

GLOBALISATION AND SECURITY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

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1. INTRODUCTION

In a world where rapid and voluminous change conjures up a sense of being boxed in by external developments, there is often the tendency to ignore the challenges that complexity pose by opting for simplistic explanations. One such reductionism is to depend on hierarchical explanations which place security in a subordinate position to globalisation. It has become a platitude to argue that weak states of the developing world have become powerless in the face of globalisation, not only in the familiar areas of economics and politics, but also in their ability to provide the most rudimentary of all services, namely security. Yet, the tragic events of September 11th, 2001 have proven that global hegemony too cannot escape the insecurity generated by transnational forces.

A need exists for explanations that reflect more accurately the complex web-like interaction between globalisation and security. In this article the intersection between globalisation as a trend-based *process* of transformation and security as the demand for a *condition* of freedom from threat is examined. This is motivated by the following factors:

- Firstly, the broad and all-inclusive nature of both the post-Cold War human security concept and globalisation as a multidimensional process necessitates the development of a more systematic analytical approach in order to avoid the charges of "fuzziness" and "unmanageability" of an expanded security agenda.
- Secondly, despite the plethora of literature on security and on globalisation, relatively scant attention has been paid to the interconnection between the two (see Clark 1999:108; Cha 2000:392). The security discourse remains pre-occupied with the competition between realism, liberalism and constructivism, whereas globalisation literature has concentrated more on social and economic processes.

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- Thirdly, the emphasis on the implications of the globalisation-security nexus for the developing world is motivated by the fact that empirical and geographical case studies in this context are relatively few and far between. It is commonly accepted that both the effects of globalisation and security threats are more pronounced in the developing world. Yet, such an assumption tends to overlook the differential impact within the developing world context. Case studies of the interface between globalisation and security could therefore then bring unique manifestations to the surface.

In view of this, the article sets out to explore a conceptual framework of understanding of the interaction between globalisation and security, with particular reference to the developing world context. This contribution is therefore an attempt to categorise the areas of intersection between security and globalisation and to provide empirical evidence in support of the classification.

The most popular line of thought is to argue that globalisation has transformed the global security environment to the extent that states can no longer guarantee their own safety and that of their citizens. This gives the impression that globalisation is an external process being imposed from the outside. However, globalisation does not merely change the external environment within which states operate, but also simultaneously reflects internal change in the very nature of states' security functions (Guehenno 1998/9:7; Clark 1999:107-9,125). Globalisation affects both external and internal sovereignty in terms of relations between public and private actors, but does not necessarily uproot the state as one of the key referents of security. In this regard the United States (US) government's response to the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon reveals an interesting turnaround. In the 1990s, there was a common belief that the free market ruled the world. In the light of the events of September 11th, many companies now realise that "[w]ithout security, it's not possible to do business. Government has to set that framework" (Lowry Miller & Piore 2001:50).

The analysis in this article is pitched at two interrelated levels. In a specific sense the *impact of globalisation on state or national security*, i.e. the penetrated security state, is placed under scrutiny. More generally, the research views the *globalisation of security or globalised security* in a transnational and multidimensional sense.

Two complementary arguments are also advanced. Firstly, due to the differential impact of globalisation on developed and developing states regional and/or context-based studies of the nexus between security and globalisation are required. Implicit in this argument is the recognition that the developing world is not monolithic. The extent to which a particular state provides security to its citizens is a reflection of a

combination of subjective factors (often generated from within the state itself) and the objective conditions of globalised security in which the state is compelled to function (see Clark 1999:123,126). Secondly, one should guard against an artificial distinction between strong and weak states in respect of the interface between security and globalisation. Weak states have always lacked sole and fully legitimate monopoly on the use of force. In the face of globalisation strong states are also experiencing diminished control over the use of force.

The discussion begins with a brief survey of the various conceptual perspectives in respect of globalisation and security. The analysis then moves to an examination of a number of ways in which globalisation and security are related. Four dimensions of globalisation are used to establish a coherent framework of analysis. These include the cognitive, material, spatio-temporal and organisational aspects.² In the final section the implications of the retreat of the state as security provider with special attention to the developing world context are explored.

2. CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES: FROM STATE SECURITY TO SOCIETAL, HUMAN AND GLOBAL SECURITY

The literature on globalisation is legion, but is marked by lack of consensus, oversimplification, and exaggeration. Much of the difficulty related to finding an accurate definition can be attributed to the fact that globalisation is not a unified phenomenon, but rather a collection of processes and activities simultaneously operating in a variety of dimensions. It is therefore not the intention of this article to offer an in-depth and conclusive verdict on the so-called "great globalisation debate". It is also beyond the scope of the study to enter into a detailed analysis of "new" security thinking.

2.1 Globalisation defined

Held and McGrew (2000:4) define globalisation as "the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social interaction. It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across the world's major regions and continents". Globalisation changes the locus of power - it is located in global networks rather than in territorially based states (Thomas 1999:2).

² For analytical purposes the categories are kept separate as far as possible, but overlapping is often unavoidable. For instance, the spatio-temporal and organisational dimensions share a degree of commonality. Space and time belong together. Furthermore, technology is also not a separate issue but underlies changes in the global arms dynamic as well as the privatisation of security.

Globalisation consists of a "tripartite cluster of characteristics" (Held & McGrew 2000:3-4,19). In a *material* sense it refers to the flow across boundaries of a network of objects and activities, such as goods and services, people, ideas and information, money, normative institutions, and behavioural patterns and practices (Rosenau 1996:256-7). The *spatio-temporal* constraints imposed upon social action and organisation are largely abolished. Hence the description of globalisation as a multidimensional and long-term process which is characterised by deterritorialisation or the spread of supraterritoriality (Scholte 2000:16,46-50). *Cognitively*, globalisation represents a mindshift captured in the slogan: "think globally, act locally". This implies the emergence of a common global consciousness, though not a global consensus. In addition, the *organisational* attributes of globalisation refer to the infrastructures which support global networks together with the level of institutionalisation.

Globalisation is also inherently ambivalent since it captures the twin processes of world politics, namely integration and fragmentation. Globalisation as "a boundary-broadening" or weakening process gives rise to localisation as a "boundary-heightening" (strengthening) process (Rosenau 1996:251-2; Clark 1997). Localisation and regionalisation can be seen both as manifestations of and/or reactions to globalisation, "reterritorialisation" in the latter instance.

2.2 Redefined security thinking and the globalist debate

In much the same way that globalisation defies uniform definition, the security discourse of the post-Cold War period struggles to reinvent itself in a manner that is both politically and intellectually acceptable.

The latter "quest" is not made any easier by the persistent realist belief that no paradigmatic shift took place at the end of the Cold War. According to this view, states remain the primary referents of security in an anarchic international system - hence security will continue to be defined in terms of territorial national interest.

In response to this, expansionists such as Buzan (1991a, 1991b, 1998), Booth (Wyn Jones 1999:102) and Wæver (1998) have developed useful theoretical frameworks for the analysis of a deterritorialised, multidimensional and multilevel security agenda. On the horizontal axis security is seen as dependent on political democracy and a culture of human rights; social and economic development; environmental sustainability; as well as military stability. In this regard Buzan identifies five "sectors" of security, namely political, societal, economic, environmental and military. The vertical hierarchy of analytical levels, such as the individual, state,

regional subsystem and international system, places the onus on people as the primary referent of security. In this context, state or national security is then redefined to encompass *human security*.

The Bonn Declaration (1991) defines human security as "the absence of threat to human life, lifestyle and culture through the fulfilment of basic needs" (Solomon 1998:7). The human security approach is a people-centred and norm-driven approach, where attention is paid to human beings, communities, and their complex social and economic relations (Thomas 1999:1; Maclean 2000:269-70).

The shift in focus to human beings as referents of security has given rise to a myriad of interpretations. Some scholars, such as Booth, have proposed a focus on *individual security*. Others argue that the emphasis should be placed on *societal or group security* at ethno-nationalist and religious level, i.e. the so-called "wars of identity". Others contend that, in an age of globalisation, a *global* societal perspective is more appropriate. In fact, proponents of the globalist view of international security assert that the days of the state as security referent are numbered. Humanity as a whole has thus become an actor in global affairs.

As usual, a number of qualifications need to be offered: Firstly, this does not mean that state security becomes irrelevant. Responses to human security encompass the interests of both the state and transnational actors. State security remains a necessary condition for human security, but it does not mean that when states are secure, people are secure. The insecurity of marginalised groups is a result of the ethnocentric bias inherent in the definition of what constitutes security (Maclean 2000:270,271; Hurrell 2000:260). In the developing world context it is arguable whether these states ever possessed the ability to act as sole providers of security. Secondly, reification of global security at the expense of state security simply means replacing one extreme with another.³ The globalist position in its "pure" form overlooks the ambivalent effect of globalisation on security. At the positive level, globalisation promotes co-operation between states which, in turn, facilitates "dialogue at the elite level between states, providing significant gains for global security" (Baylis 2001:272). On the other hand, rapid global transformation also affects international security negatively since fundamental change may contribute to inter- and intrastate conflict.

