THE IMPACT OF WAR ON ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA: TWO SOUTHERN AFRICAN CASE STUDIES

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1950s, and especially during the 1960s, African countries became independent one after another, following an era of colonial rule. Only a few countries made the transition in a relatively peaceful manner (for example, Botswana and Zambia); and only a few of the newly independent states became politically stable countries in the long term (for example, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana). In numerous cases, tribal/ethnic differences, partisan political leadership, class and élite conflicts, and coups d'état became major destabilising factors (for example, Ethiopia, Ghana, Sudan, Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) and Nigeria).

Relative latecomers to the independence process were Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and 1976, respectively, and Namibia in 1990. In 1961, South Africa cut its ties with the Commonwealth and declared a republic. Although South Africa gained its independence from Britain in 1961, it only held the first truly democratic elections in 1994. Some radical sociologists and historians describe South Africa's minority rule between 1948 - after the election victory of the National Party over the United Party - and 1989, as "colonialism of a special type" (Kotze in Liebenberg et al., 1994).

Angola and South Africa have been selected as case studies because, for historical, ideological and geo-strategic reasons, the latter country played an important role in Angola's history and civil war though the 1970s until 1989. Angola experienced a prolonged and destructive civil war, lasting 25 years, and exacerbated by South Africa's "total onslaught strategy".

After a colonialist period of more than 250 years under Dutch and British colonisers, South Africa inherited white-dominated rule in 1910 from Britain. This laid

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the foundation for apartheid and social conflict. The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), a war for scarce resources, erupted between Boer and Brit. The outcome of this war led to South Africa becoming the land of "Boer and Brit". In addition, Land Acts such as the 1913 and 1936 Acts stripped black South Africans of their rights to own any property except in so-called native reserves. In 1948, the National Party (apartheid) government came to power and black resistance, still essentially peaceful (since 1906), became widespread. The banning of various organisations such as the Pan African Congress (PAC), the African National Congress (ANC), the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and the SA Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) led to these organisations going underground. An armed struggle against legalised apartheid and minority rule ensued. South Africa, in contrast to Angola, suffered social dislocation owing to the implementation of apartheid laws and the extended low-profile civil war inside the country. South Africa's foreign adventures in southern Africa also affected the country and its people.

Developments and conflicts in Angola and South Africa were influenced by one factor above all others, namely apartheid rule and its effects internally and externally. The social, ecological and political consequences of this far-reaching policy/ ideology will be discussed in this paper. Before concluding, the authors will address the post-war period, as well as the need for sound civil-military relations and civil control over the military to prevent social disturbances, conflict and the transgression of human rights in the future.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This article is a qualitative documentary study based on the content analysis of secondary sources of information on the effects of war in Angola and South Africa respectively. Underlying this methodological technique is a functionalist perspective. The main premise is that social and military matters of an institutional and political-dynamical nature are regarded as organised systems of activity directed to realise specific goals or functions in order to survive as systems in the greater southern African society. Social dysfunction and disruption refer to the consequences of the violent conflict in Angola and South Africa.

One of the authors had the opportunity to take part in the qualitative national research project on South African youth (1984-1992) - the so-called "lost generation" - and to become involved in a study on street and shelter children in 2003. Both researchers also gained extensive qualitative experience working on a project on demobilised SA soldiers and cadres during 2000/2001. This study was initiated by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), funded by the European Union and executed by All Africa Consultants, an independent research organisation

based in Pretoria. These experiences and project outcomes contributed to the data collection. The authors' continued involvement in civil-military matters and issues of conflict and demobilisation between 2002-2005 also inform this article.

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ANGOLAN/SOUTH AFRICAN "BORDER" WAR

In 1915, during World War I, South Africa, under the dominion of Great Britain, occupied Südwestafrika [later South-West Africa (SWA), now called Namibia], which was a German colony. After the war (1914-1918), the Peace Treaty of Versailles, signed in June 1919, stipulated that a defeated Germany had to cede all rights to its former colonies. The League of Nations entrusted the Namibian territory under guardianship to South Africa to govern as a Class C Mandate. The territory was considered not viable as an independent state at the time. In the language of white South Africans, it became "our fifth province". In 1949, the first of many World Court cases regarding the status of the territory, began in The Hague in the Netherlands. The newly formed United Nations claimed the right to govern the territory, but South Africa appealed against the decision. This was the beginning of long and protracted World Court cases over the territory's governance (Ferreira 1994:43).

During 1957, a group of migrant labourers formed the Ovambo People's Congress (OPC) in Cape Town. Their contact with organisations like the ANC and the SACP, and the harsh realities of migrant labour, made them politically conscious. Inevitably, a process of politicisation started. One of the founders of OPC was Andimba Herman Ja Toivo, who served in the Native Military Corps of the Union of South Africa during World War II. At first, the aims of the organisation were somewhat less directly political. It was an attempt to put an end to the contract labour system. In 1959, the organisation's name changed to the Ovambo People's Organisation (OPO), with Sam Nujoma as its leader. OPO focused on social grievances and followed the examples of agitation in other white-ruled African countries to the north by becoming increasingly militant. This was the beginning of a new liberation movement. (Liberation struggles in SWA dated as far back as the Herero and the Witbooi People's revolt in 1904, and the Bondelswarts' revolt in 1921. What these movements set in motion, became a reality when the Namibian flag was finally hoisted in Windhoek in 1990.) In 1960, the name of the organisation changed to "South West African People's Organisation" (SWAPO). Its nationalistic approach was complemented by a socialist ethos. On its request, the Soviet Union provided weapons and partial financial backing. However, most financial support came from Scandinavian and some European sources, rather than the Soviet Union. SWAPO now became a radical revolutionary organisation.

Cadres went to communist countries for guerrilla training (Stiff 1989:9). SWAPO established its headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, and formed a military wing called the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in 1962. It had offices in Moscow, London, New York, Stockholm, Dar es Salaam and various other cities. The armed struggle became a reality.

In February 1966, SWAPO fighters attacked two Portuguese trading stores in southern Angola and killed five people. At the time, SWAPO had about 30 trained insurgents who were spreading the message to fight. In July 1966, South African Police (SAP) and Air Force helicopters attacked an insurgent base at Ongulumbashe. The police action paralysed this insurgency attempt and destroyed the only fixed base SWAPO ever had in SWA over a period of 23 years of war (Steenkamp 1990). Two insurgents were killed and nine taken prisoner. These actions officially started the Namibian/Angolan/SA war.

Despite the 1971 decision of the World Court in The Hague that SA's presence in SWA was illegal, the SAP remained deployed in the territory. By 1973, however, they could no longer counter SWAPO infiltration. The SAP was numerically not strong enough to keep the peace in South-West Africa and South Africa with its increasingly strained political circumstances. From 1974, the SA Defence Force (SADF) was given the responsibility of counteracting the SWAPO insurgency in the operational area on the Namibian/Angolan border (Steenkamp 1990:23). Low-key insurgency continued, and SWAPO infiltrated the Caprivi strip as well as Ovamboland, planting landmines that targeted policemen and Defence Force personnel.

