The European Union is not a role model for Africa's Nepad

J.J. Steÿn

Abstract

The European Union (EU) started of as a small trading block and evolved into one big region approaching 500 million people. It is planned around the core of Europe that is concentrated between London, Paris, Milan, Munich and Hamburg and builds on its global economic competitiveness

Most African states that were colonised in the nineteenth century became independent between 1957 and 1964. However they are still dependent for capital, imports and finance on the old colonial powers. In most the standard of living as well as its share in world economy decreased in the last forty years. The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963 but largely focussed on political matters. To improve the economic situation and to implement a vision of Africa's renewal, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was formed with the African Union (AU) to govern this process.

On the surface the European Union and NEPAD might look alike in terms of their objectives and principles. However significant differences in handling the effects of globalisation, fragmentation, governance as well as planning constraints will force Africa to develop its own model for development.

DIE EUROPESE UNIE IS NIE 'N ROL MODEL VIR NEPAD IN AFRIKA NIE

Die Europese Unie (EU) wat as 'n klein handelsblok begin het, het ontwikkel tot 'n groot streek wat 500 miljoen mense benader. Dit is beplan rondom die sentrum van Europa wat tussen Londen, Parys, Milaan, München en Hamburg gekonsentreer is en bou op hul globale ekonomiese mededingendheid.

Die meeste Afrika state is in die negentiende eeu gekolonialiseer en het tussen 1957 en 1964 onafhanklik geword. Tog is hul steeds afhanklik van kapitaal, invoere en finansies van die ou koloniale magte. In die meeste van hierdie lande het die lewenstandaard sowel as hul aandeel in die wêreldekonomie die laaste veertig jaar afgeneem. Die Organisasie vir Afrika Unie (OAU) is in 1963 geskep om die ekonomiese situasie te bevorder, maar hul fokus was grootliks op politiese sake. Om weereens die visie van Afrika se hernuwing te implementeer is die Nuwe Vennootskap vir Afrika se Ontwikkeling ("New Partnership for Africa's Development" NEPAD) gevorm met die Afrika Unie (AU) as "bestuurder" van die proses.

Op die oppervlak mag die Europese Unie en NEPAD dieselfde lyk in terme van hulle doelwitte en beginsels. Bestaande beduidende verskille in die hantering van globalisasie, fragmentering, regering, asook die beplanning beperkings sal Afrika dwing om sy eie model te ontwikkel.

1. INTRODUCTION

Both town and regional planning originated in a reformist and utopian tradition but their respective development followed different routes (Klosterman, 1978: 37). Town planning started out as a design orientated profession, but evolved into a more scientific discipline, on the basis of the idea of the rational comprehensive model. However, it soon became apparent that science is not value free, and neither is planning. Regional planning, according to Weaver (1984), accepted right from the beginning that different world views influence the world in which planning operates.

In the previous century, both capitalism and socialism advanced as the best vehicle for reforming the world according to the utopian ideal. The great socialist experiment in Russia failed to deliver utopia; and now the world is left with only one significant paradigm, namely capitalism, to deliver the goods.

Just as Silicon Valley is the role model for innovation with a view to creating jobs (Castells & Hall, 1994), the European Union has become the economic model for a group of smaller countries to become bigger role players in world markets. This paper will deal with the European role model that is being followed for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). However, this adherence to the European model is based on a misguided assumption. The motivating force in this regard is the search for an ethnic identity and a "place in the sun" for different cultural groups. The practical issues impending the achievement of the so called unity that is being pursued in this way will be investigated. These issues include the lack of infrastructure, bad governance and ideological differences.

Prof. Das Steÿn, Head of department, Town and Regional Planning,University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, 9300, South Africa. Tel: 051 4012893, Email: <steynjj.sci@mail.uovs.ac.za>.

In *The Wizard of OZ*, Dorothy and all the other people who wore green spectacles in the Emerald City saw that everything in the city was green. Similarly, each person has a metaphorical pair of glasses which filters the world around us, separating it into that which we can and that which we cannot understand (Rapoport, 1977: 38).

2.   SOME OF THE FORCES AT WORK IN GLOBALISATION

In this global world, there are two major conflicting ideologies defining attitudes toward regionalism, namely globalisation and localisation. The former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, stated:

> "Today we are living in the midst of a worldwide revolution. The planet is in the grip of two vast opposing forces: globalisation and fragmentation" (Martin & Schuman, 1997: 28).

These two forces are driven by different value systems. The first is most likely driven by the objective of maximising profits, while the latter is probably driven by the love of what is familiar and personal or could be a reaction to the former for the sake of self preservation.

The first force, globalisation, is in favour of increases in scale, whether in economic or regional terms. The latter force, fragmentation, aims to protect the local. In the world of political science, the English language does not distinguish clearly between the Afrikaans concepts, 'volk' and 'nasie'. English uses the same word, 'nation', for both terms. The former refers to an ethnic grouping, while the latter denotes a governmental territory that means all the population groups in a country as a whole. An Afrikaner is a member of a certain 'volk', but is also part of the South African nation. The term 'volk' correlates with the Oxford Concise Dictionary's definition for the word 'nation', namely a community of people of mainly common descent and a common history, language, etc., forming a state or inhabiting a territory. The term 'nasie' refers to the total population in a territory or a state, jointly comprising an empire or a colony. In the German and Dutch languages, this distinction is understood. To a certain extent, it correlates with Tonne's distinction at local level between the 'gemeinshaft und gesellschaft' community (Johnson, 1981: 164).

Part of the new world order is the creation of bigger regions, such as the European Union and NEPAD. On the other hand, fragmentation, along with the search for a national identity in Britain had led to the formation of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly of Wales (Allmendinger, 2001; Harris & Thomas, 2001). In Eastern Europe it led to the division of the old USSR into thirteen new states, as well as the breaking up of the old Yugoslavia into different ethnic states, either in terms of ethnic or religious division.

