SEPTEMBER 11: A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

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1.   INTRODUCTION

The sudden collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s surprised many theorists and political scientists. Not only was it unsuspected, but it changed the way in which future political affairs would be conducted. For more than forty years, world affairs were dominated by a bipolar system that divided states into two ideological camps. Conflict, diplomacy and economic interaction were conducted in the context of the rivalry between the liberal democratic West against the communist East. After the dismantling of the Berlin wall (as a direct result of the fall of communism) the West suddenly lost its main ideological rival. New theories had to be de developed to explain the unexpected changes in world affairs to identify possible new developments in the post-Cold War era. One of the new theories that were developed focused on the idea that liberal democracy was the only system of government that survived the Cold War era. Old rivals such as communism, socialism and Marxism all seemed to be on their last legs (except in countries such as China and Cuba). This idea was strongly emphasized by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama (1989:3-18) in a controversial article entitled *The end of history* in which he argued that liberal democracy is the final stage in the ideological evolution of mankind. According to him democracy defeated all its rivals and would eventually become the preferred system of government. This idea was complimented by an unprecedented wave of democratization that swept across the world after the collapse of communism. Many states in Eastern Europe as well as the newly found independent states of the former Soviet Union (all previously under communist rule) decided to follow the democratic route.

However, the dream of universal peace, influenced by the spread of worldwide democratic values, soon developed some serious setbacks. Especially in some newly established post-communist states, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions (successfully suppressed by communist ideologies during the Cold War) could no longer be controlled. It was in the light of these cultural tensions that the respected political scientist, Samuel P Huntington (1993:22-49), published his controversial

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article *The clash of civilizations.* A book entitled **The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order** (1996) followed, expanding the original views he expressed in the article. He argued that the world was entering a new phase in which cultural differences would be the new source of future conflicts opposed to ideological and economic differences during the Cold War. This view was painfully realized when an Islamic fundamentalist group attacked vulnerable targets in New York and Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001, killing hundreds of people (Gibbs 2001:33-48). The world came to the shocking realization that liberal demo-cracies based on Western values were not a universally accepted norm. The terrorist attacks seemed to mark the first serious occurrence of conflict based on cultural differences. Many of Huntington's predictions regarding culturally motivated conflict also seemed to be confirmed by these attacks. In response to the events of 11 September 2001, Huntington (2001-2002:6-13) published an article entitled *The age of Muslim wars* in a special edition of **Newsweek**. In this article he identified the terrorist attacks as an example of the type of conflict based on cultural differences he predicted in the *The Clash of civilizations* article which he had written eight years earlier. The purpose of this study will be to investigate and interpret Huntington's defence of the 'clash of civilizations' theory. His reference to the terrorist attacks as substantiation of his views on future cultural conflict will also be investigated. The first aim of the study will be to present an overview of key arguments in Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' theory.

2.   THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS - AN OVERVIEW

Huntington (1993:22) argues that world politics entered a new phase at the end of the Cold War. The most fundamental source of conflict in the 'new' world would no longer be primarily ideological or economic. The main dividing factor and source of conflict between people will be based on cultural factors. In sharp contrast to this, Fukuyama (1990:8) argued that liberal democracy was the only ideological survivor after the collapse of communism and that democracy would become the universal norm regardless of political, economic, cultural and religious differences. Huntington (1993:22), on the contrary, is of the opinion that a clash of civilizations will dominate future world politics. But what does he mean by civilizations? He defined it (1993:23-5) as cultural entities. Regions, ethnic groups, nationalities and religions all possess unique cultural characteristics and levels of cultural heterogeneity. A civilization is regarded as "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species". Civilizations also consist of common objective elements such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions and

also the subjective self-identification of people.[2] The future political order would be characterized by the increasing importance of a civilization identity, and the interaction among seven or eight major civilizations, namely the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic Orthodox, Latin American and African civilizations.

