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Globalization in the twenty-first century in quest of a new paradigm

Abstract

The historical significance of the tragedy on September 11 in 2001 may well be compared to the tragedy of June 28 in 1914 – the assassination in Sarajevo. Both tragedies closed two symbolic chapters of world history, i.e. that of the nineteenth century liberalism (1815-1914) and that of twentieth century neo-liberalism (1991-2001). The view that September 11, 2001 opened a new chapter in global history has found full confirmation in the poll of 275 opinion leaders conducted by the *International Herald Tribune* and the Pew Research Centre for People and Press. The phenomenon of global terrorism should be interpreted as a consequence of two failings in the last decade of the twentieth century. The first failing was the absence of a grand strategic vision for ordering the global stage after the col-lapse of the Soviet Empire. The second failing of the last decade of the twentieth century was the almost total disappearance of concern for the tragic plight of societies around the globe that led to polarization between rich and poor.

Keywords: Twenty-first century, globalization.

GLOBALISERING IN DIE EEN EN TWINTIGSTE EEU: OP SOEK NA 'N NUWE PARADIGMA

Die historiese impak van die tragedie op 11 September 2001 kan vergelyk word met die tragedie op 28 Junie 1914 – die sluipmoord in Sarajevo. Beide tragedies sluit twee simboliese hoofstukke in die wêreldgeskiedenis, naamlik dié van die negentiende eeuse liberalisme (1815-1914) en dié van die twintigste eeuse neo-liberalisme (1991-2001). Die mening dat 11 September 2001 'n nuwe hoofstuk in die globale geskiedenis open, word ondersteun deur 'n meningsopname onder 275 invloedryke meningvormers deur die *International Herald Tribune* en die Pew-navorsingsentrum. Die fenomeen van globale terrorisme kan geïnterpreteer word as die gevolg van twee fatale flaters wat in die laaste dekade van die twintigste eeu gemaak is. Die eerste is die afwesigheid van 'n oorhoofse strategiese visie ten opsigte van die ordening van die globale verhoog na die ineenstorting van die Sowjetryk. Die tweede is die byna algehele afwesigheid van empatie oor die tragiese toestand van talle gemeenskappe regoor die wêreld wat aanleiding gegee het tot 'n polarisasie tussen arm en ryk lande.

Sleutelwoorde: 21ste eeu, globalisasie.

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Introduction

Only by helping the least fortunate [...] can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people. Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the Peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies – hunger, misery, and despair [...]. Our allies are the millions who hunger and thirst after righteousness" (Harry S Truman as quoted in the *Rand Corporation Calendar* 2002).

Over the last decades of the twentieth century, what may be called 'the classical paradigm of globalization' emerged¹. The impression made in those years was that the classical paradigm would continue to be relevant to the vision of the world set to take shape in the twenty-first century. The tragedy of September 11, 2001, however, has disrupted this evolutionary scheme of thinking. Indeed, to a large extent the classical paradigm of the twentieth century has lost its force as a concept explaining and organizing the processes of globalization in the twentieth century. Today we must embark upon a quest for a new paradigm. This paper accepts the basic definition of a paradigm as "a set of questions addressed to the objective reality and a set of answers formulated in response to those questions" (*Table 1*).

Table 1: Paradigm: questions and answers on a 'objective reality'

Questions	Answers	
	1	2
Old	Old	New
New	3 Old	4 New

— = The boundary between the old and new paradigm

A paradigm, which supports our inclination to provide old answers to old questions must be rejected – or at least deeply transformed. We have to look for a new paradigm; one that demands new answers to old questions and new answers to new questions.

¹ Compare Buzh H & A Kukliński (eds). 2001. *Globalization. Experiences and prospects*. Warsaw: Friedrich bert Stiftung.

Globalization. *International Social Science Journal*. UNESCO June 1999:160. Paris.

Poverty. *International Social Science Journal*. June 1996:144, *op cit*.

Governance. *International Social Science Journal*. March 1999:155, *op cit*.

Deacon B. 2000. Globalization and social policy. UNRISD, Occasional paper 2000.5. Geneva.

Weisbrot M. 2001. How the IMF messed up Argentina. *International Herald Tribune*. December 26th.

Saikal A. 2001. Afghanistan will want American commitment this time. *International Herald Tribune*. December 28th.

Pentilla R. 2001. The concert is back and it seems to be working. *International Herald Tribune*, December 28th.

Kapuciński R. 2001. Innego świata nie będzie. *Rzeczpospolita – plus – minus*. December 29th-30th.

Rifkin J. Globalny fajrant. 2001. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. December 29th-30th.

Within just such an intellectual framework, the present discussion paper pursues the following thematic sequence:

- I. The tragedy of September 11, 2001 as a new chapter in global history
- II. The underlying causes of the tragedy
- III. The classical paradigm of globalization developed in the last decades of the twentieth century
- IV. The trajectories leading to a new paradigm
- V. *Pax Triadica, Pax Americana, Pax Dei.*

I. The tragedy of September 11, 2001 as a new chapter in global history

In its historical significance the tragedy of September 11th 2001 may well be compared with the tragedy of June 28, 1914 – the assassination in Sarajevo². Both tragedies closed two symbolic chapters of world history, i.e. that of nineteenth century liberalism (1815-1914) and that of twentieth century neo-liberalism (1991-2001). The view that September 11, 2001 has opened a new chapter in global history has found full confirmation in the poll of 275 opinion leaders conducted by the *International Herald Tribune*³ and the Pew Research Centre for the People and Press. Those opinion leaders from 24 countries answered *inter alia* the following question: "Has the terrorist attack in the United States and the subsequent war opened up a new chapter in world history, or do you think this will not turn out to be such a significant event?" A quantitative characteristic of the answers is presented in *Table 2*.

