

THE POST-ELECTION POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

André Duvenhage¹

1. INTRODUCTION

From a Political Science perspective nothing is more difficult to understand than the nature of political change and specifically disequilibrium change. Political change or "the alteration of an existing state ... (or) condition ... (or) an observed difference between a past and present condition" becomes more and more a reality of our everyday life (compare Palmer 1987:7). The well-known futurologist Alvin Toffler (1990:3), emphasized the fact that "(we) are living at a moment when the entire structure that held the world together is now disintegrating. A radically different structure of power is taking form and this is happening at every level of human society." In South Africa we are not insulated from political change and even fundamental (disequilibrium) political change on all levels of society. During the past decade South Africans experienced far-reaching political, economic and social changes with the promise of even more changes in the next five to ten years.

Working with the future in an environment of disequilibrium change is never easy and conclusions are more tentative if compared to for example other forms of deductive logic. However, as Toffler (1990:xxi) puts it: "As we advance into the terra incognita of tomorrow, it is better to have a general and incomplete map, subject to revision and correction, than to have no map at all." This serves as an important point of departure for this article.

Ten years ago the African National Congress (ANC) won the general election on the basis of their transformation, reconstruction and development orientated policies. The most important objective in this regard was a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic political environment. The outcome of the 2004-election emphasized the overwhelming support (69,68%) for the ANC's effort to bring change to the country. Against the above-mentioned background: What may be expected of the post-2004 election period?

¹ Department of Political Science, University of the Free State.

The main aim of this article is to make an assessment of the post-election political environment by identifying the **main variables** that may influence future political changes. By presenting the main variables in terms of projections, it is possible to develop **strategic scenario-perspectives** for purposes of the assessment of the South African political environment. Scenario-analysis will be developed as a tool for identifying governance and transformation priorities for the next 5-10 years.

Focus points are:

- the outcome of the 2004 election and a general interpretation of the result;
- identifying and projecting the most important variables within the South African political environment;
- creating a scenario-perspective of the political future of South Africa; and
- identifying the most important priorities with reference to governance and political transformation.

2. THE OUTCOME AND INTERPRETATION OF THE 2004-ELECTION

Compared to other recent election campaigns in the SADC-region (Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia) the general organization and administration of the election were of a very high standard. Election 2004 set a standard for Africa and the SADC-region. The outcome of the election was anticipated beforehand and nothing highly unexpected was foreseen. In general, the outcome of the election was in line with predictions and forecasts made earlier (compare table 1 and 2).

Table 1. Markinor surveys, the survey of the HSRC and the 2004-election result of the IEC as on internet.

PARTIES	MARKINOR SURVEYS					APRIL 2004 ELECTION RESULTS SEATS		2004 %	SURVEY BY HSRC
	NOV 2002	APRIL/MAY 2003	NOVEMBER 2003	JANUARY 2004	MARCH 2004 High	Low			
ANC	54	60	62	64	70,9	73,4	69,68%	276	67,8%
DA	9	10	11	11	9,2	8,6	12,35%	49	10,5%
NNP	6	5	5	4	1,8	1,5	1,65%	7	8,7%
IFP	5	4	-	4	4,6	3,2	6,98%	28	7,1%
UDM	3	3	1	2	1,5	2,0	2,28%	9	-
PAC	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ACDP	1	1	-	1	1,3	1,3	1,6%	6	-
CP	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FF+	1	1	-	-	-	-	0,89%	4	-
UCDP	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ID	-	-	-	1	0,9	0,9	1,73%	7	-
Others	1	1	7	-	2,3	2,3	-	-	5,9%
Don't know	11	8	-	11%	3,6	1,8	-	-	-
Refused, etc.	4	3	-		-	-	-	-	-
Not vote	2	2	4		-	-	-	-	-

General characteristics of the 2004-election are:

- The ANC obtained more than a 2/3 majority and took control of all nine provinces.
- The black majority is still voting for the ANC, while the majority of the minority groups, $\pm 25\%$ of the registered voters, are voting for opposition parties.
- The ANC's support base primarily consists of black people, unemployed people and people from disadvantaged backgrounds.
- The racial census that was so prominent in the 1994 and 1999 elections is still a prominent feature of the 2004-election. (The majority of blacks voted for the ANC and the majority of coloureds, Indians and whites for different opposition parties.)
- The NNP support declined to such an extent that the leadership decided to join the ANC, after 90 years of being a factor in SA politics, and to recommend to its supporters to do the same.