For the purposes of this article, I therefore prefer to adopt a more intermediate approach somewhere between being "anti-state" for the sake of political correctness and running the risk of reifying the state. While being transformed both from within

³ See RBJ Walker's critique in this regard (Wyn Jones 1999:113).

and without, the state remains a key referent in the current debate about security.⁴ I therefore concur with Clark who cogently argues that "[w]hat globalization can bring to bear on the topic of security is an awareness of wide-spread systematic developments without any resulting need to downplay the role of the state, or assume its obsolescence. The question that has to be addressed ... is not whether security should be reconceptualised around individuals or societies as alternatives to the state, but how the practice of states is being reconfigured to take account of new concerns with human rights and societal identity" (Clark 1999:125).


Security and globalisation are related in a number of interconnected ways, namely in terms of

- the detachment of security from territoriality (cognitive and material);
- the impact of globalisation on an extended security agenda (material);
- the existence of global military networks (spatio-temporal);
- the diminished capacity of the state to control the movement of technology and information (spatio-temporal);
- the privatisation of security (organisational); and
- forms of public geogovernance such as security regimes (organisational).

These dimensions of classification are graphically presented in the diagram (Figure 1) below and are discussed in the subsequent sections of this article.

⁴ See the arguments advanced by Baylis (2001:270), Knudsen (2001:355-68) and Hurrell (2000:261).

FIGURE 1:
GLOBALISATION AND SECURITY - AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK



3. THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION OF RECONSTRUCTED STATEHOOD

This dimension of the interface between globalisation and security deals specifically with the key feature of globalisation, namely *deterritorialisation* and its impact on the reconstruction of statehood and sovereignty. I present this concept as the foundation upon which all other dimensions are built. I furthermore categorise deterritorialisation as a cognitive aspect since it is intrinsically connected to the development of a *mindshift* - in other words, a growing public awareness and perception that the lines between national and international are rapidly fading. It remains, however, a "paradigm shift in the making".

The narrow state-centric paradigm of security is firmly tied to the notion of the protection of national interest confined to a specific sovereign territory. But with the forces of globalisation gaining momentum the concept of territoriality has increasingly become "unbundled" (Clark 1999:114; Guehenno 1998/9:8; Hughes 2000:3). Thus, security problems can no longer be responded to within the confines of the territorial sovereign state alone (Held & McGrew 2000:12-3). Cha (2000:397) describes this phenomenon as the *intermestic* arena of security - a blurring of traditional divisions between internal and external security brought on as a result of the transnationalisation of threats.

There are different interpretations regarding the continued relevance of sovereignty. Scholte (2000:136) posits that "[t]he end of territorialism has ... brought the end of sovereignty". He maintains that if sovereignty is defined as supreme and exclusive rule *over a specific territory*, then sovereignty is a thing of the past. But in this article it is argued that in the context of the globalisation-security connection territory does still matter, even though to a lesser extent. Tendencies of unbundling of territory are significant but do not nullify the importance of territorially-based forms of security. The state remains the "manager" of geographical space (Knudsen 2001:363). Some scholars such as Mann (Held & McGrew 2000:8) would argue that so-called strong states nowadays are as powerful if not more so than their predecessors. Territorial strength is enhanced through transnational means. Hegemony is maintained at a distance through corporations, banks and international organisations.

Clark (1999:115) warns that the evidence for the globalisation of security is much more ambiguous than in other spheres. Scholte (2000:140) concurs when he states that "the state's attempts to serve both territorial and global interests can breed ambiguous policy, particularly when the two constituencies conflict". The latter argument has particular relevance for developing world states. These states find

themselves between a rock and a hard place. Territory remains a key determinant in this context. For instance, the introduction of nuclear weapons has dramatically accelerated the process of deterritorialisation, but in the developing world "high tech" warfare is less relevant. Ayoob (1995:1-16) has persistently maintained that political and military security based on a strong territorial state remains the only way in which weak(er) states can meaningfully deal with the forces of globalisation. However, globalisation does have the ability to seriously frustrate traditional state-building agendas. States are faced with security problems that demand policy responses that are also trans-sovereign.

