PROCEDURAL PLANNING THEORY: THE SYNTHETIC NECESSITY*

John Muller
Professor of Town and Regional Planning
University of the Witwatersrand

Manuscript accepted February 1987.

**This paper is based on the paper presented at the international planning theory conference "La Teoria Nelle Pratiche Di Pianificozione", held in Turin in September 1986.*

Procedural planning theory has, over a period of many years, been subjected to criticism on various grounds. The current critique is based on the perception that the procedural model is divorced from context – that it is a theoretical construct separated from socio-political reality. The tendency to separate the procedural from the substantive fields of planning theory has been reinforced by a fairly broad body of work concerned with the classification of planning theory. While the classification typologies have value in the comparative analysis they provide of the attributes of various theoretical approaches, they have tended to negate or neglect the significance of the connectivity between theories. The view presented in this paper is that procedural and substantive connections are essential to planning-in-practice and that if procedural theory fails to accommodate these linkages, it should be recast in non-theoretical methodological form. The elements of planning theory can then be freely connected or synthesized, transferred to the methodology of planning and incorporated in the practice of planning.

Beplanningsteorie word jare lank reeds op verskeie grondslae gekritiseer. Die huidige kritiek berus op die waarneming dat die teorie van beplanning nie verband hou met die konteks waarin dit moet funksioneer nie, d.w.s. dat dit 'n teoretiese skepping is, verwyder van sosio-politiese werklikhede. Die neiging om aspekte van prosedure te skei van die substantiewe terreine van beplanningsteorie word verder onderhou deur 'n aansienlike hoeveelheid studie wat handel oor die klassifikasie van beplanningsteorie.

Alhoewel die waarde van klassifikasietipes in 'n vergelykende analise van die bydraes van die verskillende teoretiese benaderings lê, neig hulle om die waarde van skakeling tussen die teorieë te ignoreer.

Die uitgangspunt van hierdie artikel is dat die skakeling tussen teorieë van beplanning en substantiewe skakelings noodsaaklik vir praktiese beplanning is. As die teorieë van prosedures nie daarin slaag om hierdie skakeling te bewerkstellig nie, moet dit deur nie-teoretiese vorms vervang word.

Die elemente van beplanningsteorie kan dan vrylik gekonnekteer of sintetiseer, oorgedra na beplanningsmetodologie en in beplanningspraktyk ingelyf word.

1. PROCEDURAL THEORY – THE DEBATE

One of the long-standing and distinctive features attaching to procedural planning theory must surely be the critical debate to which it has been, and still is, subjected. The quintessential procedural model, the rational – comprehensive process, has been disparaged and denigrated for some two to three decades but, as Dalton (1986) has recently reiterated, it has been decidedly slow in succumbing to the attack. The early and familiar rejection by Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) of the tenets of rational-comprehensive planning, led Bolen (1967), twenty years ago, to pose the "real question" as to whether this model could, or should, adapt to meet the challenges of the critics at that time. Although the current set of challenges draw strength from arguments other than the limitations of man's technical problem-solving capabilities, the same question could be (and indeed is being) asked today.

It is now common cause that the burden of the present critique of procedural theory is in the perceived inability of the procedural model to recognize and accommodate socio-political reality. Procedural theory is viewed as having collapsed in the face of the radical, humanist and pragmatic offensive (Healey, McDougall and Thomas 1982); as having abdicated its paradigmatic status (Alexander, 1984); as a distinctive form of thought and action that is unconnected with the substance of the real world and is thus, in the familiar words of Thomas (1979) "contextless" and "contentless"; and as "indeterminate abstraction" embodying "vapid empirical content" (Scott and Roweis 1977).

The latter argue that the abstract rationality of procedural theory disguises the instrinsically political quality of planning intervention by transforming that intervention into no more than administrative decision-making rules. Substance and procedure are thus divorced; a separation that Roweis (1983:143) characterizes as a "standard article of faith in mainstream planning theory". The quest to link procedural and substantive theory is rejected by Taylor (1984) who puts the proposition that procedural theory is a formal or a priori conceptual theory intrinsically unconcerned with empirical or synthetic considerations, and that materialist critiques of the theory are thus fallacious. This proposition is in turn questioned by Huw Thomas (1985:59) who asserts that ". . . the approach to analytical philosophy must be one which is conscious of the political and moral context of philosophical debates . . ."

This dialectic is appealing and the arguments and counter arguments are by and large persuasive, but one is led to wonder where the intellectual muscle-flexing is now leading; where and how it contributes to the furtherance of planning-in-practice. While accepting the bond of reciprocity between theory and practice, it is a matter of concern when the trappings of theory are used to smother the problems and promise of practice. Reference to the philosophy of science – to the principles of rationality and scientific method – shows that planning procedures are by nature neither rationally nor empirically pure, and it is therefore questionable – probably presumptious – to expect purity in procedural theory. Accordingly, since procedural theory has limitations when measured against the principles of "real" or accepted theory, perhaps it would be sensible to remove it from the rarified realms of theory and recast it in *methodological* form. Methodology is, after all, the area of concern and content of procedural theory and it is in this area that the theory makes its contribution to the practice of planning.

