

AFRIKANER UNREST WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE MEASURES TAKEN TO SUPPRESS IT

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Abstract

South Africa's involvement in the Second World War was strongly opposed by elements within the white South African community, especially the Afrikaners. The majority of Afrikaners were historically anti-British, although some supported Britain, and the issue of participation divided them accordingly. Activist elements, such as the Ossewa-Brandwag, became platforms for discontent and various militant groupings violently opposed South Africa's participation in the war. Gen. JC Smuts, infamous amongst Afrikaners for his brutal suppression of the Afrikaner Rebellion in 1914-1915, as well as striking miners in 1913-1914 and 1922, utilised the Union Defence Force (UDF) and South African Police (SAP) to facilitate internment, to spy and to guard strategic objectives in an effort to prevent sabotage and serious damage to the war effort.

Keywords: Internal unrest; Oxwagon Sentinel; Union Defence Force; military force; Military Intelligence; militant activists.

Sluutelwoorde: Interne onrus; Simboliese Ossewatrek; Unieverdedigingsmag; militêre mag; Militêre Inligting; militante aktiviste.

1. INTRODUCTION

Afrikaners struggled during the first half of the twentieth century to maintain their identity. The two Boer Republics had been stripped of their independence in 1902 following the end of the Second Anglo-Boer War, and this was followed by an overt attempt at Anglicisation. This included government schools where no Afrikaans was allowed except for three hours a week and an additional two hours for religious practices. The Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, applauded the strategy and supported it wholeheartedly. These overt attempts at suppressing the language and culture of the Afrikaners and making them British subjects, fostered resentment for the British culture. This was, to an extent, curbed by the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, although British supremacy was forced upon non-English-speaking South Africans after unification in the cultural, administrative, social and economic arenas. The Afrikaners were politically weak, but a more

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pressing concern was the socio-economic hardships that still plagued the Afrikaner. Increasing rural economic decline forced mostly unskilled Afrikaners to seek work in the cities. The urban sector and the trade unions were dominated by English-speaking employers and employees. Their closed-shop activities prevented many Afrikaners, who became increasingly urbanised, from securing jobs. This exclusion, plus the poor rural economic state, had the subsequent effect that many Afrikaners became known as “poor whites”. Their poor economic state and the attempts at Anglicisation had two distinct effects on the Afrikaner community. Firstly, they hated British imperialism and secondly, it stimulated initiatives towards Afrikaner identity and unity.²

The Afrikaners’ hatred for British imperialism manifested early with the outbreak of the Rebellion in 1914. The newly formed Union of South Africa faced an Afrikaner Rebellion from 1914 to 1915 when the Union government decided to participate in the First World War on the side of Britain and invaded German South West Africa (today Namibia) at Britain’s request. This decision caused the largest and politically most sensitive internal uprising against the Union government in the period 1912-1948. It not only polarised the Afrikaans and English speakers, but also caused a rift in Afrikanerdom. Elements within the Afrikaner community, especially veterans and victims of the Second Anglo-Boer War, opposed participation in the First World War.³ The Rebellion was suppressed and, although the captured rebels were treated with compassion, Gen. Louis Botha and Gen. Jan Smuts were branded as British puppets and traitors and this opinion persisted. The suppression of white industrial strikes on the Rand in 1913, 1914 and 1922 were remembered and used against Smuts by the opposition in future political debates.⁴

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- 2 H Giliomee, *The Afrikaners. Biography of a people* (Cape Town, 2003), pp. 323-325; D Harrison, *The white tribe of Africa. South Africa in perspective* (Berkeley, 1981), pp. 48-56; C O’Neil, “Die interneringsbeleid van die Smuts-regering gedurende die jare 1939-1948. Die toepassing en uitwerking van die beleid,” BA Honours, University of Potchefstroom for CHE, 1989, p. 4; K Fedorowich, “Sleeping with the Lion?, The loyal Afrikaner and the South African Rebellion of 1914-15”, *South African Historical Journal* 49, November 2003, pp. 2-3; JFW Grosskopf, “Plattelandsverarming en plaasverlating” in *Die Armblanke-Vraagstuk in Suid-Afrika. Verslag van die Carnegie-Kommissie, Deel I: Die Ekonomiese Verslag* (Stellenbosch, 1932), pp. 7-15 (For more information on the poor white issue see the complete Carnegie Commission Report, Parts I-V.)
- 3 Union of South Africa, *Report on the outbreak of the Rebellion and the policy of the Government with regard to its suppression*, no. 10, 2 February 1915, pp. 7-10, 29; Fedorowich, pp. 2-3, 6-7, 10-12; BJ Liebenberg, “Botha en Smuts aan bewind, 1910-1924” in CFJ Muller *et al.*, *Výfhonderd jaar Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis* (Pretoria, 1980), pp. 404-408.
- 4 Fedorowich, pp. 2-3, 6-7, 10-12; Union of South Africa, *Report on the outbreak of the Rebellion ...*, pp. 7-10, 29; Union of South Africa, *Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the causes of and circumstances relating to the recent Rebellion in South Africa* 46, 1916, 5 November 1915, pp. 74-75; Giliomee, p. 383.

Information about Afrikaner unrest during the Second World War is available in various literary sources and archival material.⁵ Information on Afrikaner resistance against participation in the Second World War, in particular the Ossewa-Brandwag (OB) (Oxwagon Sentinels), was found in various unpublished theses and literature sources.⁶ The Ossewa-Brandwag collection at the Ferdinand Postma Library, North-West University (Potchefstroom), holds reports and personal correspondence between members. Various literary sources covered aspects of home defence and provided useful information on the internal deployments of the Union Defence Force (UDF) during the Second World War, especially deployments for guard duties at internment camps.⁷

This article discusses the suppression of Afrikaner unrest during the Second World War when elements within Afrikaner society opposed participation through violent means. Quick, decisive and violent overt actions of suppression were later replaced with lenient and less violent methods. Smuts limited internal unrest through various pre-emptive measures such as confiscating privately owned rifles and deploying military and police resources to ensure internal security during a time of war. The context of Afrikaner opposition and the internal divisions amongst Afrikaners on how to express this opposition are described. This is followed by a discussion on the various activist elements opposing the Union government, especially the OB. Relations between civilians and military personnel were strained to breaking point and an overview of hostilities is discussed to indicate the explosive atmosphere of the time. The internal deployments of the UDF, including Military Intelligence (MI) and other organisations, as well as the internment of citizens and aliens are discussed to highlight the measures taken to stabilise South Africa and ensure internal security.