3. A STRATEGIC SCENARIO: VARIABLES AND TENDENCIES IN THE POST-ELECTION POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

For purposes of this article a **strategic scenario** can be described as *the development and formulation of a set of related assumptions based on information, from which tendencies are projected, events anticipated and key uncertainties incorporated to explain future possibilities in a logical and coherent manner*. Although it is always possible to identify an infinite number of variables within any society, the scenario-analyst may select only the four or five most crucial variables for purposes of scenario-development. According to my assessment the South African political environment will be dominated by the following important variables:

- The ANC dynamic.
- The transformation dynamic.
- The political economy of the country.
- HIV/Aids.
- The Southern African dynamic.

3.1 The ANC dynamic

With a support base of 69,68% (276 seats in parliament) and political control over all nine provinces, the ANC dynamic is arguably the single most important factor (variable) within the South African political environment. The ANC is not only the ruling party and government, but also reflects important characteristics of a political regime. (A political regime refers to the structures of governance of the current government. According to Heywood (1997: 24) a regime "... is a broader term that encompasses not only the mechanisms of government and the institutions of the state, but also the structures and processes through which these interact with the larger society".)

Important characteristics of the ANC dynamic seem to be:

- The prominent features of an 'Uhuru party' [one party dominance; long term in office; losing real support over the longer term; opposition politics is weak; and the entire dynamics of the party is more important than inter-party dynamics.] (Compare the post-independence period in countries like Zambia, India, Israel, Zimbabwe and Namibia.)
- Escalating internal conflicts over the longer term as a direct result of Mbeki's leadership; power struggles within the party; the role of ethnicity and culture; ideological differences within the party (doves versus hawks) and the continuous transformation from a freedom movement (inclusive) towards a political party (more exclusive). Political conflict within the ANC is not only limited to national level but is also very prominent in all nine provinces as well as local governments in many areas.
- The support base of the ANC from a percentage perspective is higher than before, but the real support in terms of the number of voters is considerably lower.

1999 - Election:	89% of potential voters registered
2004 - Election:	75% of potential voters registered

According to Terreblanche (2004:11), only 38% of the potential electorate of 27,5 million voted for the ANC during the 2004-election. He explained this in the following terms: "Increased voters' apathy - and even alienation was evident during the registration process and the election. Voters' apathy is stronger in the ranks of those who previously voted for opposition parties, but is also visible among ANC supporters." This factor will be even more important in future elections in line with

the more general 'Uhuru pattern' which manifested itself in several states in the SADC region.

- **A pragmatic or ideological approach:** According to the existing pattern of change within the ANC, a policy adjustment from a Marxist-Socialist approach towards a stronger free market orientation was evident over the past decade. Within the policy framework of the ANC an ideological orientation and approach was exchanged for a more pragmatic one. However, elements of the 'people's contract' initiated as part of their election campaign, emphasized poverty relief plans, job creation, etc. that reflect elements of an ideological (socialist) orientation and approach. (Compare ANC 2003.) The moment the ANC feels insecure about the political environment and its ability to control it, a stronger ideological approach will become more prominent. (The level of insecurity will be determined by factors such as an inability to deliver 'promises', resulting in lower support levels; discord within the ranks of the ruling party; and stronger opposition specifically to the left of the centre.) It is becoming more obvious that this leftist grouping in the tripartite alliance has been successful in sidetracking Gear (and its free market-IMF characteristics).

In conclusion, the following seems to be important:

- A relatively stable ANC on the shorter term with the potential of higher levels of party instability in the long run. (A breakaway to the left over the longer term cannot be excluded.) Cosatu has now indicated that it insists on playing a more important role in Government. They want to be consulted in any decision-making (Msomi 2004: 2). The other option for the ANC, however, is to reposition itself to the left of the political spectrum, following a stronger ideological orientation with emphasis on a stronger social democratic approach, speeding up the transformation process and black power rhetoric. (Already there are strong indications that the ANC is repositioning itself to the left of the centre, for example public work programmes, acceleration of land reform and affirmative action.)
- Higher levels of political apathy and even alienation will contribute towards patterns of political instability and even praetorian politics as a worst case scenario.²
- An ideological political approach may influence economic growth patterns negatively, with as outcome, lower levels of support for government, patterns

² Praetorian politics, according to Huntington (1968:72-9; 192-4), refers to the politics of instability where the military tends to intervene in politics in order to create a more stable political environment.

of instability and even political resistance. (This will be an outcome if the ANC is repositioning itself to the left of the centre as was mentioned earlier.)

