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# The tale of three mayors: mayoral politics in the Unicity of Cape Town

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From December 2000 to June 2003, the term covered in this article, the Council of the Unicity of Cape Town had three mayors, each directing it in a unique way as they dealt with the various powers which had an impact on them and the Council. The mayors had to manage changing institutional, political and social processes. This study describes the actions of the three mayors, Aldermen Pieter Marais, Gerald Morkel and Nomaindia Mfeketo, and provides a comparative analysis which attempts to contribute to an understanding of early mayoral politics in the Unicity of Cape Town.

## Die verhaal van drie burgemeesters: burgemeesterspolitiek in die Uniestad van Kaapstad

Vanaf Desember 2000 tot Junie 2003, die termyn wat in hierdie artikel gedek word, het die Raad van die Uniestad van Kaapstad drie burgemeesters gehad wat elk op 'n unieke wyse die Raad gelei het soos wat hulle gehandel het met die verskillende magte wat 'n impak op hulle en die Raad gehad het. Die burgemeesters moes groot veranderings in institusionele, politieke en sosiale prosesse bestuur. Die handeling van die drie burgemeesters, Raadslede Pieter Marais, Gerald Morkel en Nomaindia Mfeketo word in hierdie artikel bespreek. Met 'n vergelykende beskrywing poog die artikel om by te dra tot 'n begrip van die vroeë burgemeesters politiek in die Uniestad van Kaapstad.

In December 2000 the Unicity of Cape Town was established by national government, combining the seven local authorities which had previously governed the Cape metropolis.<sup>1, 2</sup> This heralded a new era in local politics for the City of Cape Town. A new city government had to be created, integrating and unifying the different city administrations.<sup>3</sup> This process soon foundered because of political turmoil. In the first three years of its existence the new city government had three mayors and the political party composition of the Council changed. The aim of this article is to clarify the role of each mayor in the process of establishing the new city government — one of the largest in South Africa — in the midst of change.

This study covers the period December 2000 to June 2003, giving each mayor approximately the same length of term and permitting comparison of their impact on municipal politics. In their politics the mayors had to adhere to party policies, priorities and strategies. However, all three mayors were experienced politicians and had in their own right some influence on municipal politics. They had the opportunity to determine the policy direction of the new constituted city government and each one did it in his or her own way, as this comparative study will endeavour to describe.

A brief clarification of the methodology will first be given. The political role of each of the three mayors, Aldermen Pieter Marais, Gerald

- 1 Financial support from the Dept of Sociology at the University of Stellenbosch for this research is gratefully acknowledged. I also wish to thank Mr Desmond Botha of the Records Department of the Unicity of Cape Town, who made both the Council and the Exco records available to me; all the interviewees, and Prof Simon Bekker and Ms Anne Leide for their instructive comments on the first draft of this article. A version of this article was presented at the PICS Workshop on Urbanisation, Local government, Space and Identity in selected African Cities (Stellenbosch, 6-7 February 2004).
- 2 For the background and detail of the transformation of local government in South Africa cf Cameron (2003).
- 3 In the Apartheid era the Unicity of Cape Town consisted of 69 municipal bodies (36 of them formal municipalities) managed by 17 separate administrations. In 1995 these were combined to form 6 municipalities (Tygerberg, Cape Town, Helderberg, Blaauwberg, South Peninsula and Oostenberg) and an overarching Cape Metropolitan Council providing bulk services such as water and electricity. In December 2000 these 7 administrations were combined under one Unicity Council, now called the City of Cape Town, covering an area of 2 487 km<sup>2</sup>.

Morkel and Nomaindia Mfeketo, will then be described, before conclusions will be drawn.

## 1. Methodology and theoretical position

This is a descriptive study. The methodology was chosen to ensure a full description of the role of the mayors and the theoretical position to ensure comparability.

### 1.1 Methodology

The unit of analysis in this study is mayoral policies. This study describes the policies of each mayor in order to highlight each one's contribution to municipal politics as well as the differences among them. Information for this description was collected by means of a documentary study of the agendas, accompanying reports and minutes of the Council (15 December 2000 to 26 June 2003) and the minutes of the Executive Council (20 December 2000 to 4 June 2003), as well as interviews with selected individuals knowledgeable with regard to mayoral policies.

The study started with investigative interviews early in the first half of 2003. The Council documents were analysed in August 2003 and a full report prepared. From this a brief on mayoral influence was drawn up. This brief was then used as a discussion document in interviews with officials and journalists held in October and November 2003. Of the six officials targeted for interviews, only four were willing to participate. They were asked to comment on the brief in a semi-structured interview which clarified many issues. The information from the documents and the interviews was then interpreted. This study presents the findings.

### 1.2 Theoretical position

The theoretical point of departure of this study is that leaders engage with different types of power within the context of continuous change.<sup>4</sup> This study describes the mayors' involvement with different powers; the conclusion provides a comparative summary, with Tables 2 and 3 representing this comparison more graphically.

<sup>4</sup> For a full discussion of this theoretical standpoint cf Zaaiman (2001) chapter 4.

## 2. The Council of the Unicity of Cape Town

The main arena in which the mayors could develop their policies was the Council of the Unicity of Cape Town. The first meeting of this Council took place on 15 December 2000. The Council consisted of 200 Councillors, 100 elected in wards and 100 proportionally. As Table 1 shows, the floor-crossing of October 2002<sup>5</sup> caused the power balance to swing from the Democratic Alliance (DA) to the African National Congress/New National Party (ANC/NNP) coalition, resulting in a change of local government in mid-term.

Table 1: Political affiliation of councillors (N=200)

	Before floor-crossing		After floor-crossing	
	Number of seats	Percentage	Number of seats	Percentage
ACDP (African Christian Democratic Party)	8	4.0%	8	4.0%
AMP (African Muslim Party)	2	1.0%	2	1.0%
ANC (African National Congress)	77	38.5%	80	40.0%
DA (Democratic Alliance)	107	53.5%	71	35.5%
Independent	0	0.0%	1	0.5%
IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party)	1	0.5%	0	0.0%
MiP (Middle Party)	1	0.5%	1	0.5%
NNP (New National Party)	0	0.0%	32	16.0%
PAC (Pan African Congress)	1	0.5%	1	0.5%
UDM (United Democratic Movement)	3	1.5%	3	1.5%
UP (Universal Party)	0	0.0%	1	0.5%
	200	100.0%	200	100.0%

- 5 In mid-2000 the Democratic Party (DP) and New National Party (NNP) established the Democratic Alliance (DA) as a political entity to contest together the local government elections of 2000. In 2001 the NNP withdrew from the DA to form an alliance with the African National Congress (ANC). For this purpose government had to scrap the anti-defection clause in the constitution. Because the floor-crossing would favour the ANC's representation in the National Assembly, as well as in several provinces and local governments, four bills facilitating floor-

The next sections discuss the role played by each mayor. Mayors could exert considerable influence, provide direction and control aspects of the City of Cape Town's politics and service delivery because few of the Council members had any previous experience of such a big public institution. Furthermore, negative political undercurrents prevailed among members, stemming firstly from the DA's being an alliance between the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP), with members still adhering to old loyalties; secondly from the floor-crossing opportunity, which resulted in a political change in the Western Cape provincial government and subsequently in the City government, with NNP members defecting from the DA and other floor-crossings occurring after a period of significant strain among members, and thirdly from the ANC/NNP coalition's requiring two parties with different orientations to work together, with members not always being satisfied about the outcome of coalition negotiations. It is in this context that each mayor's *modus operandi* will be described.

### 3. Alderman Pieter Marais<sup>6</sup>

The new Council for the Unicity of Cape Town was elected on 5 December 2000 and convened for the first time on 15 December 2000. The law prescribed that the Mayor and Deputy Mayor had to be chosen from among the ten elected members of the Executive Committee (Exco) of the Council. The Democratic Alliance (DA) had an absolute majority and decided to offer three Exco seats to the ANC, but this was declined. Being a majority party in the Council, the DA elected Exco Councillor<sup>7</sup>

crossing were passed in Parliament in June 2002. The first window period for floor-crossing was set to start at 8 October 2002.

