The relative and the absolute in Merleau-Ponty’s account of the “spoken word”

Abstract

Merleau-Ponty’s general position transcends the traditional distinction between the absolute and the relative. The “lived world” is absolute in the sense that it is the ultimate context within which we are able to render intelligible the behavioural and perceptual powers of an individual, yet the lived world is relative to the individual. The difficulty in transcending the traditional distinction lies in the very nature of thought itself and,  consequently, in the central assumption of Western philosophy, for which the ultimate perspective is that of the universal thinker. By means of reflection on the experience of speech addressed to us, and through an analysis of the syndrome of semantic aphasia, I will corroborate Merleau-Ponty’s claim that meaning is “incarnate” in the linguistic gesture, and argue against the notion of the philosopher as a universal thinker. I will argue that the ultimate perspective is not that of the universal thinker but that of the embodied subject, which is in “contact” with others — a contact which is lived but which can never be represented in thought.