4. MATERIAL ASPECTS: IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON AN EXPANDED SECURITY AGENDA

The material processes or aspects of globalisation (i.e. global flows) have had a concrete effect on attempts to redefine the security agenda in broader and more inclusive terms. However, two issues remain contested, namely

- the extent to which the changes in the security debate can be attributed to globalisation and/or the end of the Cold War; and
- the extent to which globalisation makes matters worse or not.

Is there a material connection between security and globalisation? Or are these changes simply the result of the end of the Cold War era? It is difficult to accurately trace the origin of these changes. Cha (2000:393) points out that one of the reasons for the neglect of the security implications of globalisation is the very fact that the globalisation literature associated security effects with the end of the Cold War. Another reason is the fact that security effects are more difficult to measure (in comparison with economic matters). One should entertain the possibility that the end of the Cold War was, in itself, a consequence of globalisation. Globalisation was not directly involved in the expansion of security from a narrow military concept to a multidimensional phenomenon. It did, however, help to revive and exacerbate both latent and existing security problems, thereby cementing the expansion of security thinking.

The effects of globalisation on security are ambivalent and there is little consensus on whether globalisation makes matters better or worse. Optimists believe that increased multilateralism will bring dividends for global security. Pessimists believe that rapid global change is a recipe for increased tension. In this section attention will only be paid to the negative implications, i.e. causes of insecurity.

Firstly, the *scope of threats* has broadened substantially. External military threats to the territorial integrity of the state have been replaced by largely non-military threats. Threats are increasingly coming from inside the state.

Globalisation has increased ecological degradation and issues such as pollution, acid rain, and global warming have become transnational security concerns as a result of increased human mobility and interaction. While market forces have deepened European integration, other less developed areas have suffered under widened inequalities and persistent poverty as a result of globalisation. Politically, despite convergence between economic and political liberalism in the developed world, globalisation has deepened democratic deficits of various global governance structures. Political tensions, as a consequence of uneven development, have increased the risks of instability. In terms of societal aspects, the proliferation of drug trafficking, the advances in technology and communications have facilitated access to weapons of mass destruction, transnational crime, and terrorism. The transnational spread of disease is also the result of the increased mobility of people. Issues of identity - the rise of cultural or ethnic violence in reaction to the homogenising forces of globalisation - serve as a further example. The insecurity generated within these dimensions could lead to or exacerbate military conflict (Cha 2000:393-4; Scholte 2000:9,26-9,207-33; Hughes 2000:8-9; Clark 1999:117-8).

Secondly, globalisation has also prompted a shift in *agency*. More substate (e.g. ethnic groups, terrorists) and suprastate (e.g. transnational companies) units are involved as agents of threat. The state is also no longer the primary referent of security. A focus on how individuals can threaten the state (or ruling élite) or how the state can threaten the security of individuals has become of primary importance. The range of security providers has also expanded (e.g. NGOs and private military companies). Globalisation did not create these new security actors, but has facilitated their freedom to operate in the vacuum left by states' inability to provide security (Hughes, 2000:8).

The inequality generated by globalisation is mirrored by inequality in terms of security. Unequal power determines why certain issues come to be treated as security issues and whose security is to be protected.

5. SPATIO-TEMPORAL ASPECTS: THE GLOBAL ARMS DYNAMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION

The spatio-temporal dimension of globalisation signifies firstly, a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions. The flow of people, goods and ideas, among others, takes place transnationally. Secondly, globalisation

also signifies a process which occurs over time. It is possible that the features and manifestations of globalisation may differ between historical epochs.

The focus of this section is on the notion of "military globalisation". This refers to "the process (and patterns) of spatio-temporal and organizational features of *military* [my emphasis] relations, networks and interactions" (Held & McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton 2000:88). A number of indicators serve to map out the spatio-temporal dimension of military globalisation. Emphasis in this section will be on

- the global arms dynamic and
- the role played by technological innovation in military and civilian affairs.

The aim is to analyse the way in which these global networks have contributed towards the transformation of state capacity to provide security.

5.1 Global arms dynamic

The concept of "global arms dynamic" refers to a process of quantitative and qualitative change in national and global military capabilities. It includes two dimensions, namely the global arms transfer system and the global arms production system. The intensification of the global arms dynamic is spurred on by three trends:

- The expanding scale and volume of arms trade;
- the transnationalisation of arms production; and
- the commercialisation of arms trade in the regulated global market (Held *et al* 2000:134).