This is the approach that is adopted in this paper. The focus is on *planning procedure* rather than procedural theory. In order to illustrate the manner in which theory can inform and support practice, elements will be drawn from the field of planning theory and (freed of the bonds of theoretical rigour) applied to the methodology of planning. The intention is to delve into theory and extract elements pertinent to practical planning procedures – an approach which in principle emulates that of William James, the American philosopher of pragmatic persuasion, who made "raids into philosophy" in order to relate academic philosophy with common life. This approach will gather together those procedural, substantive and contextual elements in planning theory that have long been construed as separate – and which have been presented as such in various models or typographies on the classification of theory. Inasmuch as the predilection among theorists is divorce and delineate theory into discrete camps is probably most pronounced in these categorization models, they can usefully serve as a means of identifying and synthesizing those theoretical elements that should feed into planning procedure.

2. CLASSIFICATION OF PLANNING THEORY

The differentiation between procedural and substantive theory is clearly the most common and recurrent feature of classification models. This twofold categorization appears to have had its beginnings in the distinction between theories of the planning process and theories concerning phenomena which Hightower identified in his study of planning school curricula in the late 1960s. In this early entry into the field of theory classification, Davidoff and Reiners' Choice Theory (1962) and Banfield's Conceptual Scheme (1955) are cited as procedural theories, which are "properly identified as planning theory", and Reilly's Law is presented as an example of phenomena or substance which is "not part of the theory of planning per se" (Hightower 1969:326). The qualification is made that the distinction between process and phenomena is "sometimes arbitrary" and that certain areas of activity such as citizen participation enter the "boundary zone between procedural and substantive theory" (Hightower, 1969:327).

The selection by Hightower of Choice Theory as a prime example of procedural theory is not surprising. Its three-stage process of value formulation – means identification – effectuation was seen as a work of seminal importance when it was first published in the early 1960s and remains recognized as such today. Less well recognized and remembered is Davidoff and Reiners' (1962:37) concluding assertion that, while it had become necessary to focus on planning method, "procedures and substance cannot be treated separately". They state unambiguously that the planning act or process derives from a consideration of the substantive properties of the world-as-it-is. Choice Theory is nevertheless classified outside the boundary zone as pure procedural theory and even today is described as perhaps the most articulate expression of the rational planning model (Alexander, 1984).

Faludi (1972:7) accepts Hightower's explicit distinction and echoes it in the familiar split between theory of planning (procedural) and theory in planning (substantive). In suggesting however that the categorization "should not result in an entirely separate development of the two", he acknowledges the relationship between the two. The element of mutual exclusion is implicitly recognized as a denial of factual conditions – as indeed it should be. A planning procedure is a methodological response to an issue within prevailing societal conditions (substantive reality) and these conditions are transformed through planning intervention (procedurally structured) into new sets of conditions, which must then impact on subsequent procedural approaches. If, as Roweis (1983) states, it is not possible to describe how planners should plan without reference to substance – which is surely true – then the differentiation between theories of planning and theories in planning must be rejected.

The general acceptance of the split procedural/substantive model as common cause in planning circles would seem to make rejection a difficult proposition. Statements that address the interrelationship of the two are frequently vague: the ". . . main problem with this dichotomous classification is that the line between substantive and procedural theory is blurry . . ." (Hudson, 1979:396). It is precisely because there is no line between the two that the interface appears blurred. It is, in an intellectual and practical sense, not a line but an overlap – a meshing of the one with the other – and it is for this reason that

delineation is found problematic. Hudson (1979:396, footnote) does in fact make the point that "procedures are often specialized in their application to particular substantive problem areas. Typically, in fact, a new procedure is invented to deal with a particular problem". Excluding the questionable notion of regular procedural invention, this is a common sense statement that serves to highlight the practical links between procedure and substance.

McCallum (1974) presents another view. In support of the contention that the "confused state of planning theory" results from a lack of adequate distinction between fundamentally different sub-sets of planning theory, he introduces an additional component. The body of theory is divided into three: theories of society, of the generic planning process and of urban/regional phenomena. Emphasis is placed on the heterogeneity of the field of planning theory and the "real differences between qualitatively distinct sub-sets of the field" (1974:739). The tripartite classification results from a separation of societal and phenomenal issues, previously accommodated under the common substantive umbrella. Inasmuch as theories of society incorporate the values and decisions of the formal institutions of society, and it is those institutional or political decisions of society that give rise to the spatial and socio-economic patterns contained within theories of urban/regional phenomena, the split simply creates a gulf across which unnecessary bridges must be built. Further, and as indicated previously, the removal of the decision-based theories of the "generic planning process" from the institutional contexts within which planning operates, places planning in a vacuum. And it is of course largely against this scenario that the critique of the procedural model is directed.