This definition then asserts some indication of a homogeneous paradigm existing within civilizations upon which differences between these civilizations are accentuated. According to Skidmore (1998:182) Huntington is very vague in his definition of civilization as a concept. He (Huntington) presents the unifying culture of each civilization as its most prominent feature. Culture is, however, an indistinct and multifaceted concept. In order to explain the latter it is necessary to determine the core elements of a culture. Huntington relies very heavily on religion (as a core element of culture), although not in a consistent fashion. Language, ethnicity and a common history are invoked in some cases but not in others. In this regard Skidmore (1998:182) criticizes Huntington for not offering a standard criteria for identifying civilizations or distinguishing them from one another. This problem becomes apparent in his classification scheme. The Western civilization is for example defined as Europe and its settler colonies such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zeeland. However, Latin America, who, over many years have been conquered, settled and colonized by Europeans, is treated as a separate civilization even though many Latin Americans speak Spanish, Portuguese or English and worship a Christian God. The same problem occurs with the classification of the Slav-Orthodox world of Russia, the Ukraine and portions of the Balkans as a distinct civilization despite its close proximity to the rest of Europe and history of interaction with countries in the West and the fact that its people also embrace a branch of Christianity.

Huntington (1993:25-7) identifies six reasons why civilizations will clash in future:

- The differences that exist between civilizations are not only real, but also basic. They are different with regard to history, language, culture, tradition and most importantly religion. Although these differences do not always lead to violence, differences among civilizations have historically produced some of the most prolonged and violent conflicts. Greece under the reign of Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire are examples of civilizations that expanded aggressively and conflicted with other civilizations (Roberts 1997:206-10, 219-35, 322-32).

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[2]   In this regard people have levels of identity: a person living in Rome can for example refer to himself as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, Christian, European or Westerner. The civilization which he belongs to, is the broadest level of identification with which he identifies.

- The world in which we live is becoming smaller, meaning that the interaction among people of different civilizations is also increasing. This increased interaction intensifies the feeling of a civilization-consciousness and an awareness of differences and commonalities within civilizations.

- Processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are causing people to separate from longstanding local identities. In an era of globalization the nation state has also weakened as a source of identity. What is significant here is the fact that many religions have reacted to fill this gap in the form of movements that are labelled as 'fundamentalist'. Barber (1996:3-20) argues that globalization has divided the world into a camp that endorses the global free market economy (developed Western states which he classifies as McWorld) and another camp which favours traditional ethnic and cultural values and rejects the Western value and norm system (which he classifies as Jihad).

- The increase of a feeling of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the powerful position of the West. It is believed that the West is at the moment at the peak of its power. As a result of this many non-Western civilizations moved back to their roots. The political and economic dominance of the West has, therefore, encouraged most non-Western civilizations to consolidate their own power bases through a return to traditional values and norms.

- Cultural differences and characteristics are much more difficult to change, compromise and resolve than political and economic ones. A country can adopt democracy, its people can become rich or poor and a communist can become a democrat but it is impossible for a Russian to become an Estonian.

- The final reason why civilizations will clash is the fact that economic regionalism is increasing. In this regard the formation of economic blocks will become more important in future. These blocks reinforce the civilization-consciousness or may only succeed if it is rooted in a common civilization. In this regard the European Union is an example of an organization that rests on the shared foundation of Western culture and Western Christianity. Japan, on the other hand, faces difficulty because within the East-Asian region it is a civilization unique in itself. Even though East Asian countries such as Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan follow a strict capitalist economy they adhere to a Confucian,[3] rather than a Western democratic value and norm system (Heywood 1997:34-5).

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[3]   Heywood (1997:403) defines Confucianism as "a system of ethics derived from the philosophy of Confucius which emphasizes respect and loyalty in human relationships and the cultivation of the self".