5.1.1 Global arms trade (transfer) system

The contemporary arms transfer system is global in respect of

- the number of participants;
- the extent, volume and speed of arms transfer transactions; and
- the level of advanced technological capability of military equipment.

A number of key trends, which characterise the contemporary arms trade system, can be briefly discerned. Since the end of the Cold War global defence spending has fallen by almost a third. Arms exports have dropped by about half. Employment in the arms industry has also contracted. More than a million jobs in the US and four times as many in Russia have been lost (Loving 2000:147). While Western military spending still accounts for the largest single proportion of the world total, defence spending within the developing world increased dramatically in the 1960s, only to experience a decline since the early 1990s (Held *et al* 2000:111-2). The number of arms producers and buyers has also increased over the

years. Held *et al* (2000:113) emphatically state that "in terms of geographical scope, no world region or continent remains outside the contemporary arms transfer system". An increase in arms suppliers coupled with a decrease in defence spending has led to increased competition in this area. The growing trend towards commercialisation and privatisation of arms production has reinforced export competition (Held *et al* 2000:114).

5.1.2 Global arms production

Since the nineteenth century the arms industry has been one of the most internationalised of all industries (Lovering 2000:171). Arms production is globalised to the extent that no global region is without at least two centres of indigenous military production and no regional power is without some domestic military production capability (Held *et al* 2000:117).

A number of trends in the globalisation of arms production have become visible: First, the *lines between the civil- and military-industrial sectors have become blurred*. The increased reliance upon civilian technologies for the production of advanced weapons systems (so-called dual-use technologies) illustrates that the military-technological revolution (MTR) is a product of the information age. A good example of this is the fact that in 1989, 38 per cent of US military semi-conductors were imported (Held *et al* 2000:123; Hayward 2000:56). Multinational companies nowadays have more control over the transfer of dual-use technologies than traditional states. Second, from the 1980s, the *transnationalisation of Western defence production* became one of the most powerful forces of globalisation (Hayward 2000:56; Cha 2000:395). Due to the impact of the market on the allocation of goods and services necessary to the military; escalating costs of military technology; and subsequent cuts in defence procurement budgets the national defence industrial base has been eroded. Transnational defence production is seen as a solution to a weakened national defence industrial base. Driven by commercial incentives, calls for the denationalisation of the defence industry and promotion of cross-border alliances have been made.

There is, however, always a danger of presenting the globalisation of the defence industry in absolutist terms and painting a picture of complete deregulation. Arguing from a Northern perspective, Hayward (2000:55) reminds us that there is still considerable scope for a national defence industrial perspective.⁵ A single open defence market is in the process of developing but remains in flux. In order to

⁵ Also see Lovering (2000:174).

maintain commercial advantage in the export market some degree of protectionism will prevail, just like in other sectors of the so-called "liberal economic order".

The "inside out" and "outside in" effects of globalisation become very clear in the context of the deterritorialisation of arms production. As Held *et al* (2000:122) state, restructuring of the national defence industrial base develops alongside a global restructuring of defence production, thereby breaking down distinctions between the internal and the external. What becomes clear from this, is that the industrial part of the military-industrial complex cannot globalise without having an impact on the military part. Through globalisation the state is no longer an independent producer of (military) security.

5.2 Technological innovation, information warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

The literature on globalisation has firmly established the relationship between the flow of information, technological innovation and the state's loss of exclusive control of its territory. The uneven effects of this relationship in the developing world have also been documented to some extent. Research on the globalisation of security also acknowledges the *spatial* implications of technological innovation for security. The qualitative innovation in military technology coupled with the transnational spread of this technology serve to underline the diminished capacity of the state to provide security. However, the nature of the relationship between technology and security remains unclear, especially in *times* that are dominated by rapid technological change.