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- 5 PJ Furlong's *Between Crown and Swastika. The impact of the radical right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the Fascist era* (Johannesburg, 1991) investigated the influence of National Socialism and the accompanying political and economic growth of the Afrikaners.
- 6 LM Fourie, "Die Ossewa-Brandwag en Afrikanereenheid" (1987); H Strydom, Research project "Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog" (1983); HO Terblanche, *John Vorster, OB-Generaal en Afrikanervegter* (Roodepoort, 1983); GC Visser, *OB, Traitors or patriots?* (1976); H Strydom, *For Volk and Führer* (1982) and H van Rensburg, *Their paths crossed mine, memoirs of the Commandant-General of the Ossewa-Brandwag* (Cape Town, 1956). Journals such as *Koers* and published articles by PJJ Prinsloo, "Die kentering in die kultuurbeeld van die Ossewa-Brandwag" (1996) and S Louw, "Discourse theory, Afrikaner Nationalism and the Ossewa-Brandwag", in *STET* 6(3), (1990), respectively.
- 7 HJ Martin and ND Orpen cover home defence during the Second World War in *South African Forces World War II, Vol II; South Africa at War, Military and industrial organisation and operations in connection with the conduct of the War, 1939–1945* (1979). Regimental histories such as N Orpen, *The Cape Town Highlanders, 1885-1970* (1970); WS Douglas, *Regimental history of the Cape Town Highlanders* (1944); C Birkby, *The saga of the Transvaal Scottish Regiment, 1932-1950* (1950) and GE Visser, "Die geskiedenis van die Middellandse Regiment, 1934-1943" (1983) provide valuable information regarding internal deployments.

2. THE REVIVAL OF AFRIKANER CULTURE AND POLITICAL DISPARITY

Afrikaner culture was revived in the period between the two World Wars through the efforts of the *Afrikaner Broederbond* (AB) (Brotherhood) (1918) that formed the *Federasie vir Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings* (FAK) (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Organisations) in 1929 and the *Reddingsdaadbond* (Society for the Act of Rescue) in 1939. The FAK stimulated interest and pride in Afrikaans literature and art, education and business interests. The *Reddingsdaadbond* focused on alleviating the plight of poor whites in the urban environment.⁸

However, the unification of the Afrikaner people at a cultural level was impaired by politics. Afrikaner prominence in the political field was hoped for when Gen. JBM Hertzog won the 1924 elections with the help of the Labour Party and formed the so-called Pact government. The Pact government aimed for language equality and equity between English- and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and elevated Afrikaans to an official language alongside Dutch and English, but the fusion of Hertzog's National Party with Smuts' South African Party in 1934 disillusioned many Nationalist Afrikaners. Dr DF Malan broke away from the National Party to form the "Purified" National Party and disparity reigned amongst Afrikaners regarding political issues.⁹

During this political discord the *Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging* (ATKV) (Afrikaans Language and Culture Society) of the South African Railways and Harbours organised the centennial celebration of the Great Trek in 1938. This event sparked a wave of patriotism and the Afrikaners' fight against African tribes and British imperialism were reflected upon. The centenary celebrations brought factious elements within Afrikaner society together and for a short time political rivalry was put aside. Afrikaner nationalism flourished and in an effort to perpetuate the spirit of the celebrations the *Ossewa-Brandwag* (OB) was formed on 4 February 1939.¹⁰

The OB, under the leadership of a former Union Defence Force (UDF) officer, Col JCC Laas, aimed to unite all Afrikaners possessed of national ardour. They organised Afrikaner festivals, the building of memorials, wreath laying at monuments, maintenance of historical sites and other traditional Afrikaner activities. The aims and policies of the OB during the tenure of Col Laas were to strive towards patriotic, religious and cultural unity amongst all Afrikaners. The cultural

8 Giliomee, pp. 400-401; Harrison, pp. 10, 85, 95, 97, 108; M Wilson and L Thompson, *The Oxford History of South Africa: South Africa 1870-1966* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 297-298; Liebenberg, p. 446.

9 O'Neil, pp. 4-5; Giliomee, pp. 401, 407-408; Harrison, p. 99; Liebenberg, p. 446.

10 Liebenberg, p. 448; Harrison, p. 97; Louw, p. 26.

demeanour of the OB changed, however, when it actively opposed South Africa's participation in the Second World War.¹¹

3. SOUTH AFRICA ENTERS THE WAR INTERNALLY DIVIDED

On 4 September 1939 the House of Assembly of the South African Parliament voted 80 to 67 in favour of going to war. (See Table 1 for Table of votes) Hertzog resigned as Prime Minister and the Governor General, Sir Patrick Duncan, requested Smuts to form a new government. Smuts' War Cabinet included members of the Labour and Dominion Parties, as well as a substantial portion of the SA Party which remained loyal to Smuts. The opposition parties were the new *Herenigde Nasionale Party* or *Volksparty* (Re-United National Party or People's Party) led by Hertzog and later by Malan, the Afrikaner Party formed by NC (Klasie) Havenga and Oswald Pirow's *Nuwe Orde Party* (New Order Party).¹²

White South African society was polarised on the war issue. The opposition held anti-British sentiments and was against participating in another of Britain's wars. Afrikaner society was further divided over a militant approach *vis-à-vis* a parliamentary approach to oppose the war.¹³

Fear of open rebellion and a repetition of the 1914-1915 Rebellion prompted Smuts' War Cabinet to take pre-emptive measures. The government removed the means by which groups could organise themselves militarily against the government by passing Proclamation 201 of 1939 and the War Measures Act of 1940 (Act 13 of 1940), which provided the government with arbitrary powers. Suspects and enemy aliens were interned, privately licensed firearms and ammunition were confiscated under Proclamation 139 of 1940, white trade union activities were suspended to prevent industrial unrest and general supplies were controlled.¹⁴

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- 11 PJJ Prinsloo, "Die kentering in die kultuurbeeld van die Ossewa-Brandwag, 1939-1940", *Koers* 61(3), 1996, pp. 349-351; Louw, pp. 26-27; O'Neil, p. 8.
- 12 University of Cape Town (hereafter referred to as UCT): Patrick Duncan Papers, BC 294, A27.3, annexure A: letter from P Duncan – JBM Hertzog, 5 September 1939; Liebenberg, pp. 445-447; Harrison, pp. 123-124; WK Hancock, *Smuts, the fields of force, 1919-1950* (Cambridge, 1968), p. 368; Furlong, pp. 122-128.
- 13 JS Gericke Library, Stellenbosch University (hereafter referred to as SU): DF Malan Collection, file1/1/1431: memorandum by Stellenbosch University lecturers to constitute a reconciliation committee, 1939 n.d.; SU: DF Malan Collection, file 1/1/1460: letter from JD Lardner Burke – DF Malan, 1 May 1939; SU: DF Malan Collection, file 1/1/1483: letter from H Paulsmeier – DF Malan, 12 July 1939; Terblanche, p. 116; Giliomee, pp. 440-441; Liebenberg, p. 444; O'Neil, pp. 18-29; Furlong, pp. 119-120.
- 14 Terblanche, p. 116; Giliomee, p. 444; Harrison, pp. 119, 124-125; TRH Davenport and C Saunders, *South Africa, a modern history* (5th ed., London, 2000), pp. 344-345; O'Neil, pp. 18-29; Furlong, p. 121.