Published at the same time as McCallum's article, Friedmann and Hudsons' "Knowledge and Action: a Guide to Planning Theory" (1974) reviews the traditions of planning theory primarily in terms of Hightower's planning process category. In what is probably still the broadest coverage of the attributes of procedural theory in the classification idiom, the authors identify four intellectual traditions and associated cross-influences. It could be argued that the tradition of rationalism constitutes the only category accurately correlating with Hightower's procedural definition; that the humanism of the philosophical synthesis tradition is far removed from the methodological concerns of planning procedure and that the transference of the tenets of the organization development tradition to the institutional processes of planning is (by the author's own admission) problematic. However, Friedmann and Hudsons' (1974:3, 5) statement that the "compartmentalisation is by no means watertight", and their search for patterns of "cross-fertilization and synthesis among the traditions which have been separated in the past . . ." serve to underscore the contention that classes of theory should not be isolated. This becomes clear when a few of the seminal works cited and classified in their paper are extended from one category to another. The philosophical writings of Mannheim enter the tradition of rationalism through the means-ends conceptions of functional and substantial rationality; Dahl and Lindblom's work belongs as much to the rationalism tradition as to that of philosophical synthesis (in which it is placed) since their incrementalist decision model constitutes both an interpretation of and reaction to the premises of rationality, and the four-stage conceptual plan derived from Meyerson and Banfield's Chicago study obviously moves beyond the tradition of empiricism into that of rationalism. Etzioni's model of the active society is located within the tradition of philosophical synthesis – logically so, since his concept of societal guidance is pertinent to the work of the planning theorists of the new humanism school. Etzioni could, however, have been accorded equal prominence in the rationalism category, where he receives little more than a passing reference. The meshing of elements of the synoptic and incremental decision processes in his mixed scanning strategy is in itself of importance to planning procedure, but the synthesizing of the strategy with social and political systems is certainly of comparable significance. In analysing the levels of power, control and concensus in totalitarian and democratic societies, and relating these to mixed scanning, incremental and rationalistic models, Etzioni (1967, 1968) provides a telling example of the reciprocal relationship of substance and procedure.

The interaction between political structure and planning procedure is accepted by McConnell (1981). He expresses the view that "because planning practice is dependent on the sanction of those with political power on each level of government with a responsibility for planning, planning theory must be related to political theory if it is to relate to practice". In other words, planning practice must inevitably be related to political systems. He goes on to say that since planners are concerned with societal well-being in their decision-making processes, planning theorising should be moderated by ethical reasoning. The politico-ethical dimension then gives rise to an additional category: to theories in planning and theories of planning is added a third category, "social theories for planning". This latter classification is perceived as offering explanations of, and prescriptions for, society, and as relating to political and moral theory. It also explains "why planning is as it is". The correlation between planning and political theory has been illustrated elsewhere: Fainstein and Fainstein (1971) draw analogies between traditional, user-oriented, advocacy and incremental planning, and technocratic, democratic, socialist and liberal political theories respectively. Studies such as this reveal the political values that underpin various planning procedures and indicate why certain societies favour and adopt certain procedures rather than others. Planning method relates to political culture – as illustrated by the chosen procedural approach in any country at particular times.

Hudson's SITAR classification (1979) is, unlike those previously discussed, not derivative of the procedural/substantive convention, but is a mix of methodology (synopticism), political analysis (radicalism), professional role (advocacy), planning style (transactive planning) and decision-making approach (incrementalism). The five traditions, which are shown to have distinctive internal attributes, are subjected to comparison on the basis of a uniform set of criteria. Hudson (1979) accepts that the selected traditions and evaluative criteria are matters of personal choice but does not query the validity of entering upon a comparative analysis of disparate approaches with essentially different purposes and per-

spectives. Can a radical political philosophy be rigorously and directly compared with a sequentially structured methodology? While the answer is no, the conclusions drawn from the comparative study have value: "systematic evaluation of historical precedents like these would help create more realistic strategies for getting diverse traditions to work together . . . The real issue is whether any planning style can be effective without parallel imputs from other complementary and countervailing traditions. According to Hudson (1979: 396) the synoptic planning tradition . . . has serious blind spots, which can only be covered by recourse to other planning traditions". These sentiments provide direction but fall short of explanations and illustrations as to how, and in what circumstances, planning approaches can be combined.

Hudson suggests that advocacy planning does not replace synoptic planning, but provides the latter process with a broader perspective on issues such as the public interest. Conversely, advocacy can itself adopt much of the synoptic method in the production of alternative plans, while adhering to the principle of promoting and articulating the interest of disadvantaged groups. Integration of role and method is evident here. This is not without significance since writings on the role of the planner have in the past frequently excluded consideration of the procedure or methodology which would give practical meaning to the role. Mediation is interesting in this context: Webber (1978:7) perceives the purpose of the mediator/facilitator as being the opening up of governmental processes to all parties by "improving the process of public debate and public decision", but is not explicit in respect of the practical means of doing so. In addressing the function of the planner within the state apparatus, Roweis (1983) sees urban planning as professional mediation in territorial politics – as the interpretation of territorial realities and the effect which such knowledge-based interpretation has on political actions. The general thrust is on the planning function in the production or reproduction of workable spatial organization and not on methodological prescription. More recently however, Susskind and Ozawa (1984) have used a number of case studies to illustrate the modus operandi of mediation, and in doing so have provided useful (if largely apolitical) indicators of the ways in which particular planning roles incorporate procedural approaches appropriate to circumstances or context. Similarly, the application of the process of strategic choice in Dutch planning practice (Dekker and Mastop, 1979) could be regarded as a methodological interpretation of the tenets of incremental decision-making, the successive rounds of problem definition and comparison being consistent with Lindblom's method of successive limited comparisons.