The following developments have influenced the situation: In the first place, the commercialisation and privatisation of transnational defence production has exacerbated the situation. Both state and non-state actors have access to information and technology. Rosenau (1996:261) ascribes this trend to the success of the US in the 1991 Gulf War (and the American-led NATO air war over Kosovo). The state's monopoly over, for instance, eavesdropping technology, surveillance and encryption has thus been broken. Secondly, the growth in volume and variety of communications has made monitoring or control of diffused information and technology capabilities and flows near impossible (Cha 2000:396,399). Thirdly, a myriad of human security threats with dire implications for national security emerges, such as cyber-crime and information age terrorism. Many Americans, in an attempt to find a scapegoat, are now blaming new technology for aiding fundamentalist terrorism (see Campbell 2001:31). Lastly, combating this kind of "non-physical" threat is further impeded by the fact that national militaries are retooled to fight high-

intensity, high-technology conflicts. They are becoming less equipped to fight low-intensity conflicts such as intrastate ethnic conflict or acts of terrorism.

Nevertheless, governments need to equip their military establishments with a capacity to cope with the requirements of the information revolution. In this respect the waging of modern warfare has undergone a dramatic change with the advent of what is commonly known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). RMA can be defined as "a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations" (Hudson Teslik 2001:2). The latter emphasises not greater firepower but greater information technology and "smartness" of weapons to gain the upper hand (Cha 2000:395).

The development of RMA can be linked to both spatial and temporal dimensions of globalisation. The spatial dimension is reflected in the vast distances over which forces can be projected. The temporal dimension is reflected in the speed of information processing and computing power as well as the emphasis on the element of surprise. The Western powers have demonstrated that they can destroy their adversaries in Iraq and Yugoslavia with high tech weapons without much damage to themselves.

The feasibility of employing RMA techniques in a low intensity conflict environment is open to debate. It is often argued that in the developing world, particularly in Africa, such a hostile environment may require more "low tech" civil-military forms of conflict resolution. The picture which emerges, is however mixed. The presence of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and advanced fighter aircraft in Angola, Libya, Egypt and Botswana, for instance, indicates a trend towards a mixture of old and new weapon systems. Van Vuuren (1998:61) therefore concludes that the potential for employment of these technologies on African soil would seem to remain limited.

Returning to the central question of the paper, namely how does globalisation alter the security capacity of states at both the internal and external levels, one could argue that RMA - as a manifestation of globalisation - broadens the divide between developed and developing states. But taking the specific security implications of technological and information warfare into consideration, it also holds true that RMA is a great equaliser. On the one hand, possession of weapons of mass destruction (even if they are a little outdated) provides economically backward states regional and even global influence (e.g. North Korea with their SCUD missiles). On the other hand, ironically so, weak states' lack of resources, capacity and politi-

cal will in tackling intrastate conflict are matched by strong states' inability to meaningfully counter "low tech" terrorist attacks.

6. ORGANISATIONAL FEATURES: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC FORMS OF GEOGOVERNANCE

The shift in focus towards organisational features of the intersection between security and globalisation is somewhat artificial. Organisational or regulatory aspects are also of a spatio-temporal nature - as the term "geogovernance" denotes. However, for purposes of analytical clarity the two categories are presented separately in order to highlight the importance of infrastructural and institutional aspects.

The impact of globalisation on the security of the state has encouraged forms of regulation which are multilayered - ranging from substate to state and suprastate arrangements. The two regulatory mechanisms which are discussed here are the privatisation of security and the proliferation of security regimes.

6.1 Marketised geogovernance: privatisation of security

The informalisation of security is a global phenomenon, yet is perhaps more visible in the developing world. At the substate or private level, a security dilemma arises when groups of people begin to sense that they need to help themselves in the light of the failure of the state to protect them from each other. Their actions, in turn, lead to increased insecurity for other groups within the state. In this way, the privatisation or "communalisation" of security takes root. If the security dilemma is based on a threat to communal identity, then the danger of ethnic conflict becomes all the more real. The security threats emanating from this may lead to an implicit acknowledgment by the beleaguered state that it is no longer in full control. The state may respond in two ways, namely turning to private security providers or entering into substate or suprastate collaborative networks.

States retain the monopoly on the ability to legitimise violence, but they no longer have the ability to monopolise violence (Clark 1999:119). Security functions of the state are deregulated. In previous sections the commercialisation of national arms production has already been highlighted. The trend towards the privatisation of security is a direct consequence of the skewed retooling of states' security capacity in favour of "high tech" solutions. The control of low intensity conflict by means of peacekeeping or peace-enforcement is subsequently contracted-out.⁶ Low intensity

⁶ Between 1985 and 1994, 4,5 million soldiers were made redundant worldwide. During the same period arms industries retrenched nearly 5 million employees. These specialists provide a rich pool of employment for para-military forces (Albrecht 2000:126).

conflict and strategic minerals are also linked by the ways in which the neo-liberal forces of globalisation have provided market opportunity for private military companies. The transnational reach of many businesses necessitates the protection of existing and new markets in areas of high risk and instability. The client list of private security companies, such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, includes companies such as De Beers, Texaco, British Gas and British Petroleum (Isenberg 2000:12-3).