The structure of the answers presented in *Table 2* points to two conclusions:

- 1) The preponderance of the view – 'new chapter'
- 2) The global uniformization of the expressed opinions.

The *International Herald Tribune* indirectly suggests that the opinions of the 275 personalities are relevant and representative⁴. We do, however, have to maintain a necessary dose of skepticism:

- 1) The group of 275 personalities is very narrow, and limits the cognitive value of the poll – even if the poll had been designed and implemented in accord with state-of-the-art techniques in public opinion polling

2 Compare: Davies N. 1998. *Europa – rozprawa historyka z historia*. Znaki, Kraków.

3 How the world sees the US and September 11th *International Herald Tribune*, December 20th 2001.

4 *International Herald Tribune*, *op. cit.*

Table 2: The answers on the question regarding a new chapter in history

Questions	Mega-regions							
	USA	Total non-USA	Western Europe	Eastern Europe Russia	Latin America	Asia	Mid-East Conflict area	Islamic
New chapter in world history	78%	79%	76%	73%	90%	69%	90%	80%
Not such a significant event	20	18	22	20	10	29	10	17
Don't know/ Refused to answer	2	3	2	7	0	2	0	3

Source: *International Herald Tribune, op cit*

- 2) The global uniformization of answers indicates that the 275 personalities belong to the global elite, which ipso facto is more likely to reflect 'global' opinions than are societies representing the particular mega-regions at large.

These sceptical remarks are not aimed at questioning the general conclusion that the tragedy of September 11th has opened a new chapter in global history. For it remains a compelling hypothesis, the merits of which will be verified in upcoming inquires, studies and discussions – and the unfolding of events.

II. The underlying causes of the tragedy

We must dig down to the underlying causes of the tragedy. Interpretations, which grasp merely the surface of the problem and only the final links in the casual chain of events, lead to mistaken and dangerous conclusions from the point of view of the future of the twenty-first century. The phenomenon of global terrorism should be interpreted as a consequence of two failings of the last decade of the twentieth century. The first failing was the absence of a grand strategic vision of ordering the global stage following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The victorious liberal-democratic coalition invested inordinate hope in, and even deified market processes that were expected to spontaneously create a 'brave new world'.

Market processes are excellent instruments of the present's 'automatic' regulation of the development of the global economy. And yet market forces are not able to engender the break-through innovations required to change the structure and *modus operandi* of economies, society and the state. This is the domain of visionary strategic political decisions. An excellent example in this field was the opportunity to design and

implement a 'Marshall Plan II', which in a strategic way would have changed the qualitative development of the post-communist world. Guided processes of transformation would have created much better results than those to be observed in the spontaneous anarchy of the real events shaping the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe⁵. Of course, the concept of a Marshall Plan is only one example of a grand vision which could have been designed and implemented in the last decade of the twentieth century and have led to a new organization of the world.

In this vein it is worthwhile to review the charming and illuminating intellectual joke of *The Economist*⁶ published in the *New Year Issue* of 1993 as a *sui generis* science fiction under the title: "Looking back from 2992 – World History, Chapter 13 – The disastrous 21st Century." Let me present three passages from that essay⁷:

This was an opportunity of a magnitude the world had rarely seen before. As Chapter 12 explained, the three-sided War of Ideas that had occupied most of the 20th century ended in a sweeping victory for the once apparently doomed forces of liberalism. The defeat of racial totalitarianism in 1945 having been followed by the defeat of communist totalitarianism in 1989-91, the victorious pluralists seemed to have the future at their feet. The failure of clear thinking applied to all three members of the victorious coalition – the United States, the European Community and Japan. They could, if they wished, have brought a share of liberty and prosperity to much of the rest of the world by the end of the 21st century. They did wish it. But they failed to see that to succeed they had to remain a partnership. Instead, each of the three almost at once started to assert itself against others.

Looking back from 2992 one can see why the democracies missed the great opportunity they were given in the 1990s. The fact that they had had to spend the 20th century fighting their two-front War of Ideas, against communism and fascism, was itself a sign that a cycle of history was approaching its end. The democracies needed to re-examine the ideas that had created this cycle: but they left the re-examination too late.

The lost opportunity of the 1990s is the first underlying cause of the tragedy of September 11. The great strategic mistakes in the history of mankind are bearing tragic fruits. Is this truth comprehensible to George W Bush, who *de facto* is a magnificent nineteenth century President of the United States of America? However, is nineteenth century thinking suitable for decision-making in the twenty-first century? I hope that this

⁵ Kukliński A. 1995. The growth of knowledge and the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. In: Kukliński A (ed). *Baltic Europe in the perspective of global change*. Warsaw: Euroreg.

⁶ *The Economist*. Dec 26th 1992 to January 8th 1993.

⁷ *The Economist*, *op cit*, pp 17-19.

strong value judgment is simply wrong. Nonetheless, we should find strong arguments for the rejection of this value judgment.