Although modern man professes not to discriminate on the grounds of race, culture or religion, people are still divided by these differences in practice, as Kipling pointed out in his poem, *The stranger in our midst*, in which he shows that it is those unknown nuances of 'being different' easily lead to contempt, distrust and eventually antagonism. In a situation where everything was going well in an economy, and everybody had a job, the 'melting pot of philosophy' of America could work in practice, in a consumer driven materialistic society.

Peace has been one of the driving forces behind most wars. No wonder, then, that the First World War was once known as *the Great War to End All Wars*. But the peace negotiations after World War I ultimately led to the Second World War. Even today, the unequal distribution of goods and services between people leads to envy and – ultimately – to hatred.

The change from Russian communism to global capitalism resulted from the influence of two contradictory trends in the evolution of international trade, namely the growing liberation of trade, on the one hand and the development of a variety of projects by the governments of several countries in order to set up a trading block, on the other hand (Castells, 2000: 68).

One of the most important of these trading blocks is the European Union (EU). Others include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), MERCOSUR (formed by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, in close collaboration with Bolivia and Chile), the Asian Pacific Economic Council (APEC) and, since 2002, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). This study will only focus on the European Union and NEPAD.

3.   THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The search for world peace was the motivation behind the formation of the League of Nations, after the "Great War to End All Wars" (1914 1919). However, the League of Nations did not succeed in creating this peace. In 1943, Jean Monnet, a member of the Free French government in exile in Algiers, declared:

> "There will be no peace in Europe, if the states are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty … The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development. The European states must constitute themselves into a federation …" (History of the European Union, 2005: online).

On a larger scale, the United Nations was formed after World War Two. Instead of establishing world peace, this organisation merely created a platform for discussion but it failed to bridge the development gap between the rich north and the poor south.

On the economic front Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg founded the BENELUX in 1949. Its purpose was that of a custom union to facilitate a free flow of goods and capital between these states (Zonneveld & D'hondt, 1994: 34). Subsequently, in 1950, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, put forward Monnet's plan to place the production of the raw materials of war (coal and steel) under the control of a single common authority, in order to contribute to economic recovery. This led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Company (ECSC) in 1951 by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (the Benelux countries), as well as (West) Germany, France and Italy (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002: 17). The aim of the ECSC was to pool the steel and coal resources of the member states, in order to prevent another European war. These were the states that, through the Treaty of Rome of 1957, tried to form a European Defence Community and a French Political Community but ultimately succeeded in forming the European Economic Community (EEC), based on freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people. In 1958 the Benelux Economic Union treaty, which virtually abolished border checks within the Benelux area, was signed

(Zonneveld & D'hondt, 1994: 104). A series of treaties led to the formation of the European Union. In 1967 they became known as the European Com munities and after signing the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht 1993 the European Union.

Membership of the European Union is open to any European country with a stable democratic government, a good human rights record, a properly functioning market economy and sound micro economic policies (www. eurunion.org/inmfores/euguide/Chap ter1.htm). Several enlargements of the Union occurred over the course of time as the following countries obtained membership:

* 1973 United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark

* 1981 Greece

* 1986 Spain and Portugal

* 1990 East Germany (which was reunited with West Germany, thus increasing the area and population, although not the number of states)

* 1995 Austria, Sweden and Finland

* 2004 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland as well as Slovakia and Slovenia jointly.

The European Union does not have a formal constitution, but has been built up on the basis of a series of treaties, regarded as binding commitments by the 25 member states that signed them. Internal agreements between member states of the European Union, as well as agreements between mem ber and non member states, are in existence, (for example the Schengen treaty and the Benelux treaty). The Maastricht treaty, signed in 1992, estab lished the European Union (EU) as a 'first pillar'. Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was designated as a 'second pillar', while Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) comprised the 'third pillar'. The last two pillars are operated through intergovernmental cooperation.

In 1994 the European Economic Area was founded in order to enable the European Free Trade Countries to par ticipate in a single market, without having to join the European Market. A further step towards economic unifi

cation was the agreement that was entered into by eleven countries in 1999 to abandon their own currencies. The circulation of Euro notes and coins sub sequently commenced in January 2002.

The old European Economic Com munity was primarily a developed, urbanised and industrialised economic block, whose member states were characterised by a relatively high standard of living and a good infra structure. The inclusion of the Eastern countries into the European Union ex panded the land area by 25% and brought in an additional 75 million citi zens. These new Euro countries are in need of assistance in the upgrading of their infrastructure, as well as with re gard to their average income. A large proportion of the budget will have to be spent for this purpose. A positive aspect, however, is the fact that this new larger Europe has a market pop ulation approaching 500 million and a combined economy approaching that of the United States of America (The future of Europe, 2005: online).

The central point is that, the EU started off small, as a number of different eco nomic communities and closely allied custom unions. Only after working to gether for 35 years was closer unity attained in 1992, with the Maastricht treaty.

4. EUROPEAN PLANNING

The European Community's regional policy is the starting point for all European spatial planning. A spatial policy (with the exception of transport) was not the objective of the original treaty of Rome (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002: 4). Rather, the aim was the es tablishment of a 'common market' where a barrier free space for goods, persons, services and capital could be ensured. In order for the European spatial policy to overcome regional disparities four structural funds, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF),[1] the European Social Fund

_____

1. A European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established in the early 1970s in order to lessen regional disparities by giving fixed sums to member states to distribute in their regions. The idea was that in this way, it would be possible for decisions to be taken at the lowest level. This is a realistic and feasible approach. The European Union does not have the legal authority or competence to under take land planning. All land use planning is conducted on the national and sub national levels (Goldsmith, 2004: 13).

(ESF), the European Agricultural Fund for Guidance (EAFG) and the Financial Instruments for Fishery Guidance (FIFG) as well as the cohesion fund were es tablished. The last is "to be used main ly for infrastructure investments and environmental improvements" (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002: 5). In the period 2000 2006 the EU, according to Faludi and Waterhout (2002: 5), will spend 213 billion euro as follows, 70% for regions that are lagging behind economically and the rest for (a) social and eco nomic renewal as well as (b) for train ing and employment.