- 6 Ald Marais grew up in Cape Town and had been involved in politics since 1982. He was a member of various political parties and played a leading role in many of them before joining the National Party in 1991. The NP later formed an alliance with the DA. From 1984 to 1992 he was a member of the President's Council. As a member of the Executive Council of the Western Cape Provincial Government he acted as a minister in various portfolios: Local Government (1994-98), Health (1998), Health and Social Services (1999), and Social Services and Poverty Relief (2000). In 2000 he became a councillor and Mayor of the City of Cape Town.
- 7 Aldermanship was bestowed on the Mayor in terms of the policy of WECLOGO on 14 February 2001.

Pieter Marais (formerly of the NNP) as Mayor and officially invested him with the mayoral chain. Councillor Belinda Walker (formerly of the DP) was elected as Deputy Mayor. Cllr Marais was instated as mayor at an elegant function in the Artscape on 2 April 2001. His term ended prematurely on 22 December 2001 as a result of the DA's terminating his party membership on 22 October 2001 because of his alleged malpractice during the process of renaming streets, when Adderley Street was to become Nelson Mandela Avenue and Wale Street to become F W de Klerk Avenue.<sup>8</sup> Ald Marais appealed to the High Court, which ruled in his favour on 21 November 2001. Although he returned that day to his chambers, he gave Council notice of his resignation as Mayor on 28 November 2001. Ald Walker acted as Mayor in November 2001.

The street-name debacle had an impact on the last months of Ald Marais's term as Mayor. Of the four Council meetings held after May 2001 he only attended one, on 29 August. Of the ten Exco meetings held after May 2001 he only attended one, on 3 August. His period of

8 It was established that, on 20 May 2001 in a communication to the press and on 24 May 2001 in an address before the Press Club, Ald Marais misled the press by stating that more people supported the street renaming proposal than were against it. He said to the Press Club that the ratio of support was 2.5 to 1 conservatively, but that 5 to 1 was probably a better estimate. In view of his knowledge of the substantial objections already received, his remark was ungrounded. The *Mail and Guardian* ran an article after his communication, referring to irregularity in the process of establishing the extent of public support. This led to an investigation process (Council agenda 16/10/01). On 30 July 2001 the Western Cape Minister of Local Government appointed Adv W H Heath SC and Mr M Campbell to conduct an investigation in terms of Section 106(2) of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) and the Western Cape Provincial Commission Act (Act 10 of 1998) into the following matters: "Alleged maladministration, fraud, corruption or other serious malpractices committed by any person or persons in the public participation exercise undertaken by the City of Cape Town regarding the proposed renaming of Adderley and Wale Streets" (Exco minutes 3/8/01). In view of the outcome of the investigation by the Provincial Minister of Local Government, the Democratic Alliance terminated Ald Marais's party membership and he therefore ceased to be a member of the Council with effect from 4 pm on 22 October 2001. Ald Marais's appeal to the High Court was successful but he resigned as Mayor on 28 November 2001. As he was a senior NNP figure, his expulsion was strongly opposed by ex-NNP leaders in the DA. This led to a process in which the NNP eventually withdrew from the DA and formed an alliance with the ANC. In March 2002 this new alliance introduced floor-crossing legislation so that the alliance could be established in local governments (Cameron 2003: 18).

influence in Council during his term as Mayor was therefore from December 2000 to May 2001, with some input in August 2001. Because this was a critical time in the establishment of the Unicity of Cape Town and the energy and vigour of the Democratic Alliance was fully exerted to make Cape Town an exemplary city, it is important to clarify the nature of Ald Marais's influence during this establishment phase.

Interviewees described his leadership as follows: He was a person who continuously generated fresh ideas. He would continually surprise his office personnel with his spontaneous ideas.<sup>9</sup> However, he was not a natural administrator in terms of bringing his ideas to fruition. He was not really concerned with the administrative detail of how ideas had to be implemented.<sup>10</sup> He did a good deal to perpetuate the idea that the Coloureds were in control of the metropolis. Many of his actions were orientated towards showing that Coloureds could manage the city as well as, and even better than previous Cape Town local governments.<sup>11</sup> He was charismatic and an excellent orator. He could make audiences hang on his lips and take the wind out of the sails of protesters.<sup>12</sup> He ensured that firm decisions were taken. It was the feeling of officials and councillors that his departure ushered in an era of indecision, endless debate and frustrating processes which impacted negatively on the city government.<sup>13</sup> As a strong leader, Ald Marais was Mayor of a city which the DA wanted to make its flagship in local government because it was the only city in which it was the majority party. The DA's manifesto was clear on what it wished to establish in the city. Ald Marais's responsibility to the party<sup>14</sup> was to deliver on this. In the following sections some aspects of his contribution during his term will be discussed.

9 Senior Official in Office of Mayor 2003, personal communication 18 November 2003 (hereafter Official 2).

10 Official 2.

11 Senior Official in Office of Mayor 2003, personal communication 14 November 2003 (hereafter Official 1).

12 Official 1; Senior Official in Office of City Manager 2003, personal communication 12 May 2003 (hereafter Official 3).

13 Senior Official in Office of Communications 2003, personal communication 14 November 2003 (hereafter Official 4).

14 The party was based on a new formed alliance between the DP and the NNP. This alliance was strained and became even more so over time. Ald Marais had to manage this alliance but eventually the DP faction on local, provincial and national levels discredited him (Official 2).

### 3.1 City priorities

The Exco held a strategic planning workshop at Arniston from 22 to 23 January 2001, to spell out the priorities on which it wanted to focus. These were: safety and security, combatting HIV/AIDS and TB, free lifeline services, and job creation, especially through tourism. Ald Marais's interpretation of these priorities will be discussed in the following sections.

Ald Marais had his own priorities for the city, among which cleaning it up was very important. His addresses to Council referred continuously to this matter: "Tough decisions will have to be made if we want Cape Town to become a cleaner [...] city" (Council Minutes (CM) 15/12/00), "[T]he rolling mess action is a huge success and more than 29 000 tons of refuse has been removed from our city [...] we should strive towards creating a zero-waste city" (CM 28/3/01), "40 000 tons of dirt cleared out of the townships within 4 months" (CM 30/5/01), "Our vision is of a safe city that is clean" (CM 30/5/01), and "You know we are going to clean the city and we are going to keep it clean" (CM 30/5/01). Besides the street-name debacle, interviewees agreed that Ald Marais's term as mayor would probably best be remembered by his successful Mess Action Campaign stemming from his obsession with cleaning Cape Town.<sup>15</sup> Eventually the Mess Action Campaign removed in excess of 62 000 tons of illegally dumped waste (City Manager's Report (CMR), 16 July 2002: 6).

Another of Ald Marais's strong preferences was for partnerships. The fact that the Western Cape Province and the City of Cape Town were in the same political hands was his model for co-operation also among parties. He said in Council on 29 August 2001:

These are the types of partnerships we talk about. Not only partnerships between Provincial and Local Government, but partnerships between the parties here to resolve these problems.

It was clear from the start that the ANC's refusal to take up the three Exco seats it had been offered frustrated Marais. He pleaded with the ANC at the Council meeting of 28 March 2003: "Now is the time for

15 Senior Journalist of *Cape Argus* 2003, personal communication 30 April 2003 (hereafter Journalist 1); Senior Journalist of *Die Burger* 2003, personal communication 15 April 2003 and 6 November 2003 (hereafter Journalist 2); Official 3.



us to overcome the divisions, the cynicism and the strife.” Throughout his term voting on motions in Council meetings went according to party lines. Ironically, the one exception was the motion on changing the names of Adderley and Wale streets, which was supported by most parties. A multi-party subcommittee was appointed to advise the Exco in this regard, with only the PAC abstaining. The eventual failure of this initiative was a great disappointment to Ald Marais.

With Ald Marais in power, there was quite good co-ordination with the province but less so with national government because of political differences. Good co-ordination existed between local and provincial government on the inner-city bus transport project started under the old Cape Metro Council, for example. In urban renewal the DA did not follow the National Urban Renewal Project’s guidelines but instituted an urban renewal project which centred on safety and security.<sup>16</sup> Therefore it could not draw support and funding for this version of urban renewal from the national government.<sup>17</sup>

One partnership to which Ald Marais never referred but which was mentioned by two interviewees as a strained relationship during his term was that between the DA and the South African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU).<sup>18</sup> Because of the ongoing negotiation process with the unions (SAMWU and IMATU), led by Ald Walker and Mr Maydon, the relationship became less strained as time progressed during the terms of Ald Marais and Ald Morkel.<sup>19</sup> Ald Marais had a very good relationship with the media — the best of the three mayors under scrutiny here.<sup>20</sup> He understood the value of media communication and had a natural talent for dealing with the media.<sup>21</sup>

### 3.2 Safety and security

Ald Marais referred continually in his Council addresses to the DA’s commitment to making Cape Town a safer city for all its people. The main initiative of his term was the establishment of a city police force.