Huntington (1993:29-31) further argues that the clash of civilizations occurs at two levels. On a micro level adjacent groups along the 'fault lines' of civilizations often struggle violently over the control of territory or each other. At the macro level states from different civilizations compete for military and economic power, struggle for the control of international institutions and promote their political and religious values in a competitive way. The 'fault lines' between civilizations will replace the political and ideological boundaries that were created by the Cold War. A cultural division between Western Christianity on the one hand and Orthodox Christianity and Islam on the other now replaced the ideological division that was created in Europe during the Cold War. The most significant dividing line in Europe used by Huntington (which divides the above mentioned civilizations) is the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500.

People living to the north and west of this boundary are regarded as Protestants and Catholics. They shared important experiences of European history such as the Renaissance, Enlightenment and French Revolution. They are economically also in a better position than their counterparts in the east and can look forward to being part of a common European economy and democratic political systems. People living to the east and south of this line are classified as Orthodox and Muslim. They traditionally belonged to the Tsarist and Ottoman empires and the shaping events in the rest of Europe only influenced them slightly. Economically, these people are not in such a good position as those living in the west and the possibilities for democratic governments are more limited (Huntington 1993:30).

Huntington (1993:31-2) is of the opinion that conflict along the fault lines between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for more than 1300 years. Starting as early as 732 BC with clashes between Arabs and Moors, it culminated in 1990 when the United States and other Western coalition forces invaded parts of Iraq to defend Kuwait against the actions of Iraq. He argues that groups or states belonging to one civilization will more frequently rally support from other members in their own civilization if they become involved in war with people from a different civilization. The growth of civilization commonalities (after the end of the Cold War) referred to as the 'kin-country' syndrome, is replacing political ideologies and other balance of power considerations as the basis from which cooperation and coalitions will be conducted. During the gulf War, for example, one Arab state (Iraq) invaded another Arab state (Kuwait) and then had to fight a coalition of Arab, Western and other states. Even though many Arab states publicly condemned the aggressive actions taken by Iraq, many Arab élites cheered Hussein on and his popularity amongst the broad Arabian public also increased. Many Islamic fundamentalist groups all over the world supported the regime of Saddam

Hussein rather than the Western backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia (Huntington 1993:35-7).

Huntington (1993:39-45) is adamant in his view that the West is now at the peak of its power in relation to other civilizations, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The West not only dominates economically, but also on a military level has no real competition from other civilizations. The powerful position of the West on the UN Security Council provided them with a mandate to expel Iraq from Kuwaiti territory. Through the use of institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, the West promotes its own economic interests and imposes on other nations economic policies that it thinks appropriate. This state of affairs is especially unpopular among the people of non-Western civilizations. Huntington (1993:40) even goes so far as to argue that "the West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic recourses to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interest and promote Western political and economic values. Differences in power and struggles of military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict between the West and other civilizations." Because of the unfamiliarity that some non-Western civilizations have with Western concepts such as liberalism, human rights, liberty, equality and the rule of law, they usually feel offended when these concepts are prescribed to them by Western states. Non-Western civilizations usually react in three distinct ways against the prescribing dominance of Western civilization. In the first place they often isolate and insulate their societies from the 'corruption' of the West and therefore fulfil a non-participant role in a Western-dominated world. Examples of countries that followed this strategy are Burma and North Korea. A second alternative, often referred to as 'band-wagoning', is an attempt to join Western civilization by accepting their values and institutions. The third alternative is for such states to counterbalance the power of the West by developing their own economic and military power and operating with other non-Western countries against the West. With this strategy the emphasis is also strongly placed on preserving indigenous values and institutions and to modernize but not to westernize (Huntington 1993:41).

Because of the fact that the differences between civilizations will play a more important role in future, countries with heterogeneous civilizations, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are candidates for collapse. Other countries have cultural homogeneity but they are uncertain to which civilization they belong. This latter group is referred to as torn countries. The leaders of such countries often follow the band-wagoning strategy to try and adopt Western values, although the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-Western. Turkey is an example of a country that adopted the Western value system, is a coalition-partner

of the West in NATO and applied for membership in the European Union. Despite this, other elements in Turkish society support an Islamic revival and argue that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society. The country is, therefore, torn between Western and Islamic sentiments (Huntington 1993:42-3).