3.2 Political transformation

Political transformation refers to rapid, progressive, comprehensive and fundamental change of society (as a reaction against an unjust past), which takes the form of central planning (social and political engineering) with emphasis on the management of change in general and conflict management in particular. (Compare Duvenhage 2004: pp. 5-7.) Political transformation in South Africa aims at the attainment of the goal of "a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa" (ANC 1997:3). This broad vision of political transformation in South Africa identifies the following objectives as major priorities:

- institutionalised democratic institutions with emphasis on participation and representation;
- a non-racial democratic dispensation;
- a prosperous society with emphasis on an environmentally friendly approach, sustainability and a developmental orientation; and
- social development and service delivery in terms of basic needs. (Compare RDP - Whitepaper 1994:7-11.)

In general the success rate of transformation delivery attempts is very low. Between 60% - 70% of all transformation projects failed as a result of reasons related to:

- lack of cooperation at grass roots level; (the 'government must' syndrome is still very strong. Where a community has taken the initiative to become involved there has been notable success. Where the initiative was too fast for government there were complaints from that quarter as in Smithfield where private initiative started a black empowerment SME and it was grossly interrupted and nearly destroyed through wanton political intervention);
- lack of social and political control;
- limited political, administrative and management capacities (lack of continuity in the political sphere as well as in management has caused many projects not to materialise. When problems with the political leadership or with the ability

of the managers arise, the 'problems' are transferred or relocated seldom achieving the expected positive results);

- unsuccessful institutionalization (due to incorporation of the homeland public service departments into central and provincial government departments, the problems experienced before 1994 were only perpetuated. The provinces with the largest contingencies taken over from the 'homeland public services' have experienced enormous problems. Hopefully this will now improve);
- the 'weak state syndrome'³. [This problem is becoming more obvious e.g. a deterioration of safety and security in the country in general in terms of high levels of crime; criminals targeting the judiciary (Lombard et al. 2004:1-2); political conflict in many areas for example in the Eastern Free State and Schweizer-Reneke (North West Province); restructuring and related reaction: Government's plan to combine various tertiary education facilities has met with a number of negative reactions from the students and the academic and management side. It would be interesting to have a comparative cost analysis in the next few years];
- poor service delivery (the president has taken a stand to ensure the improvement of service delivery. That same theme has been taken on by the Minister for Public Service and Administration (Geraldine Frazer-Moleketi) to the extent that it was indicated that there is no room for those who do not perform and that after the propagation of Batho-pele. Batho-pele principles are decorating the office walls but there is little indication that it has been internalised by public servants⁴).
- inertia (the handling of the HIV/Aids pandemic is the worst possible example of inertia that can be quoted. The tragic effect of this will be more obvious in South African graveyards than in official statistics). (Compare also the section on HIV/Aids later on.)

Transformation efforts in both Tanzania (Ujamaa socialism 1960s and 1970s) and Egypt (radical socialism 1950s and 1960s) were programmed for failure as a result of combinations of the above-mentioned factors. (Compare Balaam and Vaseth, 2001:331; Jennings 2002:510-3 and Migdal 1988:183.) In this context Migdal (1988:205) referred to Nasser's attempts for a "reinvigorated Egyptian state ...

³ Compare Migdal (1988:4) for more details about the 'weak state' concept and its application.
⁴ Batho-pele is referring to the following principles in terms of the implementation of transformation: consultation; high services standards; access to information; openness and transparency; service to the community ; and value for tax money.

(that) ... ended in a rash of torture, arbitrary arrest and the like", while similar tendencies, according to Jennings (2002:513), were also evident in the unfolding of the national project in Tanzania. The following diagram shows the general dynamics of political transformation or attempts in this regard in the above-mentioned states:

Diagram 1

SA AFTER 10 YEARS ->?

In conclusion, the above-mentioned case studies show the negative outcomes of attempts to transform societies. If the tendencies regarding the incomplete transformation (national) projects are taken into consideration and compared with current political, economic and social conditions in South Africa, the potential for the successful completion of political transformation is limited. Factors working against the successful execution of the 'national project' of political transformation include discord within the ranks of the ANC hegemony, limited political and economic capacities, especially on a local government level and political instability and problems related to security within the SADC-region. (Compare Duvenhage 2004:14-22.)