16 Official 1.

17 Official 1.

18 Journalist 1 and Official 3.

19 Official 4.

20 Official 2 and Journalist 2.

21 Official 1.

This initiative started when he was in provincial government and was further promoted when he became Mayor.<sup>22</sup> The training of 500 community police officers commenced at the beginning of 2001 and the Police Training College was established in Philippi. He announced in Council on 29 August 2001: “The first 400 municipal policemen will graduate on 15th December [...] we [have] adopted a zero tolerance approach towards criminals”. A process was also started to investigate the expansion of CCTV surveillance cameras (CM 29/8/01). With regard to the causes of crime Ald Marais referred to poverty as: “one of the anchors of the underlying causes of crime” (CM15/12/00). However he also referred to intolerance as a cause of the lack of safety, saying to Council on 30 May 2001 that the DA’s vision was of: “an open, tolerant city in which every resident feels at home”.

### 3.3 HIV/AIDS

Ald Marais referred to HIV/AIDS in his address to Council on 15 December 2000, putting his party’s view bluntly: “HIV and AIDS will not become a political ball to be thrown about”. On the extent of the problem he told Council on 30 May 2001:

HIV/AIDS is a scourge to our City, it is a scourge to our country and continent. Do you know, by 2005, 62 000 people in this city will have died from Aids and Aids-related causes and in the next 20 years, 300 000 children will be orphaned in this city because of HIV/AIDS?

He also gave the city’s support to the provincial government’s campaign for the distribution of anti-retroviral medicine, a campaign in which he had been involved at the provincial level when he was the MEC for Health. As Mayor he promoted it personally in the city.<sup>23</sup> It was clear after his term that this issue was even more important for Cllr Walker. As Acting Mayor she devoted her whole address before the Council on 28 November 2001 to HIV/AIDS and the imminent World AIDS Day (1 December 2001).

<sup>22</sup> Journalist 2.

<sup>23</sup> Official 1 and Journalist 2.

### 3.4 Poverty and policy on indigency

The first motion for free lifeline services (free water and electricity) came from ANC Cllrs Mowzer and Mokoena at the constituting Council meeting of 15 December 2000, where they asked for its implementation on 1 March 2001. The Mayor amended the motion so that it would be implemented as soon as possible. On 28 March 2001 Ald Marais announced: "We will be the first Council to deliver free water and electricity to all the people". This was an important DA drive to create the first city with these free services. Eventually it was decided to supply 20 kWh of electricity free per month from 1 July 2001 and 6 kilolitres of water per month for metered domestic households from 1 May 2001 (CM 28/3/01). A glimpse of Ald Marais's way of managing politics in this regard is given in his address to Council on 30 May 2001, when he said:

At first Eskom did not want to come on board and we started arm-wrestling and I told Eskom I have friends in the ANC too, so [they'd] better watch out, and very soon Eskom started talking to us.

Other references to poverty and poor areas made by Ald Marais dealt with the upgrading of the city's existing housing stock (CM 15/12/00),<sup>24</sup> the problem of poverty as related to race (CM 30/5/01), the need for job creation (CM 30/5/01), the land restitution claims policy (Executive Committee (EM) minutes 24/4/01) and informal settlement management and improvement (CM 29/8/01). He mentioned that the city was building 27 000 houses, 5 000 of them in Delft South (CM 29/8/01). Although he stated to Council on 30 May 2001:

We definitely have a policy to help the poor [...] I can face them any time and I can assure you that if the people understand this budget and they read it, they will know that the choice they made on the 5 December was the right choice (CM 30/5/01),

no such policy was submitted to Council in his term and it was not clear that the budget was pro-poor. The first policy initiative of the DA with regard to this was the Draft Credit Control, Debt Collection and Indigent Policy discussion document submitted to Council on 31 October 2001. The DA continued to use evictions as a measure for

24 The housing stock of the City of Cape Town consists of approximately 42 000 hired units, 21 000 hostel beds and 23 000 hire-purchased units (Malan 2003).

debt control, but the collection level declined by several percentage points in Ald Marais's term.<sup>25</sup>

### 3.5 Job creation

Although job creation was one of the DA's priorities, no specific policy was adopted in this regard. With a workforce of 27 000 people (approximately 1% of all Capetonians), the municipality was supplying the bulk of work in the city. This was not the intention of the government, however, but the consequence of the number of workers inherited from the seven previous municipalities. All permanent employees were transferred from the disestablished municipalities to the City in accordance with Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act (Act 66 of 1995) as from 6 December 2000 and therefore enjoyed the same rights and privileges they had with those municipalities. In his addresses Ald Marais referred to job creation through tourism "because I believe that will kick-start our economy here" (CM 30/5/01).

### 3.6 Public participation

The first important public participation initiative of the DA was to opt for sub-councils, as opposed to the ANC's preference for ward committees. Ald Marais told the Council in its constituting meeting on 15 December 2000: "[T]o take this Council closer to the people, we will create sub-councils". The by-law to establish the sixteen sub-councils was approved on 29 August 2001 for implementation on 1 October 2001. Ward committees would probably have created more public participation. An interviewee reported almost no public participation in the sub-councils after their inception under DA rule.<sup>26</sup>

The law prescribes that municipalities must develop an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) by means of a participatory process. The IDP of 2001/2002 did not conform to this requirement. Ald Marais told the Council on 30 May 2001:

It is true that the IDP was not community-driven. This was due to time constraints, and the intention [was] to involve the community fully in the IDP process informing the next budget.

25 Official 1.

26 Journalist 2.

According to Ald Ellmann the document was compiled by Dr M van der Merwe and staff. It seems that not even the DA took ownership of it, because on 21 August 2001 Exco decided on a new IDP process and Ald Walker told the Council on 26 September 2001 that “the public participation process for the City of Cape Town’s *first* Integrated Development Plan [would] [...] soon be launched” [my italics, SJZ]. A “major public communication improvement” was announced to the Council by Ald Marais on 29 August 2001: more than 800 000 multi-coloured, trilingual pamphlets on budget details and performance areas were distributed among residents. No other notable public participation processes were initiated by the Mayor.

### 3.7 Administrative rulings

A General Valuation Steering Committee to further the Unicity’s commission work was established at Council on 15 December 2000. This general valuation process was centralised under a general valuation project manager and completed in August 2002, with 550 000 properties being valued at R200 billion and 2.6% objections ( $\pm$ 12 000) being received. Although the Unicity commission did valuable work in creating an administrative framework for the city, its financial administration remained a problem during the terms of all three mayors. Ald Marais said: “Our first 100 days were categorised by a cleanup of the financial mess we inherited” (CM 28/3/2001).

Ald Marais immediately removed senior officials from the previous dispensation when he took office — something which the ANC/NNP coalition repeated when they came to power.<sup>27</sup> Mr R Maydon, formerly Managing Director of Edgars, was appointed as City Manager, under contract from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004 (EM 4/9/01). Coming from the private sector, Mr Maydon had a huge business network, which he used to improve the city’s relationship with the business sector. He ensured good, regular interaction between the city and the Chamber of Commerce and (to a lesser extent) the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut. Ald Marais also had good relationships with the Chamber of Commerce and the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, from his time in provincial government.<sup>28</sup> Some officials were concerned with the precedence they gave

27 Official 4.

28 Journalist 2.

to the Chamber and that they did not cultivate relationships with other business groupings.<sup>29</sup> But it must be noted that at that time the general property valuation was a concern for business, especially for the Chamber, and was handled by the City Manager.