Since 1961, the Portuguese in Angola had been fighting an insurgency war against three nationalist guerrilla armies. In the north, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) under Holden Roberto was fighting with backing from Zaire (Mobuto Sese Seko), Communist China and some Arab states. In the south, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Dr Jonas Savimbi, a proclaimed anti-communist, were launching attacks with some support from Zambia based on tribal loyalties. These loyalties changed after the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) of Dr Agostinho Neto took power in Angola. Nonetheless, Savimbi requested and received military equipment from Communist China. South Africa and the American CIA also supported Savimbi (Ciment 1997:12). The MPLA was supported with money and arms by, among others, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries (Stiff 1989:12). In Lisbon, the so-called "Carnation Revolution", following the publication of General Spinola's book *Portugal e' Futuro,* led to a war-weary Portuguese military and citizenry staging a coup d'état that ousted President Caetano. The Portuguese

granted Angola its independence on 11 November 1975. The three rebel movements began fighting one another to gain control of the country with its oil-, diamond-, coffee- and cotton-rich assets before independence.

According to Ciment (1997:2), patched-together accords with the three rebel movements in Angola were entered into, but a civil war broke out. Despite the chaos, some people thought that a smooth transition would ensue after independence. Around April 1975, following SA incursions into Angola, Cuban support for and advisers to the MPLA arrived. In the aftermath of Operation Carlota, the Cubans entered the war in Angola on the side of the MPLA, while the USA secretly and temporarily supported UNITA of Jonas Savimbi (Deutschman 1989:41). The FNLA and UNITA movements found out too late that the Portuguese were more inclined towards supporting the MPLA. By August 1975, the MPLA, with Cuban assistance, took control of Luanda and became the new Angolan government. The FNLA collapsed and Savimbi retreated into the bush to prepare for the next battle for power (Ciment 1997:2). (The MPLA only later formally adopted the name of the MPLA: The Workers/Labour Party and declared its "socialist orientation" (Risquet 2003:8)). The South African government, driven by an anti-communist ethos, regarded SWA's new socialist neighbour as a threat. The USA, Britain and France covertly supported SA. According to Stiff (1989:12-3), Zambia and Zaire approached South Africa and asked for assistance against the "communist onslaught", despite the fact that they were sworn enemies of white-ruled countries. (Other observers disagree with Stiff. The Zambian government under Kaunda, for example, was sympathetic to the ANC – an organisation that worked in partnership with the SACP.)

Initially, South Africa was reluctant to support any of the warring factions, but when the MPLA advanced towards Luanda, after taking every important town, the South African government decided to support UNITA more actively to secure SWA's border. In 33 days, the SADF rampaged through the southern part of Angola, coming to within artillery distance of Luanda. When it became clear that USA promises of covert support had evaporated, the South African forces withdrew into SWA. According to sources, the Cubans had 15 000 troops deployed when the MPLA took control. Other sources mention between 20 000 and 36 000 soldiers, of which a third returned to Cuba by the first quarter of 1977 (Risquet 2003:6). Already by middle-1976, both Cuba and the Neto government foresaw a Cuban withdrawal. However, things soon became more complex. UNITA took to the bush and with South Africa's help fought against the MPLA, who was backed by Cuba. The MPLA takeover was to SWAPO's advantage, since the new government was sympathetic to their cause. SWAPO now established guerrilla-training bases in Angola, which was a matter of concern for the South African government.

From October 1977, SWAPO infiltrated SWA on a regular basis and frequent clashes with South African forces became a common occurrence. For instance, when some 80 SWAPO guerrillas entered Ovamboland, 61 insurgents and six SADF paratroopers were killed on 27 October 1977 after a series of skirmishes. Apart from acting against SWAPO on the Namibian border, South Africa wanted to pressurise the Cubans to leave Angola. General Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of the SADF, argued afterwards: "We wanted the Cubans out of Angola. That was our chief objective. Nothing could help to stabilise the situation in southern Africa as a whole more than the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola" (Bridgland 1990:372).

In an escalating semiconventional war, South Africa embarked on deep-penetrating operations and had a semipermanent presence in the southern part of Angola, until the New York agreement was signed on 22 December 1988. This agreement proposed 14 principles as a basis for peace between Cuba, South Africa and Angola. The agreement with the Cubans to withdraw from Angola in exchange for the simultaneous withdrawal of the SADF, as well as the independence of SWA, was, according to Bridgland (1990:375), the most important consequence of the "war for Africa".

After 23 years of border warfare in SWA/Namibia and Angola (1966-1989), South African representatives and a Cuban-Angolan delegation signed the Mount Etjo agreement on 9 April 1989. On 18 May 1989, after extensive negotiations, all parties decided to implement UN resolution 435 supporting the New York agreement (Ferreira 1994:45). Namibian exiles and refugees started returning home. The estimated number of exiles was around 70 000. Under the aegis of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a massive airlift brought exiles and refugees back to Namibia. The operation comprising 452 flights started on 12 June 1989. In the course of several weeks, 36 000 refugees from Angola, 3 200 from Zambia and 2 500 from 41 other countries were brought home. By the end of 1989, 42 736 Namibians were back on Namibian soil (UNTAG 1990). By November 1989, the last 1 500 South African troops withdrew from SWA after the certification of the Namibian election (UNTAG 1990). In 1990, Namibia became independent.

Meanwhile, Savimbi's role in the new Angolan government remained unclear. He rejected the results of the election he had expected to win and retreated to the bush once again, refusing to demobilise. He returned to war, occupying large pieces of the countryside, including the diamond-rich Guango basin. This "second war" led to vicious conflict, killing more people in two years than in the previous 20 years of civil war (Ciment 1997:4). In 1994, the Lusaka accord was signed between the

MPLA and UNITA, obliging Savimbi to accept the outcome of the 1992 elections, to demobilise and return the occupied territories to state administration. The UN supervision of the demobilisation process was effective but time-consuming. In 1996, it was reported that 80% of UNITA troops had handed in their weapons (Ciment 1997:4). By mid-1997, the UN imposed a set of financial sanctions against UNITA in an attempt to force them to finally demobilise, but UNITA responded by occupying even more land. In 1999, renewed fighting broke out between government troops and UNITA. From 2000 onwards, the government implemented a strategy to deprive UNITA of all rural support, which unfortunately also starved the rural community. This contributed to a "dreadful humanitarian situation in the country" (Lari and Kevlihan 2004:30-1). In February 2002, Savimbi was cornered and killed by FAPLA forces. His death facilitated the end of the war. On 4 April 2002, the civil war, which had been raging since 1975, was officially ended by the signing of an agreement between the Angolan military and UNITA (Lari and Kevlihan 2004:29).