TABLE 1: TABLE OF VOTES.¹⁵

Province	Pro-Smuts	Pro-Hertzog	Total votes cast
Cape Province	33	28	61
Transvaal	32	26	58
Orange Free State	2	13	15
Natal	13	0	13
Total	80	67	147

Proclamation 20 of 1941 forbade any subversive material and instructed the Criminal Investigation Department of the South African Police and Military Intelligence to investigate people and organisations, such as the OB, suspected of subversive activities. The Proclamation also prohibited any civil servant from participating in, representing or being a member of any subversive organisation. State employees were effectively banned from the OB.¹⁶

The OB honourably discharged all the members who were not allowed in the organisation under the Act, subsequently retaining their support. These members flocked to the banners of secret militant organisations, such as the *Stormjaers* (Storm Troopers) or *Terreurgroep* (Terror Group), to continue their resistance. Proclamation 20 of 1941 also provided for the suppression of subversive organisations and declared them illegal if they presented a danger to the defence of the Union and the Mandated Territory (SWA), public safety and order and the conduct of war.¹⁷

4. ACTIVIST ELEMENTS AND THE OSSEWA-BRANDWAG

Strong pro-German feelings were prevalent within Afrikaner society during the 1930s and Afrikaner activists from this era won support, before and during the war, as the economic, social and later military successes of Germany were reported. This

15 The National Archives (London): Dominion's Office, DO 35/1008/7, WG 429/13: South Africa Dominions 318. Report from the High Commissioner's office in Pretoria on the political situation in South Africa, 19 October 1939. (Recognition is given to Dr K Fedorowich, University of the West of England, Bristol, for the reference.)

16 Department of Defence Archives, Pretoria (hereafter referred to as DODA): Secretary for Defence (hereafter referred to as DC) DC 3841, file DF/1887, proclamation 44 of 1941: Re. "Die Ossewa-Brandwag" Association, circular 1 of 1941, 5 March 1941; University of South Africa, Pretoria (hereafter referred to as UNISA): Unisa Collection 1/1: premier oor Ossewa Brandwag, p. 1.

17 DODA: DC 3841, file DF/1887, proclamation 44 of 1941: Re. "Die Ossewa-Brandwag" Association, circular 1 of 1941, 5 March 1941; Van Rensburg, pp. 193-194; Harrison, pp. 119, 124-125; Davenport and Saunders, pp. 344-345; O'Neil, pp. 26-31.

affinity for Germany stemmed from the many Afrikaners who had German ancestry as a result of Germans settling in South Africa from as early as the seventeenth century. JA Heese's research indicates that by the nineteenth century 33,4% of Afrikaners were of German ancestry, 35,5% of Dutch ancestry, 13,9% of French ancestry, 2,9% of British ancestry and 14,3% of other nations. Afrikaners had enjoyed German sympathy during both Anglo-Boer Wars and many were reluctant to fight against them in the First or Second World Wars. German-Afrikaner sympathies were further cemented by sharing a common enemy, namely Britain.¹⁸

The German-Afrikaner connection became stronger when organisations propagating Nazi ideals were established in South Africa with the advent of Hitler's ascension to power. Far right "shirt" movements such as the Greyshirts, Blackshirts and the South African Fascists were founded with a European anti-Semitic programme instead of the traditional anti-Black programme. The Greyshirts, founded by Louis Weichardt, was the main shirt movement and various splinter shirt movements stemmed from it. These movements were the South African Fascists led by JS von Moltke, the Gentile Protection League led by JHH de Waal Jr, the People's Movement led by HS Terblanche and the South African National Democratic Party or Blackshirts led by M Wessels, which in turn suffered from splintering when C Havemann broke away to form *Die Volksbeweging* (The People's Movement).¹⁹

The strategic location of South Africa was a determining factor in continued German interest, and the Ausland organisation in Berlin, which led and coordinated all Nazi party activities overseas, showed particular interest in the subcontinent of Africa before and during the Second World War. South African intelligence sources indicated that Bruno Stiller, the Nazi Party leader in South Africa, cultivated the shirt movements and the OB. Nazi activity in Southern Africa had two dimensions. The first dimension was to create a power base among naturalised South Africans of German descent assimilated into the Afrikaner population and German nationals. The second dimension was to promote the Nazi cause not only amongst German nationals, but also among non-Germans. A torrent of propaganda flooded South Africa and Patrick Furlong suggests that this could have influenced people with a limited educational background living in the remote rural areas into being sympathetic towards Nazi Germany.²⁰

18 Ferdinand Postma Library, University of North-West, Potchefstroom, Ossewa-Brandwag Museum (hereafter referred to as OB): L de Vos Collection, box 6, file 6/32, cover 4: article in *Die Burger*, "genl. Smuts vaar uit teen die OB", 21 November 1940; SU: DF Malan Collection, file 1/1/1483: letter from H Paulsmeier – DF Malan, 12 July 1939; JA Heese, *Die herkoms van die Afrikaner; 1657-1867* (Kaaipstad, 1971), p. 56; Furlong, pp. 70-71; B Bunting, *The rise and fall of the South African Reich* (London, 1964), pp. 54-55; Hancock, p. 368; Visser, p. 167.