Another important initiative of Ald Marais's term was what he called his government's commitment to a focus on the citizen as customer (CM 30/5/2001). This approach was developed at an Exco strategic breakaway held at Ganzekraal from 22 to 23 March 2001, where it was decided with regard to trading services that each of the major functional areas (water and sanitation, electricity, solid waste management, market, and abattoir) needed to be set up as a corporatised entity (EM 20/3/01). The municipality also tried to terminate services to consumers in arrears, both individual ratepayers and businesses. Ald Marais and Walker were also very strong supporters of private-sector partnerships and even of getting the private sector to perform certain local government functions, either in its own right or as agents.<sup>30</sup> The DA presented the unions with a proposal on creating business units for trading services, which the unions saw as a forerunner of privatisation. SAMWU, in particular, resisted and opposed it actively, but the process advanced quite far in Ald Walker's term as Deputy Mayor.<sup>31</sup>

### 3.8 City Improvement Districts (CIDs)

In view of the success of the Cape Town Partnership, established before December 2000, in improving services and safety in the inner city of Cape Town, various neighbourhoods followed this example in submitting proposals for developing similar partnerships.<sup>32</sup> It was clear that the businesses there wanted to create a space which they could control, in order to ensure a safe environment. However, the proposals elicited strong reaction in the neighbourhoods — both for and against. The additional tax had to be set off against the alleged benefits. The Mayor and the

29 Official 3.

30 Journalist 2.

31 Journalist 1.

32 These were Parow Industria (EM 19/6/01), Tygerberg Business Park (EM 19/6/01), Cape Town's extension of the CID to include the parade and gardens (CM 27/6/01), Green Point (CM 27/6/01), Muizenberg (CM 26/9/01), Green Point's extension of the CID (CM 31/10/01), and Oranjekloof CID (CM 28/11/01).

DA's receptivity to this kind of proposal activated neighbourhood politics. Of the three mayors, Ald Marais was the most receptive to the idea of establishing more City Improvement Districts.<sup>33</sup>

### 3.9 Capital projects

With regard to capital projects, Ald Marais focused especially on roads. He told Council on 30 May 2001:

The City of Cape Town's road system is regarded as one of the best in the world and I intend to keep it that way. An amount of R392.6 million will be utilised in rehabilitating existing roads that have deteriorated beyond repair, which includes R50 million to finish these half built bridges which are all around.

Other projects which were important to him included the convention centre and the construction of the Roggebaai canal (CM 29/8/01). Ald Marais very quickly approved capital projects without taking their full operational costs into account. This applied in particular to the building of a clinic approved in his term.<sup>34</sup>

From the description given above it can be concluded that Ald Marais wanted to affect the visible environment of the city. He cleaned it up, undertook road rehabilitation and wanted to rename two strategic roads. He hoped this physical intervention would enhance tourism, which would create jobs and influence voters. His style of democratic politics was representative rather than participatory. He did not initiate participatory strategies; he did not intervene when the IDP was developed without public participation, and did not initiate a strategy to ensure that citizens would participate in the sub-committees. For the rest, he oversaw the implementation of DA priorities, such as the establishment of a city police service, the introduction of free lifeline services, the corporatisation of trading services, the implementation of HIV/AIDS projects, and the development of an information system.

He was a skilled politician who enjoyed participating in Council. Of the three mayors, he was the most involved in the Council, moving and amending proposals. He also had a good relationship with the administration and encouraged it to develop a new unified structure. In

33 Journalist 2.

34 Official 1.

this way he played an important role in the creation of the unified city. Politically he gave precedence to the DA and its voters, understanding that participation would not be as important to them as the delivery of good services. His short mayoral term was definitely not insignificant in the early days of the Unicity of Cape Town.

Between his term and the next mayor's, floor-crossing occurred at both the national and the provincial levels. This led to a change in provincial government, from the DA to an ANC/NNP coalition, and presaged a difficult term for the next DA mayor of Cape Town.

#### 4. Alderman Gerald Morkel<sup>35</sup>

Cllr Gerald Morkel was elected as Mayor of Cape Town at the Council meeting of 13 December 2001 by means of a DA majority vote. He was instated in halls in various communities during the "Mayor Meets the People Campaign". His term was short-lived because of the change in the political composition of the Council over the period 8-22 October 2002, when members were allowed to change party affiliation without losing their seats. The fact that his party members defected can be attributed to his association with the Harksen affair, among other things. This, rather than the floor-crossing legislation, led to his removal from office.

Under Ald Morkel the relationship with province deteriorated. For instance, the inner-city bus transport project and the completion of the foreshore freeway were reviewed by the province. Although the city administration tried to maintain good, co-operative relationships with administrative colleagues at the provincial and the national levels there was insufficient political will to achieve this.<sup>36</sup> In Council the ANC reversed its decision not to serve on the Exco and three DA members

35 Ald Morkel grew up in Cape Town and was elected to parliament in 1984 as member of the Labour Party. He joined the National Party in 1991 and was elected its Western Cape leader in 1998. On 5 August 2000 he was also appointed as leader of the Democratic Alliance in the Western Cape. As a member of the Executive Committee of the Western Cape Provincial Government he handled the following portfolios: Housing (1994-95), Police Services and Community Safety (1996-98), and Environmental Affairs (1998). On 15 June 1998 he was sworn in as Premier of the Western Cape Provincial Government, a position he held until the floor-crossing in the Provincial Government led to a change of government in 2001.

36 Official 3.



resigned on 13 December 2001 so that the ANC could take up their seats. This did not effect any difference in the relationship with the provincial and national governments. The ANC was unhappy with the Exco portfolios it received, saying they were without substance.<sup>37</sup>

Initially, some DA members were discontented with Ald Morkel's election as Mayor. But in general there was satisfaction with him because of his previous experience in government and his reasonableness.<sup>38</sup> He is remembered as a mayor who was quite accessible to his staff, officials and the media.<sup>39</sup> He liked meeting and talking to people.<sup>40</sup> But the main feature of his term of office was the Harksen affair.<sup>41</sup>

An interviewee said that Ald Morkel was too trusting to be a good politician.<sup>42</sup> The Harksen affair made him and the City of Cape Town a "lame duck".<sup>43</sup> He did not have credibility in the eyes of the media and this hampered his mayoral initiatives to promote the city in the media.<sup>44</sup> It made his term one of stagnation. He acted mainly as a ceremonial mayor, and even that role was limited. This led to Cllr Haskin asking in Council on 29 September 2002: "whether the Mayor has resumed all official duties" (CM 29/9/2002). His time was consumed by the Harksen affair. Almost no policy initiatives originated from his office, and the administration had little political direction in his term. The political instability, lack of political leadership, and general political uncertainty meant that the administration continued to function, but avoided projects on which there was not political clarity.<sup>45</sup> Officials

37 Official 4.

38 Official 4.

39 Official 2.

40 Official 2.

41 Having trusted the Western Cape MEC for Finance, Leon Markowitz, Ald Morkel accepted DM 99 000 as DA party funding from the German fraud suspect Jurgen Harksen. He also received a donation towards his rent from a wealthy German living in Cape Town, Mr Wilfred Sauerland. The Western Cape Premier, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, appointed Judge Siraj Desai to investigate the Harksen affair. This investigation extended over most of Ald Morkel's mayoral term. The final Desai Commission report was released on 3 December 2002, after Ald Morkel's term had ended.

42 Journalist 1.

43 Official 4.

44 Official 1.

45 Official 3.

became nostalgic about the Marais term, during which clear decisions had been taken and direction given.<sup>46</sup> Ald Morkel's image was so badly affected by the Harksen affair that Mr Michael Farr, Director of the Cape Town Partnership, ended up having a better public profile than the Mayor.

Ald Morkel had been a businessman before he went into full-time politics. He therefore handled his office and meetings in a businesslike manner.<sup>47</sup> He also tended to build partnerships with business. His term as Premier of the Western Cape Province had also ensured him of very good ties with the business sector.<sup>48</sup> He was attracted to projects like the International Convention Centre, which was under construction in his term. The adjacent Roggebaai Canal Tourism Precinct and the Clocktower Precinct in the Waterfront were also of special interest to him, in relation to his concern to secure the downtown area of Cape Town. He was proud of the establishment of City Improvement Districts in partnership with business. Considerable success was achieved by this initiative, and Ald Morkel said: "Our downtown has been saved, the only one in South Africa so to be" (CM 13/12/01). At the end of his term, however, he took offence at the fact that Mr Farr was receiving more prominent and more positive publicity than he and the city government were, although the city government belonged to the partnership.<sup>49</sup> This negatively influenced Ald Morkel's originally positive inclination towards the CIDs.