The end of the SA/Namibian border war in April 1989, and Namibia's independence in 1990, gave rise to the South African viewpoint that war now belonged to the past. The SADF budget was cut drastically in the period from 1989 to 1992 - by 35% in real terms. The new no-threat scenario went hand in hand with various other occurrences, all of which affected the SADF. These were:

1) The internal political transitional arrangements that transformed the SADF into an integrated national force incorporating the six former liberation armies. The new SA National Defence Force (SANDF) was established in 1994.
2) A change in leadership occurred when President FW de Klerk was replaced by Mr Nelson Mandela in 1994, and lastly,
3) the rationalisation and demobilisation of SA troops, mainly due to economic considerations and a changed threat scenario.

4. NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

The extensive system of apartheid that permeated every level of SA society since the 1960s, generated a great deal of social conflict and civil strife (Horrell 1971; Hund and Van der Merwe 1986; Frankel, Pines and Swilling 1988). Apartheid's effects resulted in widespread resistance by the 1980s, and a political stalemate by the 1990s. As an illustration of the far-reaching consequences of apartheid, it can be mentioned that more than 3,5 million South Africans were resettled under the various **Land Acts** and other legislation regarding residential segregation and "homeland" establishment. These **Acts** include the **Bantu Authorities Act, No. 68**

of 1951, the **Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act** of 1959 and the **Bantu Homeland Constitution Act** and amendments (1962-1970s). Muriel Horrel (1971: 28ff) describes in detail the Acts that regulated the territorial and residential segregation and occupation of (black) land and premises. The 1913 **Land Act** precipitated the destruction of a growing number of black landowners and a prospering black middle class. Systematic land grabbing by successive white regimes had the benefit that, apart from the destruction of the black land-owning class, black people could now be drafted for the industrial, mining and rural labour markets at minimal cost (Gerhardt 1978:21-2).

As resistance escalated, the apartheid government was forced to resort to increasingly stringent, even brutal, acts of repression. SA moved from a police-type state structure under Prime Minister Vorster to a more sophisticated "repression through reform" dispensation under PW Botha from 1978 onwards (Frankel 1980: 1984). Under the pretence of reforming apartheid and minority rule, state power was centralised, the economy militarised and a National Security Management System (NSMS) established, assisted by the executive presidency of PW Botha and the State Security Council (SSC), already established in 1972. Internal oppression coincided with an escalation of hostilities in Angola and a period of destabilisation of the Frontline States, particularly Angola and Mozambique, which were regarded as puppet Soviet governments by the apartheid regime. As part of the internal oppression programme, the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) was established to act against ANC/PAC/SACP activists. Driven by an extreme sense of insecurity resulting from the communist "total onslaught" paradigm, the Nationalist government felt compelled to secure its superiority by defending its interests, in both SA and Namibia.

4.1 Influence on the SA youth

South African society was deeply influenced by the conflict in Angola. Domestic lifestyles changed. White male teenagers were drafted for two years of compulsory military training at the age of 16, or after completing their final school year. This developed a new sense of patriotism and security consciousness in young white men. Socialisation through the Afrikaner Nationalist and "total onslaught" paradigm increasingly resulted in political intolerance.

SA experienced a great deal of socio-political change during the late 1980s and the 1990s. Military deployment and the transition to democracy posed many new challenges. According to Liebenberg (1994:97), the information and research available at the time regarding SA youth was inadequate: "Their fears, aspirations, skills, attitudes towards and awareness of opportunities in the social, economic and

political spheres are largely unknown." Studies by Booysen (1990:35f) and Gagiano (1990:10ff) confirmed that, by 1990, white students entering tertiary education displayed political intolerance and a militaristic mindset. White youths became more militarised because of their compulsory military training, and were intolerant towards other races and ideological viewpoints that differed from their own.

After 1973, black youths in particular became militant through the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) - alienated from an increasingly exclusive and oppressive state and socialised in a mode of militant resistance. Their actions and consequent socialisation were aimed at alienating or polarising SA society even further. These conflicting trends continued after the transition to democracy. Children were experiencing new political consciousness, and parents had to cope with rebellious children. Re-education and re-socialisation of these youths in order to integrate them into the democratic society in an orderly way, remain unfulfilled social needs even today. These negative attitudes perpetuate the vicious cycle of unrest and crime. People cannot find employment, which leads to poverty, followed by crime committed to satisfy basic needs.

After the first democratic elections in April 1994, thousands of political refugees returned to the country. The SA economy could not accommodate all these new job seekers. Unemployment amongst the SA youth is a common phenomenon. According to the 1996 population census released by Statistics South Africa (SSA), the overall rate of unemployment in South Africa was 34%, with the Eastern Cape and Northern Province registering the highest rates, namely 49% and 46% respectively (SSA 1996:46). The census data for unemployment released by SSA in 2004, recorded an unemployment rate of 37% for black people, 22% for coloured people and 23% for Asian/Indian people (SSA 2004: 65-6). However, these statistics are contested by research institutions and experts in the industrial field. They estimate that the national unemployment figure was about 38% in 2005. Unemployment is particularly rife among young white males, since they are not part of the equity group designated to benefit from affirmative action.

Due to lack of economic growth and to some extent affirmative action in SA, white youths are finding it difficult to obtain employment. White youths are leaving the country in their hundreds every month to work in the UK, Canada, Australia and the USA at menial jobs, since they cannot even find this type of employment in SA. Even if they are already qualified, they find it difficult to practise their vocations overseas with temporary work permits. Therefore, young white people are viewed by some as the primary victims of contract and casual labour. Besides the emigrating white youth, SA is experiencing a fairly disruptive class-based "brain drain",

which entails that many white, coloured and Indian people skilled in the medical, information technology and engineering fields are leaving the country. Black youths who took part in the liberation struggle are suffering likewise, as they are experiencing a backlog in education and their expectations regarding employment, social services and access to better lifestyles are not being met, adding to the alienating results of relative deprivation.

Negative trends attributed to unemployment include rising levels of crime, drug and alcohol abuse, drug peddling, unmarried parenthood among young women, suicide among young men and domestic violence arising from the poverty and loss of self-esteem associated with unemployment. After 1994, the SA government opened the country's borders to all Africans from other parts of the continent. While some legal and illegal immigrants did make positive contributions to the economy, there were downsides too. Certain immigrants brought drug syndicates and smuggling cartels with them. This is confirmed by several recent drug busts by the SA Police Services in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. It seems that Nigerians, Tanzanians and Chinese (triads) in particular are involved. Both white and black youths experiment with drugs, and soon find themselves addicted. Those who have jobs lose them as a result, and so the cycle of unemployment continues. Many SA youths experience a sense of marginalisation and a loss of faith in educational qualifications and training schemes, since the economy does not enable everyone to find a job, regardless of qualifications and race.

Sociological accounts of the problematic nature of youth unemployment rest on the assumption that, in Western societies, employment is critical to making the transition from childhood to independent, responsible and law-abiding adulthood (Elliot 1996:96). Employment is supposed to bring young people the attained status or prestige of having a job, the power of an independent income and independent social relationships beyond the control of their parents; however, unemployment threatens this orderly progression through the "normal" stages of life (Elliot 1996:99).