19 Bunting, pp. 54-56; Furlong, pp. 20-21; Hancock, p. 368; Visser, p. 167.

20 Furlong, pp. 23-24, 73, 83.

German propaganda by means of pamphlets, the Zeesen radio station and German missions fuelled anti-war sentiments and the OB became a structured platform from which to oppose the war. The OB developed a political character under the leadership of Dr JFJ (Hans) van Rensburg as it opposed participation in the war and propagated republicanism. Stephen Louw argues that the rise of National-Socialism in Nazi Germany influenced the OB only by the power of unification, and that the OB was not a National-Socialist tool, but a populist organisation that only expected commitment in support against the war and for the republican ideal. Van Rensburg was a self-proclaimed National-Socialist (albeit not publicly) and an admirer of Hitler's new Germany. This became apparent after Herr Dieckhoff of the German Foreign Office wrote a letter to the South African government indicating their pleasure at meeting such an important person as Van Rensburg after his visit there in 1936. Documents captured after the war implicated Van Rensburg in actively supporting German spy networks and proposing to stage a coup on condition that Germany supplied the weapons. He suggested that the weapons should be offloaded in South West Africa (West Plan) or on an airstrip in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (North Plan). Furlong argues that the plan was aborted due to a lack of grass-roots supporters willing to take up arms and the OB's growing estrangement from Malan. The OB's increasing political character brought them into direct conflict with Malan and the HNP. The Cradock Agreement of 29 October 1940 between Laas and Malan stated clearly that cooperation between the HNP and the OB would continue with the HNP focusing on the political sphere and the OB focusing on the cultural sphere. Hans van Rensburg and the OB Council broke the agreement in late 1941 through overt political activities and thus lost the support of the HNP. The membership of the two organisations overlapped and Malan distanced himself from the OB and instructed HNP members with OB membership to resign from the OB, which led to an exodus of HNP members.²¹

The OB executed its militant anti-war efforts through the *Stormjaers*. The *Stormjaers* were an elite group within the OB organisation. They organised among the local jukskei²² clubs and were responsible for instilling discipline in the OB ranks. They were initially a splinter group within the OB which,

21 SU: DF Malan Collection, file 1/1/1809. Ossewabrandwag, Kaapland. Omsendbrief 1/41, 18 June 1941; SU: DF Malan Collection, file 1/1/1811: letter from FD du Toit – DF Malan, 23 June 1941; SU: DF Malan Collection, file 1/1/1848. Ossewabrandwag Uniale Omsendbrief 2/41, September 1941; SU: DF Malan Collection, file 1/1/1850: letter from DF Malan – Ds CR Kotzé, 2 September 1941; SU: DF Malan Collection, file 1/1/1851: letter from CR Kotzé–DF Malan, 4 September 1941; SU: Malan Collection, file 1/1/1899. Dringende versoek aan HNP-lede. Bedank uit OB en bou party uit, DF Malan, 3 October 1941; Van Rensburg, pp. 187-188; Furlong, pp. 78-79, 134, 141-142, 183-189; Bunting, pp. 80-81, 92-93, 103.

22 Jukskei are the wooden pins of the yokes (*skei*) of the oxen, which pulled oxwagons. It is a game played where the jukskei is thrown at a stick planted in the ground 11 to 16 meters away.

under the leadership of Abraham Spies, was more militantly inclined. Col. Laas supported Spies in organising the *Stormjaers* and each OB Commando had to identify members for the *Stormjaers*. Van Rensburg, a former officer in the UDF, reorganised the rank and structure of the new *Stormjaers* to be similar to the citizen force structure of the UDF and gave command to Steve Hofmeyer. The OB Commandos in the Transvaal and the Free State were earmarked to specifically provide members for the *Stormjaers* because they were militantly inclined, whereas the rest of the provinces were hesitant to use these tactics.²³

The leader of the *Stormjaers* was called the *Owerste* (Chief/Head), who was appointed by and responsible to the Commandant General. Official contact between the OB Council and the *Stormjaers* was frequent in the Laas period up to 1941, but Stephen Louw argues that official contact was limited in the Van Rensburg period, because Commandant General Van Rensburg and the *Owerste* excluded the council from the various militant actions taken by the *Stormjaers*. The exclusion of the council must be seen in the context of the *Stormjaers* becoming a semi-independent organisation parallel to the OB. Further explanation for their exclusivity was their participation in militant activities not generally supported by mainstream OB members and the need for operational security against government reprisals.²⁴

Members of the *Stormjaers* were men who could be counted on to be trustworthy, dependable and to walk through fire if required. They took their oath during a ceremony where the candidate had a gun or a knife held against his chest and his back, while the oath was read in Afrikaans. The *Stormjaers'* aims went beyond disciplining the rank and file of the OB and also concentrated on threatening the internal security of the state in protest against the war. Their strategic objective was to pin down as many troops as possible inside the borders of South Africa and prevent their deployment abroad. They engaged in acts of sabotage, which included the cutting of telephone wires and the bombing of installations, shops and power pylons. The *Stormjaers* helped internees who escaped by hiding them, moving them to safe locations and giving them supplies. They acted as guards at rallies to prevent unwanted elements intervening or disturbing the rally and the families of interned OB members were supported with money and/or supplies that were stolen by the *Stormjaers*. They also sent false letters to soldiers and their wives containing allegations of infidelity and openly sullied the reputation of women in the UDF.²⁵

23 OB: PF van der Schyff, "Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog", HSRC research project, 1983, pp. 83-86; JJ Badenhorst, "Die organisasiestruktuur van die Ossewa-Brandwag, 1939-1952", MA, Potchefstroom University for CHE, 1985, pp. 59-61; Harrison, pp. 128-129.

24 Badenhorst, pp. 59-61, 147; SJ Louw, "Discourse theory and Afrikaner Nationalism. The case of the Ossewa-Brandwag", BA Honours, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, p. 93.

25 Killie Cambell African Library, University of Kwazulu-Natal (hereafter referred to as UKZN), EG Malherbe Collection, KCM 56975 (89): file 444/7 A, Subversive Activities in the Union. Report by Capt. JA Malherbe, 4 June 1941; DODA, Chief of the General Staff (hereafter CGS),

Berlin initiated a daring plan to topple the pro-British Smuts government in South Africa through Robey Leibbrandt, a South African Springbok boxer who had become a fervent Nazi. He was dropped on the Namaqualand coast in June 1941 by the yacht *Kyloe*, with orders from Nazi Germany to contact Van Rensburg and investigate the possibility of joint action to assassinate Smuts and bring about a *coup d'état* in South Africa. This plan was code named "Operation Weissdorn". Leibbrandt and Van Rensburg could not come to an agreement, after which Leibbrandt started his own group called the National Socialist Rebels. Van Rensburg sent word to the Minister of Interior, Harry Lawrence, of Leibbrandt's plans and Leibbrandt, together with a number of *Stormjaers*, was arrested on Christmas Eve in 1941. He received a commuted sentence of life imprisonment.²⁶

Other activist elements were prevalent, but on a smaller scale. The *Tereurgroep* consisted of 30 members led by Chris Coetzee. They wanted to strike terror into the hearts of government supporters in order to undermine the war effort. They were separate from the OB, but provided weapons, ammunition and explosives to the *Stormjaers*. The X-group was a splinter group that broke away from the *Stormjaers* under the leadership of Advocate Pat Jerling. Jerling and a small number of *Stormjaers* were dissatisfied with Van Rensburg's attempts to restrain their militant activities and went their own way.²⁷

The OB, *Stormjaers* and other activist elements were deemed a clear and present danger to the security of the state and bombings, the cutting of telephone wires and violent actions were frequent during 1941 and 1942. The arrest of about 350 policemen and 60 railway policemen on suspicion of belonging to the *Stormjaers* was followed by a wave of sabotage nationwide.²⁸

CGS(2) 93, file 169/7: Union of South Africa Fortnightly Intelligence Report 13, 15 September 1941; DODA, CGS(2) 93, file 169/7: Union of South Africa Fortnightly Intelligence Report 15, 1 November 1941; DODA, CGS(2) 93, file 169/7: Union of South Africa Fortnightly Intelligence Report 19, 18 February 1942; Furlong, p. 142; Van der Schyff, pp. 89-90; Louw, p. 95; See also Harrison, p. 129.

