

*Hierdie stelsel sou maklik kon dien as model vir Suid-Afrika. Sosio-ekonomiese streke kan gegroepeer word in gebiede volgens die verskeie streekkantore van die staatsdepartemente. By elkeen van die streeksetels kan dan 'n beplanningsowerheid ingestel word soos aangedui in A maar die individuele streekplanne moet dan voorgelê word aan die streekowerheid B vir prosessering en aanvaarding.*

In Frankryk bestaan daar, benewens 'n aantal nasionale en streekorgane vir ontwikkeling en finansiering ook 'n aantal streekbeplanningsliggame, een vir elk van die 21 ontwikkelingsdistrikte. Hierdie beplanningsliggame word amptelik bygestaan deur twee vrywillige organisasies wat albei nou statutêre erkenning geniet. Die eerste hiervan word genoem Ekonomiese Streekontwikkelingskomitees. Hulle het hulle oorsprong in 1950 gehad toe 'n aantal ontwikkelingsverenigings gestig is in die private sektor. Hulle het so aktief begin raak in beplanning en formulering van gemeenskapsbehoefte dat hulle in 1954 statutêre erkenning gekry het onder die nuwe naam van Ekonomiese Streekontwikkelingskomitees met amptelike status in die beplanningsprosedure.

Engeland is in 1965 in die nasionale Plan verdeel in tien ontwikkelingsstreke en is daar in elke streek 'n setel geplaas vir streekverteenwoordigers van elkeen van die veertien staatsdepartemente. Die senior amptenare, een uit elke departement in die streekkantore, vorm tesame 'n beplanningskomitee met die opdrag om met die samewerking van 'n beplanningsraad — saamgestel uit verteenwoordigers uit die private sektor — 'n ontwikkelingsplan op te stel vir die streek. Vir elke streek word daar gevolglik 'n raad saamgestel van benoemdes uit die private sektor om saam te werk aan die plan. Die rade wissel in grootte tussen 18 en 37 lede.

Die doel van hierdie besondere samestelling van die streeksbeplanningsliggaam is om "'n volle en gebalanseerde ontwikkeling te verkry van alle ekonomiese en sosiale hulpmiddele deur 'n intieme kennisname van alle streekfaktore" binne die bestek van die nasionale plan.

Ook in Suid-Afrika het dit tyd geword dat streeksontwikkelingsverenigings 'n minder liginnige rol beklee as die huidige een van lastige en ongemotiveerde druk op die staat in eie belang eerder dan nasionale belang. Die samevoegings van die verenigings by die amptelike beplanningsorgane moet nog uitgewerk word maar daar kan gedink word aan die volgende:

- Die instelling van gebiedskantore vir senior amptenare van die staatsdepartemente wat betrek word by ontwikkelingsprogramme waaronder Beplanning, Gemeenskapabou, Nyerheidsweese, Vervoer en Waterweese. 'n Tipiese gebied sou wees, bv. Wes-Kaapland;
- 'n Genomineerde komitee van verteenwoordigers van die betrokke streeksvereniging kan saam met die senior amptenare 'n beplanningsraad vorm onder beheer van die Beplanningsadviesraad van die Eerste Minister;
- Onafhanklike beplanningsopnames deur konsultante kan dan op demokratiese wyse geëvalueer word uit hoofde van die eerstehandse en intieme kennis wat die lede van die beplanningsraad het vir die gebied. Die breë verteenwoordiging sou dan ook meewerk tot 'n besadigde en objektiewe siening van ontwikkelingsprobleme.

*Verdere verwysings:*

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## **An Assessment of some policies affecting Regional Development in the Western Cape**

— Department of Urban and Regional Planning, U.C.T. —  
and D. Dewar and N. Dewar

Recently, two decisions which are likely to have far-reaching effects on regional development in the Western Cape have been taken by the South African Cabinet.

The first is the decision to establish at Saldanha Bay an iron ore loading terminal linked by rail to ore deposits at Sishen, (Fig. 1). Coupled with this is the establishment of a ship building and repairing industry, a steel works and possibly a commercial harbour. In short, there is a major development input being injected into the Western Cape and Saldanha-Vredenburg has been ear-marked as a Regional-Centre in the first draft National Plan for South Africa\*.

It is intended that designated regional centres will constitute growth poles for regional development and will be encouraged to grow by government at the relative expense of the metropolitan areas. The encouragement is provided through the vetting by the Department of Planning and the Environment of the permit applications for industries wishing to locate in controlled areas (that is, the metropolitan areas of Johannesburg-Vereniging, Durban-Pinetown, Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage and Cape Town).