4.2 Family structure

During the war, the family structure of South Africans changed from the "conventional nuclear family" to that of families with absent fathers, or female-headed families. (Some estimates suggested that as many as 300 000-400 000 young white men were conscripted between the middle of the 1970s and the end of the system in 1990/1991.) Most civilian fathers were obligated to do military service, and therefore left their families unattended for months on end. The same applied to ANC cadres, youths or guerrillas going underground or into exile. Permanent members of

the military force were seldom at home during operations in the course of the Angolan/SWA war - particularly those who were members of the rapid deployment forces. Family ties were broken, since some wives had extramarital affairs and then divorced their husbands when they returned. Several studies were conducted during the 1980s on families with absent fathers, functional and structural changes, role fulfilment, the gender-based division of labour, power patterns in families and family dysfunction (Ferreira 1984). The main conclusions of these studies were that, although the SADF and the state benefited from men going to war, family roles became dysfunctional and some wives experienced trauma and anxiety as a result of being alone and having to cope with additional daily tasks and raising children on their own. The same applied to wives of freedom fighters/guerrillas, who remained in the country while the men went into exile. In some cases, wives and children were left behind in other African countries when guerrillas/cadres returned to SA after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990.

Political transition brought other problems. Since the SADF budget was cut drastically, many soldiers were rationalised and demobilised, without the possibility of finding other employment. In Pretoria, where the headquarters of the SANDF are situated, thousands of ex-military men and women are currently unemployed, which has a serious effect on their family life and social status. Some MK cadres turned to crime, and were caught in hijackings and heists of cash-in-transit security vans. Some are currently serving jail sentences, which have a detrimental effect on their families. Families of ex-detainees and of the security forces, both in the past and at present, suffer from symptoms of dysfunction due to past experiences. This was not unexpected, since returning cadres were integrated into the new SANDF, only to be demobilised immediately thereafter with less than optimal financial remuneration (Roefs and Liebenberg 2001).

Black family life during and before the war was also affected by migrant labour. The apartheid system was, by definition, a system that suggested that races should develop separately. It was the central factor in undermining and destabilising African family life through the system of forced removals in the 1960s, which relocated thousands of blacks, coloureds and Indians to remote areas with no infrastructure. They had to resort to migrant labour to find work in the "white cities". Political harassment in the form of pass laws, arrests and detention without trial was a regular occurrence. The family structure was affected, as members seldom saw one another or lost contact altogether. Male family heads became absent migrants. Some mothers were also forced into migrant labour, and children mostly grew up with grandparents. Migrant labour debilitated black family structures. As resistance increased, the detention of activists led to poverty-stricken families, especially in the 1980s.

4.3 Rationalisation and demobilisation as negative consequences of the war

Rationalisation of the SA military began immediately after the end of the SWA/ Angolan war in April 1989, when supernumerary posts that had not been budgeted for by the SADF had to be filled by returning soldiers, previously remunerated by the SWA/Namibian government. Rationalisation was again instituted after the April 1994 elections, by way of natural attrition (resignations, deaths and discharges and freezing of posts). However, as the defence budget was constantly being cut, it was inevitable that the existing human resource structure had to be reduced accordingly. Since 1989, the defence budget has declined in real terms by more than 49%. Massive budget cuts slashed defence spending from 4,3% of the GDP in 1989 to 1,6% (R8,7 billion) in 1997. Furthermore, the integration of the seven different armed forces into the new SANDF led to an almost 35% increase in personnel numbers (Uys 1997:58). This created increasing financial pressure. Inevitably, contradicting tendencies led to the need for rationalisation and the demobilisation of soldiers. The latter caused imbalances in the staffing of the new SANDF, particularly among soldiers of the former SA Army. The SANDF managed to keep its total numbers down to 90 000 members, compared to a potential figure of 140 000 that could have resulted from the integration process. The goal was to rationalise members to a total number of 70 000 by the end of 2000.

Rationalisation was an unavoidable process in the SANDF although it was regarded as ambivalent, in the sense that it is functional for the military system itself, but at the same time dysfunctional for the individual members whose posts were terminated (Ferreira 1994:213,215). Rationalisation in itself is not a democratic process, as it is usually enforced upon people through new requirements for a smaller force structure and the imbalances between the structure and personnel of the SANDF. The rationalisation imperative focused on aspects such as efficiency, formulae and calculations amidst transitional circumstances, but failed to take the personal expectations and goals of members, as well as their human dignity, into account (Gerth and Mills 1977:50). In the SANDF, this process was purely finance-driven.

The negotiated settlement between the NP and the ANC had a specific effect on the nature of the demobilisation process. An arrangement was made for MK (ANC cadres) and APLA (PAC cadres) to return to South Africa as "unarmed civilians" (Mashike 2000:66). No formal assembly of soldiers took place. When they arrived in South Africa, the only concern was for their economic reintegration. They were given R50 each, and sent back to their respective communities. They had to wait for two months before they received grants of R300 each, administered by Khotso House. Most of the soldiers received six payments of R300 each. Some were paid up to R2 500 (Mashike 2000:66). A number of these soldiers found alternative

employment while waiting for the formal demobilisation process, while others lived in absolute poverty. The older cadres/guerrillas (50 years and older) were the worst off. Their chances to re-enter the labour market were slim, while their chances of being integrated into a new rationalised SANDF were even more remote (Liebenberg and Roefs 2001).

The formal demobilisation and reintegration of MK and APLA soldiers (as well as a small number of AZAPO guerrillas) into SA society began after April 1994. Legislation to this effect was only passed in 1996. Initially, the main concern was the integration of the seven armed forces. Planning for demobilisation was only initiated when a crisis arose over what to do with elderly and other integrated personnel who failed to meet the standards set for integration. Frankel (1998:119) is of the opinion that demobilised women presented another problem, since their reintegration into civil society had to surmount various gender barriers. Many of these women found themselves unemployed once the initial severance pay was exhausted (Ferreira 2001:54). Some researchers have pointed out the negative and constant social disruption/dysfunction of ex-liberation fighters, both men and women. Mashike (2004:87) referred to unfortunate demobilised soldiers whose skills were rendered redundant because of peace as "time bombs", while Gear (2002:47-50) focused on the impact of crime and its consequences, arising from demobilisation.