To understand the development of the European Spatial Development Per spective (ESDP), it is necessary to con sider European planners' conceptuali sation of European space in the 1980s and 1990s. One of the first formulations of a European Planning Concept was the 'Blue Banana,' developed by French planners (Zonneveld & D'Hondt, 1994: 75). In a study con ducted by Kunzmann and Wagener, commissioned by the Directorate General XVI (later D.G. Regio) in 1991, it was shown that the underlying image of the 'Blue Banana' as a metaphor for Europe's competitive ness should rather be replaced with the 'European Bunch of Grapes', which Kunzmann and Wagener regarded as a more cooperative model, expressing the diversity of Europe (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002: 11). Different planning documents, such as the Europe 2000 (Williams, 1996: 99) and Europe 2000+, showed clearly that it was not a 'European master plan' that was needed, but a frame work or policy to support the Communities' spatial planning (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002: 62). The drafting of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) took more than ten years to complete. The ESDP was accepted at the Potsdam meeting in May 1999 (Goldsmith, 2004: 2). The aims of the ESDP are to encourage sustainability and balanced develop ment across Europe, to remove barriers to development created by national boundaries and to support the princi ple of subsidiary (Goldsmith, 2004: 3).

According to the ESDP (European Commission, 1999: 19 20), three spatial development guidelines for the territory should be followed namely:

* Development of a polycentric and balanced urban system and strengthening of the partnership between urban

and rural areas. This involves overcoming the outdated dualism between city and countryside.

- Promotion of integrated transport and communica tion concepts, which support the polycentric development of the EU territory and are an important pre condition for integration into EMU (Euro pean Monetary Union). Parity of access to infrastructure and knowledge should be realised gradually. Regionally adapted solutions must be found for this.

- Development and conserva tion of the natural and the cultural heritage through wise management. This contributes both to the preservation and deepening of regional identi ties and the maintenance of the natural and cultural diver sity of the regions and cities of the EU in the age of globali sation.

The policies do not apply to the same extent to all areas in the EU but should respect the distinct cultural, political and economical differences of mem ber states. The core of Europe, which was to be a zone of global economic competitiveness, comprised 20 per cent of the territory, with 40 per cent of the inhabitants and 50 per cent of the GDP being concentrated in the cities of London, Paris, Milan, Munich and Hamburg. As the ESDP eschews policy maps, no map of this 'pentagon' is officially available. However, Faludi & Waterhout (2002: 155) are of the opinion that Schön's illustration of the '20 40 50 pentagon' shows the policy in plan form (see fig 1).

5. AFRICA – A SHORT HISTORY

The northern portion of Africa has been long known to the western world pri marily owing to the Egyptian civilisa tion that began in about 4000 B.C. The Egyptians made contact with the black tribes to the south of Egypt and influenced the cultural development. When the Sahara became drier in the third millennium B.C., the part of Africa to the south of the Sahara became isolated from the northern civilisation. According to the Greek historian Herodotus, the Phoenicians who were sent by Pharaoh Nego in 604 B.C. to explore the region to the south, took three years to sail from the Red Sea around the southern tip of Africa, in order to enter Egypt from the Medi terranean Sea (Kapp et al., 1992: 24).

Waites (1999: 102) describes the situa tion in Africa before colonialism as fol lows:

When Europeans began trading with Western Africa, there were clear technological disparities between the communities they encountered and their own: Africans did not possess firearms, wheeled transport or ocean going vessels, and moreover, they were not literate. But it should not thereby be conclud ed that the economic structures and technical competences of Europe and Africa were radical ly different at this time. The lack of quantitative data makes it impossible to "rank" pre industri al societies on the basis of objective economic criteria. Nevertheless, the descriptive evidence suggests that West Africa was neither static nor particularly 'backward'.

Nearly 2000 years later, in 1498, the Portuguese explorer, Vasco da Gama, sailed round the southernmost tip of Africa to India and back (Kapp et al., 1992: 316). For nearly a hundred years, the Portuguese dominated the African coast, with only a refreshment station in Cape Town being founded in 1652 for the Dutch East India Company (VOC). The Portuguese wanted to spread Christianity and commerce, while the VOC was a 'multi national company', only interested in trade, and not in colonies in Africa. Colonial ism was unable to penetrate into Africa in the beginning, owing to parallel mountain ranges, strong tribes, and tropical illness in Central Africa which had a different climate. It wisely es tablished mainly on the coastal area (except for South Africa). A map show ing African colonisation in 1870 con firms this (Chamberlain, 1974: 45). At the end of the 19th century the 'scramble for Africa' between Euro pean countries was motivated by raw materials and markets and was an ex


Fig 1. Schön's illustration of "20 40 50 pentagon" (Source: Faludi & Waterhout, 2002: 155)

ploitative version of European imperial ism (Terreblanche, 2005: 7). In 1885 the Berlin Treaty – the first of many (Du Boahen, 1985: 33 34) – was signed by fourteen western countries. The treaty contained principles to be followed when colonising new areas. By 1914, most of Africa had been divided between seven countries,[2] namely Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, Spain and Belgium (Kapp *et al.*, 1984: 228 235).[3]

According to Rist (1997: 67) the debate as to whether Africa profited from colonialism is still open. Du Boahen (1985: 782 809), in Volume VII of the UNESCO General History of Africa, found that both positive and negative political and social impacts were in volved, but that the economic impact comprised "a period of ruthless eco nomic exploitation rather than eco nomic development in Africa". Co lonialism lasted less than a hundred years for most parts of Africa. Africa was a supply region to the so called 'mother countries' and little industriali sation or processing of raw materials took place. Most infrastructure was developed aimed at getting the min erals or cash crops to the harbours as fast as possible (Du Boahen, 1985: 791). No inter African transport or commu nication lines were built.[4] No wonder this gave rise to the dependency par adigm in the third world (Fair, 1987: 23).