Guide plans for a city of one million people at Saldanha-Vredenburg are on the drawing boards.

The second is a decision to declare Mamre (or Dassenberg) a growth point. Again, this decision is in keeping with a national planning decision to draw growth off existing metropolitan areas but here there are ideological overtones in that Mamre is a designated Coloured area.




Figure 1  
ECONOMIC REGIONS

\*Drawn up by the Department of Planning and the Environment.

At Mamre decentralization is being encouraged through the provision of industrial infrastructure and considerable incentives including tax, loan, building and transportation incentives, by government for decentralizing industrialists! These incentives are the same as those being applied to other border area growth points.

A city of some 500 000 people is envisaged at Mamre. One of the major intentions behind the provision of incentives is to ensure that the city will have a full range of employment opportunities and will not merely become a dormitory centre for Cape Town, thereby obviating a wide range of social and economic costs.

In short, it is intended to establish two growth poles in the Western Cape, albeit for slightly different reasons.

The concepts of decentralization and growth poles have been applied in many countries in differing stages of economic growth as a palliative to problems of regional depression. In South Africa, however, there is a difference in emphasis in that the pole concept is primarily being applied in response to national problems (particularly the excessive industrial concentration on the Witwatersrand) and ideologies.

It is intended in this paper to examine these decisions in the light of specifically regional problems, processes and conditions and to utilize the experience of other parts of the world to comment on their viability and the degree to which they are likely to alleviate regional problems.

The first question that needs to be asked is whether or not a major developmental input is necessary or even desirable in the Western Cape, defined here as economic regions O1, O4, and O5 (Fig. 1).

When one looks at the Western Cape as a whole, there appears to be some justification for it.

- Natural resources are limited;
- there is a strong dependence on agriculture as the economic base of the region (some 53% of the gross regional product is either directly or indirectly based on agriculture) and a degree of diversification is probably desirable;
- the region has a declining share of the National Gross Domestic Product — from 15.6% in 1948 to 12.5% in 1970 (Bureau for Economic Research, 1973);
- the region has extremely high rates of population increase and widespread poverty and depression exists. (Table 1)

Table 1. Annual Population Growth and Income in the Western Cape, 1970

	Coloureds	Whites
Population Growth 1960-1970	4.0%	2.10
% of Total Population	58%	32%
	Estimated 65% (Estimated 24% in 1990)	(Estimated 24% in 1990)
Per Capita Income 1970	R195	R1135
% living below the HEL (R286)	67%	17%

Although there is evidence to support the view that the problem of welfare in the Western Cape is primarily one of inequalities in income distribution rather than a lack of economic growth (Dewar and Cort, 1974a), existing rates of population growth will however necessitate sustained economic growth in the future. It appears therefore that the proposed development inputs may offer considerable opportunities for the region.

If these opportunities are to be realized, however, the inputs must be so located and phased, and to be of such a nature, that they will facilitate solution of the region's most pressing problems (Newcombe, 1969). Such action must however be in conformity with the conservation of those natural resources which contribute to the beauty, uniqueness, character and economic base of the region. Thus, before evaluating the strategies, it is necessary to identify the major problems and the processes underpinning them, in the Western Cape.

The basic criterion against which development issues must be assessed is welfare, which is measurable in a number of ways. One is the primary measures, and the one which is of greatest significance in conditions of extreme poverty, is economic welfare (Dewar and Cort, 1974b).

When the problem of economic welfare in the Western Cape is examined sub-regionally it is apparent that considerable

differences exist within the region. (For a detailed discussion of these differences and of the problem of welfare in the Western Cape, see Dewar and Cort, 1974a and b).

Table 2 Per Capita Income by Economic Region — 1970

Region	Coloured		White	
	Per Capita Income	% Living below H.E.L. (R286)	Per Capita Income	% Living below H.E.L. (R286)
O1	R302	66%	R1 333	16%
O4	R133	89%	R 984	27%-28%
O5	R150	58%	R1 088	18%

Table 3. Changes in Unemployment and Dependency ratios by Economic Region — 1960 - 1970

Region	Coloureds			
	Unemployment 1960	Unemployment 1970	Dependency Ratio 1960	Dependency Ratio 1970
O1	18%	6%	2.74	2.55
O4	9%	8%	2.82	2.95
O5	11%	6%	2.67	2.30
Region	Whites			
	Unemployment 1960	Unemployment 1970	Dependency Ratio 1960	Dependency Ratio 1970
O1	4%	2%	2.06	1.95
O4	4%	3%	1.52	2.34
O5	3%	3%	1.97	2.30

#### A number of facts emerge from these tables:

Firstly, in each sub-region, marked differences exist between the have's and the have-nots; the gap between them is increasing, not decreasing; and inequalities in income distribution are fundamental to the pattern of poverty. (*ibid*)

Secondly, per capita income are a great deal higher in the more highly urbanized O1 region than elsewhere.