26 South African National Archives (SANA), WR Loubser Collection, 13/50, HG Lawrence, The Leibbrandt trap, 1 April 1973, pp. 1-20; Van Rensburg, pp. 210-211; Anon, Kwazulu Natal Branch, Newsletter 326, *South African Military History Society*, <<http://rapidftp.com/milhist/2/d02julne.html>>, July 2002, accessed 10 July 2004; H Strydom, *For Volk and Führer* (Johannesburg, 1982), pp. 73-75, 85; Bunting, p. 87.

27 DODA, CGS(2) 93, file 169/7: Union of South Africa Fortnightly Intelligence Report 8, 31 May 1941; UKZN, EG Malherbe Collection, KCM 56975 (89), file 444/7 A, Subversive Activities in the Union: Report by Capt. JA Malherbe, 4 June 1941; Louw, pp. 101-102; Davenport and Saunders, p. 349.

28 DODA, CGS(2) 93, file 169/7: Union of South Africa Fortnightly Intelligence Report 8, 31 May 1941; UKZN, EG Malherbe Collection, KCM 56975 (89), file 444/7 A, Subversive Activities in the Union: Report by Capt. JA Malherbe, 4 June 1941; DODA, CGS(2) 93, file 169/7: Union of South Africa Fortnightly Intelligence Report 19, 18 February 1942, p. 5; Davenport and

5. DETERIORATING RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVILIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

Smuts called for volunteers to take the so-called “Africa Oath” to serve outside the borders of South Africa. They wore red shoulder tabs to show their commitment and were known as *Rooi Lussies* (Red Tabs), but to Nationalists and anti-war supporters they were *Rooi Luisies* (Red Lice). The UDF was unpopular among many in the Afrikaner community due to its use against whites, in particular Afrikaners, in 1913-1914 and in 1922 to suppress industrial strikes; in 1914-1915 to suppress the Rebellion; and because of its British character. Friction between soldiers and civilians was ever present and in many cases they came to blows. The press commented on these incidents and thus contributed to the rising tension between civilians and military personnel. The OB also acted as an agent of agitation and was suspected of inflaming tension between civilians and soldiers. Soldiers received anonymous letters containing threats, while civilians were on occasion the victims of harassment.²⁹

Serious incidents of assault and violence occurred throughout the country, such as violent incidents between students of the University of Potchefstroom and soldiers from the military camp nearby in 1940, and incidents of public violence between soldiers and civilians in the streets of Johannesburg in 1941 that lasted for two days.³⁰

6. INTERNMENT AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE UDF TO SUPPRESS INTERNAL UNREST

South Africa sent two divisions, 1 and 2 SA Division, to campaign in East and North Africa. Under the command of Maj. Gen. HNW Botha, 3 SA Division remained behind for home defence and as a reserve to supply replacements to 1 and 2 SA Divisions. Anti-government actions and the threat of sabotage prompted the

Saunders, p. 349; Bunting, pp. 92-93; Louw, pp. 101-103; Van Rensburg, pp. 213-216; Hancock, p. 340.

29 DODA, CGS WAR 47, file 12/5 (I), Friction between civilians and soldiers, 17/25/2: letter from Magistrate of Piet Retief – Control Officer in Ermelo, 2 September 1940; DODA, CGS WAR 47, file 12/5 (I), Friction between civilians and soldiers, 17/25/2/5: letter from Magistrate Oudtshoorn – Chief Control Officer, Pretoria, 22 October 1940; Giliomee, p. 443; D Visser, “British influence on military training and education in South Africa. The case of the South African Military Academy and its predecessor”, *South African Historical Journal* 46, May 2002, p. 24; Harrison, p. 124.

30 DODA, CGS WAR 47, file 12/7 (I), Disturbances Potchefstroom University College: Report of Commission of Enquiry regarding Potchefstroom disturbances, 9 October 1940; DODA, DC 1433: Report of Commission of Enquiry regarding the disturbances in Johannesburg on 31 January 1941 and 1 February 1941, 19 March 1941; Bunting, pp. 83-84; Orpen, pp. 115-116.

government to deploy the UDF, SA Police, South African Railways and Harbours (SAR&H), and other volunteer organisations, in accordance with sections 76 and 79 of the Defence Act, to safeguard government buildings and strategic civilian installations such as power-generating facilities and communication lines. The training of replacements and volunteers for home defence as well as for garrison duties was the responsibility of 3 SA Division. The defence of South Africa was divided into the Inland Area and the Coastal Area. Deployment in the Inland Area consisted of guard duties at the internment camps, guarding key points and suppressing internal unrest.³¹

The First Reserve Brigade (FRB), which was formed on 29 February 1940, consisted of 12 battalions and was primarily responsible for guarding aerodromes throughout the Union. It consisted of male draftees between the ages of 18 and 45 with B and C medical classifications. It was later incorporated into the Commando National Reserve Volunteers (CNRV) on 7 April 1942 and was disbanded in 1943. The CNRV was formed on 16 October 1940 along the same lines as the FRB. Supplementing the ranks of the home defence forces was the Special Service Battalion, formed on 1 May 1933 and reorganised on 16 September 1939 into three battalions to form the Special Service Brigade. On 1 October 1940, the National Volunteer Brigade was formed and consisted of Police Reservists and Civic Guards. The Railway and Harbour Brigade was reformed on 1 April 1940 after it had been disbanded in 1928 and the Essential Services Protection Corps (ESPC), which was formed on 24 October 1939, consisted of men over the age of 45. These volunteer units executed a multitude of home defence tasks. The SAR&H and the ESPC worked in close cooperation to guard railway property and bridges. All the bridges over the Vaal, Klip, Pongola, Umtamvuna and Orange Rivers, the bridge over the Umzimkulu River between Natal and East-Griqualand and the Telle Bridge between South Africa and Basutoland (now Lesotho) had to be protected. A chronic shortage of fighting men also led to the Civilian Protective Services (CPS) taking over certain guard duties from the National Volunteer Brigade. The CPS, with its 10 000-strong Civilian Guard, resorted under the Department of the Interior and assisted local authorities and municipalities with the co-ordination, preparation and execution of civilian protection. This enabled the National Volunteer Brigade to release more men for military training.³²