Strategic choice occupies a prominent position in Faludi's (1982:82) three planning theory "paradigms" – being pertinent to his decision-centred view of planning; the "heir to the throne after the abdication of procedural planning theory". The decision-centred view, together with the object-centred and two control-centred views of planning, constitute the components of this classification. Unlike his earlier categorization, Faludi now enters the political domain. Marxist ideology is equated with the total control-centred approach, liberalist concepts with the partial control-centred approach and democratic ideals with the decision-centred view of planning. The convergence between the latter view and the procedural model is clear: the work of Banfield, Davidoff and Reiner, and Friend and Jessop, is cited as precedent. Although Geddes' incipient procedural approach is seen by Faludi (1982:90) as carrying with it "the seeds of the decision-centred view", it is interpreted solely as object-centred and characterized as a "fallacious planning doctrine". Simplistic as it appears today, Geddes' model has made a clear (yet unsung) contribution to planning: it represents the first attempt to join civic substance with a structured decision-aiding methodology.

Ultimately, and interestingly, Faludi returns to his previous procedural/substantive dichotomy by questioning whether a separation of the two categories is possible in decision-making, and whether the fundamental problems facing planners do not require solutions different to those conventionally advanced. The questions are rhetorical: the substance of particular problems requires the application of appropriate procedures to generate solutions peculiar to the problems.

The final classification model to be considered is that of Healey, McDougall and Thomas (1982). Their concern is that of the plurality of planning positions and the lack of critical evaluation and understanding of those theoretical positions. The discussion moves from the premise that various theoretical stances – such as those held by the political economy, humanist and pragmatic schools – have fairly recently emerged in opposition to, or as further developments of, procedural planning theory. Their arguments are interesting: social and advocacy planning are classified as developments of procedural theory, and as being attached to the promotion of sectoral values while accepting "the general method" of planning. Thus the methodological or procedural convention is construed as capable of accommodating the interests of the disadvantaged under a social or advocacy planning approach. Activities falling under the implementation and policy category are similarly developmental to procedural theory in that "theoretical perspectives shift around the functionalism typical of procedural theory". Incrementalism is presented as a procedural development in that it attempts to construct an alternative decision-making methodology. While the incremental approach arguably, and indeed originally, stands in opposition to the rational-comprehensive model, its recognition as an outgrowth of the latter model is obviously valid. The major opposition resides in the Marxist-based new political economy school which presents procedural theory as a mechanism of the capitalist state, the productive mode of which perpetuates unequal resource distribution and hence class conflict. The rational, technical and apolitical underpinnings of the synoptic method and its offspring have been roundly discredited through the critical analysis and explanations of advanced capitalist society by the proponents of the political economy approach. The radical left has thereby broadened the planning fraternity's understanding of socio-economic organization and the power base of the state, but has offered little in the way of prescription or procedure to the planner.

The radical new humanism position is also placed by Healey, McDougall and

Thomas (1982:17) in opposition to the procedural model, but again this antithetical approach offers planning no modus operandi – it tells planners "what they should do in a different world but (says) little about what to do now". This pithy statement serves to underscore the previously-made point on the need to extend theoretical approaches into the methodological domain, if such approaches are to be amenable to practical implementation.

3. ELEMENTS OF CLASSIFIED THEORIES

The classification of planning theory is not in itself a field of theory. It is essentially an analytical exercise that seeks to uncover the underlying characteristics and premises of the areas of intellectual investigation which fall under the general heading of planning theory. As a form of analysis, it is not concerned with synthesis; the primary thrust is that of disaggregation. The classification models have accordingly separated out fields of planning theory in various ways. (Figure 1) In so doing they have tended either to sever the connections between the fields or have failed to show how and where the connectivity occurs. It is of course this which has occasioned criticism of procedural theory by Thomas and others; it is this that Roweis has attempted to correct and it is this separation that, in the analytical philosophical view of Taylor, should be regarded as theoretically proper. It is primarily this connective issue that has precipitated the procedural theory impasse.

If however the concern is with practical issues of planning procedure rather than the nuances of theory (which is the stance adopted in this paper), then elements can be taken from the body of theory and synthesised to show the factual interdependency of the substantive and procedural components of planning. The eight classification models reviewed previously have isolated and categorised a variety of theories and, hence, elements. Of these elements, a few are common to all models, some appear in the majority of the models and others, although not explicitly recognised in all models, have a significance that should be acknowledged. The elements identified in this way pro-



FIGURE 1 PLANNING THEORY: CLASSIFICATION MODELS

vide the basis for a synthetic framework for planning theory – for a framework developed around the interrelationship of the elements of theoretical approaches. These elements are summarised as follows:

– *The political system.* The proposition that the political dimension extends across the planning field is no longer a matter of debate. It is, perhaps, largely through the work of the theorists of Marxist persuasion that there is now a broad acceptance of the bond between planning and politics, and that between the planning function and the operations of the state. Since political parameters are perceived by the critics as absent in procedural theory, it is necessary that the linkage of politics with procedure (and indeed with other aspects of planning) be demonstrated. The fundamental importance of the political system has only fairly recently been reflected in classification models – it is touched upon by Hudson and is thereafter more clearly incorporated in the categorizations of McConnell, Healey et al and Faludi (1982).

