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# Police corruption: what is the plan?

Since the closure of the SAPS anticorruption unit in 2003, SAPS management have yet to operationalise a plan to address police corruption. The past decade has produced a substantial amount of research on the perceptions and likely causes of and preventive strategies for police corruption. This article compares findings of research projects undertaken in Gauteng between 2004 and 2009 in order to identify commonalities, differences and potential strategic gaps. Findings showed similarities in perception regarding corruption and a "code of silence" among police officials, some doubt regarding the rules and regulations within the SAPS as well as likely causes of and preventive measures for corruption.

## Polisiekorrupsie: 'n planlose SAPD?

Na die sluiting van die SAPD se teenkorrupsie-eenheid in 2003, moet die SAPD-bestuur nog 'n plan operasionaliseer om polisiekorrupsie aan te spreek. Die afgelope dekade het 'n merkwaardige aantal navorsing opgelewer ten opsigte van persepsies oor polisiekorrupsie, moontlike oorsake sowel as voorkomende strategieë. Hierdie artikel vergelyk die bevindinge ten opsigte van drie verskillende projekte wat tussen 2004 en 2009 in Gauteng onderneem is om sodoende ooreenstemings, verskille en moontlike strategiese leemtes te identifiseer. Die bevindinge dui op ooreenstemings met betrekking tot persepsies oor korrupsie en die voorkoms van 'n "kode van stilswye" onder polisiebeamptes, onsekerheid ten opsigte van die reëls en regulasies van die SAPD sowel as moontlike oorsake van en maatreëls om korrupsie mee te voorkom.

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Corruption remains a universal problem and, although no country is immune to its devastating impact, developing countries are the most vulnerable.[1] Not only does this offence have the potential to cause serious damage to the fragile economy of a developing nation, but it also hampers the effective performance of corporate governance in that country (UNODC 2003: 1).

Notwithstanding the fact that most scholars will readily acknowledge the uncertainty regarding levels of corruption in different countries, because, by its very nature, corruption is not easy to measure, there is clearly too much corruption within the South African context. The *SA Crime Quarterly* published findings from research in 2006, indicating a direct link between a loss of faith in the South African Police Service (SAPS) and perceptions of pervasive corruption within the police. Unfortunately, the police are considered one of the least trustworthy government institutions in South Africa (Mattes 2006: 12-3).

A study of South African scholarly literature on police corruption revealed thatp various researchers have done a substantial amount of quantitative and qualitative research on the subject has been done over the past decade.[2] Several of these research projects focused specifically on studying the perceptions of police officials at designated police stations regarding issues such as corruption, misconduct and deviant behaviour. This body of research has produced a rich source of both qualitative and quantitative data, which has yet to be collated and reported upon. Utilising selected data, this article aims to examine and discuss the perceptions of police corruption and misconduct among police officials at different police stations, as well as likely causes and preventive measures in order to identify commonalities, differences and potential lacunas.

1   Parts of this article derive from a mini-dissertation completed by the author in 2006 for an MTech degree in policing, entitled "Perceptions of corruption at three police stations in Tshwane". The author wishes to acknowledge the Tshwane University of Technology (TUT), which holds the copyright, for their approval to extract parts from the mini-dissertation for publication.
2   Cf Benson 2006, Bruce 2007, Faull 2007, 2008 & 2009, Gopal & Zondeka 2008, Mattes 2006, Newham 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005a & 2005b, Sangweni & Balia 1999a & 1999b, Sauerman & Ivković 2005.

Although the studies being reported on are based on perception, which may be a questionable basis for this discussion, perception is the foundation of our understanding of the world (Bodasing 2002: 6). Mattes (2006: 14) emphasised this point by highlighting the fact that, even when perceptions of corruption are completely distorted, they become a reality in and of themselves. Faull (2007: 6) highlights the fact that, when studying corruption, the UN toolkit suggests that the most valuable perceptions that should be measured are those of the people within the organisation being studied. In addition, while it has merely been suggested that a member of the SAPS is three times more likely to be involved in a crime than the average South African citizen (Miller 2003), Bruce (2007: 17) and Greybe (Newham 2004: 242) will confirm that there appears to be evidence of a widespread problem of corruption within the SAPS.