Another significant project which the business sector implemented in Ald Morkel's term was the prestigious Big Bay development in Bloubergstrand (EM 4/12/01). Many major contracts were also awarded and developmental initiatives decided on in his term — Volvo busses for the inner-city public transport system (EM 27/3/02), the Khayelitsha Business District development (EM 18/6/02), the management of the inner-city public transport system in agreement with an external mechanism (CM 31/7/02), and the new community halls in Colorado Park, Lentegeur, Rocklands and Westridge (CM 25/9/02). Although Ald Morkel identified with these developments, most of them originated

46 Official 4.

47 Official 4.

48 Official 1.

49 Journalist 2.

from a previous mayoralty. During his term the new mayoral offices on the sixth floor of the Podium block, City Centre, came into service, with the move causing his office to be inactive for several weeks.<sup>50</sup> The Council met for the first time in its newly built chamber on 5 March 2002.

Ald Morkel's term was about high-level issues such as regenerating the inner-city centre rather than grass-roots problems.<sup>51</sup> In particular, he developed business partnerships for the benefit of the central business district. He was supported in this by Mr Maydon, the City Manager he inherited. During Ald Morkel's term, with a need for strong political direction from the Council, Mr Maydon played an important role in managing the city. The Council minutes reveal a significant upsurge in the administrative issues put to Council in this term. This became such a strong aspect of the functioning of Council that the following mayor, Ald Mfeketo, specially noted it as something that would have to change in her term (CM 27/11/02).

Few real initiatives were taken with regard to poverty in Ald Morkel's term. In Council on 13 December 2001, he used the following words to express his vision for the City of Cape Town: compassionate governance through a just, safe, creative, ecological, compact and beautiful city with easy contact and which celebrates its rich and historical heritage. He also continually referred to the challenges of HIV/AIDS and TB and scolded the ANC for its unwise handling of the situation (CM 27/3/02). On poverty he said:

The cry of the excluded and the marginalised who live on the social and economic edges of our city is not for party-political triumph or sectarian victory [...] Their call is for clean water, safe environments and secure shelter (CM 13/12/01).

This was addressed by means of the basic free water and electricity allowances for households, the city police force and the housing projects. On 27 March 2002 Ald Morkel made the following strong statement to Council on the housing issue:

There are two fundamental challenges which lie at the core of the very real housing crisis in this city. The one is the vexing and inhumane cycle of poverty, service arrears, eviction and destitution [...] The other is the constant threat of apparently spontaneous and desperate

50 Official 2.

51 Journalist 1.

land invasions into often hazardous and unsuitable locations. [We] should not tolerate evictions or land invasions (CM 27/3/02).

He did not, however, initiate indigent policies with regard to evictions and land invasions. Early Childhood Enrichment centres were established in Delft, Brown's Farm, Crossroads, Weltevreden Valley and Philippi East but the initiative for these came from before his term (CM 25/9/02).

Probably the real challenge in addressing poverty issues lay in the compilation of the IDP and the budget. Ald Morkel, however, reported to Council on 5 March 2002 that the IDP process had failed. The needs of various sub-councils had not been addressed; public participation was limited, and the requirements of national legislation had not been met (CM 5/3/02). It was also stated that the IDP was not driving the budget and that it would not be a people's budget, but one compiled by the administration (CM 5/3/02). Like the previous mayor, Ald Morkel did not drive a citizen participation process for the IDP, but followed a DA culture of representative democracy.

The most important poverty initiative in Ald Morkel's term was the implementation of the Indigent and Property Tax Policy. This included an indigent grant and property value exemption (CM 29/5/02).<sup>52</sup> It coincided with the implementation of property tax based on the 2000 General Valuation Roll and a new rating policy moving the city away from 50 different valuation rolls to a single roll (CM 29/5/02). The ANC reacted by discrediting the city's financial management. The attack came from Mr E Rasool, MEC for Finance in the Western Cape Provincial Government, which was ruled by the ANC/NNP coalition. Ald Morkel reacted with misgiving to this attack, but his moral standing had been undermined to such an extent by the Harksen affair that he was in no position to regain political ground before the impending floor-crossing window period.

The ceremonial role of Mayor was important to Ald Morkel. This is clear from his speeches to Council, in which he referred continually to prestigious events concerning Cape Town.<sup>53</sup> His wife, too, played a

52 It implied that residents of properties worth less than R50 000 would not pay rates, sewerage or refuse collection charges. They would also receive a R20 subsidy on other municipal charges, as well as the free water and electricity (CM 29/5/02).

53 Some of the most notable were: the 350th anniversary of the foundation of Cape Town, the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg,

significant public and ceremonial role.<sup>54</sup> He also tried to promote Coloured culture in city and public events.<sup>55</sup> Because of the Harksen affair he later decided not to represent the city as Mayor and delegated such responsibilities to the Deputy Mayor and the Speaker.

Of all the mayors, Ald Morkel had the most potential to create a regime in line with the theory developed by Clarence Stone (1993).<sup>56</sup> He and the City Manager were both business-orientated. But the opposite happened. His dealings with Harksen led to caution in the Council about close relationships with business. In a sense this prepared the Council for the ANC/NNP coalition's different approach. Probably his only significant initiative was the implementation of the Indigent and Property Tax Policy with the 2002/2003 Budget.

Ald Morkel anticipated the breakdown of the DA and the accompanying loss of mayorship in his speech to Council on 25 September 2002. He expressed strong misgivings about the ANC/NNP's intended imposition of an Executive Mayoral system on Cape Town and about the ANC/NNP candidates for Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Speaker (CM 25/9/02). His term ended a few days later when a number of DA members crossed the floor to other parties, resulting in an ANC/NNP coalition majority.

## 5. Alderman Nomaindia Mfeketo<sup>57</sup>

The floor crossing which took place from 8 October until 22 October 2002 left the ANC/NNP coalition as the majority in Council. The new

Local Action Moves the World, the Cape Care Festival, the Cape Town Festival, the launch of the Cape Care Route, the International Conference on Responsible Tourism and various sporting championships (CM 13/12/01, 5/3/02, 27/3/02, 31/7/02).

54 Official 2 and Official 4.

55 Official 4.

56 Clarence Stone's regime theory describes the dynamics of coalitions which develop between local governments and the private sector. They function as regimes which have a sustained capacity to act and to influence developments in key policy areas in cities.

57 Ald Mfeketo grew up in Cape Town. She became involved in civic, community and NGO affairs as well as business. She played a leading role in the United Women's Organisation, the Federation of South African Women, the Western Cape Civics Organisation, the United Democratic Front, the ANC Women's League and the African National Congress. She was Mayor of the former City of Cape Town in 1998. In the Unicity of Cape Town she was elected as a councillor but resigned

constituted Council of the City of Cape Town met on 29 October 2002 and removed Ald D de la Cruz of the DA as Speaker, electing Ald G Paulse in his place. The existing Exco was disestablished, whereafter new portfolios were approved and members elected. Ald Mfeketo was then elected as Mayor and robed with the regalia of office; Cllr D Erleigh was elected as Deputy Mayor, and Cllr P Gabriel replaced Ald Paulse as Chief Whip. On 27 November 2002, in accordance with an agreement between the ANC and the NNP, Cllr Erleigh and Ald Ellman resigned as Deputy Mayor and member of Exco, respectively. Cllr P Uys (NNP) was then elected as an Exco member and thereafter as Deputy Mayor. This established a coalition government at the local level, with the typical coalition politics of tension and continual negotiation. Decision-making processes were slowed down, and the administration became less effective and focused.<sup>58</sup>

The drastic political restructuring in the Council at the end of 2002 was followed by a comprehensive strategic restructuring in 2003. An agreement was reached with Mr R Maydon whereby his contract was prematurely terminated on 30 November 2002.<sup>59</sup> On 1 March 2003 Mr Wallace Mgoqi, formerly the Western Cape Land Claims Commissioner, was appointed as the new City Manager (Exco meeting 19/2/03). A new sub-council by-law was adopted on 13 May 2003. This increased the sub-councils from sixteen to twenty, with new boundaries. The allocation of seats to these twenty new sub-councils was also established, with the ANC/NNP coalition in the majority in each of them. An Executive Mayoral system (with an Executive Mayor and an Executive Deputy Mayor) was established in June 2003. It was decided that ward committees would also be established in 2003. The existing portfolio committees were rescinded and new committees approved. Two other committees were also established to advise the Mayor: a Tender and Procurement Committee and a Spatial Planning, Environment and Land Use Management Committee.

in 2001. She was then appointed as Executive Director of Public Affairs for Golden Arrow. She rejoined the Council in 2002 and was elected Mayor in November 2002 and Executive Mayor in June 2003.