The Cold War led by Eisenhower and Krushchev led to the decolonisation of Africa as well as a very damaging 'arms race' (Terreblanche, 2005: 7). Most African states became inde pendent between 1957 and 1964 but were still dependent for capital, imports and finance on the old colonial powers (Waites, 1999: 290). The boundaries of the new African Republics were those of the old colonies. These new leaders in most cases used the old colonial official languages, as they were the only *lingua franca* for the different

tribes and peoples. Even today, a large proportion of Africa's inhabitants are still living in traditional rural areas.

According to Lee (2003: 29) African regionalism was more political than economical, as it originated in early efforts to liberate the continent from colonial and neo colonial rule. The Pan Africans vision of collective self reliance and introverted strategies was based on a controlled economy as well as the establishment of sub continental economic communities (Söderbaum, 2004: 69). In Africa south of the Sahara these included the South African Custums Union (SACU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Develop ment Community (SADC), the Eco nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Except for Mozambique most of the SADC mem bers belong to more than one organi sation (see figure 2).

The cry for freedom, or Uhuru, was in many cases not a 'nationalistic' cry, as most of these so called freedom fight ers used the language of the oppres sor as their *lingua franca*. In Southern Africa, SWAPO and the ANC were English speaking movements, while those in the neighbouring Angola and Mozambique were Portuguese speak ing. Most of these movements obtained moral and economic support from the

west and military training and support from the communist countries. In the case of South Africa, the movement was split between a political arm (ANC) with headquarters in London and a military arm (Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)) with headquarters in Russia. However Chesterson, (1965) in his book *The new unhappy lords*, pointed out that neo colonial forces in the form of mining companies were in some cases the real forces behind the thrones of these new leaders.

In Africa the new leaders of inde pendent states wanted to negotiate for better economic terms and to be more effectively in competition with the developed world (Lee, 2003: 29). This was discussed in 1958 during an ALL AFRICAN People's Conference in Accra, Ghana and in subsequent African meetings. On 25th May 1963 the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was created. The organisation for African Unity had a rule that "there would be no forceful changing of post colonial boundaries" (Buzan & Weaver, 2003: 222). This was a recipe for con flict, as old colonies did not take ethnic or religious boundaries into considera tion at the time of their formation. Kebonang (2005: 5) argues that the acceptance of these colonial bound aries became an important factor in justifying one party rule in post colonial Africa and ultimately to poor govern ance.

---

2. A map of 1914 shows Africa to be totally colonised, except for Liberia and Ethiopia (Chamberlain 1974: 87).

3. Only Ethiopia and Liberia would remain autonomous. Their per capita income in 2003 were the second and fourth lowest from 190 world nations, being respective ly $90 and $130, both down $10 from the previous year. The EU average was $22850, and the Sub Sahara Africa aver age was $490 for 2003.

4. Most maps showing infrastructure in this period tend to show the railroads going directly to the coast.


Figure 2.   Overlapping Membership in Regional Economic Organisations (Source: Lee, 2003: 74).

In the 1980's the West adopted neo liberalism as the paradigm to guide the world economy (Taylor, 1998: 130). This was spearheaded by organisations such as the World Bank, the Inter national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The fall of communism and the opening up of the former East Block Countries had a negative effect on Africa. De velopment aid was halved between 1989 and 1990 (from US $24.4 billion to $12.2 billion) while Africa received only one per cent of global investments (Olivier 2003: 821). According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD) (2004: 2) the number of least developed coun tries has increased from 24 in 1971 to 50 in 2004. They accounted in 2002 for 11% of the world's population and had an average gross national income per capita of $438 per year and con tributed only 0,6% of the world's GDP. Africa has 32 of the current 50 least developed countries, with their per capita gross national product GDP at only $297 (UNCTD, 2004: 2, 18).

Internationally two fields of planning are growing, namely planning for the environment and planning for the poor. The United Nations set a target that 0,7% of the annual GDP of each economically advanced country should be allocated for Official Devel opment Assistance (ODA) (Hancock, 1996: 44). Hancock (1996: 188) found that 'aid' according to the dictionary is synonym for 'help' but in Africa it had the opposite effect. Africa lost its' self sufficiency in food production and became a continent sized beggar as its per capita food production has fallen in every single year since 1962 (Hancock, 1996: 191).

Van Niekerk (1996: 72) describes the document prepared by African mem bers for the 1965 World Summit for Social Development in Denmark as "analyses of the bad conditions in Africa". Their only hope was to show how bad the situation was in Africa and to hope that the West would write off their debts. For sub Saharan coun tries the total foreign debt rose be tween 1980 2000 from $60 billion to $206 billion and the ratio of debt to the GDP rose from 23% to 66% (Bond, 2003: 2).

6. NEPAD – A NEW PLAN

At the end of the 1990s when the cold war was something of the past Africa, issued fresh demands. At the UN con ference against racism in Durban 2001 Africa's new demands to the West in cluded explicit apologies for the slave trade and colonialism and reparations such as debt cancellation and health care funding (McGreal, 2001: 1). On the other hand the G8 leaders the pre vious year at Okinawe (Japan) already required leaders demanded from the three African president Bouteflika, Obasanjo and Mbeke that "a workable plan as a basis of the compact" must be drawn up (Adésiná, 2004: 133). Mbeki follow this up with his vision of an 'African Renaissance' as an intellectual and cultural project (Oliver, 2003: 79) and the Millennium African Recovery Programme (MAP) as the economic approach (Adésiná, 2004: 133). The OMEGA Plan of Senegal's president Wade was used to focus on regional infra structure and education (De Waal, 2002: 466). According to Bond (2003: 1) the IMF and the World Bank influenced the formation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

Olivier (2003: 815) sees Mbeki as the "seminal thinker behind, and the prin ciple author and articulator of" NEPAD, a sentiment with to which Schlemmer (2004: 78) agrees. Others sees it as a troika, (presidents Bouteflika, Obasanjo and Mbeki) who took matters in hand (Adésiná, 2004: 132; De Waal, 2002: 468) while Amuwo (2002: 7) refers to the four principle drivers of NEPAD (South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, and Algeria). The NEPAD website has under the section on the origins of NEPAD a fourth group of founders namely that a mandate was given to five Heads of States (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) by the organi sation of African Unity (NEPAD, 2005: online).