3.3 The political economy of the country

The ability of the economy of the country to perform according to political promises (referring to the people's contract, etc.) is going to be decisive for political stability, the support base of parties and even political participation/apathy, etc. The two outstanding characteristics of the ANC's election campaign were:

- Overemphasizing the progress made over the last ten years with reference to the creation of 2 million job opportunities; water and electricity for 70% of the population; and the spending of R10 billion on social services - to mention a few important items. (Compare Duvenhage 2004A:4.)
- Promises made about what will be attained over the next ten years or the so-called second decade of democracy, for example:
 - Towards 2014 only 24% of the population will live below the poverty line. Currently more than 48% of the population or 22 million live below the poverty line.
 - Unemployment will be cut from 42% to only 21% of the labour force (Terreblanche 2004:11).

Economic realities at grass roots level indicate the difficulty of bringing about fundamental change according to election promises. The following seems to be important:

- 37,7% of all households in the country are deprived of good access to between four and six of the basic services, namely health, energy, nutrition, education, communication, housing and clean drinking water.

- About 22 million people currently live below the poverty line.
- It is estimated that the labour force will have 3 million people more in 2014 and to cut the unemployment rate to 21% (as promised) the creation of about 7 million jobs is needed.
- The gap between rich and poor (white/black and black/black) is increasing. Compare the following diagram (Terreblanche 2002: 36):

SOUTH AFRICA'S HIGHLY STRATIFIED CLASS SOCIETY 2001

Terreblanche (2004:11) concluded that "we must consider that poverty and unemployment will not be cut by half, but might become worse over the next decade".

The above-mentioned perspective, despite improvements since 1994 (the first decade of democracy), is not a healthy situation and has the possibility to influence the above-mentioned factors of the ANC dynamic, as well as the transformation dynamic negatively if not managed properly. In addition to this practice, the HIV/Aids pandemic is also an aggravating factor.

The first few years after the first democratic election were indicative of support for a free-market economy and Gear (an International Monetary Fund type of plan) was propagated to stabilize the economy and there are definite signs of growth but the ever-growing number of unemployed and destitute people is a great concern. The influx of large numbers of foreign people from neighbouring countries does not help to ease this problem. (Depending on different sources, the total of illegal immigrants is estimated between 3 million and 8 million people.)

The President's plan to alleviate poverty, to provide houses for all South Africans and to have no more squatters houses in ten years, is exciting. The President has an exemplary success record concerning initiatives he announced. To make the latest promise good, his personal involvement will be necessary.

3.4 HIV/AIDS

The impact of HIV/Aids on Southern African societies cannot be underestimated. Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular do not possess the resources to maintain social, economic and political order in the face of the very high HIV/Aids rate in most of these countries. Compare the following diagram of Aids statistics in Southern African states:

Global HIV Ranking	Country	% Adults (15-49 years) HIV-positive	Adults and children HIV-positive
1	Botswana	38.3	330 000
2	Zimbabwe	33.7	2 300 000
3	Swaziland	33.4	170 000
4	Lesotho	31	360 000
5	Namibia	22.5	230 000
6	Zambia	21.5	1 200 000
7	South Africa	20.1	5 000 000
9	Malawi	15	850 000
10	Mozambique	13	1 100 000
17	Tanzania	7.8	1 500 000
25	Angola	5.5	350 000
27	DRC	4.9	1 300 000
TOTAL			14 690 000

Table 3.

(Compare Pharaoh and Schönteich 2003:3)

In a quest to obtain the latest reliable statistics for South Africa, after an announcement that South Africa's statistics have been incorrectly calculated and are much lower than previously indicated, it was mentioned that presently there are no reliable figures - any of the statistics obtained will only reflect the position of the provider - does the provider have to supply money for treatment or does the provider need funds for treatment of HIV positive patients?