Thirdly, Coloured dependency ratios are everywhere higher than White ratios; ratios are higher in the predominantly rural, and poorer, O3 and O4 regions than elsewhere; and Coloured ratios in the rural areas are increasing, while everywhere else they are decreasing.

Fourthly, unemployment levels are similar in all of the economic regions and are everywhere approaching an acceptable level (taken in most countries to be about 4%).

From these facts a number of deductions can be made.

The first is that the cause of many problems of the Western Cape lies in the vicious circle created by the primacy of Cape Town.

Cape Town is by far the largest city in the region. Over 90% of the settlements lie in the size range 5000 and less and there are substantial gaps in the urban hierarchy. Cape Town is the only centre of real size.

Because of its relative size Cape Town offers economies of scale, urbanization and localization and thereby tends to attract an ever increasing number of new firms which take advantage of the growing market, opportunities for greater specialization and proximity to major sources of decision making. In short, there is a polarization process occurring in which growth leads to still further growth. The extent of the problem is revealed graphically in Fig 2. This portrays the results of an iso-potential model which measures the relative pull or attraction of centres on a gravity basis.

This polarization process is one of the primary causes of depression in the periphery of the metropolitan area. As stated above, in economic terms growth leads to growth; moreover, those economic activities which occur in larger urban centres tend to have a higher wage structure than rural activities or activities occurring in smaller urban centres.

In social terms, the larger thresholds of urban centres enable the provision of a far greater range and diversity of social and cultural facilities than in other areas.

Consequently, in both social and economic terms, opportunities for individual advancement are far greater at the points of polarization than elsewhere.

The effect of this is that people migrate from places of relative depression to points of maximum opportunity. This process is

clearly revealed in the population shift map (cf. Perloff, 1963) which measures sub-regional rates of increase and decrease against the average for the region as a whole and which shows Cape Town and Saldanha-Vredenburg to be points of major growth. (Fig. 3) It should be noted that this map shows percentage shifts; in absolute terms, most of the growth has occurred in the metropolitan area.



Figure 2  
ISOPOTENTIAL MAP  
EXISTING SITUATION 1970




Figure 3  
POPULATION SHIFT 1960-1970

It could be argued that this migratory process is beneficial and will over time lead to an equalization of sub-regional differences but for two things: Firstly, there is a qualitative element about the migratory pattern. The people who migrate are the younger, the more intelligent and the more vigorous people — the people in short who give the sub-regional economies whatever vitality they have.

Consequently, the gap between the core and the periphery is constantly expanding, with the periphery stagnating more and more.

Secondly, demographic experience in many parts of the world has shown that there is a strong negative correlation between population increase and economic welfare (Kocher 1973).

The more depressed regions are the ones with the highest natural increase and dependency ratios (Table 3); consequently earnings which are already low need to be stretched to sustain more mouths; saving, and thus capital accumulation, which is necessary for economic growth becomes more difficult; and it becomes increasingly difficult to break out of the cycle of depression. The result of this is that the process of migration becomes a self-perpetuating one.

The second effect of the pattern of migration is in the creation of problems in the metropolitan area itself. The rate of migration is too great for it to be effectively handled by the urban system. It has been estimated that in the last decade some 25% of the growth of the metropolitan area has been due to in-migration (Cilliers 1973). The results of this have been in the self-reinforcing spheres of poverty and misery (notice that 66% of the Coloured population in the O1 region still live below the HEL); insufficient housing which results in massive squatting and unit overcrowding; increasing social pathologies such as disease, crime and the like; enormous pressure on infrastructural and social services; rapid urban sprawl, which results in the destruction of valuable agricultural resources; and increasing political discontent.

It thus appears that, in the light of regional problems and processes, the idea of controlling the growth of Cape Town through a policy of de-centralization is a sound one.

If the growth input and decentralization strategies are to succeed, however, the new centres must:

- (a) Establish themselves and survive as growth points: that is, they must grow to sufficient size for growth to become self-sustaining and have the economic characteristics to generate propulsive growth impulses through the region (Todd, 1974).
- (b) They must succeed in raising levels of welfare and reducing depression throughout the region.

Crucial to this are the related points of

- (i) Overcoming the primacy of Cape Town
- (ii) Creating conditions which stimulate economic growth and bring about income multiplier effects
- (iii) Diffusing the benefits of growth through the region. As shown above, unless this happens the stability which is necessary to raise levels of welfare throughout the region cannot be achieved.