The closure of the national anticorruption unit in 2003 left a void in the SAPS to fight corruption within its own ranks. Faull highlights this void and the resultant challenges, but elects to view the positive side in the development of the Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan (CFPP) by the SAPS (Faull 2008: 23). He further alludes to the possible content of the plan and how issues such as public education on corruption and an anticorruption hotline will be welcome additions to strengthen the fight against corruption within the SAPS (Faull 2008: 23).

Finally, after several years of development – between 2001 and 2007 – the SAPS have indicated that they are ready to implement the CFPP. This plan is highlighted in the *Annual Performance Plan of the South African Police Service 2009-2010* and is aimed at educating all SAPS employees and the public in general on the character and repercussions of corruption and fraud in the SAPS, and to inform members about the measures and guidelines which the SAPS will implement to address corruption and fraud within the organisation (SAPS 2009: 19-20). Provincial managers were instructed to commence with the implementation of this plan as from 2009.

In an effort to assess, primarily, the extent to which the CFPP has been implemented, Faull undertook a case study at the Honeydew police station in Gauteng (Faull 2009). This police station was selected

because the former station commissioner had a reputation of being very active in the implementation of anticorruption strategies.

Using the Honeydew case study as basis, a focused literature review was done to compare the findings of research on the perceptions of police corruption and misconduct, as well as perceived causes and possible preventive measures, as reported in different studies/papers. The parameters that informed the literature review were the concepts of police corruption, misconduct, perceived causes and preventive measures, as portrayed in the 2009 Honeydew SAPS case study. Therefore both pre-2005 and post-2006 literature relating to these themes was sourced. In setting up the timeline, it was deemed sound to select and compare research prior to the implementation of the "new" 2005 South African Police Service Discipline Regulations and research undertaken after this implementation (RSA 2005). Subsequently, for comparison purposes, the researcher selected two similar research reports, namely perceptions of corruption at three police stations in Tshwane (Benson 2006) and the SAPS Johannesburg area police transformation survey, based on a sample of the 21 police stations in the Johannesburg policing area (Newham 2005a).

To the extent that it is available in-text, the methodological discussion of these three studies will be addressed later in this article.

## 1.    Definitions

As neither Faull nor Newham elaborated on the concept of corruption/ police corruption, these terms will, for the purpose of this discussion, be understood as "acting illegally, dishonestly or incompletely, involving the abuse of one's official capacity to achieve results that are unjustified" (Benson 2006: 20). This understanding is in line with the thinking of various other researchers (Sayed & Bruce 1998b, Newham 2005b, Punch 2009).

Likewise, the definition of "police integrity", as developed by Klockars *et al* (2003: 2), will be used with a slight adaptation. The concept will be understood to mean "the tendency of a police official to resist the temptation to abuse the powers and privileges of his po-

sition". The term "integrity" will, for the purpose of this discussion, be understood to mean "police integrity".

Upon further scrutiny, it becomes evident that there is a relationship between the terms integrity and corruption. Klockars *et al* (2003: 7) proposed this relationship of association when they explained how considerable progress had been made in measuring corruption simply by rephrasing the problem or viewing it from another angle. They put forward the idea that, if integrity is understood to be the antithesis of corruption, then it may be possible, indirectly, to obtain a measure of corruption by measuring integrity. This resulted in the development of an integrity measurement instrument that has been used successfully among police officials in Austria, Croatia, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and the USA (Newham 2003: 29, Punch 2009: 10). Moreover, researchers in South Africa have used the integrity measurement instrument, with minor adaptations, for research among police officials, and studied aspects relating to integrity, police attitudes and police corruption (Newham 2003, Sauerman & Ivković 2005). However, Faull (2009: 12) did not make use of this method as initially intended.

Similarly, when addressing integrity, one may also consider the aspects of discipline and conduct/misconduct. Discipline within the SAPS is governed and guided by the South African Police Service Discipline Regulations, which were amended in 2005 by the Minister of Safety and Security and which came into force in September 2005. Having negotiated an agreement with the labour unions on the Safety and Security Sector Bargaining Council (SSSBC), the regulations paved the way not only for the development of sound labour relations, but also for the promotion of mutual respect among colleagues, as well as between the SAPS – as employer – and its employees. In addition, the regulations ensured that both the supervisors and the supervised understood misconduct and discipline (Gopal & Zondeka 2008: 78).