Unravelling the relationship between NEPAD and the African Union (AU) is not that easy as the NEPAD website does not provide all the answers to the power politics. De Waal (2002: 463) comes to the same conclusion. The following are from the NEPAD WEB site (NEPAD, 2005: online).

NEPAD is a VISION and STRA TEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR AFRICA'S RENEWAL.

The objectives of NEPAD are:

- to eradicate poverty
- to place African countries on a path of sustainable growth and development
- to halt marginalisation of Africa and to integrate it into the global economy
- to accelerate the empower ment of woman

That NEPAD is a programme of the African Union with the fol lowing structure:

- a steering committee (which meets once a month) that oversees projects and pro gramme development and reports to
- the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) which is responsible to
- the Assembly of the Africa Union

The official governance structure could be seen in Figure 3.

De Waal (2002: 46) describes the situ ation on the following terms: "The 'enhanced partnership' presumes to be a common commitment by African countries and donors to a set of de velopment outcomes (defined by Africa countries)". The aim is to achieve an overall annual growth of 7% in order to meet the Millennium De velopment Goals (MDGs) of halving poverty by 2015. How exactly NEPAD will slot in with the structures and pro cedures of the African Union is to a certain extend unclear (Schlemmer, 2004: 78; Longwe, 2002: 3; De Waal, 2002: 468). Hokwana described the situation as follows:

"The AU foresees that NEPAD will become the economic arm of the AU and that the AU's struc tures will be devised in such a manner that they complement NEPAD's long term objectives. Thus it is envisaged that the autonomous NEPAD secretariat in close co operation with the economic communities will be come the main driving force and implementing agency of the AU's economic system (African Cen tral Bank, African Monetary Fund, African Economic Union)."

OAU / AFRICAN UNION (AU)

SUMMIT OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

HEADS OF STATE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE

(Heads of State of 15 Countries)

(meets once every four months)

Chairman: Pres. Obasanjo (Nigeria)

Vice-chairmen: Pres. Bouteflika (Algeria), Pres. Wade (Senegal)

Central Africa: Cameroon, Gabon, São Tomé and Principé

Eastern Africa: Ethiopia, Mauritius, Rwanda

Northern Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia

Southern Africa: Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa

Western Africa: Mali, Nigeria, Senegal

STEERING COMMITTEE

(5 Founding Countries)

(meets once every month)

Chairman: Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu (South Africa)

Algeria

Egypt

Senegal

South Africa

Nigeria

SECRETARIAT

(5 people based in Pretoria, South Africa)

Policy head: Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu

Three work streams: Project / programme and policy coordination

Administration and secretarial services

Communications and Marketing

---

Figure 3: NEPAD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
(Source: Nepad governance structure, [s.a.]: online)

The African Union consists of 53 member states out of a possible 58 countries.[5] In 1999 the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) issued the first of four declarations which would eventually lead to the formation of the African Union (DFA 2005: 2). It is dedicated *inter alia* to promote economic, social and political integration in Africa, and to a strong commitment to democracy. It has a political correct vision and a series of objectives that are worthy of following (DFA, 2005: 2 3). Unfortunately Africa disregards its own rules (Schlemmer, 2004: 78). Although 53 members signed the protocol only 24 agreed to be part of the peer review process by a panel of Eminent Persons (Hokwana, 2004: 40) which is a "voluntary appraisal of governments' economic and political management performance by fellow Africans" (Kajee, 2005: 1). According to Amuwo (2002: 11) the peer review will only be for economic matters while political matters will be handled by the institutions of the African Union such as the parliament or the Commission on Human Rights. The African Union has an executive council and a commission with staff to run its operation as well as the Pan African Parliament (DFA, 2005: 3). According to Turco (2003: 370) "the good governance issue is the pivotal point for the entire Action Plan".

The Pan African Parliament is an organ within the African Union to "ensure the full participation of African peoples in governance, development and economic integration of the continent" (DFA, 2005: 3). For the first five years it will only have consultative advisory powers and all resolutions have to be confirmed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Africa Union (SABC News, 2004: 1). Each member state selects five representatives from its own parliament. This immediately leads to the first problem as Libya has no national assembly while Uganda is a one party state (Kajee, 2005).

Once again it is necessary to stress that the African Unions assembly's and the NEPAD summit are both headed by Heads of State and Government.

---

5. Some sources refer to 54 and others to 58 countries and territories.

7. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EU AND NEPAD

On the surface the two bodies might look alike and their objectives and principles are similar. Both a neo liberal economic policy which is market dominated. However, there are significant differences.

7.1 The effect of Globalisation

In the European Union the drive to open up markets and remove borders is driven by a desire to stimulate growth and development. Even with the addition of the new Central European countries, Europe can be regarded as a developed region with high levels of technology and human resource capacities. It is a region with mostly good infra structure, good economic and political governance, an aging population and negative population growth. Countries cannot become members if they do not meet the standards. The per capita GDP for 2003 in the European Union was $22 580 while the same figure for Sub Sahara Africa was $490. The dependency rate in Africa is much higher with where nearly 50% of the population is under the age of 15, compared to that of 20% in developed countries (Van Niekerk, 2004: 10).

The European Union has profited through globalisation and it has long been industrialised and exports high value goods to the rest of the world. Africa, on the other hand, has to export raw materials at prices that constantly going down. Between 1975 and 1980 the price per ton of copper went down from $17 800 to $9 500, that of cocoa from $23 400 to $10 200 and coffee from $22 800 to $13 300 (Hokwane, 2004: 56). Africa's share of world export went down from 8 per cent some fifty years ago to just 2 per cent, leaving millions of Africans and their families worse off than in the 1960's (Olivier, 2002: 826).

South Africa constitutes 29 per cent of all Africa's GPD and the equivalent of 85 per cent of Sub Saharan GPD if South Africa is excluded (Thomas & Coetzee, 2004: 17). Between 1994 and 1999, South African companies invested $1.6 billion more than inflows into the country (Carmody, 2002: 264). South African's only large trans national companies which appeared on the Fortune 500 listing namely (Anglo American Corporation, Liberty Life,

S.A.Breweries and Old Mutual) secured primary listing on the London Stock Exchange (Lesufi, 2004: 818).

