

## 9-11 AND THE SECURITISATION OF WORLD POLITICS

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### 1. INTRODUCTION

On 11 September 2001, events unfolded that may have changed the world irrevocably for the worst. Has anything changed? The world after 11 September is a less secure place. The events of 9/11 will go down in history as a defining moment just as World War One, World War Two and the Cold War has. Political differences have not entirely been set aside to create more amicable international relations, but have rather served to highlight the intense differences that continue to exacerbate how states view one another in the world today. There is definitely a greater sense of vigilance, improved national security and the emergence of a worrying trend in which the normal functioning of societal life is being subordinated by the overwhelming stress placed on greater security while sacrificing liberty. 11 September 2001 reintroduced the debate on whether the world of tomorrow will come to be defined exclusively according to security and military relations, and less on the more optimistic era of globalisation, which has dominated international relations up to now. Greater isolation as opposed to increased integration, characterised by globalisation, may become the norm that governs international relations. 11 September may become the catalyst for the securitisation of world politics.

### 2. 11 SEPTEMBER 2001: THE SECURITISATION OF WORLD POLITICS

The people of the U.S.A. has become a nation that defines itself in martial terms - the American Revolution, the American Civil War, the world wars, the war in Vietnam, the Gulf War and today Ground Zero. Yet, since 11 September terrorism has become the new enemy to war against. In the aftermath of the 11 September terror attacks, President George W Bush told US citizens that the country faced the "first war of the 21<sup>st</sup> century",<sup>2</sup> which may cause the USA to want to be out of the

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<sup>2</sup> KM Campbell, "Globalization's first war", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Winter 2002).

front lines of global security. Americans were already more ambivalent about policing the world.<sup>3</sup> The so-called "land of the free" could be (and is already) entering the era of "Fortress America". Yet, what is terrorism and securitisation that 11 September 2001 brought most urgently to the fore in the security debate?

## 2.1 Terrorism

Terrorism, viewed through the political lens, is a tool of non-state or state actors, driven by religious or political ideation designed to manipulate governments and politics through violence.<sup>4</sup> Terrorism can be dealt with either as a crime, or as an attack on the body politic.

A first attempt to arrive at an internationally acceptable definition was made under the League of Nations in 1937. In accordance with this terrorism was defined as "(a)ll criminal acts directed against and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or the general public".<sup>5</sup> The UN resolution of 1999 reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are under any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious nature that may be invoked to justify them.<sup>6</sup>

Terrorism expert A Schmid suggested in a 1992 report that it might be a good idea to take the existing consensus on what constitutes a "war crime" as a point of departure. If the core of war crimes, deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage-taking and the killing of prisoners, are extended to peacetime, we could simply define acts of terrorism as " peacetime equivalents of war crimes".<sup>7</sup>

The USA Defense Department defines terrorism as "the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are political, religious or ideological".<sup>8</sup> The US Justice Department's definition includes the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof in furtherance of political ob-

<sup>3</sup> DC Gompert, "Implications of September 11: An American perspective" (IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels, 5 November 2001), <http://www.iiss.org>, 20 July 2002.

<sup>4</sup> JH Norwitz, "Combating terrorism: With a helmet or a badge?", *Journal of Homeland Security*, August 2002 (<http://www.homelandsecurity.org>), 25 August 2002).

<sup>5</sup> ODCCP.2002, "Definitions of terrorism" (United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, <http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism>), 24 October 2002.

<sup>6</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>7</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>8</sup> Norwitz, 2002.

jectives.<sup>9</sup> If the terrorist attacks of 11 September were aimed at intimidation, the obvious response to it would be securitisation. The Algiers Convention of 1999 excludes struggles for national self-determination from the definition of terrorism.<sup>10</sup> Its notion of a "terrorist act" includes the intimidation, coercion and inducement of any government, the disruption of any public service and the creation of general insurrection in a state as well as the intimidation, coercion and inducement of any government, institution or the general public to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to certain principles.<sup>11</sup>

In the shadow of 11 September, several states facing fierce opposition have joined the 'war on terrorism' while branding domestic opponents as 'terrorists' aiming to destabilise governments.<sup>12</sup> The most recent and comprehensive description of terrorism is contained in the 'Common Position' adopted by the European Union. This includes the following terrorist acts: seriously intimidating a population or unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.<sup>13</sup> Human Rights Watch expressed concern about the European Union's broad definition of terrorism that threatens freedom of speech, assembly and association and the threats it poses to the protection of international refugees.<sup>14</sup> The new UK anti-terrorism legislation adopted can also be seen as the country's retreat from human rights and refugee protection. This could lead to human rights abuses without significantly improving UK security.<sup>15</sup> In fact this may breed more apprehension and enmity as truly innocent refugees fleeing countries where they have been severely oppressed and terrorised, may be treated with suspicion, caution and distrust just to be met with more retribution instead of salvation. There is also the old adage claiming, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter", which is complicating the definition of terrorism.

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<sup>9</sup> Norwitz, 2002.  
<sup>10</sup> J Cilliers and K Sturman, "An overview and introduction", **Africa and terrorism: Joining the global campaign** (ISS Monograph Series No 74, July 2002).  
<sup>11</sup> Cilliers and Sturman, p. 7.  
<sup>12</sup> V Whitbeck, "Terrorism: the word itself is dangerous", **Pugwash Newsletter**, Vol. 39, No. 1, June 2002 (The Council of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs).  
<sup>13</sup> Cilliers and Sturman, p. 5.  
<sup>14</sup> E Andersen, "European Union: Security proposals threaten human rights", **Human Rights Watch**, 6 November 2001 (<http://www.hrw.org>, 24 October 2002).  
<sup>15</sup> Andersen.