To ensure that they promote sound and fair labour relations when applying disciplinary measures, commanders must comply with the principles contained in the Code of Conduct for the Public Service. This implies that discipline should be corrective and not punitive, and that it should be applied promptly, fairly and progressively.

Discipline remains a management function (SAPS 1999), and its primary purpose is to correct behaviour and not to punish the offender. Section 20 of the 2005 Police Regulations lists those actions that the SAPS believes warrant disciplinary sanctions. In addition, a distinction is made between non-serious conduct and serious misconduct, the latter including bribery and corruption.

## 2. Methodology

The report on the 2004 Newham study describes how the survey was carried out over a four-week period in the Johannesburg policing area. Using a stratified sampling technique to ensure representivity along the lines of race and gender, a sample size of 580 was drawn from a population of 3 660 police officials and the data was retrieved from this sample. Quantitative data was collected using a survey consisting of 77 closed-ended questions, in which respondents had to indicate their answers using a five-point Likert scale. The questionnaire was piloted before the final questionnaire was administered by 25 experienced fieldworkers. Further primary qualitative data was collected when 45 in-depth interviews were conducted with police officials who represented the racial and gender demographics of the policing area (Newham 2005a: 2). Owing to the time frame of the project, convenience sampling was applied and fieldworkers administered the questionnaires to available police officials who fitted the demographic profile of the station where they were deployed. Once the profile of the station had been reached, the fieldworkers moved on to the next station (Newham 2005a: 3). Although undertaken in 2004, this study was only published in 2005. No further details pertaining to the methodological aspects were forthcoming in the report.

The Tshwane research undertaken by the researcher in 2006 focused on the perceptions of police officials regarding corruption at three police stations within Tshwane: Garsfontein, Mamelodi and Pretoria-Moot. From a target population of 595 staff at all three stations, a sample of 256 members was selected. Mamelodi, being the largest station, made up 60% of the sample, and Garsfontein and Pretoria-Moot made up the remaining 40% (20% each) of the sample (Benson 2006: 23-4). To this end, it may be possible to apply

the results of this research to the populations at these stations alone, and not to Tshwane or South Africa as a whole.

The researcher used the stratified random sampling technique to select a representative sample from the staff lists from each of the three stations. The populations of these three stations were divided into the strata of male/female and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and commissioned officers (COs) (Benson 2006: iii, 22). NCOs are SAPS members with the rank of constable up to inspector, and include Public Service Act personnel (typists and administration clerks). COs are members with the ranks of captain up to superintendent.[3] The number and percentage of both male/female and NCOs and COs of the stations were calculated to ensure that the samples selected were representative in terms of gender and rank. The application of the sampling method was done to eliminate/nullify any selection bias on the part of the researcher. Thus the samples selected at each of the stations were representative of those stations only and were not intended to represent the SAPS as a whole. In hindsight, though, the total sample did, by default, come close to being representative of the entire SAPS population which, according to the Annual Report 2006/2007, comprised 70.1% males and 29.9% females (RSA 2006: viii).

The characteristics of the respondents pertaining to rank, gender and years of experience are reflected in Figures 1-3.

Using a predominantly quantitative approach, a structured questionnaire consisting of six main sections was designed. In an attempt to eliminate bias in the questionnaire itself, it was piloted among police officials reflecting the demographics of the sample (ranks from constable to superintendent, as well as typists and administration clerks as well as gender) before the final version was drafted for administration. The questionnaire contained 38 statements pertaining to different elements of corruption. The respondents had to indicate their opinion/perception regarding each statement, making use of a five-point Likert scale, with options ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree; there was also an option for uncertainty

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3    There were too few senior superintendents to ensure anonymity (Benson 2006: 22).

(1 – strongly agree, 2 – agree, 3 – uncertain, 4 – disagree, 5 – strongly disagree) (Benson 2006: 8).