In Europe no single country dominates but in Africa South Africa is in an economic dominating position. During the period 1996 1998 South Africa's total investment in the Southern African Development Community has increased from 11 per cent to 40 per cent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Millar, 2004: 14). According to Lefusi, (2004: 822) South Africa capital takes the soft options where "the bulk of new activity in Africa has been through mergers, take overs and joint ventures."

Globalisation has had a very negative impact on the economy of Africa as playing fields are not equal. African countries need access to the markets of the developed world but the latter are protected by barriers particularly in agriculture. Accordingly to Owusu (2003:1688) the European Union, the United States and Japan spend one billion Dollar a day to protect their farmers.

7.2 The effects of Fragmentation

The structure of the European Union makes it possible for smaller ethnic groups, which are located in more than one country to have a voice and work together in a European Parliament. The African Union and its structures are not directly elected, for and of the 53 members which states are represented, only ten held free and democratic elections between 1990 and 1998 (Hokwane, 2004: 91 92). No civil society input was sought by the politicians and technocrats constructing NEPAD (Bond, 2002: 2).

The old colonial boundaries did not take the numerous ethnic groupings into consideration. This has led to numerous civil wars, military *coup d'etats* and authoritarian states (Hokwane, 2004: 50 51). As an example, Tanzania alone has more than 150 ethnic communities or tribes (Terreblanche, 2005: 5).

The only place where this fragmentation and diversity is dealt with is in the Constitutive Act of the AU; in Article 3(b), it states that the AU will defend the sovereignty of its member states; in Article 4(g) that it shall not intervene into the affairs of other states and in Article 4(h) where it is stated that it shall intervene in cases of human rights abuses (Hokwane, 2004: 79).

7.3 Governance

In the European Union, relatively sound governance is a given since a country can not become a member if it do not comply with the standards set for a democracy. Africa has a history of poor governance and NEPAD's recognition that it has to be addressed is noteworthy. Three dimensions of governance are particularly emphasized: economic and corporative; political; and peace and security (De Waal, 2002: 471). The African Peer Review mechanism holds the potential to help Africa solve its problems (Hokwane, 2004: 39). Bond (2003: 2) argues it is a naive hope that governance will result from the document while nothing is done to curb election abuses in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, only 24 of the 53 members have signed the peer review agreement: it is possible to become a member of the African Union and be represented in the Pan African Parliament without agreeing to those peer reviews. This Peer Review mechanism might also be the Achilles heel of the African Union. The conduct of NEPAD in this regard could influence its future credibility.

In terms of economic governance, Terreblanche (2005: 15) states that "roughly 80 cents of every dollar was borrowed by African countries flowed back as capital flight in the same year" and that it is "estimated that Africas ruling elite have private assets equivalent to 145% of the public debt these countries owed". Klitgaard (1994: 492) in and article entitled "Bribes, tribes and markets that fail" comes to the conclusion that "you can have both growth and redistribution, both efficiency and justice, by making government freer from corruption, reducing institutionalised discrimination that is born of ignorance and imperfect information, and improving the many markets that impinge upon the poor". Schlemmer (2004: 86 87) also refers to Africa, and specifically South Africa's handling of the HIV/AIDS issue as well as the promise of delivery and a better life for all that it will backfire if it never becomes a reality. After 50 years of self governance, the economic situation in Africa has deteriorated and NEPAD will have to prove that 'under development' is not *per se* associated with corruption, ethnic discrimination and exploitation.

7.4 Planning Constraints

The scale of the African continent and its diversity is huge. It extends from its most southern tip to the north, over 8000 km and from east to west nearly 7500 km wide.

7.4.1 Physical barriers to planning

The biggest obstacle dividing Africa is the Sahara dessert stretching across Africa from east to west and is approximately 1000km from north to south. Very few people are located on the adjacent low rainfall areas.

A further physical obstacle is the Zaire delta, with the tropical swamp forest and associated network of rivers and floodplains. To cross it would be expensive and maintenance cost of movement infrastructure would be very high.

Africa has some trans national infrastructure that was erected in colonial times with the building of railroads. These were mostly build between 1890 and 1950. Good roads and other forms of infrastructure are however scarce and without good and reliable infrastructure there can be little trade.

> "Africa's roads and railway lines, ports and power grids are neither adequate nor reliable. Outside of Southern Africa and Mauritius, much of the continent's infrastructure is crumbling or nonexistent. Consider the Democratic Republic of the Congo. You could fit France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain and Britain inside it, and the country is packed with timber and minerals, yet it has only a few thousand kilometres of paved road and 10,000 fixed telephone lines, and produces about the same amount of power as Albania. In other war torn countries, such as Somalia and Sierra Leone, public buildings have been destroyed by years of fighting. Corruption and mismanagement have left public utilities in places such as Cameron and Nigeria run down and inefficient" (Robinson, 2005: 24).

The idea of trans African highways consisting of 9 corridors with a total length of 59100km was formulated in the early 1970's (SWECO, 2003: 7). Raising the finances to build these roads might be the easier part of these projects. The cost of maintenance and of the bureaucracy administration thereof might be far more costly. People sometimes wait seven hours at a border post between South Africa

and Zimbabwe past corrupt traffic cops and other officials. The World Bank estimates that the transport for a container from Baltimore in the United States of America to Tanzania cost about $1000, but from Tanzania to the neighbouring Burundi it might cost as high as $10 000 (Robinson, 2005: 24).

7.4.2 Language barriers

Over 750 languages are spoken on the continent. Language differences give rise to ethnic differences and in Africa where tribal discrimination has been practice, it may give rise to civil wars and struggles for freedom. Wars also contribute to famine and to destruction of infrastructure. In several states, minority tribes have seized power and rule as dictators. An example is the government of Kabila in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) who, with his Tutsi tribe, control most official state positions, although they constitute only one million of the total population of 43 million.