## 2.2 Securitisation

The term securitisation refers to the transformation of issues into security concerns by labelling them as such. So, regardless of whether these issues lead to violence or conflict or poses a threat to the state, it is viewed as a security issue.<sup>16</sup>

Power holders attempt to use the instrument of securitisation to gain control over an issue. Nothing is necessarily a security problem - it is made so by calling it a security problem. The issue is thus securitised. Ole Waever states "that in naming a certain development a security problem the state can claim a special right. The invocation of security in relation to an issue allows the state to take extraordinary measures to combat whatever threat is identified."<sup>17</sup> Most democratic states reserve the right to suspend civil and political rights in the name of national security. The state is privileged in the process of securitisation and tends to militarise issues when it securitises them.<sup>18</sup>

Securitisation could have two extremes. They are paranoia that refers to the securitisation of non-existent threats, and complacency that refers to the nonsecuritisation of apparent threats.<sup>19</sup> A government threatened from abroad therefore will always with some right be able to invoke the security of the state. Since the terror attacks of September 11, the United States has intensified its commitment to Homeland and National Security as a priority above all else. Attempts toward desecuritisation as suggested by Waever<sup>20</sup> may seem less substantial and less likely in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Demilitarisation also appears unlikely following the war in Afghanistan and the growing likelihood of preemptive strikes against Iraq. What 11 September undeniably may have invoked is a United States of America dictated and characterised by greater isolation and more forceful securitisation.

## 3. THE USA: A RETURN TO ISOLATION AND THE BIRTH OF AN AMERICAN POLICE STATE?

The era of political isolationism under the Bush Administration may be at an end, but it could only be temporary. The USA could rejoin efforts to promote

<sup>16</sup> M Hough and A du Plessis (eds), **Selected official South African strategic and security perceptions: 1992-2000** (Ad hoc publication No. 37, November 2000, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria), p. 45.

<sup>17</sup> D Mutimer, "Beyond strategy: Critical thinking and the new security studies", in CA Snyder (ed.) **Contemporary security and strategy** (London: McMillan, 1999), p. 89.

<sup>18</sup> Mutimer, p. 90.

<sup>19</sup> B Buzan and O Waever, **Security: A new framework for analysis** (USA: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 57.

<sup>20</sup> O Waever, "Securitization and desecuritization", in RD Lipschutz (ed.), **On security** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

international cooperation, which may lead to a 'global deal' between North and South. The USA may also no longer be the 'lone ranger' in international relations. US foreign policy has been restored to high priority, where once before only indifference on external affairs existed amongst most citizens.<sup>21</sup> Re-engagement could become the cornerstone of the new Bush administration's foreign policy.<sup>22</sup> However, the form this re-engagement will take and has already taken has raised great concerns.

Yet evidence is also strongly pointing towards a pro-isolationist Bush administration, as America could possibly be closing its gates to the sinister outside world it has now come to distrust.<sup>23</sup> This could potentially transform the land of freedom, liberty and opportunity into the land of high surveillance and security. The Bush administration will thus continue to push its agenda of 'America first'. One of the first responses by the Bush administration after the 11 September attacks was the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security. In its establishment securitisation has alarmingly manifested itself.

### 3.1 Homeland security: Big Brother is watching

The Department of Homeland Security is the first new cabinet-level department in more than a decade, and is seen as the most sweeping overhaul of the federal government in more than 50 years since the creation of the Department of Defense. Securitisation is a greater possibility due to the terror attacks on the US Homeland. The United States' response to Homeland Security is testimony of this fact. The nation's air, land and seaports of entry were placed on the highest state of alert. An additional 1 600 National Guardsmen were deployed to assist in securing the USA's borders. Security at all visible monuments, including the Statue of Liberty, the National Mall, Washington, the Liberty Bell and the Gateway Arch in St. Louis was heightened. The Federal Air Marshall program was expanded. More than 9 000 National Guards were deployed to secure the USA's airports. There is a provision of 24 hours per day security at 348 dams and reservoirs. Nuclear power plants across the US were placed on the highest level of security according to a Washington Report on Homeland Security. The Justice Department proposed measures to screen out high-risk individuals from entering the country by fingerprinting and registering foreigners who come from a list of high-risk countries.<sup>24</sup> Efforts were also under way to create digitised identification cards,

<sup>21</sup> SEMiller, "The end of unilateralism or unilateralism redux?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Winter 2002).

<sup>22</sup> M Hirsh, "Death of a founding myth", *Newsweek*, 12 November 2001.

<sup>23</sup> R Ernsberger, "Fortress America: Will America lock its gates?", *Newsweek*, 12 November 2001.

<sup>24</sup> J Kemp, "A 21<sup>st</sup> century response to terrorism", *National Security*, 12 June 2002 (<http://www.empoweramerica.org/stories/>, 24 August 2002).

biometric identifiers, fingerprint and palm print scans, voice recognition and retina scan equipment. Military jets patrolling the skies above major US cities have become a part of everyday life since two hijacked airliners ploughed through the World Trade Center towers in New York.

All three Homeland Security schemes that were proposed envision a permanent military presence to police the American Homeland.<sup>25</sup> The new Office of Homeland Security has the power to direct 46 different federal agencies in the name of fighting terrorism (which indicates that the whole of US society and politics may be overshadowed by the watchful eye of the Homeland Security Czar). Nuclear or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists or rogue states constitute the greatest danger to American National Security.<sup>26</sup> A hostile nation could also strike with long-range ballistic missiles, which prompted the Bush administration to deploy a National Missile Defense Shield for protection of the US Homeland.

### 3.2 The American police state

There was an outward expansion of the portfolio of National Security issues from previous internal policing domains, and the deployment of the external military apparatus for "military operations other than war".<sup>27</sup> The militarisation of policing and the domestication of soldiering have been taking shape since 11 September 2001.