With reference to the African continent, Cilliers (1999:1) captures this development as follows: "[P]rivate security companies are increasingly supplanting the primary responsibility of the state to provide both security for its peoples and for lucrative multinational and domestic business activities. Globalisation, the failure of African countries to achieve sustainable development, concomitant with the general weakening of the African state and Western peacekeeping disengagement from Africa ... all provide a new context within which one should view historical mercenary patterns."

6.2 Public geogovernance: proliferation of multilateral security regimes

Accelerated globalisation has led to a proliferation of multilateral supranational regulatory schemes, particularly in the areas of economic/financial, environmental, conflict management and human rights interaction. These forms of global governance are, according to Scholte (2000:151), a fundamental ingredient of the post-sovereign contemporary world order.

The traditional role of international intergovernmental organisations in promoting peace and security between states, such as United Nations (UN) peace-enforcement and peacekeeping, is well documented. New forms of involvement in the post-Cold War period are concerned with constructing and amending the state in order to make it more successful, or, as Taylor (2001:348) puts it, "in effect conferring a licence of statehood". UN functions in this regard include humanitarian assistance; independent developmental projects; the rehabilitation of states after crises; new peacekeeping functions with more diversified roles for the military; and active human rights promotion and enforcement.

Public governance in the area of conflict management also takes the form of arms control agreements and the rise of international and regional security regimes. Arms control has become a multilateral process illustrating the extent and intensity of security and defence interconnections among states in the military domain. Security regimes refer to sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in the area

of security relations (see adaptation of Krasner's classic definition). While the effectiveness of SALT 1 (1972) and SALT 2 (1979) has been questioned, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) can nevertheless be cited as agreements which enjoy a broad measure of international support (Little 2001:304). Post-Cold War examples include the Landmine Ban as well as regional attempts in Southern Africa, Eastern Africa and the Greater Horn to curb the proliferation of small arms.

An examination of this trend raises the following questions:

- How are national interests shaped and redefined by transgovernmental security arrangements and institutions?
- And conversely, how do the national agendas influence transnational security provision?

In response to the former question, in the case of full-blown security regimes increased specialisation in a particular security area and increased crossfertilisation between the various domestic and transnational contexts inevitably lead to a penetration of national security agendas. Held *et al* (2000:133) concur: "Many recent agreements involve methods of verification or commitments which intrude considerably on national sovereignty and national military autonomy. ... the cumulative effect of global, regional and functional patterns of international arms control activity has been to nurture a global infrastructure of armaments regulation."

The answer to the latter question, with special reference to weak states, is in the negative. Weak states, such as the ones in Africa, came into power through unconventional means, with very little evidence of the desire to enhance the role of the state as a security unit. As Du Toit (1999:18) remarks, "[t]he shadow state is least of all geared to the delivery of security". This weakness invariably impacts upon the chances of success of regional and/or international security arrangements.

7. IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBALISATION FOR THE SECURITY FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

The state performs essential security functions that are rarely performed by other types of organisation. The state is the main collective unit processing real and perceived threats. The state facilitates the exercise of élite power; organisationally it shapes communal identity and culture; it manages territory; and legitimises authorised action and possession (Knudsen 2001:363).

These security functions must be exercised in the face of globalisation. Globalisation has changed the nature of strategy (see Guehenno 1998/9:6; Cha 2000:4000). The change in strategy is caused by the widening scope of threats as well as expanded agency. While traditional forms of nuclear deterrence will still apply to interstate security, the deterritorialised nature of "weaponised" non-state and substate actors makes it very difficult to counter such threats by conventional means. As a result of its inability to "predict" the future, strategy - under conditions of globalisation - can no longer aim for identifying the best outcome and finding the means to attain it. At most it can strive to keep "as many options open for as long as possible to provide maximum tactical flexibility" (Guehenno 1998/9:14).

The limitations of technological innovation in relation to security have been exposed. RMA has led to an effective separation of the military from society and the separation of the military from the frontline. The desire to fight a casualty-free war has encouraged the privatisation of security since mercenaries are deemed to be expendable. However, at the same time low intensity conflict and acts of global terrorism, which employ "low tech" methods, have brought civilians closer to the battlefield!