Huntington (1993:45-6) is of the opinion that the West will be challenged in future by non-Western states which he classifies as the Confucian-Islamic civilizations. For reasons of culture and power these countries do not wish to join the West but would rather compete with them by developing their own economic, military and economic power. Cooperation with other non-Western countries and the promotion of their own internal interests are some of the tactics that these countries usually follow. While most Western countries are reducing their military power, China, North Korea and several Middle-Eastern states have expanded their military capabilities. According to Calabresi (2003:36) new evidence suggests that North Korea is advancing plans to build nuclear weapon. This seemingly aggressive strategic move by North Korea could have serious implications for future relations with its neighbour, South Korea, and security relationships in the south East Asian region as a whole. The main conflict between the West and Confucian-Islamic states will focus largely on the delivery, guidance and intelligence surrounding nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Where the focus of Western countries are placed firmly on non-proliferation as the universal norm (realizing it through non-proliferation treaties, weapons inspections and sanctions against those who spread sophisticated weapons), non-Western countries assert their right to acquire and deploy weapons of choice necessary for their protection. Recent aggressive military expansions by China have become an area of concern for the West.[4]

After its publication in the summer of 1993, *The clash of civilizations* received wide acclaim but also severe criticism. Many theorists questioned Huntington's rejection of accepted post-Cold War paradigms. In his reply Fouad Adjami (1993:2-3) accused Huntington of reducing the still important role of the nation-state and replacing it with conflict between civilizations. Opposed to Huntington's emphasis on cultural factors. Adjami argues that future conflicts will still be fought over the acquisition of limited economic resources. Kishore Mahbubani (1993:10-2) is of the opinion that Huntington wrote *The clash of civilizations* in the light of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in East Asia and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the threat that it presented for the West. What

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[4]   As the Chinese civil war came to an end in 1949 Nationalist leader Shiang Kai-shek and his forces withdrew to Taiwan (then Formosa), vowing to reclaim the mainland. Since then China has regarded Taiwan as a renegade, runaway province that must someday be reunited with the mainland. In recent times China has performed a number of military exercises very close to Taiwanese territorial waters, increasing tension between the two states enormously (Strauss 2002:130-1).

the West, however, did not realize was that the rest of the world (non-Western states) was actually more afraid of them than they were of the rest of the world. Huntington's paranoia with the threat of Islam was unfounded because it was the Muslims that had always been defeated in battles with the West. The West was the cause of conflicts involving two billion people in the Islamic and Chinese civilizations, which made the threat of the Confucian-Islamic coalition somewhat unrealistic. Mahbubani (1993:10-2) further questions the fact that if civilizations were thousands of years old, why would they only clash now? Bartley (1993:15-6) argues that if conflict between civilizations indeed becomes a possibility, the 21st century will be very unpleasant. He, however, also questions the potential for conflict between, rather than within, civilizations. Liu Binyon (1993:19-21) rejects Huntington's claim that future conflict will be determined by cultural factors and argues that conflict of economic and political interests between the Great Powers is on the increase. He also rejects Huntington's claim the Confucianism is experiencing a revival in a time when China is actually experiencing spiritual decay, moral degradation and erosion of its cultural foundations.