58 Official 4.

59 Mr Maydon's exit had a negative impact on the city's financial management capacity as well as on the ANC/NNP coalition's 2003 budget process (Official 2).

Until June 2003, the period covered by this study, the ANC/NNP coalition was in firm control of local government.<sup>60</sup> Its values differed from those of the DA, and it fast-tracked political change. This was possible because it had the backing of the national and provincial governments, as well as a very clear vision of what it wanted to do, and political will and strong leadership in Ald. Mfeketo. She tried to move local politics strongly in the direction of achievements rather than announcements.<sup>61</sup> This could be dangerous, as an interviewee remarked. Often, visible projects could affront voters rather than secure their support.<sup>62</sup> Ald Mfeketo tried to ward off this danger by basing her planning on an extensive public participation process.

Ald Mfeketo's goals are clear from the initiatives she took after taking office. She wanted to address poverty, streamline the administration and develop the city by means of partnerships. This will be described in the following sections.

### 5.1 Poverty

From her first speech to Council on 29 October 2002 it was clear that Ald Mfeketo was going to focus her policies on poverty. This was echoed by her Deputy Mayor in his first speech to Council on 27 November 2002, which implied a strong consensus on this issue in the ANC/NNP coalition. They made it clear that the challenge facing the city's leaders was to eradicate poverty, by addressing not only lack of income or lack of access to basic services, but also marginalisation, powerlessness, voicelessness and vulnerability. It was clear that their focus would be on the improvement of the previously disadvantaged

60 It seems that they had taken Barbara Ferman's (1996: 9) words to heart: "As Putnam's findings in Italy suggest, changing the structure or function of an institution while leaving the underlying political (and institutional) culture untouched may amount to nothing more than moving boxes on an organisational flow chart. This sombre conclusion suggests that we view political change as a long-term, comprehensive, dynamic process that must incorporate political education; it requires alteration in values, perceptions, expectations, and ultimately behaviour."

61 In contrast, Clarence N Stone & Heywood T Sanders (1987: 179) described the fabled mayoralty of Richard Lee of New Haven, Connecticut, USA, in the 1950s as "long on the politics of announcement and image projection, but short or at least uncertain on concrete accomplishments".

62 Journalist 2.

areas of Cape Town and the upgrading of informal settlements. It was important for the ANC to invest in these areas because its voting support came mostly from them.<sup>63</sup> One example was the Cape Town Inner-City Public Transport Project, which had been supported by the previous mayors but was stopped under the rule of Ald Mfeketo, when a public transport programme serving previously disadvantaged areas was adopted (CM 11/12/02, 28/5/03).<sup>64</sup>

### 5.1.1 Policy on indigence

The first initiative with regard to poverty was Ald Mfeketo's moratorium on evictions. She said in her first speech to Council on 29 October 2002: "Poverty is a reality in our city. This Council cannot continue to punish people because they are poor and can't afford to pay their municipal bills." Three days later she moved a motion approved by Exco, instituting a six-month moratorium on evictions and water cuts, with effect from 1 November 2002 (EM 1/11/02). Although the intention was that the moratorium would be applicable to the renters of municipal houses, many residents who had difficulty with their municipal bills also stopped paying. The result was that the payment of municipal bills declined further in the six months following the announcement.<sup>65</sup>

Along with the 2003/2004 Budget an Equitable Services Framework and Indigent Policy was proposed. The 20kWh free electricity for households was raised to 30kWh. The R20 grant for households was terminated, however. The response of Ald D de la Cruz of the DA was that this was a grave error that would have a negative impact on the municipal accounts of the poor (CM 28/5/03). The ANC/NNP coalition reversed the decision a month later after it became clear that the financial department had made errors in calculation. The coalition eventually decided to reinstate the R20 blanket indigent grant to households with property valued at less than R100 000, to assist them in meeting their water and sanitation bills (CM 26/6/03).

63 Journalist 1.

64 Official 1.

65 Journalist 2.



### 5.1.2 Listening Campaign

Ald Mfeketo addressed what she saw as the voicelessness of the citizens with a comprehensive Listening Campaign. In contrast with the more prestigious events at which the two previous mayors had been introduced to the public, Ald Mfeketo embarked on a process of nineteen public meetings, making it clear that she and her officials wanted to listen to the public.<sup>66</sup> The Mayor's view at the end of the campaign was as follows:

[T]he City's Listening Campaign [...] has [...] made it clear that the battles ahead are with crime, unemployment and economic and social exclusion. [...] Children are playing in festering piles of rubbish, mosquitoes are breeding in stagnant pools of water, and we are putting the health of communities at risk. [...] The problem we have is a two-fold one. On the one hand staff and Councillors are not taking their jobs seriously. [...] The other part of the problem is that we have a community that, for whatever reason, is voiceless and disempowered, when it comes to addressing this problem (CM 26/3/03).

Issues such as housing, problems and concerns with regard to city services, and perceptions about inequality were also raised. Citizens drew comparisons between services in higher-income neighbourhoods and those in lower-income neighbourhoods (eg the frequency of refuse removal). The campaign presented the city government with a very good idea of the needs and expectations of taxpayers in the metropolis. Some NGOs were concerned that the city government wanted to take over their responsibilities. This may be related to a tendency towards narrow parochialism on the part of community-based organisations (Ferman 1996: 13).

This information was used by the city administration in the composition of the IDP and the planning and budgeting for the 2003/2004 financial year, together with the issues that emerged from the ANC/NNP coalition's strategic process preceding Council in December 2002 (CM 28/5/03). After the IDP and the Draft Budget for 2003/2004 had been approved by Council on 28 May 2003, a Listening Campaign report-back was held at thirteen venues. Two significant changes were made to the budget in view of this report-back. The tariff for very high electricity users was reduced and the indigent grant, mentioned in the

<sup>66</sup> Journalist 2 and Official 4.

previous section, retained. The Mayor reported on the second phase of the Listening Campaign:

There is an understanding that we need to focus our attention on the poor. That we cannot allow a slide into chaos as more and more of our residents cannot pay their municipal accounts (CM 26/6/03).

The Mayor remained personally involved in communities after the campaign, spending hours speaking to community members in an attempt to resolve matters of conflict with regard to municipal issues.<sup>67</sup> She understood community dynamics and could handle emotional community outbreaks in a statesmanlike manner.<sup>68</sup>

### 5.1.3 Land restitution

The Mayor put land restitution high on her agenda. However, it must be noted that, in view of the Land Claims Commission, initiatives in this regard had started before the establishment of the Unicity. Within five months of her taking office, a pilot project to prepare sites for resettlement at District Six was in progress and detailed preparations had been undertaken for the return of the Ndabeni community to Wingfield. The national government was approached to secure the resources needed to ensure the provision of bulk services in Wingfield. Preparation funding was also set aside for a tramway park in District Six (EM 19/3/03).

### 5.1.4 The Independent Development Plan

On 1 November 2002 Exco established a permanent committee to assist it with the development of the IDP. In preparing the IDP presented to Council on 28 May 2003, the committee made use of information received from the Mayoral Listening Campaign, in which approximately 12 000 people participated; from the 1996 census, and from the ten-point Strategic Direction which had been adopted by Council on 11 December 2002. In contrast with previous IDPs, this one informed the Draft Budget of 2003/2004. The Budget for 2003/2004 was developed within the context of service delivery backlogs and developmental needs as set out in the IDP. One aspect thereof was the housing backlog, which stood at 241 000 in 2001. Only 10 500 houses were delivered in 2002.

67 Official 1.

68 Official 4.

### 5.1.5 The 2003/2004 Budget

The Budget for 2003/2004 was a result of co-operation among the Mayoral office, the administration, the ANC, the NNP, other parties and the community (through the Listening Campaigns). The IDP played an important directional role. The Mayor called it a pro-poor budget and said that it was therefore a pro-Cape Town budget (CM 28/5/03). It particularly addressed the proposed Indigent Policy, the upgrading of informal settlements, urban renewal in Khayelitsha and Mitchell's Plain, community services improvement, paving, street furniture, the city police, community patrol officers, waste management, green electricity, a city-wide IT system, the housing shortage, and public transport. On the income side, a new stepped tariff model for water and a new tariff calculating model for sewerage were adopted. At the end of 2003, after the term covered by this study, it became clear that there were serious shortcomings in this budget. It required considerable revision, which was undertaken without community consultation.