All of these points are strongly interrelated.

At the heart of the problem of survival is the location and size of the poles in relation to Cape Town.

Experience in South Western France (Ponouil, 1969) has shown that an injection of raw material at the pole is not sufficient to generate growth. Large scale processing must also occur there. Moreover, if survival is viewed in the broadest sense to mean the fulfilment of the functions of a pole, then there are qualitative aspects about the growth which are necessary, for the amount and mix of industries (both in terms of backward and forward linkage and of other propulsive qualities) is of critical importance (Newcombe, *op cit.*).

At the present time the largest single obstacle to attracting the correct amount and mix of industries is the primacy of Cape Town, which is only 170 kilometres from Saldanha and which has a number of very strong relative advantages including infra-structural advantages, environmental advantages, labour advantages, market advantages and existing agglomeration economies. Generally speaking, those firms located in the metropolitan area have high entry thresholds, and the two most important factors affecting these thresholds are skilled labour supply and markets. Initially, of course, Saldanha will have none of these. Thus the firms most likely to be attracted are those which are located in smaller settlements and which have lower entry thresholds. Thus there is no guarantee that the growth point will make any major contribution to overcoming the primacy of Cape Town or that the mix of activities in terms of inter-industry linkage will be of the right type to create growth stimulus conditions.

Moreover, there are two factors which very strongly reinforce the primacy of Cape Town relative to Saldanha.

The first is a decision to connect Saldanha to Cape Town by

means of a high speed freeway, which will reduce travelling time between the two to just over an hour (construction of this has begun) and by a new rail link. (The precise alignment of the railway line has not yet been decided. It appears, however, that it will be to the West of Mamre and will have a loop feeding Mamre industrial area.) Experience has shown that the probable effects of these decisions will be to extend the market area of Cape Town and to encourage an outward flow or leakage of income from the depressed area. (Hirst, 1974, pp. 178-186; Taffe and Gauthier 1973, pp. 183-186). Thus the primacy of Cape Town will be re-inforced and it will become increasingly difficult to achieve the rate of growth necessary in the critical early stages of development.

The second relates to the railway rating structure which operates in South Africa. Under this structure, unit rates are considerably less for raw materials than they are for finished or semi-processed products. The effect of this is to distort locational factors in favour of the market as opposed to the source of raw materials. This, too, will serve to reinforce the primacy of Cape Town.

There would thus appear to be considerable grounds for the belief that large scale industrial growth of the right kind is unlikely to occur spontaneously at Saldanha and if the pole is to succeed, it must be reinforced through coercive action.

As mentioned above, the mechanism for coercion exists through the power vested in the Department of Planning to withhold industrial permits in controlled metropolitan areas.

Another difficulty now arises, however, for there appears to be a fundamental conflict between the pole concepts of Saldanha and Mamre.

Mamre is located between Saldanha and Cape Town, and seems to have considerable locational advantages over Saldanha. It is linked by rapid communication lines to both Saldanha and Cape Town; industrial infrastructure is being provided by government finance; it is closer to the larger markets of the metropolitan area than Saldanha; and far-reaching incentives are being offered to industrialists locating there by the government. It is probable therefore that the prevention of industrial expansion in Greater Cape Town will encourage growth at Mamre rather than at Saldanha.

However, the success of decentralization to Mamre is dependent upon the continuation of incentives which are subsidized by the tax payers. Incentives cannot be provided indefinitely and experience in the English Mark 1 New Towns and elsewhere indicates that Mamre is too close to Cape Town for it to become occupationally self-contained. Consequently, when incentives are lifted, it is probable that most demand for industrial sites will revert back to Cape Town. This force will probably affect the form of the metropolitan area and move towards the establishment of a development axis between Cape Town and Mamre. The net result will be vastly increased movement (both economic and commuter) between Cape Town and Mamre — precisely the opposite effect to the one which is intended.

Moreover, in regional development terms, growth at Mamre is unlikely to reduce the primacy of Cape Town. The probable effect of the growth was measured by running the iso-potential model with the size of Mamre at 500 000 people and all other sizes held constant. It can be seen (Fig. 4) that the growth of Mamre will increase, rather than reduce, the primacy of the South Western corner of the Western Cape, thereby exacerbating the problems of the region.

It can thus be concluded that severe implementational difficulties face the establishment of growth points in the form intended by the authorities.

Even if the growth points establish themselves, however, they must succeed in raising levels of welfare and diffusing the benefits of growth through the region before they can be judged as successful in moving towards an amelioration of regional problems.