The deployment of the military for internal and external policing operations was especially becoming evident in Washington D.C. and New York. Surveillance cameras in Washington D.C. already formed a part of the Capitol's strict security measures, well before tragedy struck on September 11. There is also a firm belief that anything goes if it is for government-provided safety and security.<sup>28</sup> Even prior to 9/11, a ten-foot high steel wall, dubbed the 'iron curtain', had been constructed on the San Diego border to keep illegal entries out. It serves as a reminder of the emerging security state that now characterises the USA. In that country it now seems likely that centralised police state powers in the hands of a strong executive branch will become a stark reality. The expanding power of the US government is even greater than depression era levels. The National Guard as a de facto national

<sup>25</sup> S Bonta, "Homeland Insecurity: The emerging police state", *The New American*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 14 January 2002.

<sup>26</sup> WJ Perry, "Preparing for the next attack", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 6, November/December 2001, p. 32.

<sup>27</sup> P Andreas and R Price, "From war fighting to crime fighting: Transforming the American National Security State", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, Issue 3, (Blackwell, Fall 2001).

<sup>28</sup> R Paul, *Is America a police state?* Address by U.S. Congressman Ron Paul, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington D.C, 27 June 2002, <http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec/congrec2002/cr062702.htm>).

military police is also a likelihood.<sup>29</sup> Major Ralph Peters of the US Army War College claims that the "domestic deployment of the military appears to be the inevitable future. The USA's future military tasks will become increasingly domesticated and policing tasks increasingly internationalized and militarized."<sup>30</sup>

There is an ethos in America that standing armies are a threat to governments, unless they are at war. The Whigs believed that a standing military force in time of peace was a threat to liberty.<sup>31</sup> The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits, unless with presidential intervention, to use armed forces to execute laws upon citizenry.

Another manifestation of the emerging American police state is political spying. US Attorney General Ashcroft authorised the FBI to spy on political meetings, without any basis for believing that any criminal activity had been planned.<sup>32</sup> 'Operation TIPS' is a program encouraging citizens to spy on one another.<sup>33</sup> The CIA would be given greater powers to police American citizens. These deliberate attempts toward securitisation could give way to the infringement of civil liberties the USA has been built on for centuries.<sup>34</sup> A new anti-terror law, the 'USA-Patriot Act' could further encroach on the rights of US citizens.<sup>35</sup> The USA could take on greater semblances of a police state in which everyone is a suspect, and security above liberty may replace the 'land of the free' image indefinitely. The US government, certain of another attack, assigned 100 civilian government officials to 24-hour rotations in underground bunkers. This program became known as the 'shadow government' that was ready to take the reins if the next attack could turn out to be the White House or Congress itself.<sup>36</sup>

According to Congressman Ron Paul the United States is not yet a ruthless authoritarian police state. However, 11 September laid a firm foundation for further securitisation. The declining US hegemony could lead to a rapid rise in securitisation to protect the last superpower from fading from the political scene. The most serious implication drawn from the terror attacks was that the very same system of globalisation that fuelled the glory days of the 1990s and the openness of the US economy to the world and which helped spawn unparalleled growth also increased America's vulnerability and its greater sense of insecurity.<sup>37</sup> Just as globalisation is

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<sup>29</sup> Bonta, p. 11.

<sup>30</sup> Andreas and Price, p. 52.

<sup>31</sup> Norwitz, p. 5.

<sup>32</sup> D Cole, "Trading liberty for security after September 11", **Foreign Policy in Focus** (<http://www.fpij.org/papers/post9-11.html>), 24 August 2002.

<sup>33</sup> Cole, p. 9.

<sup>34</sup> Perry, p. 36.

<sup>35</sup> W Blum, **Rogue State: A guide to the world's only superpower** (London: Zed Books, 2002).

<sup>36</sup> M Calabresi and R Ratnesar, "Can we stop the next attack?" **Time**, 11 March 2002, p. 24.

<sup>37</sup> S Flynn, "America the vulnerable", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 81, No. 1, January/February 2002, p. 61.

based on borderless relations, the insecurity threat after September 11 2001 has not remained confined to the United States alone.

#### 4. THE GLOBALISATION OF SECURITISATION

A host of countries and international organisations answered US President George W Bush's call for a worldwide coalition to fight terrorism: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Union (EU), Organisation of American States (OAS), Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), African Union (AU), Arab League, United Nations (UN) and most vocally the United Kingdom. The response to the events of 11 September was best captured by the *Le Monde* headline: "We are all Americans".<sup>38</sup> This sense of solidarity has all but vanished as the United States continues to assert itself in the war on terror and against rogue states.

Sino-US relations experienced a strained phase. The Bush administration was considering a weapons package for Taiwan, pledging to protect the country in case of an attack by China. A mid-air collision between a US spy plane and a Chinese jet off Hainan Island in the South China Sea earlier in 2001, had placed relations under great strain.<sup>39</sup> The Middle East conflict threatens to derail the Bush administration's next phase in the war on terror, if the conflict is allowed to erupt into a full-blown regional clash that might inflame the entire Arab world. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon launched his own campaign against terrorism as he seemingly vows that a Palestinian state will not come into existence.<sup>40</sup> US-Saudi relations also came under fire. There was growing Saudi reservations about hosting a US military presence, even during peace-time.<sup>41</sup> The most beneficial geostrategic effect could be the change in Russian foreign policy towards the west.<sup>42</sup> President Vladimir Putin and President George W Bush signed a nuclear arms agreement with the aim of reducing the nuclear arsenals of both the former Cold War rivals.<sup>43</sup> The Russian president acknowledged that US forces were being placed on high alert after September 11, but that the Russian military would stand down - a

<sup>38</sup> Hirsh, p. 21.