### 5.1.6 The Urban Renewal Programme

President Thabo Mbeki announced the establishment of a National Urban Renewal Strategy at the opening of Parliament on 9 February 2001. In this strategy, the Western Cape nodal points were identified as Khayelitsha and Mitchell's Plain. The previous two Mayors had not utilised this resource but rather initiated their own developmental strategies for Khayelitsha and Mitchell's Plain. Because of the political similarities at the national, provincial and local levels after the floor-crossing, Mayor Mfeketo could tap into the National Urban Renewal Project. She unleashed considerable national and provincial resources in this regard and involved President Mbeki and the relevant ministers in the development initiatives.

## 5.2 Management Strategy

Under the aegis of facilitator Mr N McLachlan of Organisation Development Africa, the ANC/NNP coalition developed a new vision and mission for the city. This new strategic vision was based on the City Development Indicators, and thus made it possible to measure performance at the end of a term of office. The Mayor, however, emphasised that the most important aspect was to have a long-term growth and

development strategy driven as a partnership, rather than by the City. She pointed out that such a long-term growth and development strategy would bring the city into line with other big metros in South Africa, which had for some time been working on 20- to 30-year plans to ensure that they were more globally competitive (CM 11/12/02, CM 28/5/03). The development of the strategy did not start in the period covered by this study. One interviewee suggested that the best chance for the development of such a strategy would have been in Ald Marais's term as the new government's commitment to such a strategy was not clear.<sup>69</sup>

### 5.2.1 Administration

The Mayor expressed strong opinions on the administration of the city. The Exco started its term with detailed briefing sessions from the various administrative departments. This was aimed at developing a collective overview of the entire Council, and moving away from a piecemeal approach to problem-solving (CM 27/11/02). The decision of the Exco was that the city needed to re-orientate its approach and focus, and that the latter needed to be external rather than internal. The political leadership and top management of the city needed to focus on the delivery challenges which residents expected them to meet, rather than being preoccupied with internal restructuring, micro-design and city-wide computerised systems and processes (CM 27/11/02). The appointment of a City Manager with a public sector background confirmed this. The Mayor also regarded it as important that strategies be found to develop the Council from what essentially amounted to seven administrations into one effective, modern city government. This was important because the long process of integration had had a negative impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration. She envisaged that an audit would be necessary to provide an accurate assessment of the status of the organisation (CM 29/10/02). It was clear that the ANC/NNP coalition preferred to focus on service delivery rather than on trading services.<sup>70</sup> This new focus led to the adoption of a new macro design for the city in the place of the one developed by the DA, which prolonged the integration process considerably.

69 Official 3.

70 Official 1.

However, the long process of bargaining between the City and the Unions (SAMWU and IMATU) ran right through the terms of the three mayors. The DA-inspired micro-design process agreement had to be concluded on 1 February 2002. In terms of this agreement the parties negotiated a placement policy whereby existing employees of the City (26 073 employees on 30 July 2003) were to be placed in a new organisational structure. This agreement was signed by the parties on 7 May 2003 (CM 26/6/03). For the ANC/NNP coalition, it created a dilemma as it did not fit into the new macro design. Further processes were therefore initiated, which delayed the restructuring process.<sup>71</sup> The political instability traumatised the administrative personnel as they had to contend with continual change.<sup>72</sup>

### 5.2.2 Strategic decisions

In this section some of the decisions taken during Ald Mfeketo's term until July 2003 are presented in order to indicate the strategic direction which the ANC/NNP coalition took.

The coalition's sensitivity to "green" issues is clear in its continuation of initiatives in this regard which had started before its term of government. One example is its plan to draw up a power purchase agreement with Darling Wind Energy (EM 14/2/03). On the cultural level, a language policy for the City of Cape Town was adopted (CM 27/11/02). The local Afrikaans newspaper *Die Burger* played an important role throughout the terms of the three mayors in pressurising local government to formulate a language policy. Although this was adopted in Ald Mfeketo's term it seems that she did not support it whole-heartedly.<sup>73</sup> It fell under the office of the Deputy Mayor and was driven more from there.<sup>74</sup> A policy for the renaming of streets, public areas, natural areas and Council-owned buildings, facilities and artefacts was also adopted (CM 24/4/03).

The ANC/NNP coalition was clearly not negative about the private sector. It approved the selling of the Philippi East Market, a process started by the DA (EM 29/1/03). But it was soon clear that the new city

71 Official 2.

72 Official 2.

73 Journalist 2.

74 Official 1.

government was not going into partnership with business without ensuring that appropriate benefits would accrue to it. Under the previous mayors, the Cape Town partnership had developed a higher profile in the media than the city government. The new Mayor would not tolerate this. She made it clear that she was not negative about partnerships but that the policy had to be reviewed, especially after assessing the Durbanville CID (CM 28/5/03). She referred to “the excellent Cape Town Partnership” (CM 11/6/03) which “[had] paved the way for the continued growth and renewal of [the] CBD” (CM 26/6/03). An example of the coalition’s willingness to continue with CIDs was the approval given to the CID for Epping Industria Extensions 1-4 on 28 May 2003. The ANC has reservations about CIDs in upper-class residential areas because it believes they could make such areas inaccessible to the general public along racial lines.<sup>75</sup> In the coalition the ANC and the NNP agreed to differ on this issue (Official 1).<sup>76</sup>

The strategic position of the Mayor on HIV/AIDS was unclear. She only once referred to it in a speech in Council, saying: “HIV/AIDS is a reality for many Capetonians” (CM 29/10/02). Her scanty dealing with this issue stands in stark contrast with the strong viewpoints expressed by the previous two mayors. It must be mentioned, however, that in the Mayor’s Listening Campaign no need was expressed by citizens for action from the city in this regard.<sup>77</sup>

### 5.3 Partnerships

Ald Mfeketo made it very clear from the start that she supported partnerships to ensure good city government and assist development.<sup>78</sup> In connection with partnerships she referred to the development of entrepreneurial skills, the empowerment of black business and of women, the vulnerable, the poor, single-parent families, the sick, the disabled,

75 Official 1 and Journalist 2.

76 Official 1.

77 Official 1.

78 This may confirm what feminist theorists of local politics say: “[W]omen are more likely to bring citizens into the governing process; women are more responsive to outsider groups; women use more contextually-orientated problem-solving styles; women define power in co-operative rather than coercive terms” (Clarke *et al* 1995: 212).

the unemployed and the marginalised. In these partnerships she expected the city to be the dominant partner, with the other partners supporting the government in the realisation of its strategic vision. In connection with the Community Board which she wished to establish, she said for instance that it would consist of “a diverse group of men and women whose only interest would be to make sure that this City is properly managed” (CM 29/10/02). It was in the context of this premise of putting city governance first that the ANC/NNP coalition evaluated partnerships.

From the preceding description it is clear that Ald Mfeketo saw partnerships with business as important, especially in their ability to benefit the poor. However, the coalition kept itself at a greater distance from business than the DA had. For instance, Dr Mgoqi did not hold regular meetings with the Chamber of Commerce as Mr Maydon had. Nor did the coalition encourage privatisation as the DA had, although it was willing to consider proposals in this regard from the administration in order to introduce financial austerity, integrity and efficiency.

In the city government there was potential for tension between the politicians and the administration with regard to preferences in awarding contracts. An interviewee noted that there was considerable pettiness amongst officials in this matter and in relation to being told by the political masters of the day who was preferred and who was not.<sup>79</sup> The ANC/NNP coalition’s interpretation of the procurement policy therefore affected both the small and medium businesses which had been awarded contracts when the DA had been in power. Big businesses suffered less. Organisation Development Africa, for example, remained a consultant of the local government whether it was DA, ANC or NNP.

Ald Mfeketo brought about a major change in the City’s relations with provincial and national government, resulting in much more assistance and co-operation, especially with regard to urban planning, transport and housing. The different levels of government now align their budgets in cognisance of this. As a result, City policy is now not only locally determined, but by agreement between the national ANC in Pretoria and the local ANC.