The SANDF demobilisation package had three components. The first consisted of one-off gratuities ranging from R42 058 to R12 734, depending on the period of service. The second consisted of limited counselling over a period of two weeks regarding personal matters, careers, social services and finances. The third was an opportunity to join the Service Corps (SC) for 18 months. In order to "discharge its responsibilities", the SANDF established a SC as a "centre-piece institution" for rationalisation and demobilisation (Frankel 1998:120). The purpose of the corps was to provide training for both integrated and rationalised members of the SANDF in order to equip them for civilian life, whatever that would mean. They received training in basic skills, life skills and adult literacy; no further training or assistance with social integration into society was offered (Mashike 2000:66). According to a research study, the SC trained about 30% of the respondents - fewer than intended. Most MK and APLA soldiers decided not to join, since it was not compulsory and some considered the training too basic. They depended on their small gratuities. Some were unemployed, or had obtained part-time employment or some other form of employment since demobilisation. Others had adequate skills to survive as civilians, since MK soldiers were given the opportunity to study in exile. Some took advantage of this opportunity, while others did not study. This divided them into two groups - the "winners" and the "losers" (Mashike 2000:68). The "winners"

are subdivided into those who were integrated into the new SANDF, and those who found alternative employment. The SC was apparently intended to cater for the "losers" as a form of long-term integration. It eventually proved to be inadequate in meeting the demands of ex-soldiers. Former soldiers are mostly seen as unskilled in a job market where everyone has to compete for scarce resources; consequently, they remain "losers". Mashike (2000:70) is of the opinion that the neo-liberal hegemony is dividing workers into the "core" (skilled workers) and the "periphery" (unskilled workers). This hegemonic neo-liberalism is now unfortunately embraced by the ANC (Mashike 2000:71). It is the corollary to the macro-economic approach (GEAR) of privatising state assets, of which one of the effects is loss of employment, which is in direct contrast to the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) followed by the ANC after 1994. However, the ANC government jettisoned the more social-democratic RDP in 1998/1999, in favour of a liberal-capitalist macro-economic programme. The expected outcomes were more negative than positive in terms of job creation and the distribution of wealth. The effects of demobilisation and the integration of new SANDF members into society were not as successful as expected, due to improper planning.

Rationalisation in the SANDF could be regarded as a form of demobilisation. Soldiers lost their military employment and were placed back into civil society to cope on their own, without substantial severance packages and - in some cases - without the necessary preparation and retraining.

4.4 Ecological damage in South Africa

Since the war was not fought on South African soil, ecological and environmental damage was generally restricted to Angola. However, South Africa initiated a programme for nuclear development. The SA nuclear industry started small in 1955 and expanded over the next years, enabling SA to become a nuclear power (Steyn, Van der Walt and Van Loggerenberg 2003:31-40). By 1973, test sites were being sought for experimental nuclear explosions. A site that was large enough for an adequate exclusion area to contain radioactivity and control damage, was found in the Northern Cape (Steyn et al. 2003:41). Testing of devices took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It was later found that the number of leukaemia patients from the Northern Cape who reported to the Tygerberg hospital in the Western Cape for treatment, had increased. It was alleged that this increase might be related to contamination of groundwater. However, adequate research has not yet been done to obtain conclusive evidence in this regard.

Land expropriated from indigenous peoples by the SADF, such as the sites at Riemvasmaak and Lohatla, resulted in local communities being resettled and

rendered dysfunctional. The land taken was used as training and testing facilities for new artillery technology. Since 1994, Riemvasmaak in the Northern Cape has been "cleaned up" sufficiently to be returned to the communities that originally lived there. However, a number of outstanding land claims are still being settled at Lohatla.

5. NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA

The disruption of social life in Angola began under Portuguese colonial rule, when Afro-Portuguese were used since the 1900s as interpreters, textile porters and ox-riders. Many Portuguese colonisers intermarried with local women, mainly from the Kimbundu tribe - thus, a small Creole population of Afro-Portuguese developed (Zegeye, Dixon and Liebenberg 1999:388).

In Angola, a migrant labour system soon developed, and functioned as an effective means of exploiting labourers (Zegeye et al. 1999:389). Commercial planting of coffee and cotton and forced labour fundamentally altered the social structures and class and race relations in rural areas. For instance, the Bakongo people in the north of Angola were displaced by expanding plantations, and driven off their land into Zaire (now the DRC). Many of the Ovimbundu people in the central highlands were displaced, and social and family kinship structures became fragmented (Isheme 1989:108ff).

The following quote illustrates this: "Poor Portuguese (who settled between 1950 and 1974) monopolised virtually all levels of employment in urban areas. Many lived at an economic level not much above that of urban Africans ... making their homes in *musseques* (shanty towns)... The sheer volume of newcomers angered Africans, who found themselves pushed down the economic ladder. Within a society with already limited social mobility potential, this process was tantamount to increasing impoverishment for indigenous Angolans" (Zegeye et al. 1999:392).

In the early 1950s, the first indigenous organisations amongst Angolans advocating reform of colonial structures were cultural groups consisting of young Angolan people and students, as well as exiles. These developments led to the formation of three liberation movements, namely MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. Spontaneous uprisings occurred in 1960, with a number of unarmed protesters being gunned down. However, the first real uprising occurred in Malange Province, among the Kimbundu cotton farms. The peasants damaged property and killed Portuguese colonists' livestock. Portuguese retaliation was brutal, and some 7 000 Africans were killed in a land and air attack (Ciment 1997:42; Zegeye et al. 1999:393). The

storming of the city prison in Luanda by Africans in order to free detained militants resulted in white members of society retaliating in a wave of violence that left about 20 000 Angolans dead. The uprisings of 1960/1961 led to armed resistance against the Portuguese colonisers that continued for 15 years (1960/61-1975). The civil war that broke out with the support of the CIA, South Africa, Zaire, Cuba and the Soviet Union, began in 1976. After 1992, UNITA still received some covert assistance from the USA that was only terminated at the time of Savimbi's death.

The civil war left Angola with a severely damaged infrastructure and virtually non-existent social services, particularly in rural areas. Figures indicating the number of people maimed by landmines during the war, range between 70 000 and 100 000. Angola has the dubious honour of being the country most infected by landmines in the world - between seven and nine million landmines are scattered over Angolan soil, and an estimated US$9 billion is needed to eradicate this scourge from the country (Salim 1977:7). One does not need much "sociological imagination" to grasp how these staggering amounts required for de-mining will subtract from the provision of essential social services such as transport, sanitation, health and schooling. Angola has so far received US$ 24,5 million - far too little - for mine clearing (Elliot and Mills 2000:1).

The end of the war in Angola fundamentally changed the human rights situation. Violations became less significant in the absence of war (Lari and Kevlihan 2004: 39). However, endemic corruption remained a problem, and "despite some minor successes, with respect to human rights Angola is a case study of failure: the failure of the international community and the Angolan government to adequately protect its citizens from gross and systematic human rights abuses during a brutal civil war" (Lari and Kevlihan 2004:29).

5.1 Profiting from "peace"

Angola has vast natural resources, and exploitation of this wealth became a priority. Following the negotiated withdrawal of Cuba and South Africa from the Angolan War theatre in April 1989, a void was left in a severely damaged Angola for private security firms to move in to exploit the situation. The collapse of local structures in Angola's countryside after years of destabilisation by South Africa and Savimbi's continued guerrilla activities left an ideal vacuum for the privatisation of security to ensure economic profits. So-called commercial military outfits moved in to extract scarce resources from Angolan soil. Pech (1999:81ff) refers to "corporate conquest" in Angola. Private security companies secured business relationships with the diamond mining companies Anglo-American and De Beers in order to "protect" their

interests (Pech 1999:85). Some of these mercenary outfits (linked with corporate interests) became involved in smuggling, illegal trading and money laundering.

