Die politiek van ekonomiese hervorming: Die geval van Tanzanië

Abstract

Fund in Africa have been the subject of intense debate in the la st two decades. However, the process whereby the leaderships of African states come to accept that economic reforms as required by SAP's are indeed necessary, or alternately come to reject such reforms, has not been well documented and studied.

It is suggested that the prospect of economic aid is a powerful incentive for African leaderships to agree to SAP's, but whether such reforms are actually implemented depends on whether the leadership of the given state considers them desirable. African governments can turn such programs into an adversarial relationship with the International Financial Institutions (IFI's), particularly when programs are agreed upon, only to be reneged upon once the initial tranches of payments have been received.

It is also argued that the internal political process within the leadership (the executive branch) of a given state, is of critical importance if such programs are to be successfully implemented. It examines the relationship between the leadership of Tanzania and the IFI's between 1980 and 1986 to illustrate how economic reform was only undertaken in earnest once reform-minded members of the leadership achieved predominance in the government.