Figure 1: Respondents per rank (Benson 2006: 27)



Figure 2: Respondents per gender (Benson 2006: 28)

79%

21%

■ 0-5
■ 6+

Figure 3: Respondents per years of experience (Benson 2006: 27)

The first section (section A) was designed to capture the bio-graphical data of the respondent; sections B to E consisted of closed-ended statements and the last section (section F) had one open-ended question that invited general comments (Benson 2006: 8). Owing to the problematic nature of the issue of corruption, the question-naire included several questions that covered the same issue, but each worded differently, to check the honesty of the respondents (Bless & Higson-Smith 2000: 115).

Given the complex nature of corruption and its manifestations, the various sections of the questionnaire (sections B to E) focused on the diverse elements of corruption:

- section B – the nature of corruption: this section covered pre-dominantly the perceived causes of corruption;
- section C – personal and organisational perceptions: this section was designed to measure how corrupt the respondents perceived their own and other organisations to be;
- section D – corruption *per se*: this section was developed to meas-ure the perceptions of respondents regarding the seriousness, ra-tionality and insidious nature of corruption;
- section E – perceptions regarding remedial actions: this section covered the perceptions pertaining to the investigation and pos-sible prevention of corruption (Benson 2006: 8-9).

195

Finally, the methodological approach used by Faull in 2009 at Honeydew can be summarised as follows. The station has a staff complement of approximately 260 members (including the administrative staff). The researcher indicates that the dominant research method was semi-structured face-to-face interviews with approximately 10% (n = 29) of the staff. Like the 2006 Benson study, with the exclusion of the chair of the community police forum (CPF), the sample consisted of operational members, commissioned and non-commissioned officers, administrative staff, new constables and students in their probationary year (Faull 2009: 11-2). The interviews probed various statements and the following topics are relevant to this discussion:

- employees' perceptions of discipline and their understanding of rules;
- whether corruption is perceived as a problem at the station and in the SAPS in general;
- what respondents believe could/should be done to reduce corruption;
- the perceived causes of corruption, and
- whether the respondents knew of any formal SAPS anticorruption initiatives, strategies or plans, including hotlines (Faull 2009: 12).

No further details pertaining to the methodological aspects were forthcoming in the article.

Although the approaches in the 2004 and 2006 studies were primarily quantitative (with some qualitative elements) and the 2009 study was qualitative, the discussion in this article pertaining to the research findings will be primarily qualitative in nature. A description and discussion of the most prominent and relevant findings (in relation to this article) as they were gleaned from the three research reports now follows.

## 3.   Results of the comparative analysis

### 3.1  Corruption as a problem in the SAPS

The findings of all three studies clearly show that the SAPS are viewed as corrupt. The Newham study, in particular, showed that police corruption is a serious challenge within the SAPS and that corruption has increased within the last four years (Newham 2005a: 21-2). It is really disconcerting that the majority of the respondents indicated that, although they are aware of other members who are involved in corrupt practices, the majority of them would NOT report such members (Newham 2005a: 23-4). In this instance, the "code of silence" surfaces and will continue to do so, albeit to a lesser degree within the remaining two reports.

The aforementioned perceptions of corruption within the SAPS are echoed in the findings from the Benson study, in which the majority of the respondents were of the opinion that more than 50% of police officials are corrupt (Benson 2006: 61). In addition, considering that corruption is a serious departmental issue – in terms of the 2005 Police Regulations – it is disconcerting that the Benson study found (in 2006 – a year after the new police regulations came into effect) that, although the respondents indicated that they "knew exactly what corruption entails", they were not altogether sure about its manifestation. Moreover, the majority of the respondents alluded to the existence of a policy on corruption designed to guide employees, but it was not clear to the researcher which policy the respondents were alluding to (Benson 2006: 94). It is disturbing about these findings that the majority of the respondents have more than five years' experience in the SAPS and should be aware of the regulations and policy (or lack thereof). On a more positive note, it appears that of the minority of respondents who know of corrupt colleagues, the majority are prepared to report them (Benson 2006: 58).