The second failing of the last decade of the twentieth century was the almost total disappearance of concern over the tragic plight of societies all around the globe, coupled with a frequent conscious and unapologetic ignoring of mechanisms that have led to a polarization between rich and poor unprecedented in history. In the global ocean of social Darwinism, social sensitivity has almost vanished. The Triad was *grosso modo* interested only in the issues of the wealthy North. The tragedy of illness and misery in the South has vanished from global awareness. The transfer of assistance from the rich countries to the poor countries in the nineties declined to the lowest level in the second half of the twentieth century. The growth of global terrorism cannot be explained without the role of misery, something, which creates the climate for terrorist activities⁸. This is the second underlying reason of the tragedy of September 11.

In addressing the underlying causes of the tragedy, in no way do I mean to justify the heinous acts of the monsters that committed the crimes of September 11. Nor by any means do I seek to call into question the right of the antiterrorist coalition to employ full-scale military power in the battle against global terrorism. On the contrary: my point is that this is not the only method of liquidating the causes of the tragedy. Without addressing underlying causes as well, the enormous problems of the twenty-first century cannot be resolved.

III. The classical paradigm of globalization developed in the last decades of the twentieth century

We need to analyse three foundations of this paradigm. As the first foundation we recognize the astounding technological progress and especially the breakthroughs in the field of information and telecommunication technologies (ICT). The matter of the technologies of the twentieth and twenty-first century is comprehensively analysed in a multitude of magnificent studies and publications developed within the framework of the theoretical and pragmatic infrastructure created by the OECD⁹. In this context the following observation of R Miller, W Michalski and B Stevens¹⁰ is pertinent:

⁸ Cf: Kristof ND. 2001. To put terror out of business give Afghans a living. *International Herald Tribune*, December 15th-16th.

⁹ OECD. Technology and economy key relationships. Paris. 1992.

¹⁰ Miller R *et alia*. 1998. The promises and perils of 21st century technology An overview of the issues in OECD – 21st century technologies – promises and perils of a dynamic future. Paris.

If the risk can be managed, it is plausible that over the next twenty-five years a panoply of technological advances will vastly improve human welfare as well as help set the world's development on a sustainable course. However, as history demonstrates, the availability of a particular scientific discovery or innovative technology is no assurance that its potential will be extended into useful applications, nor that it will diffuse widely or to those who might use it most productively. Reaping the rewards and reducing the dangers generated by technological advances depend on a complex interaction with underlying economic, social and political conditions. Realizing the fruits of socio-technical dynamism demands careful consideration of two dimensions: first, how various socio-economic environments lead to differences in the pace and direction of technological innovation and diffusion; and second, what the implications are of the uses and spread of new technologies for the economy and society.

Reading the *grosso modo* optimistic content incorporated into the OECD publications, we should also remember the critical observations of R. Galar¹¹, who attempts to argue that in the second half of the twentieth century we had a deficit of breakthrough innovations.

The second foundation of the classical paradigm is the huge growth of the scale and importance of the world of finances, which, following the processes of deregulation and liberalization, transformed into the most important domain of the global economy. In the last decade of the twentieth century the world of finance transformed into a phenomenon of huge scale having almost total autonomy in relation to the world of tangible objects. An observation made by K Valaskakis¹² should be quoted in this context:

Whereas in the earlier part of the 20th century, trade and empire were the drivers of globalization, in the last decade the new drivers were technology and capital flows. In this age of the internet, short-term foreign exchange flows amount to over 1 trillion US dollars on a daily basis as opposed to \$4 trillion of trade flows on an annual basis.

The champions of this phenomenon of 'dematerialization' will indicate that this is the triumph of the new world of finances over the old world of physical tangible objects. The critics however will respond by indicating that an ocean of speculative thinking and speculative *modus operandi* overwhelmed the world of finances.

The third foundation of the classical paradigm is the market as the main manager of the global scene¹³. A *sui generis* deification of the market

¹¹ Galar R. 2001. *Gospodarka oparta na wiedzy i innowacje przelomowe*. In: Kukliński A (ed). *Gospodarka oparta na wiedzy* (GOW). Warsaw: KBN.

¹² Valaskakis K. *Globalization as a theatre*. In: *I S S J. op cit*, p 154.

¹³ Valaskakis K. *op cit*, p 158.

has emerged, one that deems the market to be the universal answer to all questions. The critic of this universal deification of the market may present two of many observations:

- 1) The functional efficiency of the market is strongly differentiated both in time and in space. The market functions well in a setting characterized by sound institutional conditions¹⁴ and especially by an honest and efficient administration of law and justice
- 2) Like all creations of the human mind, market forces have to be subordinated to supreme norms and values¹⁵.

The three foundations of the classical paradigm – the world of technology, the world of finances, and the world of the market – were in the past and will be in the future – very important factors in global development and in the globalization of economies, society and governance. But these three forces cannot be transformed into a Pantheon of three Deities – withdrawn from the sphere of theoretical and pragmatic critique.

The transnational corporation¹⁶ has been broadly recognized as the main vehicle and hero of globalization and the most efficient form of

¹⁴ Porwit K. Globalization context and challenges for the possible future. Evolution of a socio-economic order in Poland. In: H Bunz & A Kukiński (eds). *Globalization. op cit.*

¹⁵ Pfaff KW, 1998. What happens, when market forces get out of control. *International Herald Tribune*, July 14th.