The significance of this debate was realized and Huntington (1993:186-7) replied to his critics in an article entitled *If not civilization, what?* According to him the world functioned for more than forty years within an oversimplified international relations paradigm called the Cold War. The world was divided between a group consisting of rich and mostly democratic countries (led by the USA) that was involved in an ideological, economic, political and often military struggle with a poorer group consisting of communist countries under control of the Soviet Union. The Cold War paradigm was unable to address all the realities of international relations such as the declining relationship between the Soviet Union and China. According to Huntington (1993:187-8) the 'clash of civilizations' was an attempt to address the shortcomings of this paradigm and to try and make sense of the post-Cold War world. The Cold War paradigm with its simplistic bipolar classification system was unable to address the complexities of the dramatically changing world. Instead, Huntington's alternative classification is based on micro and macro levels. On the micro level of world politics the possibility of violent and dangerous conflicts between states and groups belonging to different civilizations will be high. On the macro level conflicts and shifting power balances will take place between states of different civilizations. So called 'inter-civilization issues' are already replacing superpower issues as the top priority on the agenda of world politics. These include issues such as human rights and immigrations.

According to Huntington (1993:191-4) his critics are unable to provide better alternatives and explanations of the complexities of current affairs. They provide what he terms as pseudo and unreal alternatives. The pseudo alternative is based on a statistical paradigm that proposes irrelevant and artificial oppositions between states and civilizations. The unreal alternative is a one-world paradigm that a universal civilization now exists and is likely to exist in future. The main fallacy of the latter alternative is that it is still rooted in the Cold War assumption that communism means the end of history and the universal acceptance of liberal democracy. It fails to take into account factors such as religion that lies outside the world perceived in terms of secular ideologies. There is also an assumption that increased interaction (greater communication and transportation) produces a common culture although most wars occur more frequently between countries with high levels of interaction. Huntington (1993:191-4) further argues that the West is becoming weaker as a dominant power. The worldwide use of English as a language is also on the decline as many societies experience revivals in the use of traditional languages. The power of the West is weakening while the moral and cultural roots of non-Western states are becoming stronger.

In reaction to the terrorist attack on the United States, Huntington (2001-2002:7-13) published an article entitled *The age of Muslim wars*. This was an attempt to substantiate the claims he made in *The clash of civilizations* article in the light of the attacks.

3.   THE AGE OF MUSLIM WARS

Huntington (2001-2002:8) argues that contemporary global politics entered the age of Muslim wars when the Cold War wound down at the end of the 1980s. The first serious Islamic confrontations started in 1980 when Iraq invaded Iran, resulting in a death toll of more than 500 000. At the same time the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, resulting in serious resistance from Afghani forces and compelling the Soviet forces to withdraw in 1989. Then in 1990 Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait after which the United States organized an international coalition (including several Muslim countries) to defeat him. It is interesting to note that this apparent 'coalition of civilizations' (between the West and Muslim countries) seems to contradict the view held by Huntington in his *The clash of civilizations* article. The 1990s were also characterized by conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Kashmir, India and the Philippines. During this time roughly half of the ethnic conflicts that took place in the world involved Muslims fighting each other or non-Muslims. In the period from 1980 to 1995 the US armed forces were involved in 17 military operations against Muslims. The 'new' war on terrorism is not so new but rather a continuation and escalation of

patterns of violence involving Muslims. Earlier attacks by Muslim terrorists seemed to be more sporadic, smaller in scale and orchestrated from various countries by different terrorist groups. The attacks on America and its facilities, starting in 1993, all appeared to have originated with Osama bin Laden. The attacks of September 11 revealed the existence of a global terrorist network with specialized knowledge, expertise and resources and the capability to operate from cells in 40 countries or more.

According to Huntington (2001-2002:9-10) the causes of contemporary Muslim conflict does not lie in its century old religious doctrines but in the following political factors:

- One of the most significant social, cultural and political developments of the past few decades has been the resurgence of the Islamic consciousness, movements and identity among Muslims from around the world This has taken place in reaction to modernization and globalization. Many Islamic movements have over recent years made it their mission to meet the needs of the increasing number of urban Muslims by providing social support, moral guidance, welfare, health services, education and unemployment relief. According to Esposito (1992:49-50) this also implied a return to the fundamentals of Islam: the Quaran, the life of the Prophet and a return to early Islamic community.
- Throughout the whole of the Muslim world and especially amongst the Arabs a feeling of grievance, resentment, envy and hostility exists towards the West and its wealth, power and culture. The reason for this has been Western imperialism and its domination of the Muslim world for much of the twentieth century. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the major challenges to Islamic society were of an internal nature and a real threat from the West was not experienced until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It constituted a singular political, economic, moral and cultural challenge to Islam. With the dawn of European domination of the Muslim world the image of Islam as an expansive worldwide force were finally shattered (Esposito 1992:51). A strong 'anti-American' resentment has also developed because of the United States' support for Israel and its strong military presence (especially in Saudi Arabia) on the Arabian Peninsula (Lewis 1990:5).
- Tribal, religious, ethnic, political and cultural divisions within the Muslim world stimulate violence between Muslims. Different Muslim groups and governments (such as Saudi-Arabia and Iran) compete with one another to promote their own 'brand' of Islam. They also assisted and gave support to other Muslim groups ranging from Bosnia to the Philippines.

- The Islamic resurgence also coincided with high birthrates in most Muslim societies, which produced a so-called 'youth bulge' with a majority of the population ranging from the age of 16 to 30. Many of these men obtain secondary, technical or higher education qualifications but due to unemployment usually migrate to the West where they join fundamentalist organizations and political parties or enroll into Muslim guerilla groups and terrorist networks.

Huntington (2001-2002:12-3) tempts the reader by asking whether it would be possible for the Muslim violence discussed above to escalate into a major violent civilizational war between Islam and the West and possibly other civilizations. He argues that this was precisely the goal of Ossama bin Laden when he declared a holy war on the United States, attempting to mobilize Muslims worldwide and encouraging all Muslims to kill Americans indiscriminately as part of his Jihad. Due to the many divisions that exist within Islam, this has not happened yet, even though the makings of a general clash of civilizations exist. The international reactions to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. and the response of the United States were strictly along civilizational lines. Governments and peoples of Western countries were overwhelmingly sympathetic and supportive towards the United States, offering to join them in the global war against terrorism. Countries such as Britain, Canada and Australia who share a common Anglo culture with the United States quickly offered to commit military forces to the effort. Support and sympathy also manifested among German, French and other European peoples, who identified themselves with the Americans. Russia, China, India and Japan, the leading countries of non-Western, non-Muslim civilizations, reacted with more modulated expressions of sympathy and support. Almost all the Muslim governments condemned the attacks because they were concerned about the threat that Muslim extremist groups posed to their own authoritarian regimes. However, of all die Muslim regimes only Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Turkey provided direct support to the American response while only Jordan and Egypt (as members of major Arab governments) endorsed that response. In most of the Muslim countries many people condemned the attacks, as small number endorsed the attacks and huge numbers denounced the American response. However, the longer and the more intensely the United States and its allies take military action against terrorist groups in Muslim countries, the more widespread and intense Muslim reaction is likely to be. In their attempt to create a stable and democratic Iraq, the United States is currently experiencing fierce opposition and violent resistance from rebel groups in the country. The bombing of the UN headquarters as well as a mosque may only be the beginning of more violent retaliations against not only the United States, but also other Western sympathizers (Elliot 2003:20-32). The terrorist attacks on the United States may have produced Western unity

but a real danger exists that a prolonged response to Septemb er 11 could produce a hostile Muslim unity.

Huntington (2001-2002:13) concludes that the age of Muslim wars will only come to an end when its causes change or is changed. One strategy of reducing the resentment of Muslims toward the West would be for the United States to change its policies towards Israel. In the long run improvements in the social, economic and political conditions in Muslim countries would be necessary. Governments that fail to provide basic economic and welfare needs for their people and suppress their freedom tend to generate violent opposition to themselves and to Western governments that support them. While the disunity within Islam seems unlikely to abate for quite some time, the demographic prospects are more promising. Even though the birthrate is still very high in many Muslim countries the 'youth bulge' might be shrinking by 2020. By then the age of Muslim wars could fade into history or be succeeded by an era dominated by other forms of violence.