<sup>39</sup> ME Ahrari, "Iran, China and Russia: The emerging anti-US Nexus?" *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, 2001 (International Peace Research Institute Oslo), p. 459.

<sup>40</sup> I Wallerstein, "Mr. Bush's war on terrorism: How certain is the outcome?" in K Booth and T Dunne (eds) *Worlds in collision: Terror and the future of global order* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 97.

<sup>41</sup> M Strauss, "Attacking Iraq", *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2002, p. 14.

<sup>42</sup> JL Helgerson, "Global trends and the implications of the 11 September attacks." Army War College, 22 January 2002. National Intelligence Council, [http://www.cia.gov/nic/army\\_war\\_college](http://www.cia.gov/nic/army_war_college), 20 July 2002.

<sup>43</sup> M Moran, "In from the cold", *Newsweek International*, 21 May 2002, <http://www.newsweek.com>, 5 August 2002.



significant break from Cold War tradition.<sup>44</sup> A European Union acting in a coherent manner did not materialize, as individual EU states offered support to Washington. Yet Europe may become a less reliable ally as Europeans talk dismissively of President Bush - leader of Texas. The US camp in response lashed out with taunts such as 'feckless Eurowimps'.<sup>45</sup> The relations between Germany, the first ally to condemn the Bush administration's preemptive war cry against Iraq, and the USA were dubbed the 'poisoned relationship'.<sup>46</sup> Europe too was gripped by a new sense of insecurity as warnings of imminent Al Qaeda attacks surfaced, most notably in Great Britain, the USA's strongest ally in the war on terror, which led to the arrest of three suspects allegedly planning a gas or cyanide attack on the London underground rail system. Osama bin Laden's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, indicated in a broadcast that Germany and France were targets of renewed terror. This was in reference to the synagogue attacks in Tunisia in which 11 German tourists were killed and an ambush in Karachi that killed 11 French naval engineers.<sup>47</sup>

President George W Bush also urged more African states to ratify the 1999 Algiers Convention against Terrorism, which had been adopted following the U.S Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.<sup>48</sup> Post 11 September Africa matters to the US in significant ways, good and bad. Africa's weaknesses pose a threat to US security. The continent's exceptional circumstances provide porous and insecure borders and an already aggrieved audience, which could benefit the next terrorist network.<sup>49</sup>

The USA after 11 September designated the Horn of Africa as a security priority, particularly Sudan and Somalia, both countries notorious for having had close links in the past with Osama bin Laden.<sup>50</sup> Somalia, a collapsed state with no central government, is speculated to be the next target of US military action on terror bases in Africa.<sup>51</sup> Any military action in a state already severely paralysed by war and insurrection could however seriously breach the continent's already unstable

<sup>44</sup> J Carney, "Russia: America's new best friend?", **Time**, 27 May 2002, p. 36.

<sup>45</sup> JFO McAllister, "Theatre of War", **Time**, 10 July 2002.

<sup>46</sup> **The Economist**, "America and Germany: The poisoned relationship", 28 September 2002, p. 52.

<sup>47</sup> J Graff, "Is Europe next?", **Time**, 18 November 2002, p. 33.

<sup>48</sup> GWBush, "U.S., Africa strengthen counter-terrorism and economic ties". Remarks by the U.S. President to the African Growth and Opportunity Forum, Washington D.C., 29 October 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001.html>, 30 June 2002.

<sup>49</sup> J Morrison, "Africa and the war on global terrorism". Testimony by Dr J Stephen Morrison before the House of International Relations Committee's subcommittee on Africa, 15 November 2001. Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://www.csis.org>, 20 July 2002.

<sup>50</sup> Morrison, "Somalia's and Sudan's race to the fore in Africa", **The Washington Quarterly**, Vol. 25, No. 2, Spring 2002, Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 191.

<sup>51</sup> M Hough, "New York terror: The implications for Africa", **Africa Insight**, Vol. 32, No. 1, (Africa Institute, 2002).

internal security situation and could provide more insecurity that could harm any anti-terror operation.

President Bush in his State of the Union address created the 'Axis of Evil', identifying Iran, Iraq and North Korea as regimes that could provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists.<sup>52</sup> At that stage Iraq seemed to be the next phase in the war on terror with the aim of effecting regime change. Fears were then expressed across the world of a unilateral rush into preemptive war with Iraq that could undercut world support for the war on terror and cast America as an aggressor nation for the first time in its history.<sup>53</sup> An attack on Iraq could destabilise the already volatile and insecure Arab world.<sup>54</sup> Hawks agreed that toppling Saddam Hussein had to be the next phase in the war on terror.<sup>55</sup> A defiant North Korea confessed that it was developing a nuclear weapons program, but facing pressure from the USA to scrap its nuclear ambitions, warned the USA that it would take unspecified 'tougher counteraction' if Washington did not accept peaceful talks on the issue.<sup>56</sup> President Bush was quick to declare that full-scale war with North Korea was out of the question as Pyongyang with a million-man army was close enough to destroy Seoul, South Korea's capital in retaliation.<sup>57</sup>

Afghanistan remains a country gripped by insecurity as its interim leader, President Hamid Karzai, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt, whilst under close protection of US Special Forces bodyguards. The attack came as bomb blasts ripped through the capital city of Kabul. Pakistan and India's relations at times brought the two countries virtually to a military and more alarmingly to a threat of nuclear showdown.<sup>58</sup> Nearly 200 innocent civilians were brutally killed in a terrorist attack in Bali, Indonesia. This was described as the worst act of terrorism in Indonesia's history. Australia subsequently dispatched passenger and Hercules C-130 military jets to evacuate frightened tourists and the injured.<sup>59</sup> President Megawati Sukarnoputri was the target of two assassination attempts in the past by suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in Indonesia. Australia was hit hardest by the terror attacks already dubbed 'Australia's 9/11'.<sup>60</sup> The Bali bomb attack destroyed the myth of Australia being out of the line of fire in international discord. Three parcel bombs

<sup>52</sup> M Calabresi, "The 'Axis of Evil'. Is it for real?", **Time**, 11 February 2002, p. 30.