Cilliers (1999:4) states that mercenary activity became endemic to the war. During the 1990s, some mercenary groups, such as Executive Outcomes, played an important role in the fighting against UNITA. Once they had left in January 1996, other South African security companies became active in Angola. They protected mining companies at great cost. Mining companies such as De Beers (diamonds) and the Canadian company Southern Era Resources suffered considerable losses. De Beers stopped mining in Angola in 2001 and the Canadian company withdrew from Angola, since security costs made mining only "marginally profitable - and highly dangerous" (Cilliers 1999:6). Although De Beers moved back into business in mid-2005, their mining activities are now restricted to only a fraction of what they were previously.

Another problem that emerged, with extreme negative consequences for society and the growth of sustainable development, is the corruption that followed in the wake of a weakening state and the inability to exercise proper control over finances. Asante-Darko (1999:183, 185-8), in a discussion on political corruption and armed conflicts, maintains that corruption in Angola, Sudan and Zaire "taps away" or sidetracks money earmarked for reconstruction and development.

5.2 Influence on Angolan families and youth

War situations interfere with stable family life. Fathers go to war, while mothers raise children alone at home in extremely difficult circumstances. It is presumed that war had the same impact, or even a greater impact, on Angolan families as on South African families. For many years, there has been a near-continuous movement of people in Angola - mainly young families, unaccompanied children and the elderly (Clover 2002:1). The involvement of children in war can be seen from two perspectives: it served primarily to increase fighting strength, and secondly, it politicised the youth to ensure their loyalty and support and to perpetuate the survival of the two opposing parties (UNITA and MPLA). According to Parsons (in McIntyre 2005:50), "the relative ease with which the youth could be controlled and manipulated, at least when compared with older soldiers, may also explain the increased concentration, post-1992 in particular, on forced recruitment of child-soldiers by both sides". Both Dos Santos and Savimbi preferred to focus on the youth, as they tried to minimise their dependence on high-ranking aides who could later become too powerful and constitute threats to their individual positions. The elimination of political rivals often occurred (Parsons in McIntyre 2005:50). Savimbi centralised power around himself, and UNITA children were instructed to

address only him as "father". This dissociated children from their own (blood) families, and increased their reliance on their UNITA "family". In this way, Savimbi used - or even manipulated - the pre-existing tradition in Angolan society of respect for the father or elders, to his own advantage.

Both UNITA and the MPLA developed and enforced a sophisticated system of politicisation of the youth. They created youth movements to channel support to the parties, and the members were mobilised to show support at meetings. "Youth, who may have had no desire to participate directly in the war, were thus inadvertently incorporated into its dynamics" (Parsons in McIntyre 2005:52). However, the more direct way to incorporate children was to simply recruit them as child soldiers - especially after 1992, when some government troops deserted and others were demobilised. UNITA, on the other hand, was still organised and in barracks, and in order to match UNITA's strength, the MPLA government recruited the South African-based company Executive Outcomes to train new troops, particularly children and young people. The MPLA "commonly rounded up young people in market places and around schools", and over 9 000 child soldiers were registered during the Lusaka process (Parsons 2005:53). UNITA abducted children, but they "were registered" as family members rather than as combatants.

The civil war also led to the dislocation of rural communities and a refugee crisis. The latter led to urbanisation in Luanda, Benguela and Lobito on an unprecedented scale – and with it, the challenge of providing adequate social services. Death and destruction in families during the war were daily occurrences, and the aftermath of these circumstances was devastating to the lives of Angolan family members. Of these displaced people, more than half of the population of 13 million were children younger than 15 years who have never known peace. Twenty percent of them were under the age of five, and they were the people who bore the brunt of impoverishment, loss of family members and health services and education (Clover 2002:1). Furthermore, the effects of the exposure to violence and war were evident in family members, particularly with regard to the formation of politicised and militarised identities amongst children. It was reported that, in 1998, 67% of children were found to have lost family members, 76% had seen people killed and 77,5% had killed people themselves (Parsons 2005:57).

Youngsters who performed military activities during the war were excluded from any assistance during demobilisation. However, this was greeted with serious protest from the child soldiers. They regarded themselves as adults entitled to the full demobilisation benefits of adult soldiers (Parsons 2005). Some returned to their family homes, where basic facilities no longer existed, and others went to the cities to find work or to further their education while living in very poor conditions.

Demobilisation and reintegration programmes did not make provision for all circumstances, and the necessary basic infrastructure was not restored for facilitating the return of the population.

5.3 Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DD&R)

During 1991-1992, and then again in 1994-1998, attempts were made to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants, as well as to move internally displaced persons (IDPs). About 800 000 IDPs and 425 000 refugees in neighbouring countries were involved. In May 1991, the Bicesse Peace Accords were entered into, containing the origins of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DD&R) structures still employed today. This laid the foundation for people to return to their original residential areas; however, only a fraction eventually returned. When war resumed in 1992 and combat spread to urban areas, another 1,3 million people were displaced (Gomes and Parsons 2003). During 1994, the Lusaka Protocol was signed to enable people to return; however, only a small number returned due to a lack of confidence in the peace process. By the end of 1997, more than 1 million people were still displaced, and by the end of 1998, the war flared up again. An additional 3 million rural people were now displaced from their homes by UNITA forces (Gomes and Parsons 2003).

Since the death of Savimbi in 2002 and the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Angolan Army and UNITA, the ceasefire has represented an opportunity for the country to finally enjoy peace. While the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords and the Lusaka Protocol of 1994 had failed, the 2002 process was seen as the third DD&R process aimed at normalising Angolan society (Gomes and Parsons 2003). While these processes were supposed to secure the ending of violent conflict, there was also growing concern about new social and political conflicts at various levels (Gomes and Parsons 2003). A new series of military, political and humanitarian issues was now at hand. The basic conditions in the areas to which internally displaced people and ex-combatants would be returning, were assessed.

There were 300 campsites, which included 25 substandard transit centres, rundown warehouses, abandoned public buildings and temporary sheds without any basic facilities, in which displaced people lived. The number of IDPs stood at 4,1 million at that time (Lari 2004:1). They were living in urban areas or scattered around such areas, while 450 000 refugees lived in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Namibia. IDPs were economically deprived, and the absence of employment in the formal sector led them towards informal employment instead of back to the agricultural sector, where they could produce food for self-sufficiency.

This caused a reverse in population density patterns, since more than 60% of Angolans now lived in urban areas (Lari 2004:2). However, 18 months after April 2002, 3,8 million displaced persons had moved back to their areas of origin and 91 693 former UNITA combatants and 285 818 family members had been transported to areas of their choice. Another 176 000 refugees returned to Angola by themselves, together with 43 323 people who were assisted in returning by the United Nations (Lari 2004:2). The political will of UNITA's members to comply with the 2002 Memorandum of Agreement, led to an unforeseen growth in numbers by the end of February 2003 that was logistically difficult to handle. The estimated number of UNITA family members in reception areas was a staggering 350 000. Together with the ex-combatants in quartering areas, they numbered in the region of 435 000 people (Gomes and Parsons 2003). The challenge for the Angolan government remains to reintegrate these people successfully into civil society and secure their immediate survival.

