Kursk and the ten commandments of armoured warfare

Abstract

The Battle of Kursk 60 years ago in what is today the independent republic of the Ukraine was, from the German side, an abomination. Just about every rule of armoured warfare was broken by the attackers. They had by their actions advertised their intention to attack for weeks (although the Russians also got wind of it through their spy system). They made no attempt to hide their preparations, the points they were intending to attack, nor the approximate time it would take place. It was a brutal frontal attack on a heavily and cunningly fortified defence line, with very little attempt to mislead the Russians, to try outflanking manoeuvres, to follow the line of least expectation, to do it all at a time when it would not be expected. The Luftwaffe's command of the air, while still more or less intact, was increasingly disputed by the Russians. And finally, at decisive stages of the battle the German tanks had no infantry to back them up.