¹⁶ Compare: Barnett RJ & J Cavanagh. 1994. *Global dreams – imperial corporations and the New World order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Zarska A, & Ku Globalizacji. 1998. *Przemiany w korporacjach transnarodowych i gospodarce światowej*. Warsaw: PWN.

Compare also the great laudatio of multinational corporations by Garef M & JP Lehman. 2002. The 21st century needs corporate driven globalization. *IHT*, January 4th. Three quotations from this article:

The impact of corporate-driven globalization is, on balance, highly positive on the welfare and development of the countries concerned. Generally – of course there are exceptions, as always – the standards maintained by multinational corporations in labor conditions, environment, stakeholder relationships and social contributions are significantly higher than those of local firms. This is not to suggest that multinational corporate leaders are superior moral beings. Simply, these matters are dictated by good business strategy and the logic of contemporary capitalism.

Corporate-driven market globalization generates entrepreneurship, competition and both job and wealth creation. The allegation that it promotes oligopoly is nonsense. Twenty years ago, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, there were about 6 000 multinational corporations. Today there are more than 60 000 – of which 10 000 come from the developing world.

With the debris of Seattle behind us, and in the hope that Doha will provide firmer foundations for erecting a solid economic edifice for the 21st century, let us make up for lost time, get this century right and in 2002 look to the future with confidence that capitalist corporate-driven market globalization has a fantastic, unprecedented potential for human well-being. On these foundations, let us build a better world – and resist all efforts, no matter how well intentioned, to plunge it back into the misery that plagued a good deal of the 20th century.

governance. This model of governance is very often an inspiration in the processes of reform and transformation designed and implemented in international organizations, the institutions of government and self-government on global, continental, national, regional and local scales. The classical paradigm of globalization is the focus of a multitude of studies and publications demonstrating a very high theoretical and methodological level and sponsored by numerous academic institutions and international organizations. There is no doubt, however, that the OECD¹⁷ – a unique scientific and political institution steadily integrating innovative currents of theoretical and pragmatic thinking – is the most important institution in the realm of creating the doctrine of globalization.

IV. The trajectories leading to a new paradigm

In the transformation of the old paradigm and the creation of the new paradigm – four trajectories may be envisaged. The first trajectory is the humanization of technology in the spirit of the last UNDP Report¹⁸: 'Making Technology Work for Human Development'. Let us quote six theses from the Report:

- 1) The technology divide does not have to follow the income divide. Throughout history, technology has been a powerful tool for human development and poverty reduction. The market is a powerful engine of technological progress
- 2) The market is a powerful engine of technological progress – but it is not powerful enough to create and diffuse the technologies needed to eradicate poverty
- 3) Developing countries may gain especially high rewards from new technologies, but they also face especially severe challenges in managing the risks
- 4) The technology revolution and globalization are creating a network age and that is changing how technology is created and diffused
- 5) Even in the network age, domestic policy still matters. All countries, even the poorest, need to implement policies that encourage innovation, access and the development of advanced skills
- 6) National policies will not be sufficient to compensate for global market failures. New international initiatives and the fair use of global rules are needed to channel new technologies towards the most urgent needs of the world's poor people.

¹⁷ Woroniecki J. 2000. OECD on the threshold of the XXI century. Its glorious past on going reforms and prospects. In: Kukliński A & W Orłowski (eds). *The knowledge based economy. The global challenges of the XXI Century*. Warsaw.

¹⁸ UNDP. Human Development Report 2001. Making new technologies work for human development. New York.

These six theses indicate that the UNDP is trying to use the language of the world's poor. Therefore, we should not read only the publications of the OECD, which, after all, represent the point of view of the rich, who, following the gospel Saint Matthew, are most successful in multiplying talents. The second trajectory is the implementation of the proposal of L. Emmerij¹⁹ concerning a global social contract, something that will kindle the hope of the poorest 20% of the global population. Let us quote the original formulation of L Emmerij:

What is most urgently needed is a global social contract with special emphasis on meeting the basic needs of the world population, including the poorest 20%. Probably the most important challenge in the negotiations for such a Contract is how to insert free and rapidly expanding global capitalism into a socially, environmentally and politically accountable system to benefit all citizens of the world. The inevitable second challenge then becomes how new socioeconomic and political spaces can be organized at the regional and world levels within which nation-states would lose a degree of sovereignty in exchange for new forms of free and participatory democratic institutions.

Just as it was being recognized during the first half of the 20th century in the industrial countries that national poverty could be tackled, so it is imperative that during the first half of the 21st century it is recognized that relieving the populations of the world is not an unrealistic target.

A Found [Foundation (Editor)] must be set up (which may well precede the conclusion of the Global Social Contract) in order to start implementing the idea of a more equitable distribution of global wealth. Global enterprises – the creators of global wealth – must take a contribution to this Found.

The global social contract is a great challenge for the twenty-first century. The inspiring paper of L Emmerij is to a certain extent a follow up of two earlier publications²⁰ related to the activity of that author. The third trajectory leading to a new paradigm is the rehabilitation of the idea of the nation-state on both the scale of individual countries and the globe. The tragedy of September 11th should create an impulse to look anew upon the fate of the nation-state in the new conditions of the twenty-first century. There is no doubt that certain important functions of the nation-state cannot be transferred to any other institution. In this context we find new power in the arguments of the volume "States against markets"²¹, inspired by the theoretical and methodological concept of the French Regulation School. The fourth trajectory is the development of a

19 Emmerij L. Major development challenges – globally and regionally In: Bunz H & A Kukliński (eds). *Globalization. Experiences and prospects*, op cit.