The first point which must be considered, then, is the process of growth generation and welfare increase. A number of necessary pre-conditions which must be met if a growth point is effectively to raise levels of welfare have been recognized. (Penouil, *op cit*):

(i) "Its technical content must be within reach of the economic and human environment of the depressed areas" (*ibid*, p 100). If the activities established are too complex, or are too

automated, large scale employment in the relatively depressed areas will not be generated, either because sub-contracting industries and technical staff will not be available locally, or because jobs will not be created. In the case of Saldanha, the ore loading and steel producing processes envisaged are highly automated and will not provide many jobs (Department of Water Affairs, 1974).

(ii) "The more processing of a product than can be undertaken locally, the greater will be the development impact. Once provided that the raw material can be exported as such, it is a matter of chance whether complementary 'induced' activities appear or not" (*ibid*). As mentioned above, it is likely that much of the processing activity will occur outside of the region.

(iii) "Allowance must be made for the repercussion of activities on employment and distribution of incomes" (*ibid*). Critical in the generative process is the income multiplier effect. The greater the recourse to local manpower, the greater the wage bill distributed and the stronger the induced effects. At Saldanha, however, most of the planned inputs are capital, rather than labour, extensive; consequently, little local labour will be employed and the growth-inducing effects are likely to be considerably less than envisaged.

In the opinion of these authors, it is highly unlikely that inputs at Saldanha will generate anything like the growth anticipated by the authorities.

A second point relates to the diffusion of growth and innovation through a region.

The process of diffusion is as yet incompletely understood (Berry, 1972; Tadd, 1974) but it is well established that the impulses of growth and change originate in larger centres, are transmitted vertically down the city system, and horizontally outwards from these centres, permeating their surrounding spheres of influence. The direct impact of the pole on welfare is likely to be a very short distance one, due to a rapid distance decay function, and limited to the orbit of daily commuting journeys. The success of the pole, then, is determined by how far indirect benefits can be spread. This, in turn, is dependent upon regional strategies relating to the city system, and infrastructural links connecting the system (it has been recognized that the most powerful diffusion effects occur along these links).

All of this requires a high degree of planning, and there is no indication that this planning is occurring.




Figure 4  
ISOPOTENTIAL MAP  
Size of Mamre increased to 500 000 people

## Conclusion

It thus appears that the decisions to provide a developmental input and 'regional centre' at Saldanha and a "growth point" at Mamre face severe implementation difficulties and may well aggravate already severe regional problems.

At the heart of the problem is the fact that there is a fundamental conflict between the concepts of a 'growth point' and a 'decentralization centre' in the way in which they are being applied in the Western Cape. The problem is confused by terminological difficulties.

The 'regional centre' concept at Saldanha is similar to the 'growth point' concept, in the international meaning of the term — the introduction of a developmental input at a particular point, with the potential for overcoming regional problems and improving regional and sub-regional levels of welfare.

The 'growth point' at Mamre is in fact a decentralization point and is primarily concerned with the redistribution of economic and population growth from an existing metropolitan area.

The concepts are not inherently conflicting, but they become conflicting when pursued in isolation. The Mamre concept is not primarily concerned with regional problems, but with metropolitan and ideological concerns. However, the implementing mechanisms being applied to achieve these limited ends are likely to be strong enough to siphon off many of the intended benefits of the Saldanha scheme. If this occurs, it is likely to worsen, and not alleviate regional problems. There is thus an urgent need to co-ordinate the ends of decentralization and growth. This can only be achieved by concentrating the mechanisms designed to achieve both on one centre.

From the point of view of regional problems and processes, a growth point at Saldanha has a higher potential for success than one at Mamre. However, there is no guarantee that a growth point will emerge, simply through the introduction of a raw material, some basic processing activities, and the application of certain incentives. Moreover, even if Saldanha did grow to a size of one million people, it will not succeed in overcoming the basic problem of the Western Cape, which is the primacy of Cape Town. The iso-potential model shows the establishment of a fairly weak outlier of dominance around the pole but the basic pattern remains unchanged. (Fig. 5).

If the growth point idea is to succeed, it must be built into a comprehensive regional development strategy. The base of the pole must be carefully planned and implemented; contradictions between Mamre and Saldanha must be eliminated and developmental and infrastructural patterns throughout the entire region must be considered in the light of diffusion and other processes.

Finally, it must be emphasised that physical planning actions *per se* will not be sufficient to overcome regional problems and raise levels of welfare. Policy decisions which have a fundamental effect on the distribution of income and other factors must be taken concomitantly (Dewar and Cort, 1974).

Figure 5  
ISOPOTENTIAL MAP  
All towns as at 1970 except Saldanha — 800 000



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