Finally, Faull's findings showed that the majority of the respondents at Honeydew believed that corruption was a problem in the SAPS. With specific reference to Honeydew, one of the respondents stated that "whatever Honeydew officers can do, other officers can do"

(Faull 2009: 14). Some of the respondents indicated that they felt that the inability of the SAPS to reduce crime was evidence of corruption (Faull 2009: 14). Factors such as sympathy for colleagues, fear of retribution or even hesitation hint at a station culture of silence where whistle-blowing was unlikely to be a successful strategy to address corruption at the station (Faull 2009: 18).

Perceptions regarding the perceived corrupt status of the SAPS may not only seriously damage the image of the SAPS, as viewed from outside, but also have dire consequences for the morale and *esprit de corps* of the SAPS as an organisation. Unfortunately, police officials are not lone entities; they represent an organisation of men and women, so what is done by one (whether good or bad) tends to be reflected onto the others within the same organisation.

In summary, the findings of all three studies reveal that there is a definite perception of corruption as being a problem within the SAPS; this is compounded by the fact that in two of the three studies, the majority of the respondents/participants would not report a colleague for misconduct or corruption. Reasons for this may be the "code of silence" among police officials or the belief that blowing the whistle will not help for whatever reason. This aspect will be considered in the discussion on the findings relating to likely causes of corruption and preventive measures.

## 3.2 How well do members know the rules and regulations?

Bearing in mind that student trainees who attend the Police College for Basic Training are exposed to and trained (academically) in the Code of Conduct for the South African Police Service, and that this code is read out during their passing-out parade, it is unclear how there could still be ignorance of its content.

In the latter half of 2005 the SAPS and the organised labour unions – namely, the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU), the South African Police Union (SAPU) and the Public Servant's Association (PSA) – negotiated an agreement, through the SSSBC, in which they agreed on a framework of what is considered to be misconduct in accordance with the new South African Police Service Disciplinary

Regulations (Gopal & Zondeka 2008: 78). Understanding the rules and regulations should, therefore, be a fairly simple matter.

However, the findings from the three research projects showed a slight difference between participants who have some knowledge of police rules and regulations and those who *think* they have some knowledge of police rules and regulations. The Newham study showed that the majority of the respondents felt that most police members follow the rules and procedures (Newham 2005a: 23). Newham assumes that the reason for this is that they are aware of the rules and procedures, since Regulation 18 of the disciplinary regulations contains in excess of 38 different examples of misconduct alone. At the time of the Newham study the 1996 South African Police Service Disciplinary Regulations were still in force (SAPS 1996).

From the Benson study – undertaken a year after the implementation of the new South African Police Service Discipline Regulations – it would appear that, although the majority of the respondents are clear on some issues, there is some uncertainty regarding the manifestations of misconduct (Benson 2006: 75). This may indicate that communication with regard to the new regulations (and the listed misconduct) has not yet filtered down to station level.

The Faull study – undertaken three years after the implementation of the new South African Police Service Discipline Regulations – revealed that, although all the respondents were of the opinion that their colleagues "had a good knowledge of the SAPS rules, regulations, codes and standing orders", the lack of awareness that might have existed among the less experienced members seemed to be as a result of poor communication of the said rules by the more experienced members (Faull 2009: 13). Poor/ineffective communication may thus be contributing to the apparent lack of knowledge.

To put the above into perspective, the "old" section 18 regulations consisted of over 38 different examples of misconduct in terms of which members could be charged. Section 20 in the "new" regulations, however, contains only 26 types of misconduct (RSA 2004: 124-5 & 2009: 245-6). Therefore, while it would appear that the total number of deeds of misconduct has decreased, on closer inspection

it is found that several of the deeds have merely been streamlined or clustered under one heading. These findings seem to indicate that even after the development of a new set of regulations in which misconduct is spelt out clearly (section 20); there are still members who appear to be uninformed about certain aspects of these regulations, possibly due to ineffective or poor communication and information sharing by not only head office, but also general station management.

## 3.3  Perceived causes of corruption

The main themes that emerged as likely causes of police corruption included poor salaries, poor communication, poor leadership and ineffective training.