31 Defence Act 13 of 1912, Statutes of the Union of South Africa, pp. 244, 246; HJ Martin and ND Orpen, *South African Forces World War II, Vol VII, South Africa at War. Military and industrial organisation and operations in connection with the conduct of the War, 1939-1945* (Wynberg, 1979), pp. 60, 68, 70; Fedorowich, p. 214; Orpen, p. 114; WS Douglas, *Regimental history of the Cape Town Highlanders* (Cairo, 1944), pp. 2-3; S Rothwell, <<http://homepages.force9.net/rothwell/3sa.htm>>, accessed 21 September 2004.

32 Martin and Orpen, pp. 34, 39, 149; Fedorowich, pp. 213-214; IJ van der Waag, "A history of Military Intelligence in South Africa, 1912-1968", Military Intelligence Department, Pretoria,

Women and non-whites were pressed into service to assist with home defence in an effort to free more white men for frontline duty. The Cape Corps and the Native Military Corps accounted for 123 000 of the 335 000 (35%) of the war-time UDF personnel strength. The majority of these non-whites were used for home defence duties, where they also had to deal with local prejudice against them wearing the uniform. They were used to man the coastal artillery batteries and to seal off parts of the coast where shipping movements could be observed. Guard duties for non-whites included securing strategic installations such as airfields, harbours and key factories that produced chemicals and ammunition. They were also deployed to guard the Italian and German POW camps. The women from the South African Woman's Auxiliary Service (SAWAS) ensured that visiting troops received entertainment, hospitality and refreshments, but they were also utilised as auxiliary nurses, for motor transport, secretarial services, civic services, crèche and welfare services, hospital requisite services, canteen services and other general and specialised services. Women also joined the armed forces through the South African Woman's Auxiliary Defence Corps (SAWADC) and were utilised in home defence tasks such as manning coastal batteries and harbour defences.³³

Union citizens contravening the various emergency regulations proclaimed by the Smuts government and especially those suspected of subversive activities were held under the War Measures Act without trial and faced internment along with enemy spies and foreign nationals suspected of subversive acts. They were held at six internment camps, namely Baviaanspoort, Leeukop, Andalusia, Ganspan, Sonderwater and Koffiefontein during the war. (See Figure 1: Internment Camps.) German and Italian POWs were held at Andalusia and Sonderwater respectively, while citizens of the Union were held at the other camps. Col. EG Malherbe, Director of Military Intelligence, noted in his biography that 6 636 people were interned during the war.³⁴

1990, p. 12. Anon. South African Army, 1939-1940, <<http://home.adelphia.net/~dryan67/orders/sa.html>>, n.d. accessed 21 September 2004; W Otto, *Die Spesiale Diens Batteljon, 1933-1973* (Pretoria: Central Documentation Service, SADF, 1973), pp. 17, 85.

33 I Gleeson, *The unknown force. Black, Indian and Coloured soldiers through two world wars* (Rivonia, 1994), pp. 149-151; WM Bisset, "Coast Artillery in South Africa" in CJ Nöthling (ed.), *Ultimo Ratio Regum: Artillery history of South Africa* (Pretoria, SADF, 1987), pp. 341-351; MPH Laver, *Sailor-women Sea-women SWANS, A history of the South African Women's Auxiliary Naval Service, 1943-1949* (Simon's Town, 1982), pp. 88-106; IJ van der Waag, "Naval history of Saldanha", *Paratus*, January 1994, p. 46; Martin and Orpen, pp. 225-243.

34 DODA, CGS(2) 93, file 169/7: Union of South Africa Fortnightly Intelligence Report 15, 1 November 1941, p. 10; O'Neil, pp. 18-19, 69; EG Malherbe, *Never a dull moment* (Cape Town, 1981), p. 245; Gleeson, p. 150; B Moore and K Fedorowich, *The British Empire and its Italian prisoners of war, 1940-1947* (Hampshire, 2002), p. 230.




Figure 1: Map of internment camps.³⁵

The UDF was responsible for guarding these camps and the units deployed for home defence guarded the various camps on a rotation basis. Guard duty had a demoralising effect on the troops. They were under the impression that they were inactive units to be used only for guard duty and the disappointment at their apparent misfortune of not going to war led to many men requesting transfers to the SAAF and other active units.³⁶

The internment camps embittered Afrikaners, because many families had relatives in these camps. HO Terblanche states in his book about John Vorster that Advocate JG Strijdom compared the use of camps by Smuts to Kitchener’s concentration camps during the Second Anglo-Boer War. Strijdom correctly predicted that the emotional reaction to Smuts’s internment camps would be the same hate and embitterment evoked by Kitchener’s concentration camps. However, the conditions in these camps were not as appalling as those of the concentration camps. Capt. GHF Strydom, an opposition MP, visited Koffiefontein and found the conditions satisfactory, albeit that individual freedom was temporarily restricted.

35 O’Neil, p. 69 and combined map by C Mercer, South African Map, <<http://home.global.co.za/~mercon/map.htm>>, 1997, accessed 10 July 2004.

36 Malherbe, p. 243; Orpen, p. 115; Douglas, p. 3; GC Visser, pp. 82-84.

Anti-Smuts and anti-British feelings were inflamed and the tension between pro- and anti-war supporters was reaching breaking point.³⁷

7. THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

The first UDF Director of Intelligence, Col. BW Thwaites, was appointed on 25 September 1939 and was responsible for civil security, local censorship and propaganda. This organisation was known as Internal Security. A second intelligence organisation, known as Military Intelligence, was established during February 1940 in an effort to focus on more military related intelligence tasks, which included security of the armed forces and military intelligence. Lt Col HT Newman was appointed as Deputy Director of Military Intelligence (DDMI) and he was responsible for censorship and propaganda in East Africa, North Africa, Italy and the Middle East when the UDF went on active service.³⁸