– *The institutional structure.* The political system finds expression in the formal institutions of the state and society. These are the instruments of power, through which the policy-making, resource distribution and other control mechanisms are exercised. Planning operates largely within the formal institutional structure, but not exclusively, as Dyckman (1983) demonstrates. The less formal institutions – citizen groups, community organizations and the like – also bear upon planning activity. Advocacy and mediation are obvious examples. The institutional element is evident in the work of McCallum, Friedmann and Hudson, Faludi and Healey, McDougall and Thomas.

– *Socio-economic conditions.* The social and economic environment is of course a contextual element of planning. Socio-economic conditions are indicative of the efficacy (or otherwise) of state policy and have been at the base of much of the theorising in the planning discipline. The justifiable concern with the circumstances of disadvantaged sectors of society has, for example, been extended from early sociological and physical studies into the fields of political reform (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1982) and democratic decision-making (Webber, 1978). The socio-economic surrounds of planning activity are contained within the sustantive theoretical categories in the majority of the classification models previously discussed.

– *Spatial organization.* The preceding elements are ultimately manifest in patterns of land use, land development and land values – all of historical and contemporary import to planning. The early studies emphasizing the physical end-results of land use planning retain relevance, but have (in a theoretical sense at least) been supplemented by more probing investigations into the political underpinnings of territorial allocations (Roweis, 1983), state involvement in areas such as housing (Marcuse, 1982) and the provision of public services (Rich, 1982). Spatial organization is a substantive issue and is covered in the "phenomena" classifications of Hightower and McCallum, and in the substantive and object-centred categories in the two Faludi models.

Ethical stance. The four contextual elements outlined above are subject to morally-grounded interpretation by the planner. This interpretation, this exercise of professional ethics, has a direct impact on the way he executes his responsibilities. Issues central to the planner's ethical stance – conscience, obligations, responsibilities and values – have been fairly extensively covered in the literature recently (Klosterman, 1978; Howe and Kaufman, 1979; Bolen, 1983) and serve to indicate that neutral attitudes to political and societal conditions are no longer tenable. Ethics has deep and historical philosophical connotations and is tied to theoretical interpretations of reality: socio-historical, politico-economic, epistomological, phenomenological, etc (de Neufville, 1983). Such theories give direction to ethical approaches. Communications theory in the work of the critical theorists is an example. With the exceptions of Friedmann and Hudson, who enter the ethical field in their philosophical synthesis category, McCallum, who touches on ethics briefly, and McConnell who invokes the Rawlsian theory of justice in his "theories for planning" category, the classification models are silent on this issue.

– *Planning role.* The contextual, theoretical and ethical elements make up the crucible in which the role of the planner is formed. The planner's role has been variously defined over the years: technician, analyst, facilitator, mediator, teacher, inventor (Webber, 1978), entrepreneur, administrator, advocate and guerrilla (Alexander, 1979). But the manner in which the role emerges from the theoretical and practical context – and the extent to which it is consistent with the perceptions and perspectives attaching to the context – is not infrequently obscure. The correlation of instrumental rationality with community-based utopian visions of the good life is, for example, found "ironic" by Dyckman (1983). There is, similarly, a lack of clarity in the transference of the planning role to a compatible procedural approach: ". . . Friedman gives no agenda to guide transactive dialogue, and Lindblom provides neither size nor direction for any increment in particular." (Hoch, 1984:341). The issue of the planning role – if not its connections – is addressed at varying levels of detail by Friedmann and Hudson, Hudson, Healey et al and Faludi.

– *Planning procedure.* All the classification models incorporate procedure as a category of planning theory. As observed previously, the practical realisation of the goals of any planning approach requires the application of an appropriate methodology. It is surely in the nature of a professional discipline – medical, legal or any other – to seek to resolve a problem through the use of suitable modus operandi, and planning is not an exception. The overriding consideration is, however, that of the suitability, the relevance, the appropriateness of the adopted planning procedure in relation to the contextual, theoretical and ethical elements. There is, to state the obvious, no single procedure capable of resolving all problems and no problem amenable to all procedures. The outright rejection of the synoptic model fails to recognize its latent propensity for modification, for adaptation to circumstances, or to acknowledge that the most effective methodology may well be a sensible mix of the attributes of more than one procedural approach (Muller, 1982). In the end, planning procedure or methodology must address, and be informed by, the political, social, economic, institutional and spatial issues that constitute the surrounds of planning – as

well as by the ethical and operational (role) issues that derive from those surrounds.

Procedure is thus tied to context, and to the obvious extent that problems reside within and develop out of a particular context, and exhibit characteristics symptomatic of that context, it follows that problem and procedure are inseparable. Adam's (1932:15) adage of the early 1930s is still apposite: "The art of planning is as much the art of perceiving the problem to be solved as it is the art of presenting a design for its solution". Accurately identified, the problem should function as a determinant of not only the methodology to be used in the search for a viable solution, but also as a means of exposing contextual conditions – which then bear directly upon the role and ethical attitude of the planner.

4. SYNTHETIC FRAMEWORK

The framework illustrated here (Figure 2) incorporates the elements identified in the preceding section.