The lack of basic infrastructure such as bridges, roads and airstrips hampered operations, and several areas were inaccessible due to landmine infestation. After July 2002, 360 000 former UNITA combatants and their dependants were also incorporated into the IDP programme. They now became entitled to receiving assistance as displaced persons, which had not previously been the case. According to Lari (2004:9), there was also a "sense that authorities prioritised assistance for the former UNITA combatants, jeopardizing support to the IDPs". Combatants were transported to their local authorities, while IDPs were never assisted in this way. According to records of June 2003, the government had spent US$ 138 million on dependants and the demobilisation of combatants, and is in the process of implementing a second phase for training and integration programmes valued at US$ 105 million (Lari 2004:12). After assessing the seriousness of the humanitarian crisis, a Government policy to facilitate the return and resettlement of the displaced people was implemented. A normative framework was adopted according to which the resettlement and return processes should be implemented (Lari 2004:4). Acceptable living conditions such as safe access to resettlement areas, security, shelter, clean water and the availability of arable land and educational services, received attention.

Assistance became available to returning Angolan refugees, both within the UNHCR-organised repatriation programme that was initiated in June 2003, as well as for refugees who have returned by choice since mid-2002 (Lari 2004:5). By the end of 2002, 2,8 million people were still dependent on food rations. A lot more has to be done to ensure that the returning refugees and IDPs do not become vulnerable once more. Displaced women, or female-headed households, are particularly

vulnerable upon return. They face problems in obtaining legal title to land and property. The management of three simultaneous complex programmes, viz.

1) the demobilisation and integration of former combatants,
2) the return, resettlement and integration of displaced populations, and
3) the return and integration of former Angolan refugees, was evaluated in June 2004.

The stabilisation of integration depended on available resources, efficient and effective co-ordination of the programme and the actors involved. The aim is for families to be self-sufficient, and to reduce their dependence on emergency assistance and humanitarian aid. It was estimated that returning refugees would require assistance until the harvest in 2005 (Lari 2004:11).

The food problem competes with the need for education and socio-economic upliftment. The primary education sector is in ruins, and only 45% of Angolan children attend school. Their poverty situation is of great concern, as many became separated from their families and live in the streets, or are placed in children's homes and institutions with no access to the necessary educational or health facilities. A shortage of teachers and health workers is hampering the road to recovery. The rapid spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is another issue with potentially serious long-term implications. According to Foster (2004:66), the number of children in 41 African countries who are orphaned for whatever reason, will double in the period from 1990 to 2010. HIV/AIDS increases poverty, and causes social fragmentation of family life. The children are most affected by this. One can presume that the statistics referred to by Robyn Pharaoh (2004) regarding the sub-Saharan African states will also be reflected in Angolan statistics. However, the authors could not find definite statistics for Angola. Pharaoh described in great detail the impact of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa, the development of such children, the destruction of kinship and family structures and the rise of child-headed households.

5.4 Ecological damage in Angola

The SADF as well as the three rebel armies exploited and damaged the Angolan environment. Using the rural communities as go-betweens, they traded in natural commodities, like ivory and hardwood, to subsidise the war, including UNITA's exploits in Angola (Ellis 1998:443). An official enquiry in 1996 calculated that the SADF exported at least 30 to 40 tons of ivory per year between 1978 and 1987 (Ellis 1998:444). Presumably, a lot of ivory came from Angola where the elephant populations declined drastically. These actions dealt a devastating blow to the wild life and natural resources of Angola and even Zaire. Between 1980 and 1986, the

SADF became an established player in the market for illegally obtained ivory. Ellis (1998:443-4) points out that during the same period, "privatised military outfits" began using their ivory-smuggling networks to take diamonds out of Angola. A private front company, called Frama Inter-trading, was established in SA to smuggle rhino horn, dagga (marijuana), mandrax, diamonds and hardwood (Ellis 1998:443). This front company would later be joined by privatised, military-style security companies. Ellis (1998:445) also mentions that SADF front companies culled between 30 000 and 100 000 elephants during the period 1978-1988. All these fronts for illegal trading became steadily more effective and secretive between 1980 and 1986.

The ivory smuggling of the SADF and UNITA disillusioned Colonel Jan Breytenbach. In scarcely camouflaged terms, he describes the extensive ivory smuggling networks in his fictional work, **The plunderers**. He estimates that between 20 000 and 100 000 elephants were culled. This issue led to Breytenbach's resignation from the SADF (Ellis 1998:445).

The crossing of borders and exploitation of nature owing to war is no new phenomenon. Southern Africa was no exception. Frontline states and anti-apartheid organisations frequently made allegations that the SADF in Angola used Agent Orange, a deforestation agent (defoliant), to rid border areas of "unnecessary growth" (foliage). Because of its toxicity, it would harm animal and human life for years to come. The rehabilitation of natural resources in Angola may take decades. Little concrete evidence of the widespread use of Agent Orange and other plant-killers has survived.

5.5 Civil-military relations in Angola

Within Angola, the lack of effective civil-military relations made for a difficult operating environment. Confronted with increasing violence against civilians during the latter part of the war, a military solution seemed to be out of the question. Other means had to be found, such as a negotiated settlement. When the war suddenly ended with the death of Savimbi, some of civil society's leaders were caught unawares (Lari and Kevlihan 2004:32). Demilitarisation, reintegration of army personnel into civilian life and civil control over the military are still receiving attention. On the positive side, one has to mention that the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA), albeit within an earlier one-party context, remained under control of the MPLA civilian government. This contrasts with African states such as Nigeria, Ghana and Somalia where military forces took political control of the country. It seems as though the Angolan military did not compromise itself by supporting a state that suffered a lack of legitimacy, such as what happened in

South Africa from 1976 up to 1988, where a "praetorian state of a special type" developed (Frankel 1984; Liebenberg 2001). Angola's move towards a multiparty state, even in the ambit of a dominant party system, seems to retain the crucial element of civil control over the military. Researchers agree that little information on the defence transformation process is available apart from the knowledge that the transition from war to peacetime structures remains the biggest challenge ahead (Leão and Rupiya 2005:40).

One of the authors visited Luanda recently and found that the integration process has much to recommend it. Unemployment, worsened by demobilisation, however, puts enormous strain on the country's economic system - a situation comparable to that in South Africa. Both countries thus face huge social challenges.

6. LESSONS LEARNT: POSITIVE SPIN-OFFS OF THE WAR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

6.1 Democratisation of the SANDF

It is possible to argue that, in the case of Angola and South Africa, the successful integration of armed forces and the institution of civil control over the military may prevent future internal and international conflicts and may assist in creating a sustainable human rights culture and communal tolerance.