The Union government was fighting a war on two fronts, North Africa and internally. Thousands of troops were tied down guarding key points and internment camps, and directorates, such as Military Intelligence, and were sorely pressed to provide a service for both. South Africa lacked a well-established counter-intelligence service to combat the internal threat from pro-Nazi, anti-British and right-wing Afrikaner groups such as the OB. Proper training and funding in particular were major obstacles, which were rectified when Smuts took over the reigns as Prime Minister, and Minister of Defence and External Affairs. Shortly after his appointment he allocated £1 250 to the defence budget for “Miscellaneous and Incidental Expenditure” to pay for agents to collect information for military purposes. Military Intelligence waged a silent war against pro-German and anti-government supporters as well as German spies in cooperation with Allied intelligence agencies.³⁹

Military Intelligence staff and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the police shared information on subversive activities and this formed an integral cog in the wheel of law enforcement. There were several important reasons why military intelligence was utilised domestically. Firstly, a government at war facing internal unrest directly related to the war had to utilise all the information services at its disposal to gain strategic, operational and tactical knowledge internationally

37 Terblanche, pp. 104-105; Malherbe, p. 245; Hancock, p. 340.

38 Fedorowich, “German espionage...”, pp. 212-213; Van der Waag, “A history of Military Intelligence...”, pp. 11-12.

39 DODA, Adjutant General (hereafter AG), AG(W) 4, file 168/2/A-1: EP Command Intelligence Staff: duties of Command Intelligence Officers, 26 March 1940; Fedorowich, “German espionage...”, pp. 211-215; School for Tactical Intelligence, module 5, pamphlet 2-10, The Intelligence Cycle, pp. 5-71; AW Shulsky, 2nd ed., *Silent warfare, Understanding the world of intelligence* (Washington, 1993), pp. 4-6.

and domestically. The use of Military Intelligence enabled the government to collect information, process it through evaluation, collation and interpretation and then disseminate it to all relevant parties to be acted on. The second reason was that, without Military Intelligence, domestic law enforcement would not have information about foreign activities influencing domestic situations and cases being investigated by the police, and, by sharing information, this was provided. Thirdly, the information provided would enable pro-active measures to prevent illegal or subversive activities. The fourth reason was to provide law enforcement with the necessary background information when cases were investigated.⁴⁰

The collection of information was critical to form a credible intelligence picture and the intelligence staff worked diligently to keep tabs on the many people suspected of subversive activities. Vigilance committees were established in areas where German-speakers were concentrated with the aim of providing a rapid system of communication between the rural areas and the central government. Consisting of no less than three and no more than five people, these committees performed four functions. They firstly watched for espionage, sabotage and hostile action by groups. Secondly they reported cases of intimidation, tampering with the indigenous population, subversive speeches or actions and watched for possible parachutists. The third function was to report cases of hardship affecting the wives and families of those away on service, investigate the hardship and, where necessary, redress it. The fourth function was to observe and report any movement or action that may tend to impair security. These committees, intelligence agents and other security services provided ample information, but the processing and dissemination thereof was initially hampered due to the lack of a central coordinating agency. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, Deneys Reitz, suggested an Intelligence Clearance Bureau (ICB)⁴¹ to act as a central reception point.⁴²

The ICB was operational by the end of 1940 under the command of Brig. HJ Lenton, who was also the Controller of Censorship. It did not interfere with the functions and responsibilities of the DDMI. It provided information of military value from sources otherwise not tapped by Military Intelligence. The ICB held weekly meetings with senior representatives from the SA Police, Railway Police, Military Intelligence, the Commissioner of Immigration, the Commissioner of Customs and the Treasury. The ICB ensured proper dissemination of internal security reports and the maintenance of a complete set of intelligence records. It

40 DODA, AG(W) 4, file 168/2/A-1: EP Command Intelligence Staff, Duties of Command Intelligence Officers, 26 March 1940; Fedorowich, "German espionage...", pp. 211-215; School for Tactical Intelligence, module 5, pamphlet 2-10, The Intelligence Cycle, pp. 5-71; Shulsky, pp. 4-6.

41 It was otherwise known as the Intelligence Records Bureau.

42 DODA, AG(W) 4, file 168/2/A-: EP Command Intelligence Staff, letter to all Command Intelligence Officers, 18 June 1940; Malherbe, p. 241; Fedorowich, "German espionage...", pp. 214-215.

ensured proper coordination between departments, facilitated inter-departmental arrangements and submitted regulations and recommendations to the Minister of the Interior, HG Lawrence.⁴³

Prof. EG Malherbe headed the Army Education Scheme (renamed Army Information Services), commissioned after the outbreak of hostilities, with the aim of training men to “educate” troops during war. These men were known as Information Officers. Malherbe was asked by Smuts to take over the responsibilities of the Military Intelligence Directorate and was given a commission as Lt Col and performed the duties of Director of Military Intelligence and Director of the Army Education Scheme. In August 1943 Military Intelligence was finalised with Information, Security and Censure sections as well as a broader intelligence capability with the Intelligence Corps, Education Officers, the UDF Film Unit and the Historical Records and War Museum.⁴⁴

Intelligence Officers employed inside the borders of South Africa taped council meetings of the *Afrikaner Broederbond* and many members of the OB were under constant surveillance. Prof. Malherbe’s opinion of the above-mentioned organisations was that they presented the greatest security risk to South Africa. It is evident from the fortnightly intelligence reports that the *Afrikaner Broederbond* and the OB were closely watched. Smuts branded the OB a poisonous abscess during his speech at the opening of the Transvaal Congress of the United Party on 20 November 1940. During this speech he issued a warning to the OB that the government would keep an eye on them and action would follow without hesitation if deemed necessary. Military Intelligence diligently included reports of the OB in their fortnightly intelligence reports. Paid informants, such as Baron Otto von Strahl, worked for the Allies and provided valuable information about German activities in Africa. He had been in the German diplomatic service since 1918 and served in Durban, South Africa, from 1936, but his anti-Nazi standpoint led to his dismissal in 1937. Prisoners of war and internees had to be questioned and the morale of the troops in North Africa had to be upheld. It is therefore not surprising that intelligence expenditure rose considerably during the war from £698 in 1939 to £13 711 in 1945.⁴⁵ (See Table 2 for Military Intelligence spending during the Second World War.)

43 Fedorowich, “German espionage...”, p. 215; Van der Waag, “A history of Military Intelligence...”, p. 12.

44 Van der Waag, “A history of Military Intelligence...”, p. 14; Malherbe, pp. 215-217, 222; MC van Deventer, “Die ontwikkeling van ’n militêre inligtingsvermoë vir die Unieverdedigingsmag”, BMil Honours Staff Paper, Faculty Military Science (Military Academy), SU, 25 August 1994, pp. 15-30.