The recent no votes in France and the Netherlands in referendums on a new constitution for the European Union show that countries and people do not easily give up their sovereignty. The European Union in its structure leave tolerance for a Europe of regions as the Basque – people in both France and Spain could get representatives in the European Union and could there work together. But the future of these small nations is not secure even in Europe. Western Europe is presently experiencing a rise in the use of English, largely around the globalisation of the academic world. Every University wants to be an international player, thus graduate courses are offered in English. This helps you to keep numbers of students high. The drop in birth rates over the last 20 years has meant that universities either have to globalize or reduce size.

7.4.3 Religious barriers

Along the southern edges of the Sahara, where the Muslims and non Muslims meet, there is conflict. Some of the governments in North Africa, like Egypt, are opposed by Islamic Fundamentalists and this leads to political friction and conflict.

Religion can also be used to political ends as a tool to obtain foreign help. In 1977 for example Bokassa from New Guinea declared him an emperor and

spent 20 million dollar, given to him by the French, on the crowning ceremo ny. Afterwards he was twice convert ed to Islam to obtain money from people like Mohammed Gaddafi, only to be reconverted to Christianity (Van Niekerk, 1996: 93). The fact that the country was anti communist at that stage helped the west to ignore what happened in that state.

In South Africa there is the conflict be tween the traditionalists and the mod ernists. This is not simply a matter of politics or democracy. The traditional leaders were 'elected' by the ances tors and chiefs and king are thus tribe leaders but in a sense religious leaders as well. Control over tribal land, which is the power base of the chiefs, is a cause of conflict. The democratic elected government wants to do away with tribal land and tribal control over it. In customary law, land is not an eco nomical commodity which can be bought and sold. It is a resource that belongs to the spirits of the ancestors as well as to generations yet to come. No one person can ever possess it: the western world of economic thinking does not fit into this paradigm.

8. CONCLUSION

It is widely argued that NEPAD should follow the path of the European Union. This paper shows there are substantial contextual and other differences.

The European Union grow from a series of small economic unions into a larger body while the African Union started as a politically driven union with the aim to attract foreign investments and to eradicate poverty through high economic growth. It still has to prove that it can be economically sustain able in a global economic market.

Africa will have to develop its own model and will have to make it work. The focus must be to develop one Regional Economic Organisation for each of the five sub regions of Africa, (Southern Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, West Africa, North Africa) and get them to work in terms of the NEPAD vision. No overlapping memberships of member states should be allowed.

In the Southern Africa Development Community, South Africa plays according to Geyer (2003: 409) an important role as a gateway to Africa and as a role model of implementing global economic politics. The South African positive influence is under

mined by the tactic of 'silent diploma cy' towards the abuses of power by the Zimbabwean government (Miller, 2005: 55). It will have to use its position as a regional power in the peer review process as a disciplining instrument and not only for rhetoric. When the different economic regions of Africa are succeeding in getting their sub regions on the path of sustainable growth, development and good gov ernance they can start investigating the viability of the bigger economic union.

REFERENCES

ADÉSINÁ, J.O. 2004. NEPAD and the challenge of Africa's development: towards the political economy of a discourse. *Society in Transition*, 35(1), p. 125 144.

ALMENGDINGER, P. 2001. The head and the heart. National identity and urban planning in a devolved Scot land. *International Planning Studies*, 6(1), p. 33 54.

AMUWO, K. 2002. Globalisation. NEPAD and the Governance Question in Africa. *African Studies Quarterly*, [online], 6(3), p. 1 19. Available from: <http//web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v6:324. htm>

BOND, P. 2002. *Debt, Structural Adjustment and Jubilee.* [online]. Available from <http://www.web.net/ ~iccaf/debtsap/nepad aidc.htm> [Accessed 25 April 2005], p. 1 8.

BOND, P. 2003. *Africa in Evian: If the G8 is meeting it must be time to "dig nify" NEPAD (again).* [online]. Available from: <http://rorg.no.//rorg/ aktuelt/2003/dok/bondevian.html> [Accessed 25 April 2005], p. 1 4.

BUZAN, B. & WEAVER, O. 2003. *Regions and Power: the structure of Inter national Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CARMODY. 2002. Between globalisa tion and (Post) Apartheid the political economy of restructuring in South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28(2), p. 256 275.

CASTELLS, M. & HALL, P. 1994. *Techno poles of the world*. London: Routledge.

CASTELLS, M. 2000. *The rise of the Network Society.* 2nd ed. Oxford (UK): Blackwell Publishing.

CHAMBERLAIN, M.E. 1974. *The scramble for Africa.* London: Longman Group Limited.

CHESTERSON, C.A. 1965. *The new un happy Lords: an exposure of power politics.* London: Candor.

DFA (DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS). 2005. *Africa Union in a Nut shell* [online]. Available from: <www. dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/au nutshell.htm >, p.1 5.

DE WAAL, A. 2002. What's new in the "New Partnership for Africa's Develop ment?" *International Affairs*, 78(3), p. 463 473.

DU BOAHEN, A.A. 1985. *General history of Africa VII. Africa under colonial domination 1880 1835.* London: Heineman.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 1999. European Spatial Development Perspective.

FAIR, T.J.D. 1987. *South Africa: spatial frameworks for development.* Cape Town: Juta & Co. Ltd.

FALUDI, A. & WATERHOUT, B. 2002. *The making of the European Spatial De velopment Perspective: No masterplan.* London: Routledge.

GEYER, H.S. 2003. South Africa in Global Context: the view from above and below. *Annuals of Regional Science*, Vol. 37, p. 407 420.

GOLDSMITH, M.V. 2004. *Spatial plan ning for future development in the European Union.* Paris: Urban Land Institute.

HANCOCK, G. 1996. *Lords of Poverty.* London: Mandann Paperbacks.

HARRIS, N. & THOMAS, H. 2001. *Politics, planning and the construction of national identity in Wales.* [s.l] [s.n.]. p. 43 60.

HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION. 2005. [s.a.]. *History of European Union.* [online]. Available from: <http://www. absoluteastronomy.com/encyclope dia/H/Hi/History of the European Union.htm> [Accessed: 5 July 2005].