20 Vide: Emmerij L (ed). 1997. *Economic and social development into the XXI Century*. Inter American Development Bank, Washington DC.

21 Boyer R & D Dracke. 1996. *States against markets – the limits of globalization*. London: Routledge.

new concept of 'global governance'. This concept cannot be reduced only to the war against global terrorism. 'Global governance' must be seen as an instrument in the construction of a better and more egalitarian global reality.

These four trajectories, to my mind, hold forth an opening of the way for a reconstruction of the old paradigm and the construction of a new paradigm. We need a new hierarchy of fundamental values creating a moral and political climate for the construction of the new paradigm. The new paradigm will also provide new answers to the new questions of globalization and the privatization of terrorism.

V. *Pax Triadica, Pax Americana, Pax Dei*

The new paradigm can emerge only in the context of a new vision of the global future. In the last quarter of the twentieth century this vision was expressed in the concept of *Pax Triadica*²². The triadic pattern of cooperation and competition – the USA, European Union, and Japan – seemed at that time to form the main axis of the organization of the global reality²³. The tragedy of September 11th generated the hope that *Pax Triadica* will be replaced by a more general solution. Contrary to these expectations, the last months have accelerated the growth of unilateral American diplomacy, which *per pacta* and *facta concludentia* is implementing the idea of *Pax Americana*²⁴.

22 The Lisbon Group. 1995. The limits of competition. MIT. The Group of Lisbon. The Gulbekian Foundation.

23 Caracostas P & M Muldur. 1997. Society – the endless frontier. A European vision of research and innovation policies for the 21st century, European Commission, Brussels.

24 Doalder IH & JM Lindsay. 2001. Unilateralism is alive and well in Washington. *International Herald Tribune*, December 21st. Compare also the following brilliant paper: Wade RH. 2002. America's empire rules an unbalanced world. *IHT*, January 4th. The final part of this paper reads as follows:

These power relations and exercises of statecraft are obscured in the current talk about globalization. Far from being just a collapsing of distance and widening of opportunities for all, the increasing mobility of information, finance, goods and services frees the American government of constraints while more tightly constraining everyone else. Globalization and the global supervisory organizations enable the United States to harness the rest of the world to its own rhythms and structure.

Of course these arrangements do not produce terrorism in any direct way. But they are deeply implicated in the very slow economic growth in most of the developing world since 1980, and in the wide and widening world income inequality (The average purchasing power of the bottom 10 percent of Americans is higher than that of two thirds of the rest of the world's population). Slow economic growth and vast income disparities, when seen as such, breed cohorts of partly educated young people who grow up in anger and despair. Some try by legal or illegal means to migrate to the West; some join militant ethnic or religious movements directed at each other and their own rules. But now the idea has spread among a few vengeful fundamentalists that the United States should be attacked directly.

The United States and its allies can stamp out specific groups by force and bribery. But in the longer run, the structural arrangements that replicate a grossly unequal world have to be redesigned, as we did at the Bretton Woods conference after World War II, so that markets working within the new framework produce more equitable results. Historians looking back a century from now will say that the time to have begun was now.

In this context it is advisable to look once more at information published by IHT²⁵ and incorporated in *Table 3* on the question: Do most people, many people, only some, or hardly any ordinary people think that US policies and actions in the world were a major cause of the attack?

Table 3: The reaction of the respondents to the US policies and actions (%)

People	Mega-regions							
	USA	Total non-USA	Western Europe	Eastern Europe/Russia	Latin America	Asia	Mid-East/Conflict area	Islamic
Most people	0	26	9	34	19	24	47	45
Many people	18	32	27	37	39	36	34	31
Only some	48	29	37	23	34	24	15	18
Hardly any	32	9	22	3	5	10	2	3
Don't know/ Refused to answer	2	4	5	3	3	6	2	3

Source: IHT. *op cit.*

The difference in relation to *Table 2* is quite striking. Two observations are especially important:

- 1) The megaregional differentiation in the structure of the answers
- 2) The contrast in the evaluation of US policies and actions as per US versus non US (columns one and two in *Table 3*).

The promotion of the idea of *Pax Americana* in a global climate, where a vast section of non-US public opinion is indirectly saying to the US '*Medice cure te ipsum*' may raise some very serious questions. Therefore, what our world's current and anticipated circumstances in the twenty-first century demand is neither *Pax Triadica* nor *Pax Americana*, but rather *Pax Dei*. Here I have in mind a new concept of Deus, one for both believers and atheists, of God as a synthesis of the ideas of goodness, love and truth. I think that the vision of Saint Francis of Assisi, so close to the heart of John Paul II, could be of supreme value in shaping the world of the twenty-first century. Let me quote in this context the concluding sentences of an inspiring comment made by F Lewis²⁶. "Andre Malraux said that 'the 21st century will be spiritual or it

²⁵ IHT, December 20th 2001. *op cit.*

²⁶ Compare: Lewis F. We need global ideas for the era ahead. *International Herald Tribune*, December 21st 2001.

won't be'. The world cannot run on power alone. Philosophers, scholars, leaders and all thoughtful people need to stop and consider now how to articulate some guiding ideas for this new age."