Although the 2004 Newham study did not specifically address the issue of perceived causes of corruption, it did address the issue of the prevention of corruption. Findings in this regard in the 2006 Benson study revealed a related trend in that salaries, example set by managers, and lack of proper training were cited as some of the likely causes of corruption (Benson 2006: 117). These themes also emerged in the findings of Faull. The participants mentioned poor communication, ineffective leadership, lack of training and poor salaries as probably causing or contributing to the occurrence of corruption (Faull 2009: 15-7).

## 3.4  Preventive measures

The findings regarding the perceptions and opinions on corruption prevention strategies continued in the same vein. In the Newham study, the majority of the respondents were of the opinion that the SAPS was effective at tackling or preventing corruption (Newham 2005a: 22). This was probably because these stations were under the command of an area commissioner (at that stage) who had a reputation for aggressively addressing corruption. This commander was later re-deployed (when the policing areas "closed down/amalgamated") as the station commissioner at the Honeydew police station where the 2009 Faull study was done.

In the Benson study, respondents were of the opinion that corruption may be prevented by addressing the issue of poor salaries and the improper examples set by senior officers and managers and by proper training (Benson 2006: 122). The findings at Honeydew showed a similar trend, with participants suggesting that better official communication, improved salaries and better leadership and training would contribute to preventing corruption at the station (Faull 2009: 15-7).

The above projects also indicated similarities in the anticorruption strategy and policy. The Newham study showed that the majority of the respondents felt that the SAPS – as an organisation – was effective in tackling or preventing corruption, even when there was no anticorruption strategy/plan by the SAPS in place (Newham 2005a: 22). This perception may be due to the area commissioner's focus on corruption prevention within the policing area of Johannesburg; this illustrates the importance of effective leadership. In addition, the Benson study revealed that there was an erroneous perception of the existence of a policy on corruption within the police when, in fact, no such policy existed. This perception is probably indicative of poor communication, not only from SAPS top management, but also from station management (Benson 2006: 121).

Finally, Faull's study revealed that the clear majority of respondents were not aware of any anticorruption strategies being employed by the SAPS, despite the fact that the SAPS had launched the CFPP in early 2009. While some of the respondents were aware of some kind of anticorruption hotline, they did not volunteer the information; it had to be solicited. Besides, nobody knew which number to call. The fact that the Client Service Centre has an electronic panel screen which periodically shows the message "Please Report Corrupt Activity: 0800701701" makes this finding even more unacceptable (Faull 2009:11, 17-8).

In concluding this section, it would therefore seem that any anticorruption strategy developed by the SAPS would do well to focus on the issues of improved communication, improved leadership/management and the training of all staff in matters relating to corruption and conduct. It is unlikely that the issue of improved salaries,

as a strategy to address corruption, will receive any real attention by SAPS management at this stage as it may then appear that members' integrity can be bought.

## 4.    Findings

The findings revealed that corruption appears to be a problem within the SAPS. The fact that two of the three studies revealed that the majority of the members would not report corruption, indicating a strong presence of the "code of silence" is directly linked to this finding. Reasons which appear to be impacting on members' decisions to "blow the whistle" or not range from fear of retribution, to empathy for the fellow officer and even to a lack of belief in the success of the disciplinary processes in place.

It would also appear from the discussion above that members possess varying degrees of familiarity with the Code of Conduct, the 1996 Police Disciplinary Regulations (cf Newham study) as well as the new 2006 SAPS Disciplinary Regulations (cf Benson and Faull studies). It may be deduced that the level of their knowledge (or ignorance) can be attributed to internal communication (or the lack thereof) and "seniors" at the station briefing them of the regulations (or failing to do so).

As far as the likely causes of corruption are concerned, the respondents/participants from the Benson and Faull studies identified the following issues: poor salaries, ineffective/poor communication, poor leadership/poor examples set by managers, and no proper training/ineffective training.

The Newham study did not directly address this issue but rather that of preventive measures.

Finally, as far as likely preventive measures are concerned, the respondents in both the Newham and Benson studies showed a similar trend regarding anticorruption policy/strategy. Despite the fact that the SAPS had not communicated any definite strategy/policy to address corruption, the Newham respondents felt that the SAPS were effective at tackling or preventing corruption while the Benson

respondents were under the erroneous perception that the SAPS had developed a corruption policy.