<sup>53</sup> M Hirsh, "Hawks, doves and Dubya", **Newsweek International**, 2 September 2002, p. 26.

<sup>54</sup> Strauss, p. 14.

<sup>55</sup> KM Pollack, "Next Stop Baghdad?", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 81, No.2, March/April 2002.

<sup>56</sup> P Eckert, "North Korea calls for talks on arms", **Washington Post**, 23 October, 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>, 26 October 2002

<sup>57</sup> J Mcgeary, "Look who's got the bomb", **Time**, 28 October 2002, p. 41.

<sup>58</sup> S Spaeth, "India and Pakistan: Looking down the barrel", **Time**, 14 January 2002.

<sup>59</sup> A Sipress, and E Nakashima, "187 killed in blast at Indonesia nightclub", **The Washington Post**, 13 October 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>, 15 October 2002.

<sup>60</sup> D Struck, "In many ways, Australia's 9/11", **The Washington Post**, 17 October 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>, 19 October 2002

exploded in Pakistan's violence-plagued commercial capital Karachi and a powerful bus bomb exploded in the Philippines. Moscow also became the scene of terror with the hostage crisis in which Chechen separatists demanded the immediate withdrawal of President Vladimir Putin's troops in what was dubbed Russia's own 'war on terrorism'. The hostage crisis left 178 people dead and the conflict in Chechnya nowhere near resolution. In Yemen an oil tanker was attacked in similar fashion to the attacks on the USS Cole of 2000, also in Yemen. In Kuwait 3 US troops were killed in a surprise terror attack. Even South Africa seemed to face a new threat to its national security. The country was shocked by the bomb blasts that ripped through Soweto and surrounding areas in which one person was tragically killed and a Mosque damaged and another bomb diffused at a Buddhist temple. The South African Police Service and security forces uncovered a major plot to overthrow the government. An Afrikaner right wing group and its members known as the Farmers' Forces (Boeremag), were arrested for their role in conspiring to overthrow the government.<sup>61</sup> Large caches of weapons, explosives and trucks filled with arms and ammunition were discovered. Plans involved a possible military take over of army and air force bases and parliamentary institutions. The conspiratorial nature of the plot seemed to pose a definite threat to South Africa's National Security. South Africa's security forces were placed on high alert.

9/11, the date that will go down in infamy, clearly sparked off regional and continental tensions with enormous consequences. Political and social relations look increasingly less nonviolent, tranquil, stable or amicable. The world will increasingly become caught in a state of geopolitical isolation in efforts to insulate itself from the worst transnational actor that has taken advantage of a more globalized and open world – the terrorist network.

After 11 September security first and foremost will overshadow and dictate how states and nations relate to one another. States will increasingly rely on tougher measures and security to prevent further attacks, mayhem and destruction at all costs to protect innocent civilians even if the price to pay is liberty. This was vividly illustrated at two major summits held after the terrorist atrocities on US soil. They were the G8 Summit in Canada and the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002.

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<sup>61</sup> P Hawthorne, "No laughing matter", **Time**, 14 October 2002, p. 38.

## 5. AFTER 9/11: THE SECURITISATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Two major conferences held since 11 September provided a true reflection of the new world and new security climate in which international relations now operates.

### 5.1 Kananaskis, Canada: The G-8 Summit

The heavy security at the G-8 Summit held in Kananaskis, Canada, characterised by thousands of soldiers, tanks and anti-aircraft missiles, served as a visible reminder that the discussions were clouded by the shadow of the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks. The Canadian government authored a catch-all definition of terrorism post 11 September. This could be used to threaten massive legal reprisals against virtually anyone involved in civil disobedience. It also provided police and state security forces with a mandate to spy on a vast array of groups opposed to the current government, foreign governments and business.<sup>62</sup>

Let anyone who disputes that securitisation is on the verge of becoming a more defining feature in the way states perceive and relate to one another dispute no more! Under Bill C-42, the Canadian Defence Minister gained power by proclaiming any part of Canadian land, water or air space a military security zone.<sup>63</sup>

The military were then empowered to remove anyone who did not have state authorisation to be there from entering the 'military security zone'. Like its counterpart, Bill 36, the Public Safety Act (Bill C-42), is an omnibus bill that amends many existing laws and gives the state vast new powers. This includes the right of the Defence Minister to act without approval of parliament or cabinet to proclaim a military security zone. These laws ensured the establishment of a military security zone around the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis.

### 5.2. The World Summit on Sustainable Development: Security in excess of people, planet and prosperity?

The state remains the primary referent object of security of the instance that is to be secured. If this is the case, military threats to states are privileged as the principal source of insecurity.<sup>64</sup> The United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa in August/September saw unpre-

<sup>62</sup> G Charron, "Canada may declare G-8 Summit site a militarized zone", 12 January 2002, **World Socialist Web Site**, <http://www.wsws.org/articles>, 19 July 2002.

<sup>63</sup> Charron, 2002.