Under these changing strategic circumstances states face a number of options or strategies.

- The first question that states need to ask themselves is, to what extent are they going to act unilaterally or multilaterally?⁷
- The second question is whether their strategy is flexible enough to take advantage of the new context. In other words, to what extent are states prepared to enter into partnerships and adopt a strategy of burden-sharing?

Nation states - particularly the strong states - are not the mere victims of globalisation, but rather active participants in shaping and determining their scope and reach (see Hirst & Thompson 1999:256). Governments are sharing powers with businesses, international organisations and citizen groups. The threat to state sovereignty is often depicted as a one-way process, but Krasner (1997:258) reminds us that it is in fact a two-way process: Transnational actors also need the state to survive. According to Hirst and Thompson (1999:274) "[i]nternationally [companies] seek a measure of security and stability in financial markets [n]ationally they seek to profit from the distinct advantages conferred by the cultural and institutional frameworks of the successful industrial states". In a bargaining relationship between

⁷ The USA-led NATO operation against Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan was clearly both a multilateral and multidimensional effort. The campaign comprised of a military operation coupled with diplomacy and humanitarian assistance, as well as collective global efforts at denying terrorists sanctuary, finance and technology, and encouraging their extradition and prosecution.

states and transnational actors states may lose; they may accept transnational actors even though they would have preferred to exclude them. But states may also win; they may secure resources that enhance their capabilities and control over their own domestic population, other states or transnationals.

Similarly at the level of security, the state is not being eclipsed as security referent, but is forced by globalisation to renegotiate domestic social compacts with civil society. The state is no longer capable to meet all security needs. This has direct implications for state legitimacy. The state has to make fewer demands on citizens and soldiers in support of the war effort. The state, therefore, has to bargain with its citizens about what they are prepared to sacrifice for the state (Baylis 2001:270; Clark 1999:119-22; Hirst and Thompson 1999:263-5). Democratic states, in particular, could take advantage of the new context and allow non-state security providers, who share similar democratic ideals, a fair degree of autonomy. This would help to spread the burden of responsibility.

One could also argue that what the state loses on the swings it gains on the roundabouts. Since the state can no longer act unilaterally to provide absolute security, it is increasingly drawn into collaborative networks and alliances. The state's monopoly on the use of violence is now collectively legitimised.

So what does all this mean for the developing world? In attempting to answer this question one has to make a few observations regarding the differential impact of globalisation on the security of weak and strong states. Clark disagrees with Buzan who concludes that the weak state has been penetrated more than the strong. Clark argues that the opposite is more correct: For him the strength of the strong states lies in their "suffusion by the forces of globalisation" (1999:111) - almost a recentralisation of power. Weak states' marginalisation in global affairs is therefore the source of their weakness. Clark cautions us not to use the capacity to resist penetration from external forces as a barometer of internal strength. Any analysis of power has to be contextualised. The seeming inability of the US to resist penetration on September 11th, 2001 is certainly not a sign of the state's internal disintegration. One could also speculate as to whether this act of penetration was in fact an aberration - a once-off successful attempt of an opponent to avoid fighting in the high tech manner that suits the US and its allies?

In fact, the globalisation of security in a sense has brought strong and weak states together. Weak states have always been characterised by an inability to provide security to its citizens. Globalisation is now forcing strong states to also re-evaluate their position in this regard. This - according to Clark (1999:123) - implies a greater uniformity of state underproduction of security.

8. CONCLUSION

This article outlined the dimensions of globalised security and examined the various ways in which globalisation impacts upon the security functions of states. This is not to argue that globalisation is the only variable leading to change in state functions. Some would argue that internal weaknesses such as inefficiency, deteriorating infrastructure and a pervasive culture of corruption also bedevil developing states' capacity to care for their citizens. Due to the blurring of lines between the internal and the external, it is not always easy to determine where these two dimensions diverge.

It is not sufficient to simply argue that globalised states become strong at the expense of less globalised states. Even the developing world displays a great deal of differentiation. Globalisation as a two-edged sword implies that the methods applied to ensure security in one context are often exactly those that undermine it in another. Any analysis must therefore be contextualised and the specific reasons of the differential impact of the globalisation-security connection across regions must be examined. Applying generic analytical frameworks to regional case studies can kickstart such an investigation. The broad-brush strokes painted in this article were aimed at developing one such framework.

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