The battle of Kursk: An appraisal of the Soviet and German operational doctrines

Authors

  • Abel Esterhuyse Stellenbosch University
  • Evert Jordaan Stellenbosch University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.38140/sjch.v28i2.362

Abstract

Operation Zitadelle (Citadel), the German attack on the Kursk salient on 5 July 1943, constituted the final attempt by the German Army to retain its operational initiative on the Eastern Front. The Russians knew that the Kursk salient was a great temptation to the German Army. The German General Staff's classic reaction to an enemy promontory, an enemy -held outpost stretching beyond the general run of the front line, had always been to pinch the promontory off by attacking each of its flanks simultaneously. This was precisely what the Germans did at Kursk when Field Marshall HG von Kluge attacked the salient from the north, while Lieutenant-General FE von Manstein struck it from the south.

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Published

2003-06-30

How to Cite

Esterhuyse, A., & Jordaan, E. (2003). The battle of Kursk: An appraisal of the Soviet and German operational doctrines. Southern Journal for Contemporary History, 28(2), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.38140/sjch.v28i2.362

Issue

Section

Articles