<sup>64</sup> Mutimer, p. 86.

cedented levels of security one year after the attacks of 11 September on Washington and New York. Security at the summit was amidst the specter of measures now in place in the USA and across the world. Johannesburg, notorious for its high level of crime, was shrouded in an impenetrable security blanket as U.N. delegates, world leaders and protestors alike converged on the Sandton Convention Center. Approximately 8 000 South African Police Service officers provided security for the summit and elements of the South African Air Force, SA National Defence Force and Metro Police Services provided additional security. A Seeker unmanned aircraft was utilized monitoring events on the ground. The South African Rooivalk attack helicopter also provided a pivotal support role in maintaining security.<sup>65</sup> A no-fly zone of five kilometers within the conference center radius was also enforced. Unidentified aircraft entering the airspace would be dealt with if deemed necessary by a Cheetah fighter. Security concerns against mortar attacks, snipers, assassins and violent demonstrations and security fears, shaped by the 9/11 events contributed to the securitisation of the summit. Two high-technology operation centers kept all individuals suspected of involvement in sabotage plots under close surveillance. Reports were also revealed of an attempt that was made to sabotage the World Summit. Police were alerted of a possible terrorist attack plot to bomb the summit that was attended by 104 Heads of State.<sup>66</sup> However, a major security breach transpired in which Green Peace activists managed to scale the Koeberg nuclear power plant in a protest against nuclear power energy, raising concerns that a terrorist group might have achieved with the greatest of ease and little resistance a major strike against an evidently open target. This prompted South African security and intelligence services to deploy a navy strike craft to monitor the activities of Green Peace in response to the massive security breach at South Africa's supposedly 'impenetrable' nuclear power plant.<sup>67</sup> This may serve as another indicator of the massive and sweeping crack-down on peaceful protests, labelled as 'terrorist attacks', that may emerge in future. South Africa's anti-terror legislation post 11 September, was criticized for its 'impossibly wide definition' of what constitutes a terrorist act.<sup>68</sup> After the Soweto bomb attacks the clamp down was sure to become fiercer.

## 6. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001:THE MILITARISATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

11 September 2001 constituted an act of war, which will be responded to in kind as the war on international terrorism unfolds. President George W Bush is set to

<sup>65</sup> J Hennop, "Pilotless plane, attack helicopters to protect world summit", <http://www.joburesummit2002.com>, 25 August 2002.

<sup>66</sup> R Munusamy, "Summit bomb plot foiled", **Sunday Times**, 8 September 2002.

<sup>67</sup> T Msimang, "Greenpeace under surveillance", **The Citizen**, 28 August 2002.

<sup>68</sup> K Magardie, "Definition of terrorism staggeringly wide", **Mail & Guardian**, 5 October 2001.

become the 'War President'. The US President believes that his presidency will be judged according to the effectiveness with which he wages this war.<sup>69</sup> The President's approval rating in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was established at 86%. A president's approval rating during times of war and crisis always rises. Bush's approval rating was unprecedented.<sup>70</sup> This secured the President's hold on Washington and the White House, following the controversial Florida vote that secured him the presidency in 2000. The historic midterm US elections of 2002 ensured that the Republican Party secured both Houses of Congress.<sup>71</sup> This was seen as a clear warning that the Bush administration, unchecked and uncontrolled, could pursue the war on terrorism and rogue states more forcefully, without any clear stumbling block in the way. Despite the UN Security Council resolution calling for Iraq's immediate disarmament and compliance to weapons inspectors, plans for battle in Baghdad, following the attacks on Afghanistan were not abandoned. The strategic implications of 11 September may yield a renewed sense of realism in world affairs. The President however lacked a few basic advantages that previous wartime presidents have had - a clear target, even a clear enemy, which illustrates the new kind of war the United States of America was waging. Operation Enduring Freedom, launched on October 7 2001, signalled the start of the military phase of the war on terrorism. The war in Afghanistan signalled a revolution in military affairs.<sup>72</sup> US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, emphasised the uniqueness of the military operation in the combination of a First World Air Force with a Fourth World Army - the Northern Alliance.<sup>73</sup> Asymmetrical warfare, in which one side conducts military operations using unconventional tactics, is on the ascendant.<sup>74</sup> This has enormous implications for countries that have placed great trust in conventional military capabilities in ensuring security. F-15 fighter jets responded too late to prevent Boeing 747s from being flown Kamikaze style into the World Trade Center towers.

The Pentagon, the military fortress and stronghold of the United States, was partially laid to waste. NATO on 12 September, 24 hours after the terrorist attacks on the USA, for the first time in its 52-year existence invoked the treaty's mutual defence guarantee - pledging that an attack on one ally would be treated as an

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<sup>69</sup> Miller, p. 16.

<sup>70</sup> H Fineman, and M Brant, "Bush's battle cry", *Newsweek*, 1 October 2001, p. 13.

<sup>71</sup> R Ratnesar, "The battle hymn of the Republicans", *Time*, 18 November, 2002, p. 26.

<sup>72</sup> J Barry, "A new breed of soldier", *Newsweek*, 10 December 2001, p. 15.

<sup>73</sup> L Freedman, "A new type of war", in K Booth and T Dunne, **Worlds in Collision: Terror and the future of global order** (London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

<sup>74</sup> D Da Cunha, T Seng, K Nathan and F Noor, "Regional, political and security implications of the terror attacks in the United States", No. 13, October 2001, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, <http://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html>, 23 July 2002.

attack on all.<sup>75</sup> Another alarming development was the surge in post 11 September arms sales and military aid. The USA seems more willing than ever to sell or give away weapons to countries that have pledged assistance in the global war on terrorism.<sup>76</sup> Several countries before the advent of 11 September 2001 that would not have qualified as recipients of military aid, are now on the receiving end of such assistance. Deals to strategic countries include the sale of fighter jets to Oman and missiles to Egypt. Pakistan, regarded a valued ally in the war on terrorism, rapidly shifted from pariah to partner. This despite the military dictatorship that plundered the country's wealth and democratic institutions in a state that has come to be known as an 'army that has a country'.<sup>77</sup> The USA may also fall prey to this label as a country that has come to be associated more with its armed forces and military power and less by its culture, ordinary citizens and the values of liberty, democracy and peace. To the military establishment fighting wars on earth, too, may prove not to suffice. The USA may be planning to conduct wars in outer space according to Pentagon officials: "During the early portion of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, space power will also evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare. The emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea and air superiority will lead to Full Spectrum Dominance."<sup>78</sup> The recent release of the USA's National Security Strategy has been dubbed the most significant US foreign policy statement since NSC 68, the 1950 paper that codified the containment doctrine.<sup>79</sup> This document states clearly that America would take preemptive action if it saw that any country was developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons for use against it.<sup>80</sup> The National Security Strategy does however not call for a temporary wartime build-up to fight terrorism, but calls for a permanent policy of maintaining US military hegemony. The USA could, however, be threatening world security with its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which could risk a new Cold War and an arms race with China and the upset of the nuclear 'balance of terror'.<sup>81</sup>