In the aftermath of the war in Angola and the negotiated transition to a democratic South Africa, the country required a new defence force mission and design. A new Defence Force had to mirror the changes in society. The SANDF was, in fact, constitutionally obliged to transform; a new **White Paper on Defence** was needed. A draft of the document was published and civilian input was invited in order to democratise defence policy. After additional comments by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) and the Portfolio Committee on Defence, the final draft of the **White Paper** was submitted to Cabinet and approved in May 1996 (Frankel 1998:149). The **Defence Review,** focusing on civil society, was based on the **White Paper** and completed in 1998.

Like many other state institutions during the 1990s, the South African Department of Defence (DoD) initiated a process of far-reaching change. A transformed SANDF was envisaged, an organisation broadly representative at all rank levels of all the people in the country; a defence force of national unity - credible and legitimate in the eyes of all the people. The point of reference for change was the **South African Constitution (1996)**, which provided the framework for transformation. This system of ideas, rules and beliefs included interrelated issues like the

following: the South African **White Paper on Defence** and the **Defence Review**; the integration of seven armed forces into one SANDF; affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes; rationalisation; activities aimed at improving and perpetuating the effective and efficient functioning of the Department; and ensuring the institutionalisation of civil control over the military institution (Cilliers et al. 1997:26).

The context for the transformation of the DoD was the reformulation of South African defence policy, as encapsulated in the **South African White Paper on Defence** (1996) and the subsequent **Defence Review** (1998).

6.2 The SA White Paper on Defence

The **White Paper on Defence** considers the role of the military in a new democracy and presents the defence policy of the Government of national unity. It informs citizens and other states of South Africa's new defence blueprint. Any national policy is the product of a process of goal setting and devising means of achieving such goals. The two major goals emphasised in the **White Paper** are essentially the constitutional functions of defence, namely to loyally defend and protect the sovereignty, territory and people of the country against external aggression, and to assist the civilian authorities in maintaining the rule of law when called upon to do so. Underlying these goals is an important guiding principle of democratisation, namely the establishment of civil control over the military.

The South African government's policy on defence has "defence in a democracy" as central theme. It was prepared in "the spirit of the new democratic era in South Africa" (**White Paper** 1996:1). Democracy provides an ideal political system for the SANDF to inhabit and defend, since it means, according to Parsons (Ritzer 1992:241), the inclusion of all categories of the population within the political system by extending to them the right to vote and partake in political decision-making. For the first time in SA history, a **Defence White Paper** reflected the interests of the majority of the people, represented national consensus and was subjected to an unprecedented degree of transparency, consultation and debate.

This new approach to defence policy has changed South African's former posture on defence and contributed to peaceful defence co-operation in the region. It provided the basis for the country's **National Defence Review** that elaborates on the defence policy in terms of the SANDF's role, function, posture, doctrine, force design, equipment levels and budget, as well as human resources issues such as the details and practical implementation of integration, affirmative action and effective transformation. The Review thus determines the size as well as the personnel, com-

mand and control structures of the SANDF, and its primary equipment and related budgetary requirements. It has been hailed as the most consultative, inclusive and transparent document of its kind anywhere in the world. The finalisation of the text was preceded by three national consultative conferences, a host of regional workshops in all provinces and public hearings in Parliament. It drew together a wide range of interest groups, including academics, clergymen, industrialists, journalists, Parliamentarians, and members of the Defence Force establishment.

6.3 Institutionalisation of civil control over the SA military

Civil control over the Defence Force ensures that the military operates according to the rules of the Constitution and Parliament. It espouses control of the military by the elected representatives of the people, as opposed to control by appointed officials. The military has no choice but to subject itself to the democratic principle of civil supremacy. Civil control of the SANDF is not to be confused with civilian command of the SANDF. The military must be allowed to execute its task according to its own doctrines, principles and specialised training, under its own command system. It must apply and manage military force to support the national strategy as set out by Parliament. Professional soldiers must be allowed to wage war or maintain peace professionally. Elected civilians have legislative powers, approve the defence budget and review in Parliament the President's decisions to deploy the SANDF in critical functions. The mechanism used to bring about civil control provides for the shared overseeing of the military, namely by the legislative, the executive and the judiciary in order to assert and maintain democratic control over the armed forces and defence policy.

The ideal is to integrate the military into a democratic society, strengthen mutual trust between the South African public and the military, and promote a sense of dignity within the military because it is serving a democratic, constitutional state. Defence policy should thus be determined by Parliament, debated and agreed upon by the Standing Committee on Defence in Parliament and accepted by Cabinet (Cilliers and Sass 1994:4). Such control does not, however, imply interference in the tactical decision-making processes of the military operating in the field. These must be left to the appropriate military commanders, though civil control will still ensure a close linkage between military operations and political objectives (Cilliers and Sass 1994:4-5).

6.4 Civil-military relations in South Africa: Implications for Angola

The new system of civil control through a Defence Secretariat refers to the relationship between the armed forces and the civilian authorities. Military leaders, of course, had to adapt their traditional way of thinking to accept the idea of functional equality between the military and its civilian overseers. Nevertheless, despite initial differences between the Defence Secretariat and the mainstream military establishment over the institutionalisation of civil control, all parties were strongly committed to a democratic agenda (Frankel 1998:166).

Civil-military relations of this nature pave the way for future governance, with civilians formulating policy and the military executing policy. Civilians should be responsible for the political dimensions of defence, while the contribution of military officers to policy formulation based on their functional expertise should be welcomed. This is a reciprocal relationship that stands to benefit both the military and society at large, reducing the likelihood of "civil strife" and civil war. Civil-military relations of this kind could serve as a model for post-conflict societies, like Angola and South Africa. A prerequisite for healthy civil-military relations, however, is the creation of a political culture that would allow such mutually beneficial relationships to thrive and facilitate constant interaction between civil society and the military (Steyn 1995:7). While SA cannot export its experience as a blueprint, it could arguably suggest some "lessons learnt" applicable to other countries - perhaps including Angola.

7. CONCLUSION

Institutionalisation of sound civil-military relations is required for all post-war and conflict-ridden countries in southern Africa to sustain peace and to maintain good democratic governance. This cannot be done, however, if attention is not simultaneously paid to economic growth, education, health and the protection of human dignity as part of the drive to normalise post-war societies. Problems such as structural inequality, disproportionate stratification, ethnic strife and the governing élite's lack of accountability, should be addressed at a statutory level. Such an approach should include an emphasis on government-society interaction and strengthening the rule of law.

A remark made nearly 2000 years ago by Sun Tsu may provide useful pointers for the South African and Angolan political and military leadership, now and in the future:

> "A government should not mobilise an army out of anger, military leaders should not provoke war out of wrath... Anger can revert to joy, wrath can revert to delight, but a nation destroyed cannot be restored to existence and the dead cannot be restored to life. Therefore an enlightened government is careful about this, a good military leadership is alert to this. This is a way to secure a nation and keep the armed forces whole."

The quoted words surely applies to countries engaged in reconstructing their political, social and economic lives - countries like South Africa and Angola.

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