The Institute for Global Dialogue (2002:39-42) identified the following outcomes as a result of the HIV/Aids pandemic:

- A developmental crisis in the region.
- Regional communities will be decimated. (In Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland life expectancy has dropped to 40 years).
- Population structures will change.
- The pandemic will contribute towards a cycle of impoverishment. (Up to a quarter of the households in Botswana will have lost their income earner by 2010.)
- All aspects of social and economic life will be affected. (In Swaziland school enrolment has fallen by 36% due to Aids.)
- Human security in the region will be undermined. ("HIV/Aids may compromise political stability and undermine democratic governance.") Alarming figures of tests conducted on Defence Force members (on a voluntary basis) have been published but immediately denied by the ANC Minister for Defence. (Of the 1089 soldiers tested, 947 were HIV positive; 60% of the volunteers were married and the average age was about 24 years. It is estimated that the SANDF is losing at least 400 000 working days a year as a result of the disease.)
- Economic growth will be reduced. (In countries with an HIV/Aids rate of 20% or more GDP growth may decline up to 2% a year.)
- A population of orphans will present new challenges. (4,7 million children under 15 in the SADC region have been orphaned by Aids.)

A recent publication, **Die geprojekteerde ekonomiese impak van MIV/Vigs in Suid-Afrika 2003-2015**, projected the impact of the pandemic in South Africa in the following terms:

- HIV/Aids is expected to kill 12 million South Africans in 2015.
- In the Eastern Cape
 - in 2004, 40 000 people will die;
 - in 2005, 50 000 people will die;
 - in 2006, 60 000 people will die;
 - in 2007, 70 000 people will die;
 - in 2008, 80 000 people will die;
 - in 2009, 90 000 people will die;
 - in 2010, 100 000 people will die;
 - in 2011, 110 000 people will die.
- The most severe situation, however, is in Kwazulu-Natal where the average life expectancy will decline to 33 years by 2010 from 60 years in 1996, while in the Eastern Cape life expectancy will drop to 37 years.
- Economic growth between now and 2015 will decline by between 1,3% and 6%.
- Income of households will be between 8% and 20% lower.
- Anti-retroviral treatment/drugs will cost the government R10 milliard per annum.
- The spending of households will decline by between 6% and 14%. Aids has a negative impact on the consumer market. HIV/Aids-infected people spend their money on healthy food and not on consumer goods. The infected poor will spend money on medicine rather than on food, education and other essentials. (Compare Van Aardt 2003: report 325; Enterprise 2003:70.)

It is also expected, for the first time in more than a hundred years, that the South African death rate will exceed the birth rate (per 1000 of the population) (Pelser 2004:10).

There can be no doubt that the HIV/Aids pandemic will influence political and social stability negatively in both Southern and South Africa. Economic growth will be hampered, resulting in the region not attaining the goals related to political transformation. It is accurate to assess that the HIV/Aids pandemic will contribute negatively to the previously mentioned areas of influence, namely the ANC dynamic, the transformation dynamic, as well as the South African political economy.

3.5 The Southern African dynamic

Documentation with a transformational focus emphasises the objective "to address the complex issue of all-round regional cooperation and development as one of the fundamental objectives of our revolution" (ANC 1996:15). Political transformation and 'political revolution' in South Africa must therefore serve as a framework for development and good governance on a Pan African level for SADC-states and Africa in general. This viewpoint laid the foundation for the Africa Renaissance idea, which gave birth to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union emphasizing peace and security, democracy and political governance, economic and corporate governance, as well as regional cooperation and integration.

The Institute for Global Dialogue (2002:39), however, describes the SADC-region as "(a region) characterised by low human development, widespread poverty, and extreme inequality". In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) for 1999 seven of the fourteen countries qualified within the medium category and six within the low category. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Mozambique was US\$ 861, DRC US\$ 801, Zambia US\$ 756, Malawi US\$ 586 and Tanzania US\$ 501. (The average for the category lowest developed countries is US\$ 1 170.) People living below the poverty line was Mauritius (10,6%), Zimbabwe (25,5%), Lesotho (49,2%), Tanzania (51%), Malawi (54%) and Zambia (86%). (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2002:39.)

Political dynamics in the SADC-region related to patterns of political instability (Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Malawi and Zambia), problems related to food security in nine of the 14 SADC states, high level of poverty and unemployment, as well as the 'weak state' phenomenon and tendencies of de-democratization in certain countries, will almost definitely influence regional transformation attempts negatively. With soft borders (related to the 'weak state' phenomenon) problems of SADC-states will find their way to the more prosperous South Africa - a country that is going to find it more and more difficult to accomplish its goals concerning internal transformation, reconstruction and development.

4. THE POST-ELECTION POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: A SCENARIO-PERSPECTIVE

Taking the areas of influence as point of departure and projecting it towards the future (5-10 years from here) it is possible within the scenario methodology to create alternative futures (scenarios).