The major threat has however emanated from the US withdrawal from the 'negative security assurance'. This act states that the US will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state, unless that non-nuclear state attacks the US in alliance with a

<sup>75</sup> PH Gordon, "NATO after 11 September", *Survival*, Vol. 43, No.4, Winter 2002, <http://www.iiss.org>, 22 July 2002.

<sup>76</sup> R Stohl, "Post September 11 arms sales and military aid demonstrate dangerous trend", Center for Defense Information, Washington D.C., 29 January 2002, <http://www.cdi.org>, 19 July 2002.

<sup>77</sup> R Moreau and Z Hussain, "Pakistan: Power and privilege", *Newsweek*, 14 October 2002, p. 27.  
<sup>78</sup> Blum, p. 25.

<sup>79</sup> M Boot, "Doctrine of the 'Big Enchilada'", *The Washington Post*, 14 October 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>, 15 October 2002.

<sup>80</sup> *The Economist*, "Pre-empting threats, threatening pre-emption", 28 September 2002, p. 51.

<sup>81</sup> R Lowry, "America the Rogue?", *NationalReviewOnline*, 12 March 2002, <http://www.nationalreview.com>, 10 October 2002.

nuclear state.<sup>82</sup> In New York, in the aftermath of the terror attacks, calls for peace far outnumbered demands for retribution.<sup>83</sup> The USA finds itself in the process of assigning itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, using force and meting out justice, unconstrained by the rules and norms of the international community.<sup>84</sup> In fact, in much of the world the USA is regarded as a leading terrorist state. In 1986 the USA was condemned by the World Court for unlawful use of force (international terrorism) and then vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states (meaning the USA) to adhere to international law.<sup>85</sup> President Bush and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also proposed a new \$2 trillion five year spending plan on military equipment.<sup>86</sup> This is a clear sign pointing to unrestrained military build-up to protect the USA whatever the cost may be. The Bush administration has a coherent (and extremely powerful) military strategy in place, yet does not have a similar political strategy. On this crucial front the war on terror is failing.<sup>87</sup> The war on terrorism is succeeding in crushing, killing and destroying fundamentalists (note the recent US predator attack killing Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen), but is increasingly propping up and exacerbating and feeding an ever-seething fundamentalism and violent sentiment against America and its allies (note Bali, Kuwait, Yemen and Tunisia). In the process of securitisation a nation's security and status will ultimately be determined by the size of its military might. In this instance, the USA in its forceful drive towards securitisation, will almost always declare that might is right. This may however be driven by a complex, but firm belief that the USA by no means is wrong whatever it decides to do after 11 September, driven forward by a certain attitude towards the new kind of conflict it finds itself in.

## 7. NEW WAR, SAME ATTITUDE?

Conflict attitudes are regarded as those psychological states (attitudes, emotions and misperception) that frequently accompany and arise from involvement in a situation of conflict.<sup>88</sup> Conflict attitudes include emotional orientations such as feelings of anger, fear, distrust, resentment and scorn, all irrefutably what American citizens experienced following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, symbols of American pride and achievement and the subsequent anti-Islamic sentiment that took hold, where passengers of Arab decent were treated

<sup>82</sup> Lowry, 2002

<sup>83</sup> N Chomsky, "The ideological campaign, 9-11, USA" (Seven Stories Press/SA, M&G Books), p. 27.

<sup>84</sup> GJ Ikenberry, "America's Imperial ambition", **Foreign Affairs**, September/October 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, 19 November 2002.

<sup>85</sup> Chomsky, p. 21.

<sup>86</sup> M Thompson, "The lessons of Afghanistan", **Time**, 18 February 2002.

<sup>87</sup> F Zakaria, "We need a political strategy", **The Washington Post**, 22 October 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>, 22 October 2002.

<sup>88</sup> CR Mitchell, **The structure of international conflict** (McMillan, London, 1981), p. 27.



with the utmost caution and suspicion. FBI warnings cautioned that "Al Qaeda may favour spectacular attacks, resulting in mass casualties, severe damage to the American economy and maximum psychological trauma".<sup>89</sup> The second attitude includes cognitive processes, such as stereotyping or refusal to accept non-conforming information in an endeavour to maintain a consistent structure of beliefs about the outside world (and especially about an adversary).<sup>90</sup> Yet again the unfortunate stereotypes of Muslims and people of Islamic faith as being 'the enemy' and linked to acts of terrorism emerged, despite President George W Bush's repeated calls that this war is not a war on Islam, but on terrorists who distort the faith's peaceful message. The President also launched various initiatives to reach out to the Islamic communities in order to prevent any misconception of who the targets of American military action in the coming war would be. Another related element of conflict attitudes is that during any intense crisis the sense of being the target of a serious and continuing threat will increase anxiety and lead to such a high level of stress that response may be ill-considered and violent.<sup>91</sup> President Bush's immediate response to the attacks, however well thought through and well planned, rallying public opinion and international support. This would however not be the case with the President's preemptive military operation against Iraq to rid the world of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. This was based on President George W Bush's incessant warnings of threats posed to the USA and the world by rogue states and weapons of mass destruction, causing great unease and alarm. This conflict attitude may however not be unfounded as many irresponsible pariahs and rogues have openly flaunted their hostility towards the USA and since 9/11 any threat posed to the USA and the world is one that will be treated with the greatest response and urgency to prevent tragedy from striking again. Another element that conflict attitudes deal with is suppression and repression. In a conflict situation, both suppression and repression can remove immediate awareness events showing one's party in a bad light, or acting cruelly or unjustly.<sup>92</sup> Clear evidence of this was President Bush's war declaration on October 7<sup>th</sup> with the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in which the President declared: "As we strike military targets, we will drop food for the Afghan people."<sup>93</sup> It was regarded as inordinately strange for the United States to be dropping both bombs and food on the people of Afghanistan at the same time.<sup>94</sup> This served to boost the image of the USA's magnanimity. Very few US citizens regarded the attacks on Afghanistan as more than destroying Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden's terror