In the discussions of the visions of globalization of the XXI century we face two dilemmas: *primo* – the Darwinian versus Franciscan visions; and *secundo* – the material versus spiritual visions. The rich imagination and the ability of visionary thinking is a *conditio sine qua non* in all activities leading to the development of a new paradigm of globalization.

Conclusion

The tragedy of September 11th should elicit our deep reflection into the causes and consequences of this turning point in global history²⁷. We should not let ourselves be fooled into believing that after a few months, the status quo ante will be re-established. The new visions for the twenty-first century will emerge in a climate of deep uncertainty related to the global and individual future of humanity²⁸. This uncertainty should not lead to despair, but to a summoning of courage and the ability to think about the global future.

This is the attitude and intention of this paper, one written in the hope that some of its ideas and suggestions will prove useful in the construction of a New Paradigm. I am aware that this paper contains many

27 To avoid the trap of simplistic egalitarianism in the evaluation of the grand route of historical experiences please see, Landes D. 1998. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why some are so rich and some so poor*. London: Little Brown & Company. Landes asks:

How big is the gap between rich and poor and what is happening to it? Very roughly and briefly: the difference in income per head between the richest industrial nation, say Switzerland, and the poorest non-industrial country, Mozambique, is about 400 to 1. Two hundred and fifty years ago, this gap between richest and poorest was perhaps 5 to 1, and the difference between Europe and, say, east or South Asia (China or India) was around 1.5 or 2 to 1.

Is the gap still growing today? At the extremes, clearly yes. Some countries are not only not gaining; they are growing poorer, relatively and sometimes absolutely. Others are barely holding their own. Others are catching up. Our task (the rich countries), in our own interest as well as theirs, is to help the poor become healthier and wealthier. If we do not, they will seek to take what they cannot make; and if they cannot earn by exporting commodities, they will export people. In short, wealth is an irresistible magnet; and poverty is a potentially raging contaminant: it cannot be segregated, and our peace and prosperity depend in the long run on the well-being of others.

28 In this paper I have quoted several times the materials published in the *International Herald Tribune*. *IHT* is and will be in the future an especially inspiring source of new materials very useful in the construction of the New Paradigm. Compare:

- 1) Pfaff William. 2001. Don't look for a New World Order after Afghan war. *IHT*, December 22nd-23rd.
- 2) Sampson Anthony, To defeat the terrorist, their grievances must be addressed. *IHT*, *op cit*.
- 3) Rice Susan E. Africa is breeding future Bin Ladens. *IHT*.
- 4) Levine RA. Economic puritanism is bad for Argentina, Too. *IHT*, December 31st, 2001.
- 5) Krugman P. Argentina's crisis is a US failure. *IHT*, January 2nd 2002
- 6) Pfaff W. 2001. Will the New World order rest solely on American might? *IHT*, December 29th-30th 2001.

empirical and methodological weaknesses²⁹, but to my mind they do not invalidate the main message of the paper.

Comments on the discussion paper by Jan Woroniecki*

First of all, the question arises as to whether we do we need a new paradigm to understand and, as far as feasible, to try to shape globalisationⁱ as it unveils around us. To my mind, and apparently to Professor A Kukliński's as well, the answer is an unequivocal yes. The reasons are numerous – and multi-faceted: both in terms of threats to humanity including the most recent international terrorism, and hopes, among them what is called (though prematurely) "the new economy"ⁱⁱ. The scope of change underway and its implicationsⁱⁱⁱ, perhaps escapes our imagination and is extremely (or at least increasingly, despite IT) difficult to seize intellectually. Nevertheless, it is not just worth trying, but actually the effort to see the wood for the trees appears of tremendous importance as it (i.e. search for a new paradigm in the offing) may affect our prosperity, and perhaps even our survival. Otherwise, it would not be possible to undertake any global action to steer in, even slightly, the direction we are heading. With this in mind, I read the paper.

Firstly, I tend to disagree that towards the end of the past century we had mastered the paradigm of globalisation; maybe it was about to emerge, but we were pretty far from taking full cognisance of it; espe-

²⁹ In this paper, very often a critical judgment in relation of the USA was expressed. For an interesting laudatio of the American *modus operandi*. Please see: The patient accumulation of success – their military achievement in Afghanistan should make Americans proud and the world optimistic. *The Economist*, December 22nd 2001-January 4th 2002.

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ⁱ According to the OECD (countries and the Secretariat), it constitutes the challenge confronting us, and our responsibility – shaping globalisation. *Communiqué* of the ministerial session of the OECD Council. Paris, OECD News Release, 27 June 2000.

ⁱⁱ For its analysis, see: The new economy: Beyond the hype – final report on the OECD Growth Project. OECD study submitted to the ministerial session of the OECD Council. Paris, OECD, 10 May 2001 and Woroniecki, Jan. New Economy: Illusion or reality? *TIGER Working Paper Series* No 5, Warsaw, Leon Kozminski Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management (WSPiZ), May 2001.