79 Journalist 1.

The previous mayors' answer to the safety and security problem was to establish a city police force. Mayor Mfeketo did not strongly support this initiative, believing such policing to be mainly a provincial responsibility. She knew, however, that the establishment of the city police was welcomed by the voters and that its disestablishment would not therefore be wise. She thus took two initiatives: the planned expansion of the city police by the DA was reduced<sup>80</sup> and co-ordination between the provincial Department of Safety and Security and the city police was improved in order to optimise their use (CM 29/10/02, 26/3/03). Her view was that the best way to address crime was to focus on social development initiatives in order to ensure that young people had a range of opportunities and were not tempted into crime (CM 26/3/03). However, Council accepted the tender report for the installation of surveillance security cameras in Khayelitsha and Mitchell's Plain on 26 June 2003.

Ald Mfeketo had strong personal opinions on evictions, equal services and community participation, arising from negative personal experiences in this regard in the apartheid era. Her mayorship was thus characterised by a focus on the Indigent Policy in order to address evictions, equity in service delivery, citizen participation and urban renewal. The IDP and the 2003/2004 Budget emerged from this focus. She also wanted the Council and the administration to be attuned to the citizens' needs and interests. She did not see residents as consumers, as Ald Marais described them, but rather as citizens whose rights must be built. For this purpose she deemed partnerships important. This unique and personal contribution of Ald Mfeketo in orientating the City of Cape Town to specific values and priorities in its early years is sure to affect it over the coming years as well.

80 In 2003, 1000 city policemen were deployed. The DA planned to train 350 recruits during the 2003/2004 financial year and each year thereafter to reach a target of 3 000. The ANC limited the training of recruits to 100 during the 2003/2004 financial year.



Table 2: Mayors and powers

Powers	Mayors		
	Ald Marais	Ald Morkel	Ald Mfeketo
Active powers	Supported by DA with reservations. Contested by ANC. Good relationship with Chamber of Commerce and AHI. Receptive to CIDs. Confronted by Heath Commission. Media engagement.	Confronted by Desai commission. Media engagement. Supported by DA with reservations. Contested by ANC and NNP especially at provincial level. Good general business relationships and with Chamber of Commerce and AHI. Supported CIDs.	Supported by ANC and ANC/NNP coalition. Continuous coalition negotiations. Engagement with citizens by means of the Listening Campaign. Media engagement. Engagement with community organisations.
Social patterns and products	Interventions: Cleaning of city. Upgrading of roads. Establishment of city police and installing of surveillance cameras. HIV/AIDS focus. Smart Cape system.	Interventions: Inner-city Public Transport Plan developed. New community halls built. Early Childhood Enrichment Centres established.	Interventions: Listening Campaign. Equity measures taken in 2003/2004 Budget. Urban renewal programme. New Public Transport Plan developed.
Economic arrangements	Interventions: Trading services corporatised. Evictions used. Private sector partnerships. Tourism promoted.	Interventions: 2000 General Valuation Roll implemented. Evictions used. Indigent and Property Tax Policy implemented.	Interventions: Moratorium on evictions. Equitable Services Framework and Indigent Policy implemented with a continuation of the indigent grant. Equity measures taken. Urban renewal programme.
Political structures and processes	Interventions: Exco established. Portfolio committees established.	Interventions: Exco restructured with three seats being given to the ANC.	Interventions: Exco restructured and replaced by Mayoral Committee.

Table 2: Mayors and powers (continued)

Powers	Mayors		
	Ald Marais	Ald Morkel	Ald Mfeketo
	Sub-councils created.	Inauguration of new Council chamber.	Portfolio committees restructured. Sub-councils restructured. Process of establishing ward committees started. Executive Mayoral system established. Administration re-focused on service delivery.
Natural space environment			Interventions: New strategy for the management of the Company Gardens adopted.
Natural resources		Intervention: Power purchase agreement with Darling Wind Energy planned.	Intervention: Power purchase agreement with Darling Wind Energy.
Human needs	Interventions: Free basic water and electricity. Housing: building and upgrading. HIV/AIDS focus.	Interventions: Indigent and Property Tax Policy with indigent grant implemented.	Interventions: Moratorium on evictions. Land restitution actions. Upgrading of informal settlements. Housing built. Equitable Services Framework and Indigent Policy implemented with a continuation of the indigent grant. Extension of free basic water and electricity. Listening Campaign. Urban renewal programme.

## 6. Conclusion

This tale of the three mayors who held office in the City of Cape Town from December 2000 to June 2003 has demonstrated the different strategies they used to handle the powers they believed they were dealing with. In this regard, all three of them had to deal with profound political changes to structures and processes. They also had to engage with powerful individuals and groups. In addition, they were in a reciprocally influential relationship with dynamic social patterns and products, economic arrangements, the natural space environment, natural resources and human needs — from the neighbourhood level to the global. They had to ensure themselves an influential space for. Table 2 lists the mayors' engagement with regard to these active, created and natural powers.

Table 2 demonstrates in a sense to what extent party politics dominated the respective agendas of the mayors.<sup>81</sup> Important aspects of the DA's approach to city government included business partnerships, corporatisation, professional and efficient administration techniques, and indigent grants. The DA mayors promoted all of these. On the other hand, the ANC's focus was on service delivery, public participation, equity and comprehensive assistance to the poor. This approach dominated in the ANC/NNP coalition largely because of Ald Mfeketo's emphasis. This article has demonstrated, however, that besides these strong party agendas, the mayors also had an impact on local politics because of their personalities, skills, networks, agendas and dilemmas. This played an important role in determining the extent to which party agendas could be achieved in the local government.

The controversy with which Aldermen Marais and Morkel had to deal in their terms of office impacted heavily on the DA's ability to implement its strategy for the city. Besides this, Ald Marais also had his own priorities for the city. The brevity of both his term and Ald Morkel's, for which they themselves were largely responsible, strained the DA's processes and it was mainly the Deputy Mayor, the other members of Exco and the City Manager who had to implement the party's strategy. In Ald Mfeketo's term the ANC's strategy, and to a lesser extent

81 One interviewee suggested that a more appropriate name for this article would be: "The tale of two parties" (Official 2). The article has, however, focused on demonstrating the personal impact of each of the mayors on local politics.

the NNP's priorities, were implemented by Exco and eventually centralised in the Mayor's Committee after the establishment of the Executive Mayoral system. The ANC/NNP Exco and the Mayor's Committee were strong bodies for the implementation of party policies, but continual internal coalition negotiations and consultations with the community and the unions, as well as the restructuring of the administration, slowed down both policy formulation and implementation processes. After all the political turmoil of the first years, Ald Mfeketo had to deal with an administration full of distrust and disillusionment with regard to local politics. This was demotivating. It also seems that the capacity of the financial administration of the city was weakened by its restructuring by the ANC/NNP coalition. This influenced its output negatively. On the other hand, Ald Mfeketo inherited quite a number of initiatives and projects which originated from before her term but came into fruition during it.

Table 2 gives an indication of the differing engagements of the mayors with the various powers in the context of the city government. It is clear from Table 2 and in view of the discussion in this study that Ald Marais engaged strongly with active powers (especially groups), social patterns and products, and human needs, while Ald Morkel's engagement was mainly with active powers (individuals and groups), and Ald Mfeketo, in the part of her term covered by this study, chose to engage with active powers (especially groups), political structures and processes, and human needs.

The levels of engagement of the mayors are also significant. As shown in Table 3, Ald Mfeketo experienced support from all levels of government. In contrast, Ald. Marais had support only from the local and provincial levels of government, and later had to deal with the Heath Commission of Inquiry installed by the provincial government. Ald Morkel had significant government support only at the local level, and

Table 3: Political impact of various governmental levels on mayors

Levels	Mayor		
	Ald Marais	Ald Morkel	Ald Mfeketo
Local level	+	±	+
Provincial level	±	-	+
National level	-	-	+

later lost even that with the floor-crossing of DA members. These relationships largely determined the extent of the power role that the mayors could play.

This study set out to describe the mayoral politics of the Unicity of Cape Town from December 2000 to June 2003, illustrating the way in which the mayors engaged (according to their interpretation) with powers at local and other levels, and vice versa. The comparisons drawn highlight how these engagements led to differences in action and outcomes in the three mayorships. The study hopes to have contributed to an understanding of the early mayoral politics of the Unicity of Cape Town.

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