<sup>89</sup> M Hosenball, M Isikoff and T Lipper, "Al Qaeda: Alive and killing", **Newsweek**, 25 November 2002, p. 22.

<sup>90</sup> Mitchell, p. 29.

<sup>91</sup> Mitchell, p. 73.

<sup>92</sup> Mitchell, p. 80.

<sup>93</sup> J De Derian, "In Terrorem: Before and after 9/11" in K Booth and T Dunne (eds), **Worlds in collision: Terror and the future of global order** (New York: Palgrave-McMillan, 2002).

<sup>94</sup> Blum, p xvi.

training camps, yet may have missed the media images of innocent men, women and children fighting for their lives as victims of the USA's bombing campaign. Success in repressing such information will, of course, make it all the more difficult for the members of one party to understand the way they are regarded by their opponents, and thus further confirm the latter's malevolence.<sup>95</sup> This remains essentially the United States of America's fundamental problem, which causes the persistent question: "Why do they hate us?" Unfortunately the Khobar Towers attack, the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen did not seek adequate answers and solutions to this persistent problem, which may have (although it is doubtful) prevented the horrific events of 9/11. Unacceptable levels of psychological stress are avoided by the general tendency to employ overly simple categories when evaluating one's environment, or to force events, people and motivations into a few grossly over-simplified cognitive categories. One way of labelling this process is to use the term 'black-and-white thinking' or known as Charles Osgood's concept of psychologic.<sup>96</sup> Psychologic starts from an individual's tendency to perceive a simple, black-and-white world and to indulge in evaluative polarity, by constantly employing only two contrasting categories, declaring our party to be good and just; it follows that our enemy must be bad and unfair. President George W Bush has masterfully put this into practice declaring that every nation around the world must now make a choice: "You are either with us or you are with the terrorists."<sup>97</sup> Any country caught on the wrong side of this definition is surely to face retribution. Another important element in the process of reducing psychological stress is by turning the enemy into lower beings sharing none of the opponent's qualities.<sup>98</sup> A prime example of this is an excerpt from Bob Woodward's book entitled **Bush at War**. It serves as but one example of the current attitude towards the hostile rogue states. President Bush is said to be extremely anxious to rid the world of murderous dictators, and has been quoted as saying that " I loathe Kim Jong II, I've got a visceral reaction to this guy."<sup>99</sup> In the securitisation of world politics these sentiments that world leaders hold toward one another are likely to remain an endemic and unfortunate feature of international relations, one that may have disastrous consequences if not immediately addressed by constructive engagement and diplomacy.

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<sup>95</sup> Mitchell, p 80.

<sup>96</sup> Mitchell, p. 81.

<sup>97</sup> SE Miller, "The end of unilateralism or unilateralism redux?" **The Washington Quarterly**, Vol 25, No. 1, Winter 2002.

<sup>98</sup> Mitchell, p. 85.

<sup>99</sup> E Thomas, "In the war room": Book review of **Bush at War**, written by Bob Woodward, **Newsweek**, 25 November 2002, p 29.

## 8. CONCLUSION

In a climate fraught with immense insecurity, the international community is voicing great concern with President George W Bush's new National Security Strategy based on taking preemptive action against any country perceived as a potential threat to US National Security. The world after 11 September 2001 may leave no other option but to do so. Yet it may become a world that many people will find difficult to live in as talk of terror and war is increasingly dominating world headlines with no sign of abating. Osama bin Laden, considered to be the source of this new sense of global hostility and insecurity, resurfaced with a stern message of warning as he foreshadowed catastrophic future attacks on the West: "As you kill, you will be killed, as you bomb, you will be bombed."<sup>100</sup>

However, if the goal of policy will be narrowly restricted to one of national security (and securitisation), then, as Ken Booth and Tim Dunne stated, September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 was not only the world community's shared yesterday, but risks also being all of the world's tomorrow. The world after 11 September 2001 could become a world ruled by securocrats, seeking exclusively to secure the upper echelons of government. The world after 11 September 2001 echoes with the words of Jean Jacques Rousseau: "Free people, remember this maxim: we may acquire liberty, but it is never recovered if it is once lost." The paradigm of securitisation the world may come to be defined by, is faced with many probing and urgent questions: How much security is adequate and how much security is bearable and endurable? Has the world changed? Indeed it has. The once peaceful and safe society envisioned by so many leaders may have collapsed along with the legacy the Twin Towers has left, now hallowed ground. The prosperity of the world may well depend on what kind of future may be built on those foundations: A future of safety, liberty, human security, peace and unity or a future based on state securitisation, suppression, containment, war, hostility, turmoil and division. With the clouds of war that closed in and battle cries that came from Washington to Westminster, from Baghdad to Bali, the securitisation of world politics had already begun.

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<sup>100</sup> Hosenball, Isikoff and Lipper, p. 21.