4.   CONCLUSION

The terrorist attacks on the United States altered the way in which many political scientists viewed current world affairs. For many optimistic theorists the dream of a universal democratic world was shattered as quickly as the World Trade Centers collapsed. Others, who argued that China might become the next superpower, and the West's main rival, also had to reconsider their original ideas (Corson 2001:1). Samuel P Huntington, however, seemed to be correct in many of his predictions regarding a world that would engage in conflict because of cultural, rather than ideological and economical differences. For him the attacks of September 11, 2001 were the first serious manifestation of the future clashes that would occur between the Western and especially the Islamic civilization. A question that needs to be asked here is whether the Muslim world will ever get in a position to challenge the military hegemony of the west in a conventional conflict? This is highly unlikely because conflict in the sense of a 'clash' will, for the foreseeable future at least, probably be based on guerilla tactics which should suit terrorist groups well. Huntington is adamant that the terrorist attack substantiates many of the claims that he made in *The clash of civilizations* article.

- The differences with regard to culture, language and religion that exist between civilizations were highlighted by the fact that all the orchestraters in the terrorist attacks adhered to an Islamic value and norm system opposed to the Western value and norm system (rooted in Christianity) followed by their victims.

- Mention was made of the fact that civilizations will clash because the world is becoming 'smaller' (because of advances in information and transport technologies) due to increased interaction between civilizations. These terrorists lived and worked in the United States and planned their attacks using the technologies that globalization provided them. It was a case of one civilization interacting with another civilization and using the resources of that civilization to attack it.

- The process of economic modernization and social change initiated by the West has resulted in a resurgence of Islamic consciousness, movements and identity of many Muslims around the world. Not all Muslims are radical but the broad spectrum of Islamic people reject what they regard as the 'corrupt' Western value and norm system. A 'fundamentalist' minority within the Islamic civilization (with a radical approach towards the preservation of the Islamic value and norm system) carried out the terrorist attacks.

- The magnitude of and sheer damage and devastation caused by the terrorist attacks reflect the intensity of hate, resentment, grievance and hostility that exists towards the Western civilization by many Muslims. Western imperialism and domination of the Muslim world during the twentieth century and the policy of the United States towards Israel are some of the reasons for this hatred. The West's, especially the United States' arrogance and domination of and interfering in world affairs were probably used as a motivation for the terrorists to initiating the attacks.

Despite severe criticism of *The clash of civilizations*, the terrorist attacks in the United States served as proof that the world was not yet as safe as many observers would have wanted it to be. The so-called 'triumph of liberal democracy' experienced its first major setback and the world realized that not all its inhabitants accepted a Western value and norm system. Vaïsse (2001:1) further argues that "Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis can be criticized in many ways but no one can deny that it is cherished by all the worlds reactionaries: Chinese and Hindu nationalists, Islamists, the European and Russian far right etc. Nor can it be denied that the notion of a clash of civilizations, for millions of people around the world, was given a real boost on September 11." Even Fukuyama (2001-2002:58-60), the great adherent to the 'end of history' theory, accepted that the role of cultural factors in future conflict could not be discarded. He argues that "while the Bush administration has been correctly asserting that the current struggle is against terrorism, not a war between the West and Islam, there are clearly cultural issues at play." In his contribution, Huntington has already given us a sneak preview of the possible future of world affairs and the events of September 11, 2001 painfully

confirmed it. Another perception that can be derived from the 'clash of civilizations' idea is that Huntington's thought is influenced by the realist perspective of world politics. His vision of future interaction between civilizations ties in with Holsti's (1995:5-6) typical reference to the security dilemma: the means by which one state (civilization?) provides for its security creates insecurity for others. It seems as if Huntington's views are firmly embedded in the perception of multi-polarity. This is in contrast to the globalization paradigm which emphasizes a more homogeneous worldview ('global village' idea).

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