Mao's theory is also used to explain why the Boer guerrilla campaign remained strategically fruitless. Together, Clausewitz and Mao furnish an explanation not just for what happened, but why it happened that way and what it means.