ⁱⁱⁱ The case against the global economy. And for a turn toward the local, ed. Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith. San Francisco, Sierra Club Books, 1996 and Rifkin Jeremy. The end of work. The decline of the global labour force and the dawn of the post-market era. Wrocaw, Wyd. Dolnoœskie, 2001 (Original version 1995).

cially in view of the fact (if we can use this term here) that the situation was still evolving in both economic and social aspects, perhaps less so in political ones, after the Cold War ended^v. I fully agree, however, that September 11, 2001 should be taken as a watershed for further deliberations on globalisation XXI. Not because of the degree of shock (it was not the first massive terrorist attack, after all, though most dreadful and deadly – and spectacular) but as it demonstrated the fragility of our civilisation and reminded us of new (and old) divisions threatening our planet, including digital divisions, incidentally. But – foremost – are the social tensions both between the nations (countries) and within (including the developed ones).

The September 11, 2001 events and what they epitomise do open, regrettably, a new, sad chapter in global history. As a warning of the clash of civilisations, it is too early (as the media did) to speak of the clash in the present tense. It would be constructive (if that adjective is applicable at all within this topic) to treat the tragedy as a warning of yet another dangerous division basically ignored after the energy crisis of the 70s – the North-South development and civilisational gap which by now has got even bigger, (and ODA – shrunk). Obviously, it would be wrong to give to the terrorist acts and Osama bin Laden, for that matter, such justification. Neither himself, nor many his followers originate from poor and neglected families. And nothing justifies recourse to terror – neither political nor economic (living standard) motives, and the terror never helps to achieve any (professed sincerely or not) goals in those domains. Still, rising extremism, religious or otherwise, often testifies to the inherent problems within the society – or the nation. The poll to which Professor Kukliński refers may reflect a certain overreaction; still, it calls for careful scrutiny.

The link between global terrorism and the absence of a great strategic vision after the end of the Cold War may be difficult to prove (apart from the assistance terrorists may have received from in the course of the East-West, or US-USSR, rivalry), but the (first) weakness in the form of the absence of such a vision, and action that would derive therefrom, is unquestionable. For instance, all calls for a Marshall Plan-bis to assist countries in transition and/or developing countries out of the economies on armaments fell on deaf ears, even though such assistance, wisely managed, would generate markets for developed countries' exports and DFI, and enhance stability. Unfortunately, even limited schemes promoted by Austria to launch such a plan only for the sake of environ-

^v I wonder why we don't speak of it as World War III; it divided the globe into two hostile camps and ended by a clear victory for the US-led 'coalition' and loss of the now defunct USSR forceful 'coalition'.

mental protection in Central and Eastern Europe were never approved. And – as Professor Kukliński rightly notes – the invisible hand of the market is incapable of bringing about any visionary strategic political decisions. The mighty politicians proved no better; perhaps to confirm the worrisome 'public choice' theory which, distrusts politicians' officially declared motivations to act in favour of society (state) and maintains that they in fact care only for their own interests and ambitions. Surely, this was a lost opportunity of the two last decades of the XX century. Are present politicians any better, and more socially sensible, in particular the social democrats prevailing in Europe? At least they have been confronted with the new threat and are beginning to realise that winning the war (World War IV?) against international (and nationally supported – or even generated, as the case may well be) terrorism is not only a long-term endeavour, but also quite hopeless if the underlying reasons, and roots of the evil, are not eliminated or markedly alleviated (in this way, the tragedy may contain a blessing – if the message is grasped). It must also be realised that the current technological revolution (like all previous ones) carries the risk of deepening inequalities and generating losers. There is perhaps one difference exacerbating the danger: owing to ICT, people are much more aware of inequalities and are much better equipped to compare their fate with that of others'. Thus the second weakness to which Professor Kukliński alludes represents under globalisation an even bigger threat – if not remedied. Misery may not be a direct cause of terrorism^y, but it certainly creates the climate, and helps terrorists to find and indoctrinate their allies.

What Professor Kukliński calls a "classical paradigm" of globalisation, is a set of three key foundations, or constituent parts, of the global economy and society which were formed (or crystallised) in the last decades of the XX century: ICT and sprouts of the new economy which go far beyond technological achievements in computerisation and communications, global finance and the role of (the deified) market (perhaps more in services and investment than in 'conventional' merchandise). All this is closely interrelated (with mutual reinforcement) with liberalisation and deregulation policies (advertised *inter alia* by OECD). Of course, all three foundations will continue to be with us well into the XXI century, if not a millennium. It seems though that our existence based on three foundations only may well prove to be shaky. A social equity, or solidarity, and an ethical foundation is missing. Economic, financial and technological factors do not suffice, and development (*sensu largo*) without 'human face' may simply break down. This is why – most importantly – there is a need to search for a new paradigm and trajectories leading

^y Terrorism is not the only scourge. *The Economist*, 5 December 2001, p 10.

in this direction – as Professor Kukliński puts it.