45 DODA, AG(W) 4, file 168/2/A-1: EP Command Intelligence Staff, letter to all Command Intelligence Officers, 18 June 1940; UNISA, Unisa Collection 1/1, premier oor Ossewa Brandwag,

Military Intelligence had to counter the activities of German spies, German intelligence networks in Mozambique and effective pro-German propaganda from Radio Zeesen. The German Deputy Consul in Lourenço Marques (Maputo, Mozambique), Luitpold Werz, was in charge of the whole German spy network in Southern Africa. He was fluent in Afrikaans, English, French and Portuguese, as well as acquainted with Italian. He provided intelligence on Allied shipping from sources in Mozambique and South Africa. His network was supplemented by the Italian Consul, Umberto Campini, who had his own effective intelligence networks in Lourenço Marques and in South Africa.⁴⁶

TABLE 2: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SPENDING DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR.⁴⁷

Financial Year	Expenditure
1939-1940	£ 698-01-05
1940-1941	£ 4 716-10-06
1941-1942	£ 3 006-18-01
1942-1943	£ 5 824-15-11
1943-1944	£ 10 725-13-00
1944-1945	£ 13 711-13-00

The Union government subjected political opponents and suspects to imprisonment, private letters were confiscated and telephones were tapped. Prisoners were detained and many suspects were confined without trial under the War Measures Act. An example is the internment of BJ (John) Vorster, later Prime Minister of South Africa, but an OB General in 1942. Vorster's internment was preceded by a confinement of three-and-a-half months in jail. The official reasons given for his detainment and later internment were his position as OB General, that he was anti-British and anti-war, aided criminals and was seen as a serious threat to the state. He later commented on his internment by saying: "I was an Afrikaner standing up for the rights of my people."⁴⁸ Vorster and many Afrikaners like him were rounded up by the police and questioned at leisure. The Afrikaners who opposed the war loathed intelligence officers, informants and the police who investigated possible suspects and called them *kakieridders* (khaki knights). They were regarded as

p. 1; Shulsky, p. 6; Malherbe, p. 241; Harrison, pp. 140-144; Bunting, p. 101; Hancock, p. 369; Van der Waag, "A history of Military Intelligence...", pp. 15-16; Strydom, pp. 77-78.

46 Furlong, pp. 129, 141; Fedorowich, "German espionage...", pp. 224-225.

47 Van der Waag, "A history of Military Intelligence...", p. 16.

48 Terblanche, p. 104.

traitors to the Afrikaner cause and thus just as bad as the Afrikaners who joined the British during the Second Anglo-Boer War.⁴⁹

Support for the *Stormjaers*, the *Tereurgroep* and other militant groups waned as Allied victories continued, and the end of the war in favour of the Allies also meant the end of these organisations. Power balancing took place with the elections of 1943 and not through violent revolution. The OB was weakened when many members left after the split between the HNP and the OB, and ceased being a determining factor in Afrikaner politics after the war.⁵⁰

South Africa's participation in the Second World War came at a price for Smuts in terms of his career in South African politics. Animosity amongst Afrikaners was rife, but at the end of the war many Afrikaners were united in their support of DF Malan and the National Party (NP). Malan provided Afrikaners with an alternative to Smuts, without the need to resort to violence. Afrikaners flocked to the NP banner seeking political survival, economic prosperity, racial protection and cultural autonomy, and the NP became the ruling party after their victory in the 1948 election.⁵¹

8. CONCLUSION

The UDF overcame serious challenges and did a fine job of participating in the war and safeguarding internal security during the Second World War. Afrikaner dissidents during the 1914-1915 Rebellion and the industrial strikes of 1913, 1914 and 1922 were harshly dealt with and quickly suppressed by Smuts. However, he changed his methods during the Second World War by being more lenient and less violent. The suppression of the Rebellion and industrial strikes taught Smuts valuable lessons, which he employed against opposition groups during the Second World War. These measures were the passing of the War Measures Act by Parliament in 1940 and other proclamations that removed the means whereby groups could organise themselves militarily against the government. Sanctioned covert actions and internment were used to curb internal unrest and to separate agitators from the broader community.

In military terms the UDF showed it was capable of defending the authority of the state and maintaining law and order with a minimum of casualties during the suppression of the Rebellion and mining strikes. However, the political cost of utilising the UDF against whites was very high. Participation in the Second World War was strongly opposed by many Afrikaners as resentment against the govern-

49 Shulsky, p. 6; Malherbe, pp. 241, 245; Van Rensburg, p. 188; Terblanche, pp. 104-105; Harrison, pp. 140-144; Terblanche, pp. 102-103, 133.

50 Giliomee, p. 446; Louw, pp. 27-28; Hancock, pp. 370-371; Furlong, pp. 159-160.

51 Furlong, p. 144; Giliomee, p. 446; SJ Louw, pp. 27-28; Hancock, pp. 370-371.

ment, and especially Smuts, was harboured for using military force against white South Africans.

Among the Afrikaners who opposed the war, many expressed their outrage through political action, but the militants flocked to activist elements to express their anger through sabotage. Afrikaner unrest during the Second World War was not an open rebellion, but a subversive and clandestine action aimed at disrupting the South African war effort through bombings, sabotage and intimidation. As with the First World War, the Second World War enticed strong anti-British feelings and organisations such as the OB capitalised on them. The cultural revival within the Afrikaner community provided fertile ground for the OB to sow its seeds of dissension and reap the harvest quickly. The secret *Stormjaers* within the OB were responsible for many of these actions of sabotage, but other groups, such as the *Tereurgroep*, the X-Group and the National Socialist Rebels, were also guilty.

The suppression of Afrikaner unrest was a necessity. The home front had to be secured to ensure a steady supply of war material and personnel to the front, because an unstable home front creates low morale and a weak support base. The UDF, SA Police, SAR&H, Military Intelligence and volunteer organisations provided an invaluable service in assisting the government in keeping the home front subdued. Criticism of Smuts was forthcoming from the opposition and the anti-war activists. Spying, confinement and internment characterised government actions and was answered with more sabotage and intimidation. The war ended in favour of Britain and its Allies and this eroded the anti-war groups' power base preventing them from recruiting more members to their cause or finding support amongst the population to continue with their actions. Afrikaners turned their attention to parliamentary actions and their support for the NP ensured a victory during the 1948 elections.

The suppression of internal unrest through military means will always illicit strong negative reaction against the government of the day. The politicians and military officers in charge suffer the consequences of their actions in the aftermath. However, in spite of the consequences, a country's defence force has the responsibility of protecting such country against enemies of a foreign or a domestic nature and assisting the local police force in maintaining law and order. These unpopular actions are a necessity when the country's safety, security and stability are at stake.