On the other hand, the Faull respondents were not aware of any anticorruption strategies despite the fact that SAPS management had instructed the launch of the much-awaited CFPP in early 2009. Clearly this situation alludes to a total failure in communication and consultation between SAPS management and station level.

## 5. Recommendations

Without belabouring the point, it should be clear that a multidimensional approach would be required for any anticorruption strategy or preventive mechanism to stand a chance of being even remotely successful. In considering the discussion on the findings of the three research projects, it is suggested that whatever approach is designed or policy is developed or plan operationalised – be it at national or station level – such initiatives should contain practical strategies to address the following elements.

## 5.1 Improved communication

It has been suggested that consultation be used to determine which form/s of communication SAPS members find most appealing, and then to make use of them. This may mean that the SAPS will need to develop an sms system for keeping members informed of news, happenings and events, or issue podcasts containing the information to be disseminated, which members can then upload onto their phones or onto the GPS systems used in most police vehicles. Emphasis should be placed on communicating the CFPP and how it impacts on the role and function of each individual SAPS member. This issue should receive further attention in training interventions and workshops.

In addition, the shop stewards of the labour unions can be used to arrange workshops that address the application and explanation of the guiding rules and regulations within the SAPS. This strategy can be supplemented with monthly reports of disciplinary procedures implemented (numerically per actions of misconduct) and the outcomes pertaining to such cases. These reports should be posted

on the bulletin/noticeboards at stations to ensure that all members get the clear message that corruption and misconduct will not be tolerated but will be addressed swiftly and effectively.

## 5.2 The development of effective leadership

No organisation will survive without effective leadership. There is great potential within the SAPS, but it often does not come "packaged" in the expected way. The challenge for the SAPS – as an organisation – is to invest in the leaders of the future within its own ranks. These leaders, in turn, have the capacity to motivate their followers to serve and protect with pride, honesty and integrity, thereby creating a climate where the "code of silence" is unheard of and where abuses of power and position will not be tolerated – not from the highest ranking officer or from the most junior student/constable.

## 5.3 Training

The academic training in the Code of Conduct and the SAPS rules and regulations should be supplemented with practical, real-life scenarios for which there are no simple solutions. Exposing young and even older more experienced police officials to such situations and allowing debate, discussion and discourse to inform decisions may go a long way in assisting the SAPS to develop young minds to think, reason and decide the best course of action within set parameters. This may also challenge the thinking and opinion of some of the "old dogs". Training and workshops to discuss and debate the operationalisation of the CFPP must be implemented as a matter of urgency to ensure voluntary implementation in accordance with the SAPS' Annual Performance Plan 2009/2010. It may be prudent to include the shop stewards of organised labour in such interventions.

Refresher workshops should also be held for the "older" members and "mentoring" sessions for officers in managerial positions to empower them to be effective in their interpretation and implementation of the disciplinary regulations and mentoring.

It is further suggested that, possibly through the Employee Assistance Programme (EAP), members be trained in the principles of

sound financial planning and management. This is a life skill that many people lack and, as a result, they make poor judgement calls in respect of their finances, leading to financial trouble. It is also suggested that members who are promoted (and consequently receive higher salaries) schedule a consultation with a member of the EAP concerning the wise structuring and dissemination of their increased funds.

## 6.  Conclusion

The previous MEC for Safety and Security in Gauteng, Mr F Cachalia, is quoted as saying: "I think there is corruption in the police and I don't think it is being adequately addressed".[4] While the SAPS indicates that it has developed an anticorruption strategy in the form of the CFPP, it appears that the latter document was prepared in isolation and, once disseminated to the provinces, was to a large extent ignored. One thus wonders whether the political will to eradicate corruption does indeed exist (Faull 2007: 8-10).

The SAPS, as the national police service, remains accountable to the inhabitants of this country, who deserve a safer South Africa, better policing and honest police officials. But no amount of legislation and citing codes of conduct, or even changing the rank structure, will bring about the change required. Change needs to happen from within the police, from within the hearts and minds of those protecting and serving every day. Leadership must be at the forefront of this change and should start by cleaning up the orchard to ensure that there is no place for rotten apples. This will require a plan ... but what is the plan?

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