Within a framework of the Best Case - Worst Case dichotomy, it is a fact that scenarios will mostly position itself between the extremes. Within this spectrum, Scenario A - **The rolling stone** and Scenario B - **The prophet** are discussed. Compare the following diagram:

Diagram 2

SOUTH AFRICA TOWARDS 2014

Scenario A - The rolling stone

Point of departure. Political dynamics originating from areas of influence (identified earlier) cannot be managed properly and are responsible for patterns of political instability (dynamic equilibrium)⁵ in the South African society and politics. After the 2009-election political processes related to dynamic equilibrium will intensify and political outcomes will become more unpredictable compared to earlier phases in the transformation process.

Characteristics of this environment:

- A political environment that is more unstable.
 - ~ Eroding political support of the ruling party (political apathy; discord, etc.).
 - ~ Radical and reactionary politics (political violence may not be excluded. Compare political activities related to Pagad, Qwibla, Boeremag and Landless People Movement.)
 - ~ Disillusioned citizens as a result of the impact of the transformation dynamic. (Diepsloot, Harrismith, Bethlehem, Kestell and Vrede.)
- A government that is losing support especially to the left of the political centrum.

Reasons:

 - ~ The sometimes unpopular leadership of President Mbeki (number 4 on the Free State list of the ANC before the 2004-election).
 - ~ Divisions within the ANC (Tripartite Alliance; populist leaders/groups; internal divisions for example Robben Islanders, exiles, UDF groupings).
 - ~ Disillusioned citizens as a result of a number of reasons (poor service delivery; 42% unemployment rate; escalating poverty).
 - ~ Unattractive political alternatives to the right.
- Multi-dimensional oppositions in politics-
 - ~ from the left;
 - ~ from the right;
 - ~ reactionary groups;
 - ~ radical groups;
 - ~ urban/rural divisions (traditional vs modern political structures); and
 - ~ ethnicity and culture.

⁵ Compare Duvenhage (2003:53-7) for an interpretation of dynamic equilibrium as a forephase in political processes related to decay.

- Patterns of relative deprivation will intensify within the next 510 years (higher expectations as a result of government promises vs. limited growth as was manifested recently in Diepsloot, Harrismith, Bethlehem).
- An economy under pressure to deliver as a result of (among others):
 - ~ The impact of HIV/Aids on society, the economy and Government image.
 - ~ Patterns of political instability (related number of reasons including economic, social cultural and ideological reasons).
 - ~ Lower levels of investment (Zimbabwe, labour and other transformational legislations, and HIV/Aids).
 - ~ The impact of legislation (social engineering) on the economy (780 new pieces of legislation were passed since 1994 with far-reaching implications).
Economists argue that the Labour Relations Act and other regulations, for example gun laws, laws related to land reform, health and medicine, are not always conducive for purposes of economic growth and development.
 - ~ The impact of the 'brain drain'.
- Patterns related to the 'weak-state' syndrome and its manifestation in terms of political and social decay:
 - ~ provincial and local government (effectiveness; efficiency, debt, etc.),
 - ~ corruption (in public and private sectors),
 - ~ the high crime rate,
 - ~ poor levels of service delivery, and
 - ~ poor border control.
- An unstable international and regional political environment.
- Post-Cold War instability.
- 'Clashes of civilizations' (a post-Cold War tendency predicted by SP Huntington, which is manifesting itself in terms of violent acts from groups like Pagad and Qwibla as manifestations of Islamitic fundamentalism⁶).
- Political and economic instability within the SADC-countries.
The Government's foreign policy - the Government's stature in respect of Africa is growing (African Union, NEPAD); on the other hand, its inability/unwillingness to become involved in the real problems to be handled in terms of Nepad and the approach of silent diplomacy in respect of the Zimbabwean tinderbox.

⁶ Compare SP Huntington's work, **The clash of civilisations and the remaking of world order.**

Implications: For the first time since 1994, the political dynamics in the country may present an unexpected outcome away from the 'status quo'. (With the 'political status quo' I referred to the ANC's status quo.)

Reasons:

- Leadership change within the ANC (Mbeki's two terms are completed and a new ANC leader must be appointed during 2007).
- The possibility of an opposition party (coming from within the tripartite alliance and/or populist groups) organized to the left of the centre.
- A re-organizing of the political opposition to the right of the centre.
- Limited levels of economic growth compared to high expectations (promises from government which is unrealistic for example cutting the unemployment rate with 50%, etc.).
- The impact of HIV/Aids on the social, economic and political environment.
- A negative reaction to the transformation dynamics (Diepsloot, Harrismith, Bethlehem and others).