The linkages between the elements – horizontal, vertical and diagonal – indicate the interlacing nature of planning theories, and thereby confront the practice of separating and delineating theories into discrete categories.

While the intensity of the interconnectivity between the various elements is not constant and, indeed, may vary with personal interpretation, the fact that there is a definite form of connection between each and every element is deducible from the framework. For example, the vertical link 1-3-6 joins the political system with the ethical stance and role of the planner. To the obvious extent that the "question is not whether planning will reflect politics, but whose politics will it reflect" (Long in Klosterman, 1978:39), planning cannot but enter ethical field. If the planner is party to the promotion of public policy objectives, it must be assumed that the dictates of his conscience and values permit acceptance of those objectives. An adherent to Rawl's principles of justice would support distributive policies which benefit the disadvantaged, and would be morally bound to reject those institutional policies that further entrench the favoured position of the affluent. Bolen (1983) refers to the professional pull between the teleological and deontological ethical view: whether good ends should be sought regardless of means or whether good ends should be forfeited if the means are intrinsically wrong. Ethical judgement of the defensibility of politically based institutional policies (or, equally, of private sector programmes) now falls squarely within the planner's bailiwick – he can no longer assume the discredited stance of a neutral, value-free scientist, technician or administrator. The planner's ethical position extends logically to that of the planner's role. The early value-free planner gained guidance from logical-positivist and rational means-ends approaches to support his role as a technical expert. Now, the ethical concern with political and social equality, which stem from the ideals of democratic theory, carry through to the representational principles of the advocacy role. The analytical critics of capitalism have a moral stance which leads them to socialist theory and on to largely undefined roles supportive of welfare and oppositional to market capitalism (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1982).



FIGURE 2 SYNTHETIC FRAMEWORK

The diagonal link 2-4-6 correlates the role of the planner with planning procedure and institutional structure. This introduces, inter alia, the function of the planner operating within the bureaucracy, and the associated conflict situation between official policy and planning ideology that can arise in problematic planning environments. The difficulty of undertaking an advocacy role in city government – of attempting to reconcile sectoral interests with the public interest – illustrates the point. The activities of the private sector advocate, mediator or transactive planner are perforce located within the parameters of the institutionalized power structure of the state. These parameters also serve to define the procedural approaches open to the planner, in the form of statutory prescriptions attaching to planning permission.

The split procedural/substantive convention is addressed in the 1-4-7 diagonal linkage. Governmental policies and decisions mirror politically-based

values and goals, and are realisable through the application of planning method. Etzioni's and the Fainsteins' correlation of political value systems with rational, incremental and other planning procedures highlight the conjunction of political systems with planning methodology. Some political climates are amenable to participatory processes while others are not and incline toward processes that accommodate pre-determined policy ends. Further, the procedural mode of planning must be a response to a particular issue or problem, which cannot but be a reflection of socio-economic conditions – which are, in turn, a manifestation of the resource-distributive goals of the political system.

Turbulent socio-economic conditions may preclude the use of sophisticated, time-consuming methodologies, and call for the adoption of less complex, possibly piece-meal, planning procedures; the environmental orientation of the traditional comprehensive planning approach has applicability in physical improvement programmes. The latter serves as an illustration of the ethical stance/planning procedure/spatial organization (3-4-5) combination. Inner city physical renovation requires of the planner a clear sense of responsibility in respect of the affected community, and the formulation of a modus operandi that is compatible with those community-directed concerns.

The above examples seek to demonstrate the inter-dependency and interaction of the elements of planning theory. On this basis, the conception of the synoptic procedure as a methodological approach based primarily on the premises of rationality and divorced from the socio-political surrounds of planning has limited validity.

It has validity only where planning methodology and procedural planning theory are seen as synonymous and procedural theory is perceived as an abstract model for decision-making: an intellectual construct, a "discipline of the mind which does not itself make claims about the nature of reality" (Thomas, 1985:58). But this denies both the historical development of the procedural base of planning and the use of the rational-comprehensive process in practice. The incipient Geddesian survey-analysis-plan procedure was devised precisely as a means of ensuring that factual societal data formed the basis of the plan-making process. This procedure has, over the decades, been expanded by the incorporation of the principles of systems and decision theory, but its application remains tied to real-world-derived data. The manner in which the data has been interpreted and has been procedurally applied may well be open to criticism on social, political and ideological grounds, but the fact remains that the data is fed into the procedural model and the model is used as a practical methodological medium for addressing and seeking to resolve planning problems in the real world.

5. SOUTH AFRICA

The planning situation in the Republic of South Africa provides an example of the working of the elemental linkages outlined in the synthetic framework. While there is today a universal awareness of the untenable conditions pertaining in the Republic under the doctrine of apartheid, less is known of the effect of the separatist racial policy on planning activity and procedures. Apartheid has in fact given planning in South Africa a "split personality, two faces, clearly evident in the marked differentiation in ethical approach in planning for the Blacks and Whites. Planning for the White group has been prescriptively permissive, that for the Black sector has assumed a form of puppetry played out under the guiding hand of the state" (Muller 1983:18). Thus, "planning in South Africa emerges as a comparatively mildly constraining process in the White social system and as a highly constraining process in the Black social system". (Fair and Muller 1981:179). Since planning for the White group follows by and large the conventions of the British planning system and the operation of the free market, it reflects only partially the workings of government policy. Planning for the Black majority has however been an integral activity in the implementation of the apartheid policy and illustrates well the interaction between context, substance and procedure.

