Dirty scapegoats: Explaining Israel's ties with South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s

Abstract

The article surveys five possible explanations for the ties between Israel and South Africa between the 1970s  and  1980s.  (1)  The  Industrial-Military  Complex  Explanation,  arguing  that  both  the  Israeli  and  South  African  defence  establishments  and  arms  industries  had  much  to  gain  from  such  a  relationship,  and  enough  political  influence  to  ensure  that  this  would  indeed  happen.  (2)  The  Nuclear Alliance Explanation,  arguing  that  it  was  in  Israel  and  South  Africa’s  national  interest  to  forge  a  nuclear  consortium  that  would  enable  them  to  attain  and  further  develop  significant  nuclear  capacities, conceived  by  both  states  as  the  ultimate  means  for  guaranteeing  the  survival  of  their  chronically-contested regimes. (3) The Ideological Affinities / similar Regime-Type Explanation, arguing that, while Israel  was  unable  or  in  any  case  reluctant  to  publicly  admit  it,  it  was  not  averse  to  the  South  African  regime  of  separate  development,  mostly  because,  ever  since  1967,  it  was  on  a  course  of  constructing  its  own  version  of  such  a  regime.  (4)  The  Pariah  States  Alliance  Explanation,  arguing  that  Israel  and  South  Africa  shared  the  same  international  status  of  pariah  states,  hence  having  no  other  states  they  could befriend, and in any case nothing to lose from collaborating with each other. (5) The Politics of International Pariah-Making Explanation, arguing that the concept of the pariah state – which emerged in 1977 and disappeared by the end of the 1980s – was not a naïve scholarly attempt to conceptualize a new type of international actor, but rather an ideological construct, meant to re-justify the United State’s support  for  some  of  its  more  embarrassing  client  states,  while  restructuring  the  precise  way  in  which  that support was provided.