HOKWANA, A. 2004. Facing up to reality? Nepad and the challenge to globalisation. Unpublished M.A. thesis in Political Science. Bloemfontein: University of the Free State.

JOHNSON, D.P. 1981. *Sociological the ory: Classical founders and con temporary perspectives.* New York: John Wiley & Son.

KAJEE, A. 2005. No stress diet for African forum. *Business Day*, Johannesburg. 9 May 2005.

KAPP, P.H. *et al.* 1992. *Geskiedskrywing van die Westerse Beskawing: Deel 1 – Oorsprong tot Intellektuele Revolusie.* Pretoria: HAUM Uitgewers. (Revised edition, paperback).

KAPP, P.H. *et al.* 1984. *Geskiedskrywing van die Westerse Beskawing: Deel 2 – Van Rewolusie tot Wêreldoorlog.* Pretoria: HAUM Uitgewers.

KEBONANG, Z. 2005. The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Promoting Foreign Direct Investment through Moral Political Leadership. *Africa Insight*, 35(1), pp. 3-13.

KLITGAARD, R. 1994. Bribes, Tribes and Markets that fail: Rethinking the eco nomics of underdelopment. *Develop ment Southern Africa*, 11(4), pp. 481-492.

KLOSTERMAN, R.E. 1978. Foundations for normative planning. *American Institute of Planners Journal*, 44(1), pp. 37-46.

LEE, M.C. 2003. *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa.* Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boulder, USA.

LESUFI, I. 2004. South Africa and the rest of the continent:towards a cri tique of political economy of NEPAD. *Current Sociology*, 52(5), pp. 809-829.

LONGWE, S.H. 2003. Africa: Gender and NEPAD 2. *Africa Policy E Journal.* [online]. Available from:<www. africaaction.org/doccs02/gen0211b.h tm> pp. 1-7.

MARTIN, H P. & SCHUMANN, H. 1997. *The Global Trap.* London: Zed Books Ltd.

MCGREAL. 2001. *Racism conference rocked by new slave trade demands.* [online]. Available from: <http://www. guardian.co.uk/unracism/story/0,1099, 546978,00.html> [Accessed 5 July 2005], pp. 1-3.

MILLER, D. 2004. South African Multi national corporations, NEPAD and competing spatial claims on post apartheid Southern Africa. *I.D.G. Occasional Paper no. 40*, Institute for Global Dialogue, Braamfontein, South Africa.

MILLER, D. 2005. South Africa and the IBS Initiative: constraints and chal lenges. *Africa Insight*, 35(1), pp. 52-57.

NEPAD, 2005. *NEPAD in Brief*. [online]. Available from: <www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.ph p.> [Accessed: 27 May 2005].

NEPAD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE. [s.a.]. [online]. Available from: <http:// isa africa.com/nepad/nepad struc ture.pdf>

OLIVIER, G. 2003. Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Saviour? *International Affairs*, No. 79, pp. 815-828.

OWUSU, F. 2003. Pragmatism and gradual shift from Dependency to Neo liberalism: The World Bank, African Leaders and development policy in Africa. *World development*, 31(10), pp. 1655-1672.

RAPOPORT, A. 1977. *Human aspects of urban forum*. England: Pergamen Press, Oxford.

RIST, G. 1997. *The history of develop ment: From western origins to global faith*. Cape Town: UCT Press.

ROBINSON, S. 2005. *Building Con fidence (Africa Special report).* Time magazine, 165(23), pp. 24-25.

SABC NEWS. 2004. *About the Pan African Parliament* [online]. Availabe from: <www.sabcnews.co./features/pan af rican parliament/about.html> [Accessed 27 May 2005], pp.1-3.

SCHLEMMER, L. 2004. NEPAD en die stryd teen armoede in Afrika: Beloftes en leemtes. *Tydskrif vir Geestes wetenskappe*, 44(2&3), pp. 77-89.

SÖDERBAUM, F. 2004. *The political economy of regionalism: the case of Southern Africa.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

SWECO. 2003. *Review of the Imple mentation status of the trans African Highways and the Missing Links.* Vol. 4: Appendices (Final Report). Stockholm, Sweden, SWECO International AB.

TAYLOR, N. 1998. *Urban Planning Theory since 1945.* London: Sage Publications.

TERREBLANCHE, S. 2005. Africa south of the Sahara (ASS) the impoverished stepchild of the world – who is to be blamed? ASS or the rest of the world? Unpublished paper of a meeting organised by the Economic Society *et al.*, Bloemfontein, South Africa, on 21 April 2005.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. [s.a.] *The future of European Union.* [online]. Available from: <http://www.globalchange.com/ futureeurope.htm> [Accessed: 5 July 2005].

THOMAS, W. & COETZEE, S. 2004. *Africa, the Millennium Development Goals and NEPAD.* In State of Africa 2003 2004, Africa Institute of South Africa. South Africa: Pretoria.

TURCO, A. 2003. Africa and globalisa tion: What perspectives for the future of the continent. *Ekistics*, Vols. 422&423, pp. 366-371.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE IN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTD). 2004. *Development and Globalisation: facts and figures.* United Nations, New York.

VAN NIEKERK, A. 1996. *Anderkant die reënboog.* (Translated as On the other side of the Rainbow). Kaapstad: Tafelberg.

VAN NIEKERK, A. J. 2004. Africa and the global economy: the catch 22 sit uation. Unpublished paper delivered at the 6th African Development Finance Conference on 24/10/2004. Department of Economics, Free State University, Bloemfontein, South Africa.

WAITES, B. 1999. *Europe and the third world: From colonisation to decoloni sation, c. 1500 1998.* London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

WEAVER, C. 1984. *Regional develop ment and the local community: Planning politics and social context.* New York: John Wiley and Sons.

WILLIAMS, R.H. 1996. *European Union spatial policy and planning.* London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd.

ZONNEVELD, W. & D'HONT, F. (reds.). 1994. *Europese ruimtelike ordening.* Vlaamse Federasie vir Planologie. Gent.