The political system is clearly manifest in the spatial organization of South African society. Separation in space is evident at the national level in the form of designated "homelands" for the various Black tribal groups, four of which have opted for self-rule or autonomy – albeit under conditions of economic dependency on the Republic. Racial segregation is more tangible in the urban areas of South Africa where the lower income Black population is, typically, housed in extensive dormitory settlements on the urban fringe. A comparison of the density and environmental patterns between these settlements and White suburbia provides a clear picture of socio-economic differentiation in the cities.

Planning for urban regions is currently executed under the Guide Plan procedure of the government Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. These Guide Plans designate long term land uses on, inter alia, the basis of state policy for industrial location and population distribution. The Guide Plan, which is a binding legal document, is a blueprint (that product of a discredited form of planning) and makes little concession to the prospect or inevitability of change. The procedure that spawns the Guide Plan is perhaps best described as a modified version of the comprehensive planning approach. It certainly cannot be construed as rationalistic since the procedure is constrained in terms of alternatives and the like, and is exclusionary in respect of purpose. It is a process that is oriented toward the protection of the interests of the White minority and is thus consistent with the prevailing political ideology.

The role of the planner operating within such procedural parameters can be construed as that of the apolitical technical expert. It is a role centred around the production of means to meet the predetermined ends of state policy. As Catanese (1984:59) says "The apolitical-technical planner uses traditional techniques and methods of planning . . . They try to perform these technical functions without invoking their political and social values, although many will acknowledge that this is not always possible". This latter comment pushes role definition toward ethical considerations. There is an ethical judgement in the formulation of a problem – about what is included in the problem – and there is consequently an ethical attitude in the adoption of a planning procedure which seeks to resolve the problem. It must accordingly be concluded that those planners con-

tributing directly to the implementation of the state's objectives have an ethical stance congruent with apartheid ideology.

But this is, in my view, a negation of the ideology of planning; a dismissal of the principles on which planning was founded and on which its philosophical superstructure has been built. The 19th century seeds of modern planning were planted in the fertile bed of social reform in Great Britain and the United States: in the sanitary, public health and housing reform movements which sought to expose and remove the reprehensible living conditions of the labouring poor (Muller, 1983). This disciplinary responsibility to the disadvantaged sector of society remains an ethical imperative today. At a time of turbulance and change in South Africa, that responsibility must be recognized by the planning fraternity and must be translated into role and procedure. This must be done in the interests of the credibility, and hence effectiveness, of the planning profession in the changed social order of the future.

6. CONCLUSION

The foregoing brief review of South African planning illustrates the fundamental linkages that join political system, institutional structure, socio-economic conditions and spatial order with planning role and ethical stance. The practical inter-relationship of the various elements with planning procedure places questions at the door of the convention that separates the substantive and procedural components of planning theory. Further, if theoretical rigour precludes the meshing of fields of planning theory then, in the quest to improve the efficacy of planning-in-practice, it is defensible and sensible to extract pertinent elements from the corpus of theory and link these to planning procedure. Such synthesis is necessary if planning theory is to support and be complementary to practice.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Financial assistance rendered by the Human Sciences Research Council through its Management Committee of the HSRC Investigation into Research Methodology for undertaking the research is hereby acknowledged. The views expressed in this work or the conclusions drawn are those of the writer and should not be regarded as those of the Human Sciences Research Council or the Management Committee of the HSRC Investigation into Research Methodology.

REFERENCES

Adams, T. 1932. *Recent Advances in Town Planning*. London, J and A Churchill.

Alexander, E. R. 1979. *Planning Roles and Context*. In Catanese, A. J. and Snyder, J. C. (Eds). Introduction to Urban Planning, New York, McGraw-Hill.

Alexander, E. R. 1984. "After Rationality, What?" *Journal of the American Planning Association*. Vol. 50, No. 1, Winter.

Banfield, E. C. 1955. In Meyerson, M. and Banfield, E.C. *Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest*. New York. The Free Press.

Banfield, E. C. 1959. "Ends and Means in Planning." *International Social Science Journal*. Vol. 11, No. 3.

Bolen, R. S. 1967. "Emerging Views of Planning." *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*. Vol. 3, No. 4, July.

Bolen, R. S. 1983. "The Structure of Ethical Choice in Planning Practice." *Journal of Planning Education and Research*. Vol. 3, No. 1.

Baybrooke, D. and Lindbolm, C. 1963. *A Strategy of Decision*. New York. The Free Press.

Catanese, A. J. 1984. *The Politics of Planning and Development*. Beverley Hills, Sage Publications.

Dalton, L. C. 1986. "Why the Rational Paradigm Persists – The Resistance of Professional Education and Practice to Alternative Forms of Planning." *Journal of Planning Education and Research*. Vol. 5, No. 3.

Davidoff, P. and Reiner, T. A. 1962. "A Choice Theory of Planning." *Journal of American Institute of Planners*. Vol. 28, No. 2, May.