The technological revolution and globalisation (assisted by liberalisation) are indeed creating a network age, network society and network economy^{vi}. The point is to be wired, included – as distinct from the adverse phenomenon of exclusion even in rich societies. Professor Kukliński defines the first trajectory as the humanisation of technology, which is – after all – just a tool to be used in any imaginable manner, human or even inhuman (the Internet by terrorists!). Technological policy therefore matters, and – as UNDP submits – not only on a national scale but also within the international dialogue expected to bring global rules to diffuse technologies to those who cannot afford them and get new international initiatives going, supposedly, in the same direction. An example of such an initiative is arguable: a Global Social Contract (and Fund) based on redistribution of wealth, financed by TNCs (does that mean that governments and state budgets may feel relieved?), a bit similar to the Global Compact of Kofi Annan, to fight poverty, may actually petrify it, unless it is used to give the poor a fishing rod rather than a rotten fish. While a global social contract (as the second trajectory) would be welcome, it is a very difficult task to negotiate who sits at the negotiating table. An attempt with NIEO^{vii} may have taught a lesson regarding such over-ambitious initiatives. The third trajectory, which is a rejuvenation of the nation-state's role and responsibility (made easier after the eruption of patriotism after the terrorist attack against the US) boils down, it seems, to the role of governments domestically and internationally (globally), especially as regulators of markets. This leads Professor Kukliński to the crucial fourth trajectory, which is in fact intertwined with all previous ones, of global, i.e. chiefly intergovernmental, governance. Along these paths a new paradigm is to be sought – to provide new and up-to-date answers to the new (and old) questions uppermost in our minds. One can argue that setting such trajectories (as boundaries between them are blurred) calls for some refining; still, essential elements of the paradigm are there (without the geopolitical, now of lesser importance as the bipolar world is no more with us).

As to the overall (philosophical) vision of the future, or the "central organising idea", *Pax Dei* is advocated by Professor Kukliński to replace *Pax Americana* (contested by many) or *Pax Triadica* (which does not function well, either). *Pax Dei* is understood to be a sort of global morality, a set of common values uniting humanity: "God for the Believers and

^{vi} Castells Manuel. 2001. *The rise of a network society*. Oxford/Malden: MI, Blackwell Publishers.

^{vii} New International Economic Order, launched unsuccessfully in the UNGA in 1973-74 under the shock generated by the oil crisis.

Atheists", as he put it; one based on Franciscan and spiritual premises rather than on Darwinian and materialist ones. A longing for such a spiritual order is understandable, not only because – and after – the events of September 11, 2001. Indeed the pace of technological change breeds uncertainty, not only prosperity (and not to all). It is easier to lose than to catch up, let alone to win in a highly competitive world. How to achieve such *Pax Dei* though, and to whom to entrust the task? And who will dare to indicate those trusted ones?

Professor Kukliński's conclusion that the time has come (or is overdue) to think about the global (our) future is beyond discussion. The construction (or reading from events, with the subsequent correction) of a new paradigm of irresistible globalisation^{viii} is more than timely. This message of the paper deserves to be considered soon.

Annex

One can often observe a tendency to demonise globalisation, to ascribe to it almost the features of a living thing, sometimes malicious and acting not necessarily with the best intent. Contemporary globalisation brought about to a large extent by ICT and opportunities created by the Internet is not a doctrine, or a blueprint, or yet a devil's *idée fixe* invented by someone and then enforced; rather, it is a conglomerate of phenomena underway in the global village we are in. Its scope goes much beyond economic matters (like the activity of TNCs, *nota bene* older than globalisation); it covers lifestyles and consumption patterns ('McDonaldisation'); and it carries both threats and promise. It makes no sense whatsoever to fight it or deliberate whether we should allow globalisation to take place (or continue) or eliminate it (block); it enjoys a sort of independent existence, neither good nor evil by definition. That does not mean that only a determinist stance is possible, that nothing can be done about it. Efforts may and should be undertaken to try to shape (or correct) its mechanisms – and 'face'. The point is, who, by virtue of whose mandate, and on what means, to do it? In other words exercising a global interventionism, as necessary as it is. With governments and their organisations (IGOs^x like the UN system, OECD,

^{viii} See enclosed comment on globalisation made at the seminar (Warsaw, 22 November, 2001) devoted to the promotion of the book sponsored by F Stiftung Foundation: *Globalisation. Experiences and prospects*. Bünz H (ed) & A Kukliński. Warsaw, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2001. The book contains my article entitled: The visions of globalisation (comparison of neo-liberal versus social democratic policy frameworks). Statement at the F Ebert Stiftung seminar on Globalisation: Experiences and Prospects. Warsaw, 22 November 2001.

^x Inter-Governmental Organisations.

EU). It is not easy to reach a consensus, especially regarding far-reaching initiatives, not to mention resources, influential NGOs, TNCs, or some sort of a governmental-NGO mix. Nevertheless, it appears urgent to strive to reduce negative phenomena which were not born of globalisation but which are accompanying it and may be intensified (i.e. inequalities). I have in mind some sort of curbing or 'civilising', not globalisation as such, but precisely those adverse phenomena, which give rise to complaints (and vivid protests) that globalisation harms people. There is clearly a high demand for such a regulatory function (or global governance), especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and earlier protests starting from those against MAI* negotiated in OECD and Seattle, provided it is not going to be another NIEO** or a somewhat utopian Global Social Contract (between whom?). Apart from such a function an inter-cultural dialogue needs to be initiated, leading to enhancing tolerance through understanding, and ensuring (defence of) cultural diversity. If we are to avoid self-destruction, we should move in this direction.

* Multilateral Agreement on Investment (after the protests the effort was abandoned by OECD although the text was almost ready and agreed).

** New International Economic Order launched in the UNGA in mid-70s and approved in the atmosphere of energy crisis – to appease the Group 77 (developing countries). Its provisions were never implemented.