Therefore: A possible outcome could be that no political party would end up with an absolute majority towards 2014.

These political patterns will already be evident during the 2009-election, but will manifest stronger in the post-election period. From the 2009-election onwards, the South African political environment will reorientate upon itself on a number of areas:

- The ANC is still the majority party (not necessarily an absolute majority).
- Higher levels of political conflict and violence within society and politics.
- Patterns of political instability eroding economic growth.
- Coalition politics as one pre-requisite to form a stable government.

Conclusion: The ANC will still be a dominant force within SA politics, but will need political support from other parties and groups on a continuous basis to stabilize the political, economic and social environment.

Scenario B - The prophet

Point of departure. A combination of factors and/or variables and unexpected events will be responsible for a trend break, which can/may influence the political landscape fundamentally. The convergence of a number of variables, for example,

an unstable ruling party; opposition from the left; the negative impact of the transformation dynamic; militant and violent political reaction; the impact of HIV/Aids; and the deterioration of the South African political economy can (in combination) be responsible for high levels of political instability with unforeseen outcomes. (Compare the previous scenario!)

Characteristics of this environment: The same as the previous scenario, but a combination of these factors resulting in higher levels of instability with more unforeseen outcomes.

Implications:

- 'Politics of survival' is taking the place of 'politics of structure'.⁷ [According to the Migdal (1987:391) perspective, if applied to South Africa, the ANC will find it more and more difficult to control the state in future.]
- The ANC will still be a prominent political factor, but not necessarily a dominant one.
- Politics of violence will be more prominent compared to earlier periods.
- The revitalization of the legacy of apartheid as a source for the organizing and mobilizing of support.
- Election campaigns will be more similar to campaigns in SADC-countries like Zambia, Malawi and possibly even those in Zimbabwe in recent times.
- The possibility of a 'second transformation' to legitimize government activities and conduct.
- The Aids problem would continue not to be recognised for what it is and the threats it contain for the economy as well as for the government's poverty alleviation programme will continue.

Conclusion: A very unstable political environment that is not conducive to free and fair elections and which may result in fundamental changes within the South African political environment.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The two scenarios (The Rolling Stone and The Prophet) are not predicting a positive future for the second decade of democracy in South Africa. The aim of a scenario analysis, however, is to indicate the most important 'negative' areas in order to identify the areas that need attention and which can, if properly addressed

⁷ For a detailed analysis of the differences between 'politics of structure' and 'politics of survival', compare Duvenhage (2003:47-64).

contribute towards a better outcome. From a governance and political transformation perspective political and/or party management should focus on the following priorities trying to alleviate the potential negative impact of the above-mentioned scenarios.

- The successful completion of the 'transformation' of the ANC from a freedom movement into a modern democratic political party is of critical importance. Focal points within this framework should be:
 - mechanisms to reconcile political conflict within the party structure;
 - the establishment and the consolidation of a culture of tolerance within the party;
 - the creation of a federal character within the party, in order to accommodate divergent interest within the South African society; and
 - the clear demarcation of party, government and regime interests.
- Counterstrategies to avoid the pitfalls of the transformation dynamic (a revocratic culture⁸ compared to a bureaucratic culture; capacity building in terms of administrative, management and political criteria; emphasizing a democratic ethos; economic sustainability; and local government structures that can provide service delivery).
- A strong emphasis on a free market orientation and the creation of a political environment that is conducive to economic investment, capacity building, tourism, etc., for purposes of economic growth. This, however, need to be balanced with a social developmental approach of constructive state intervention to address problems related to poverty, unemployment, etc. The concept of a developmental state is applicable here.
- The consolidation and entrenchment of democratic principles and ethos at all levels of government, the state and society.
- A national, well-organized and well-equipped plan to counter the negative impact of the HIV/Aids pandemic.

⁸ Compare Human (1998: 73 -109) for an explanation and application of revocrats and a revocratic culture.

- Creating the political environment through NEPAD and the African Union that is conducive for purposes of economic development and political stability in the region, countering the negative impact of the Southern African dynamic on transformation attempts in South Africa.

Focussing on the above-mentioned areas can contribute towards a best case scenario and not the worst case as was predicted earlier.

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