Dekker, F. and Mastop, H. 1979. "Strategic Choice: an Application in Dutch Planning Practice." *Planning Outlook*. Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter.

de Neufville, J. I. 1983. "Planning Theory and Practice: Bridging the Gap." *Journal of Planning Education and Research*. Vol. 3, No. 1.

Dyckman, J. W. 1983. "Reflections on Planning Practice in an Age of Reaction." *Journal of Planning Education and Research*. Vol. 3, No. 1.

Etzioni, A. 1967. "Mixed-Scanning: a 'Third' Approach to Decision-making." In Faludi, A (Ed). *A Reader in Planning Theory*. Oxford. Pergamon Press.

Etzioni, A. 1968. *The Active Society: A Theory of Society and Political Processes*. New York. The Free Press.

Fainstein, N. N. and Fainstein, S. 1971. "City Planning and Political Values." *Urban Affairs Quarterly*. March.

Fainstein, N. N. and Fainstein, S. 1982. "New Debates in Urban Planning: the Impact of Marxist Theory within the United States." In Paris, C. (Ed). *Critical Readings in Planning Theory*. Oxford. Pergamon Press.

Fair, T. J. D. and Muller, J. G. 1981. "The Johannesburg Metropolitan Area" In Pacione, M (Ed). *Urban Problems and Planning in the Developed World*. London. Groom Helm.

Faludi, A. 1973. *Planning Theory*. Oxford. Pergamon Press.

Faludi, A. 1982. "Three Paridigms of Planning Theory." In Healey, P, McDougall, G and Thomas, M J (Eds). *Planning Theory: Prospects for the 1980s* Oxford. Pergamon Press.

Friedmann, J. and Hudson, B. 1974. "Knowledge and Action: a Guide to Planning Theory." *Journal of the American Institute of Planning*. Vol. 40, No. 1, January.

Healey, P., McDougall, G. and Thomas, M. J. 1982. "Theoretical Debates in Planning: Towards a Coherent Dialogue." In Healey, McDougall and Thomas (Eds) *Planning Theory: Prospects for the 1980s*. Oxford. Pergamon Press.

Hightower, H. C. 1969. "Planning Theory in Contemporary Professional Education." *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*. Vol. 35, No. 5, September.

Hoch, C. J. 1984. "Pragmatism, Planning and Power." *Journal of Planning Education and Research*. Vol. 4, No. 2.

Hoch, C .J. 1984A. "Doing Good and Being Right." *Journal of the American Planning Association*. Vol. 50, No. 3. Summer.

Howe, E. and Kaufman, J. L. 1979. "The Ethics of Contemporary American Planners." *Journal of the American Planning Association*. Vol. 45, No. 3, July.

Hudson, B. M. 1979. "Comparison of Current Planning Theories: Counterparts and Contradictions." *Journal of the American Planning Association*. Vol. 45, No. 4, October.

Klosterman, R. E. 1978. "Foundations for Normative Planning." *Journal of the American Institute of Planning*. Vol. 44, No. 1, January.

Marcuse, P. 1982. "Determinants of State Housing Policies: West Germany and the United States." In Fainstein, N and Fainstein, S (Eds). *Urban Policy under Capitalism*. Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.

McCallum D. J. 1974. "Planning Theory in Planning Education." *The Planner*. Vol. 60, No. 6, June.

McConnell, S. 1981. *Theories for Planning*. London. Heinemann.

McLoughlin, J. B. 1969. *Urban and Regional Planning: A Systems Approach*. London. Faber and Faber.

Muller, J. G. 1982. "Promotive Planning: Towards an Approach to Planning for the Disadvantaged." In Healey, P, McDougall, G and Thomas, M J (Eds) *Planning Theory: Prospects for the 1980s*. Oxford. Pergamon Press.

Muller, J. G. 1983. *Theory and Practice: The Janus Face of Planning*. Johannesburg. Witwatersrand University Press.

Rich, R. C. 1982. "The Political Economy of Public Services." In Fainstein, N and Fainstein, S (Eds) *Urban Policy Under Capitalism*. Beverly Hills. Sage Publication.

Roweis, S. T. 1983. "Urban Planning as Professional Mediation of Territorial Politics." *Environment and Planning. D:* Society and Space. Vol. 1.

Scott, A. J. and Roweis, S. T. 1977. "Urban Planning in Theory and Practice: A Reappraisal." *Environment and Planning. A*. Vol. 9.

Susskind, L. W. and Ozawa, C. 1984. "Mediated Negotiation in the Public Sector: the Planner as Mediator." *Journal of Planning Education and Research*. Vol. 4, No. 1.

Taylor, N. 1984. "A Critique of Materialist Critiques of Procedural Planning Theory." *Environment and Planning B*. Vol. 11.

Thomas, H. 1985. Analytical Philosophy and Planning Theory. *Planning Outlook*. Vol. 28, No. 2.

Thomas, M. J. 1979. "The Procedural Theory of A. Faludi." *Planning Outlook* Vol. 22, No. 2. Autumn.

Webber, M. 1978. "A Difference Paradigm for Planning." In Burchell, R W and Sternlieb, G. (Eds) *Planning Theory in the 1980s*. New Brunswick The Centre for Urban Policy Research.